A  HISTORY  OF 
SOCIAL   THOUGHT 


BY 

EMORY  S.  BOGARDUS,  PH.D. 

Profeswr  and  Head  of  Department  of  Sociology  and  Social  Work 
University  of  Southern  California 

Author  of 

INTRODUCTION    TO    SOCIOLOGY 
ESSENTIALS  OF   SOCIAL   PSYCHOLOGY 
ESSENTIALS    OF    AMERICANIZATION 


1922 

UNIVERSITY  OF  SOUTHERN  CALIFORNIA  PRESS 

3474  UNIVERSITY  AVENUE 

LOS  ANGELES 


Copyright  1922,  University  of  Southern  California  Press 


JESSE    RAY    MILLER 

UNIVERSITY    OF    SOUTHERN    CALIFORNIA    PRESS 
LOS   ANGELES 


DEDICATED  TO  MY  STUDENTS 

WHO  ARE  TRANSFORMING  THEIR  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 
INTO  HELPFUL  LIVING 


72562 


CONTENTS 


4-.  THE   NATURE   OF    SOCIAL   THOUGHT           .         .  11 

•2.  EARLIEST    SOCIAL   THOUGHT       ....  20 

*3.  THE  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  OF  ANCIENT  CIVILIZATIONS  36 

<~4.  THE  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  OF  THE  HEBREWS           .  54 

/5.  PLATO  AND  GRECIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT      .         .  74 

/_6.  ARISTOTLE  AND  GRECIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT          .  101 

-7.  ROMAN    SOCIAL  THOUGHT           .         .         .         .  114 

8.  EARLY  CHRISTIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT           .         .  121 

"-9.  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  IN  THE  MIDDLE  AGES      .         .  146 

^0.  MORE  AND  UTOPIAN   SOCIAL  THOUGHT       .         .  155 

-11.  INDIVIDUALISTIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT       .         .         .  173 

42.  MALTHUS  AND  POPULATION  CONCEPTS       .         .  199 

4-3.  COMTE  AND  POSITIVE  SOCIAL  THOUGHT      .        .  209 

14.  MARX  AND  SOCIALISTIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT          .  226 

15.  BUCKLE  AND  GEOGRAPHIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT       .  246 

16.  SPENCER  AND  ORGANIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT           .  •  257 

17.  THE  SOCIOLOGY  OF  LESTER  F.  WARD          .         .  277 

18.  ANTHROPOLOGIC  SOCIOLOGY          ....  301 

19.  EUGENIC   SOCIOLOGY             325 

20.  CONFLICT  THEORIES  IN  SOCIOLOGY      .         .         .  338 

21.  Cpj-opERATioN  THEORIES  IN  SOCIOLOGY       .         .  351 

22.  PsYCHo-SociOLOGic   THOUGHT            .        .        .  367 

23.  "PsYCHo-SocioLOGic   THOUGHT    (continued)        .  389 

24.  THE  TREND  OF  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY      .         .         .  423 

25.  THE  RISE  OF  EDUCATIONAL  SOCIOLOGY       .         .  442 

26.  THE  SOCIOLOGY  OF  MODERN  CHRISTIANITY          .  451 

27.  METHODS  OF  SOCIOLOGICAL  INVESTIGATION           .  475 

28.  THE  DISSEMINATION  OF  SOCIOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  489 
INDEX  504 


PREFACE 

This  book  is  written  for  the  world  of  students. 
In  it  any  seriously-minded  person  should  find  a 
fundamental  background  for  understanding  the 
central  theme  of  human  progress,  a  substantial 
basis  for  attacking  the  most  important  problems  of 
the  day,  and  a  call  to  renew  his  faith  in  the  sound- 
ness of  human  aspirations. 

Inasmuch  as  this  treatise  is  written  for  students, 
it  is  not  intended  to  be  the  last  word  on  the  subject, 
but  simply  a  first  word.  The  theme  of  each  chap- 
ter is  in  itself  a  subject  for  further  investigation. 
In  fact,  the  student  with  an  alert  mind  will  find  in 
each  chapter  many  subjects  concerning  which  he 
will  want  to  learn  more.  If  the  discussions  in  this 
book  stimulate  the  student  to  make  inquiries  on  his 
own  initiative,  they  will  have  accomplished  more 
than  the  author  could  have  expected. 

EMORY  S.  BOGARDUS. 

University  of  Southern  California. 
June  1,  1921. 


A  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

CHAPTER  I 
THE  NATURE  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 


Man  faces  a  world  of  social  problems.  As  a  re- 
sult he  is  perplexed  beyond  description ;  his  thinking 
often  ends  in  confusion.  Inasmuch  as  the  average 
citizen,  for  the  first  time  in  the  world's  history,  is 
beginning  to  attack  social  problems,  he  is  entitled 
to  all  the  aid  that  can  be  made  available.  Upon  the 
success  of  the  average  person  in  mastering  the  in- 
tricacies of  social  thinking,  the  cause  of  democracy 
depends. 

A  large  proportion  of  the  analyses  of  social 
questions  has  been  academic.  These  discussions 
have  often  terminated  in  quibbles  or  erudite  gen- 
eralizations. Insofar  as  social  theories  have  been 
correct  they  have  unfortunately  been  reserved  for 
the  theorists  alone.  The  people  themselves  have 
not  understood  the  nature  of  social  thought;  they 
have  not  benefited ;  and  hence,  they  have  held  social 
thought  in  contempt.  Sound  social  thought  needs 
to  be  democratized,  that  is,  to  be  made  available  for 
all  people. 


if :  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

In  thinking  about  social  problems,  the  so-called 
practical  person  has  proceeded  in  his  own  way.  He 
has  had  personal  experience — and  that  to  him  has 
been  sufficient.  He  has  been  motivated  by  a  sense 
of  injustice,  and  stung  into  fervid  thought  by  cir- 
cumstances which  seemed  to  him  unfair;  he  has 
concocted  a  make-shift  remedy,  or  impulsively  ac- 
cepted a  ready-made  program.  Perhaps  he  has 
urged  a  single  cause  for  all  social  ills  and  pre- 
scribed a  single  remedy  for  all  social  diseases. 
Usually,  he  has  been  very  limited  in  his  observa- 
tions, untrained  in  making  proper  inductions,  and 
hence,  narrow  and  intolerant  in  his  conclusions. 
He  has  been  entirely  baffled,  or  else  he  has  felt 
cock-sure. 

The  practicalist  is  often  a  poor  theorist.  He 
may  be  even  the  most  dangerous  type  of  theorist. 
He  has  scoffed  at  theory  and  then  fallen  into  the 
pit  of  incorrect  theory.  He  has  failed  to  see,  for 
example,  that  a  good  bridge  does  not  project  itself 
across  a  chasm,  but  that  a  correct  bridge-building 
theory  is  essential.  With  social  practicalists  and 
theorists  calling  each  other  names,  instead  of  co- 
operating and  unselfishly  giving  the  world  of  people 
the  benefit  of  their  combined  points  of  view,  the 
world  has  floundered  and  its  social  problems  have 
piled  up,  mountains  high. 

Another  difficulty  in  the  pathway  of  sound  social 
thinking  is  found  in  an  absence  of  proper  back- 
grounds. People  are  prone  to  offer  solutions  for 


THE  NATURE  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  13 

social  questions  without  first  equipping  themselves 
with  a  knowledge  of  foundational  elements.  More- 
over, they  are  often  unwilling  to  acquaint  them- 
selves with  these  necessary  factors.  It  is  only  by 
accident,  however,  that  current  social  movements 
can  be  understood  unless  the  historical  sequences 
of  social  cause  and  effect  are  perceived.  Nearly  all 
social  problems  are  essentially  the  outcroppings  of 
tendencies  which  have  had  a  long  human  history. 
A  current  social  maladjustment  is  generally  indica- 
tive of  a  long  line  of  antecedent  factors.  A  knowl- 
edge of  societary  fundamentals  is  essential  to  sound 
thinking  about  present-day  evils.  A  history  of 
social  thought  furnishes  a  minimum  social  back- 
ground for  the  understanding  of  current  social 
processes  and  problems. 

Social  thought,  as  distinguished  from  individual  I 
thought,  treats  of  the  welfare  of  one's  associates,' 
and  of  groups.    It  may  be  very  simple,  merely  ob- 
servational, the  result  of  daily  experience,  or  it  may 
be  a  scientific  study  of  social  processes.    Sociology 
as  an  organized  science  has  developed  only  during 
the  past  few  decades.     Inasmuch  as  (sociology  has  \, 
simply  begun  its  work  of  formulating  the  principles  \ 
of  societaryprogress,  )a  large  proportion  of  the 
thinking  that  has  thus  far  been  done  in  human  his- 
tory about  the  welfare  of  socii  or  associates  is 
either  individual  or  social,  rather  than  sociological. 
A  history  of  social  thought,  therefore,  includes  the 
larger  social  field  as  well  as  the  more  specific  one 


14  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

of  recent  development,  namely,  the  sociological. 
The  time  is  hardly  ripe  for  a  history  of  distinctly 
sociological  thought. 

Social  thought,  as  here  used,  is  a  synthesis  of 
the  observations  of  individuals  about  the  welfare 
of  other  individuals,  considered  as  individuals  or  as 
groups.  The  focus  of  social  thought  is  not  the  wel- 
fare of  the  ego  but  of  the  alter,  not  of  the  self  but 
of  others,  not  of  the  individual  but  of  the  class, 
group,  organization,  or  process.  Social  thought 
draws  from  the  thought-life  of  persons  who  have 
done  unselfish  thinking  and  who  have  focalized 
their  attention  upon  the  nature  and  principles  of 
associative  activities.  It  tests  group  progress  by 
the  degree  in  which  human  personalities  secure 
constructive,  co-operative  expression.  It  measures 
the  individual  in  his  relationships  to  the  social 
whole,  whether  that  unit  be  the  family,  school, 
church,  state,  or  the  world  society.  It  rates  the  in- 
dividual in  terms  of  a  functioning  unit  in  group 
life.  It  evaluates  the  group  both  in  regard  to  the 
quality  of  the  personalities  which  it  produces  in  its 
membership,  and  to  the  loyalty  which  it  manifests 
as  a  unit  of  a  larger  group,  even  of  human  society 
itself. 

Social  thought  is  both  concrete  and  abstract. 
Concrete  thinking  rarely  goes  deep.  It  asks  few 
questions,  raises  few  doubts,  and  perceives  few 
connections.  Abstract  thinking  seeks  causal  ex- 
planations, classifies  concretenesses,  penetrates  re- 


THE  NATURE  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  17 

ranean  caverns  have  been  made  to  pour  forth  reser- 
voirs of  gas  and  oil.  Modern  transportation  has 
been  made  possible  by  the  use  of  steam,  gasoline, 
electricity.  Mechanical  inventions  have  followed 
one  another  in  unanticipated  fashion,  paying  awe- 
inspiring  tribute  to  the  genius  of  man.  Abstract 
thinking  has  given  man  a  marvelous  degree  of  con- 
trol over  the  material  side  of  life. 

(5)  Recently,  the  problem  of  man's  adjustment 
and  responsibility  to  his  fellowmen  is  being  ac- 
corded a  worthy  hearing  at  the  bar  of  scientific 
thought.  For  millenniums  man  has  pondered  hard 
over  his  relations  and  obligations  to  his  God'and  to 
his  universe'  over  the  nature  of  his  mind  and  spirit, 
over  ways  and  means  of  acquiring  individual  suc- 
cess through  a  manipulation  of  the  material  re- 
sources of  the  earth.  Incomprehensible  as  it  may 
seem,  it  is  true,  however,  that  man  has  neglected 
almost  wholly,  until  recently,  the  very  heart  of  all 
successful  living,  namely,  his  relations  and  obliga-" 
tions  to  his  fellow  men  and  to  society.  Social 
thought,  the  center  of  all  sound  thinking,  has  been 
ignored.  Consequently,  the  world,  beneath  its  load 
of  social  ills,  has  slipped  backward  nearly  as  often 
as  it  has  advanced. 

In  the  present  age,  however,  the  world  is  making 
unprecedented  demands  upon  social  thought,  long 
before  social  thought  is  adequately  prepared  for  its 
gigantic  tasks.  Religion  is  seeking  re-vitalization 
through  socialized  thinking.  In  its  modern  en- 


18  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

deavor  to  win  the  world,  Christianity  is  making  tre- 
mendous demands  upon  applied  sociology. 

After  many  vain  searches  among  false  theories 
and  impersonal  ends,  philosophy  is  seeking  to  find 
itself  in  a  social  universe.  Psychology,  likewise,  is 
no  longer  individual,  structural,  and  formal;  it  is 
now  trying  to  interpret  itself  in  terms  of  human 
behavior.  Group  processes  are  being  searched  for 
the  origins  of  stimuli  that  will  explain  individual 
conduct. 

Economic  thought,  too,  has  reached  a  stage 
where  it  is  endeavoring  to  re-define  its  concepts  in 
the  light  of  sociological  knowledge.  The  material 
resources  of  the  earth  as  well  as  industrial  and 
business  enterprises,  in  fact  all  economic  values,  are 
being  measured,  and  re-valued  in  terms  of  their 
societary  significance.  The  meaning  of  industrial 
democracy  is  being  sought  in  sociological  terms. 

In  the  distinctively  associative  life  enormous  de- 
mands are  being  made  upon  sociology.  It  is  invited 
to  formulate  the  criteria  by  which  the  worth  of  an 
educational  system  may  be  determined.  Groups  are 
trying  to  provide  for  the  use  of  the  leisure  time  of 
their  members  by  methods  that  are  socially  valu- 
able. Many  attempts  are  being  made  for  restoring 
to  the  family  its  fundamental  prerogatives  as  a 
social  institution. 

The  history  of  social  thought  rises  out  of  the  be- 
ginnings of  human  life  on  earth  and  with  jagged 
edges  extends  along  the  full  sweep  of  the  changing 


THE  NATURE  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT     19 

historical  horizon.  It  finds  expression  through 
some  of  the  world's  best  minds.  Our  quest  will 
bring  us  in  contact  with  the  most  vital  moments  of 
the  world's  most  valuable  thinkers. 


CHAPTER  II 
EARLIEST  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 


Primitive  people  were  inquisitive.  They  thought 
about  what  happened  and  they  sought  explana- 
tions. Their  attention  was  centered  on  the  tangible 
phenomena  of  life.  Their  imagination  worked  out 
fantastic  and  superstitious  interpretations.  They 
reasoned  about  the  daily  occurrences  of  life  in  con- 
crete, graphic,  and  personal  terms. 

Primitive  people  everywhere,  apparently,  sensed 
in  a  piecemeal  and  microscopic  way  the  meaning 
of  social  relationships.  Archeological  records  dis- 
close crude  and  simple,  but  nevertheless  genuine 
social  implications.  Early  mythologies  recognize 
the  importance  of  social  bonds.  Out  of  the  dim 
dawn  of  tribal  life  there  appeared  a  rough-hewn 
sense  of  social  property.  The  proverbs  of  primi- 
tive people  include  implications,  if  not  definite  state- 
ments, of  social  responsibility. 

Primitive  people  lived  simple  group  lives.  If  the 
paternal  relationship  was  not  always  known  or 
recognized,  the  maternal  relationship  functioned 
for  at  least  a  few  years.  The  loose  family  ties  har- 
bored a  degree  of  social  responsibility.  Wherever 
ancestor  worship  developed,  the  family  group  as- 


EARLIEST  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  21 

sumed  large  proportions  and  manifested  strong 
social  characteristics.  The  clan,  or  gens,  betokened 
social  fealty. 

Communal  property  testified  to  communal  think-  v 
ing.  The  existence  of  common  hunting  grounds 
and  tribal  flocks  was  indicative  of  folk  thought. 
Group  dances,  feasts,  building  enterprises,  celebra- 
tions delineated  the  social  spirit.  Warfare  pro- 
duced bursts  of  tribal  loyalty.  An  examination  of 
the  folkways  reveals  indistinct  but  incipient  notions 
of  societal  welfare.  Such  a  treatise  as  Sumner's 
Folkways  chronicles  a  vast  amount  of  elemental 
folk  thinking. 

Folk  thinking  permeated  primitive  religions.  The 
earliest  forms  of  religion  presupposed  societies  of 
spirits  or  gods.  The  conduct  of  the  individual  was 
regulated  by  his  ideas  concerning  the  ways  in  which 
he  had  pleased  or  offended  the  spirits  or  gods.  An 
infant  was  born  into  a  society  peopled  with  human 
and  spirit  beings.  The  latter  were  often  more 
numerous  than  the  former;  they  frequently  were 
more  feared ;  and  hence  were  more  powerful.  The 
living  people,  the  departed  spirits,  and  the  gods  in  a 
hierarchal  order  constituted  an  effective  society  for 
the  exercise  of  many  vigorous  forms  of  social 
control. 

If  pestilence  came,  it  was  because  the  gods  had 
been  offended  by  some  human  being.  As  a  result 
of  the  offense  of  one  individual,  the  whole  tribe 
was  considered  to  be  liable  to  punishment.  Conse- 


22  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

quently,  the  tribe  in  turn  would  punish  the  offend- 
ing member  and  through  the  use  of  force  and  fear 
would  exert  a  tremendous  power  over  the  conduct 
and  thought  of  individuals. 

Primitive  people  were  dominated  by  custom. 
They  were  subject  to  the  autocracy  of  the  past. 
They  were  hopelessly  caught  between  ancestral 
ascendance  and  current  fears.  They  threaded  their 
way,  mentally,  through  tantalizingly  uncertain  and 
narrow  apertures.  They  learned  the  meaning  of 
obedience,  but  obedience  to  a  harsh  and  rigorous 
past  and  a  fickle  and  disconcerting  future.  Leader- 
ship was  drastic  and  capricious;  followership  was 
frantic  and  tremulous. 

Some  of  the  incipient  social  concepts  of  primi- 
tive peoples  have  been  preserved  in  the  form  of 
proverbs,  maxims,  fables,  and  myths.  Many  of  the 
subtler  social  relationships  of  life  were  recognized 
by  early  man.  His  limited  thinking  drifted  into 
simple  formulae.  His  vocabulary  was  scanty;  his 
ideas  were  few.  He  spoke  in  conventional  sayings. 
"Primitive  man  spoke  in  proverbs." 

Many  folkthoughts,  or  primitive  conceptions  of 
social  obligations,  have  been  preserved.  The  early 
proverbs  of  man  reveal  the  beginnings  of  social 
thought.  Equally  valuable  and  similar  materials 
are  found  in  the  sayings  of  the  tribes  which  today 
are  in  a  state  of  arrested  development.  A  few  illus- 
trations of  embryonic  social  thought  will  be  given 
here.1 


EARLIEST  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  23 

The  first  examples  will  be  selected  from  the  folk- 
thoughts  of  the  Africans  of  the  Guinea  Coast.  The 
proverb,  Ashes  fly  back  in  the  face  of  him  who 
throws  them,  recognizes  that  evil  deeds  return  upon 
the  doer,  or  as  moderns  declare,  Curses  come  home 
to  roost.  In  the  saying,  Cowries  are  men,  primi- 
tive man  roughly  but  succinctly  stated  the  theory 
of  the  economic  determination  of  human  history.  It 
is  cowries,  or  money,  which  molds  human  thought, 
determines  human  evaluations  and  attitudes,  gives 
social  power,  and  "makes  the  man."  An  age-long 
conception,  indicative  of  a  low  sense  of  social 
feeling,  but  possessing  great  force  in  society,  is 
revealed  in  the  dictum,  Full-belly  child  says  to 
hungry-belly  child,  "Keep  good  cheer."  Through- 
out human  history,  the  fortunate  glutton  has  always 
recommended  patience  and  tranquility  to  the  unfor- 
tunate, hard-working  brother.  An  eminent  Ameri- 
can financier  of  the  multi-millionaire  class  ex- 
pressed pity  for  telephone  girls  who  undergo  hard 
labor,  but  declared  that  their  harsh  conditions  were 
what  the  good  Lord  had  made  for  them.  But  how 
far  has  this  well-groomed  citizen  of  our  century 
advanced  beyond  the  "full-belly"  social  philosophy 
of  savage  man? 

In  the  observation,  A  fool  of  Ika  and  an  idiot 
of  Iluka  meet  together  to  make  friends,  the  Afri- 
can has  noted  that  friends  are  persons  of  similar 
types,  of  similar  minds,  of  similar  prejudices,  and 
that  "birds  of  a  feather  flock  together."  Whether 


24  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

conscious  or  unconscious,  association  occurs  among 
persons  of  a  kind,  among  fools  of  Ika  and  idiots 
of  Iluka. 

Romantic  love,  evidently,  has  always  been  fickle, 
for  the  African  has  discovered  that  "quick  loving 
a  woman  means  quick  not  loving  a  woman."  If 
this  naive  but  shrewd  reflection  concerning  love- 
making  were  taken  at  its  real  worth  at  the  present 
time,  it  would  be  crystallized  into  a  federal  mar- 
riage law  requiring  that  a  license  to  marry  should 
be  obtained  at  least  fifteen  or  thirty  days  before 
the  marriage  could  be  celebrated. 

A  rather  keen  sense  of  social  injustice  is  ex- 
pressed in  the  monologue :  "The  ground-pig  said : 
'I  do  not  feel  so  angry  with  the  man  who  killed  me 
as  with  the  man  who  dashed  me  on  the  ground 
afterward/  "  Here  the  injustice  of  striking  an  in- 
dividual when  he  is  down  is  depicted.  Even  primi- 
tive man  has  a  sense  of  sympathy  for  the  defeated 
and  helpless. 

"Three  elders  cannot  all  fail  to  pronounce  the 
word  ekulu  (antelope)  ;  one  may  say  ekulu;  another 
ekulu;  but  the  third  will  say,  ekulu  (which  is  cor- 
rect)." In  other  words,  several  heads  are  better 
than  one;  or,  in  a  multitude  of  counsellors  there  is 
safety.  It  was  this  simple  social  precept  which  a 
highly  individualistic  man  like  Roosevelt  used  fre- 
quently to  the  advantage  of  himself  and  the  nation. 
When  a  perplexing  problem  would  confront  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt,  he  was  wont  to  invite  to  the  White 


EARLIEST  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  25 

House  persons  whose  beliefs  were  contrary  to  his 
own  in  order  to  secure  their  opinions.  He  acted 
independently,  but  after  taking  counsel  with  several 
"elders." 

In  Thinking  Black,  Daniel  Crawford  has  pre- 
sented phases  of  the  colored  man's  philosophy.2 
While  much  is  individual,  more  is  social  philosophy. 
Custom  imitation  prevails.  The  social  philosophy 
of  the  African  Negro  is  summarized  in  the  rule: 
Follow  your  leader.  Social  precedent,  not  principle, 
is  the  guide  to  conduct.  If  you  are  a  follower,  fol- 
low patiently;  if  you  are  a  leader,  lead  drastically. 
"If  thou  art  an  anvil,  be  patient  .  .  .  but  if  thou 
art  a  hammer,  strike  hard." 

The  African  understands  the  social  psychology 
of  language.  He  watches  the  eyes  more  carefully 
than  the  voice.  To  him  the  human  eye  speaks  all 
languages  under  the  sun.  Mr.  Crawford  says  that 
the  wary  eye  of  the  African  "can  easily  fish  news 
out  of  the  two  deep  liquid  pools  of  your  eye-balls." 
If  your  eye  says  one  thing  and  your  tongue  an- 
other, then  the  African  "will  plump  for  the  verdict 
of  the  eye." 

The  aphorism,  There  is  no  pocket  in  a  shroud, 
warns  the  individual  against  the  possibility  of  tak- 
ing his  material  goods  into  the  next  world.  To 
share  with  other  persons  is  rated  a  higher  act  than 
to  store  from  others.  He  is  richest  who  shares 
most.  Among  the  Africans  with  whom  Mr.  Craw- 
ford worked,  the  word  for  criminal  was  not  applied 


26  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

to  the  person  who  had  stolen  property  or  who  had 
taken  life,  but  to  the  one  who  eats  alone.  "The 
high  crime  and  misdemeanor  of  the  town  is  to  dine 
alone;"  the  criminal  above  other  criminals  is  "Mr. 
Eat- Alone."  He  who  refuses  to  share  his  food 
with  those  who  are  less  fortunate  than  himself  is 
an  arch-devil.  Such  a  vice  is  common  among 
beasts ;  it  is  beneath  the  dignity  of  man — according 
to  the  African.  When  several  primitives  were 
taken  to  London  and  shown  the  wealthy  and  the 
poor  sections  of  that  city,  tney  were  dumbfounded. 
They  were  utterly  unable  to  understand  how  any 
persons  with  the  slightest  spark  of  human  nature 
in  them  could  endure  to  live  to  themselves  in  wealth 
when  in  the  same  city  there  were  the  wretched  and 
prostrated  multitudes  of  Whitechapel  and  the  other 
cheerless  slums. 

"What  baby  lion  ever  trembled  at  his  father's 
roaring?"  A  few  mornings  ago,  I  heard  an  angry 
parent  yelling  at  his  son,  but  the  disobedient  child 
kept  on  in  his  own  way.  I  wondered  how  far  this 
father  had  advanced  in  parental  influence  and  dis- 
cipline beyond  the  stage  represented  by  the  African 
seer  who  drew  his  social  images  from  a  lion-fre- 
quented environment.  "If  a  tree  has  grown  up 
crooked,  it  is  because  no  one  straightened  it  when 
young."  This  statement  postulates  social  responsi- 
bility for  juvenile  delinquency  and  even  for  adult 
crime.  The  underlying  principle  is  the  same  as 
that  in  the  Hebraic  injunction:  Train  up  a  child 


EARLIEST  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  27 

in  the  way  he  should  go;  and  when  he  is  old,  he 
will  not  depart  from  it.  The  principle  has  received 
current  recognition  in  the  doctrine  of  contributory 
negligence  of  parents.  The  modern  observation 
full  of  socially  dangerous  implications,  that  parents 
are  blind  to  the  weaknesses  of  their  children,  has 
its  African  counterpart:  The  beetle  is  a  beauty 
in  the  eyes  of  its  mother.  A  gleam  of  light  is 
thrown  upon  the  current  discussions  concerning 
social  parasitism  by  the  African's  assertion :  The 
parasite  has  no  roots. 

The  Australian  Blackfellow  who  goes  upon  a 
journey,  sometimes  takes  a  handful  of  mother  earth 
with  him.  In  this  way  he  testifies  to  his  loyalty  to 
home,  and  provides  against  the  rise  of  lonesome- 
ness  which  he  will  experience  during  tribal  hunts. 
His  act  crudely  represents  the  essence  of  the  con- 
cept of  patriotism.  A  sense  of  justice  is  common 
to  primitive  Australians.  Among  the  Whayook  of 
Australia  a  man  who  has  wounded  a  fellow  tribes- 
man is  required  to  present  himself  to  the  injured 
in  order  to  receive  a  similar  wound.3  Among  the 
Wumbais,  a  person  who  is  absent  when  a  relative 
dies  must  not  speak  on  his  return  to  camp  to  any- 
one until  he  has  had  spears  thrown  at  him.4  Spen- 
cer and  Gillen  report  that  the  Australian  primitive 
regards  any  offense  as  wiped  out  by  a  suitable  prof- 
fer of  atonement.5 

The  Filipino  declares:  A  piece  of  green  wood 
will  burn  if  placed  near  the  fire.  In  other  words, 


28  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

temptation  is  a  subtle  element  that  ultimately 
destroy  even  persons  who  are  supposedly  tempta- 
tion-proof. In  the  proverb,  Boastfulness  drives 
away  wisdom,  the  Filipino  has  pointed  out  that  the 
desire  to  make  a  strong  impression  upon  associates 
hinders  intellectual  progress.  The  chief  danger  of 
luxury  is  stated  in  the  saying:  He  who  is  raised 
in  ease,  is  usually  destitute.  The  leading  result  of 
being  financially  fortunate  is  summarized  thus: 
Easy  earning  means  quick  spending.  The  evils  of 
hypercriticism  are  bluntly  phrased:  The  fault- 
finder has  the  biggest  faults.  The  law  of  social 
compensation  is  stated  as  follows:  You  laugh  to- 
day; I  laugh  tomorrow.  The  organic  nature  of 
society  is  implied  in  the  truism:  The  pain  of  a 
finger  is  the  suffering  of  the  whole  body.  The 
need  for  independent  thinking  is  urged  in  the  decla- 
ration :  Whoever  believes  everything  said,  has  no 
mind  of  his  own.  On  the  other  hand,  the  ego- 
centric mind  receives  solemn  warning  in  the  dic- 
tum: He  who  despises  counsel  is  on  the  way  to 
misfortune.  The  value  of  a  social  spirit  is  pro- 
claimed as  follows :  Kindness  is  a  great  capital ; 
and  again:  Good  deeds  are  more  precious  than 
gold  or  silver.  A  gentle  hint  of  social  importance 
is  given  in  the  formula :  Kindness  is  with  kindness 
to  be  paid,  not  with  gold  or  silver.  In  these  and 
related  proverbs  the  earliest  social  thought  of  the 
Filipino  mind  is  indicated. 

Let  us  now  examine  a   few  ancient  Japanese 


EARLIEST  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  29 

axioms.  (1)  The  mouth  of  the  mass  melts  gold. 
This  proverb  refers  to  the  fundamental  force  of 
public  opinion.  (2)  The  world  is  like  a  looking- 
glass;  if  you  smile,  others  also  smile.  Here  is  de- 
picted the  elemental  character  of  unconscious  imi- 
tation. (3)  What  the  ruler  wants,  the  ruled  also 
wants.  In  other  words,  what  the  upper  classes  de- 
sire, the  lower  classes  long  for;  or,  as  Tarde  has 
said :  "The  superior  are  imitated  by  the  inferior." 
(4)  Three  men  get  together  and  have  knowledge 
equivalent  to  that  of  Monju  (a  famous  Buddhist 
thinker).  The  African,  Filipino,  and  English 
equivalents  of  this  adage  have  already  been  given. 
All  races,  apparently,  have  early  observed  the 
safety  which  comes  from  taking  counsel.  (5)  The 
net  of  Heaven  is  rough,  but  will  never  miss  one 
victim.  Our  equivalent,  of  Graeco-Latin  origin,  is : 
The  mills  of  the  gods  grind  slowly,  but  exceedingly 
small.  Evil  brings  its  own  rewards  sooner  or  later. 
The  law  of  retribution  cannot  be  overcome,  even 
by  social  manipulations.  (6)  If  one  dog  barks  a 
falsehood,  ten  thousand  others  spread  it  as  a  truth. 
In  these  words,  gossip  is  condemned,  and  the  hu- 
manity-wide tendency  of  hearsay  evidence  to  gain 
social  force  is  pictured.  (7)  The  tongue  is  but 
three  inches  long,  but  it  can  kill  a  man  six  feet 
high.  Again,  the  vicious  nature  of  gossip  is  shown. 
Further,  the  severest  punishment  is  not  always 
physical;  it  may  come  from  the  human  tongue. 
(8)  A  man  takes  a  drink;  then  the  drink  takes  the 


30  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

man.  In  this  dramatic  description,  the  drinking  of 
intoxicating  liquors  is  effectively  indicted.  (9)  Ap- 
plause is  the  root  of  abuse.  Even  the  Japanese 
have  recognized  the  force  of  opinion  in  influencing 
the  individual,  and  of  favorable  opinion  in  unduly 
expanding  the  ego.  A  unique  characteristic  of 
many  Japanese  proverbs  is  the  fundamental  and 
deep-moving  knowledge  of  social  psychology  which 
they  show.  Judged  by  their  proverbs,  the  Japanese 
possess  an  unusual  understanding  of  human  nature. 
Bulgarian  proverbs  disclose  social  thought.  The 
"full-belly"  philosophy  of  the  African,  or  the  pig- 
trough  philosophy  that  has  been  analyzed  by  T. 
N.  Carver,  has  its  Bulgarian  counterpart:  The 
satiated  man  cannot  believe  the  hungry  man.  The 
South  Slavs  are  noted  for  their  weddings  which 
often  continue  for  three  days.  When  these  festivi- 
ties are  over,  the  bride  enters  upon  a  more  or  less 
monotonous  round  of  bearing  and  rearing  children. 
These  social  conditions  are  aptly  described : 

Dum!  Dum!  for  three  days; 
Oh  dear!  Oh  dear!  for  all  days. 

Patience  is  enjoined  in  the  Bulgarian  adage: 
Endure,  O  horse,  until  the  time  of  green  grass. 
Hope  that  rises  in  the  heart  of  man  is  paid  homely 
but  genuine  tribute  in  the  rural  Slavic  proverb: 
The  hungry  hen  dreams  of  millet. 

The  Danes  have  many  sayings  which  emphasize 
social  dependence.  The  individual  is  instructed: 


EARLIEST  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  31 

Act  so  in  the  valley  that  you  need  not  fear  those 
that  stand  on  the  hill.  The  shrewd  man  is  socially 
dangerous,  for :  Cunning  has  little  honor.  Gossip 
is  shown  as  a  swift  messenger  in  the  axiom:  A 
man's  character  reaches  town  before  his  person. 
The  most  serious  result  of  cheating  others  is  the 
effect  upon  the  cheater,  or:  He  is  most  cheated 
who  cheats  himself.  The  common  character  of  sin 
is  recognized  in  the  Danish  proverb:  He  must  be 
pure  who  would  blame  another.  Custom  is  a  pow- 
erful agency  of  control.  The  Danes  command: 
Follow  the  customs,  or  fly  the  country. 

The  Portuguese  have  a  social  saying  to  the  effect : 
He  buys  very  dear  who  begs.  The  unscientific  na- 
ture of  love  is  indicated  in  the  Portuguese  declara- 
tion: Love  has  no  law.  The  frequent  antithesis 
between  money  lending  and  friend  making  is  suc- 
cinctly phrased :  Money  lent,  an  enemy  made. 

A  few  Arabian  proverbs  state  social  ideas.  The 
laws  of  human  association  and  imitation  can  be 
found  in  the  following  axiom :  A  wise  man  asso- 
ciating with  the  vicious  becomes  an  idiot;  a  dog 
traveling  with  good  men  becomes  a  rational  being. 
The  strength  which  comes  from  unity  is  forcibly 
phrased:  Three  if  they  unite  against  a  town  will 
ruin  it.  The  transforming  power  of  love  is  recog- 
nized: Love  can  make  any  place  agreeable.  An 
idealistic  social  standard  is  set  for  the  individual  in 
the  aphorism:  It  is  more  noble  to  pardon  than  to 
punish.  On  the  other  hand,  mercy  may  be  mis- 


HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

placed:  Mercy  to  the  criminal  may  be  cruelty  to 
the  people.  The  individual  must  beware  of  being 
an  ingrate;  he  must  not  permit  his  selfish  desires 
to  crush  out  the  spirit  of  gratitude:  A  tree  that 
affords  thee  shade,  do  not  order  it  cut  down.  The 
omnipresence  of  envy  is  understood :  Envy  assails 
the  noblest;  the  winds  howl  around  the  highest 
peaks.  The  anti-social  tendency  of  a  vicious  habit 
is  well  described:  A  hand  accustomed  to  take  is 
far  from  giving.  Perhaps  the  Malthusian  advocate 
will  find  solace  in  the  simple  dictum:  If  the  sailors 
become  too  numerous,  the  boat  will  sink.  He  who 
pleases  everybody  has  done  so  at  the  expense  of  his 
own  character,  or  as  the  Arabs  say:  He  deserves 
no  man's  good  will  of  whom  all  men  speak  well. 

From  Ceylon  comes  the  philanthropic  request: 
When  you  eat,  think  of  the  poor.  The  Cingalese, 
however,  recognize  the  importance  of  maintaining 
the  scientific  attitude  in  charity,  for  they  have  a 
saying:  He  who  gives  alms  must  do  it  with  dis- 
cretion. The  blighting  influence  of  wealth  is  stated 
in  the  Cingalese  axiom:  A  covetous  man  has  two 
sources  of  iniquity — how  to  amass  money,  and  how 
to  use  it. 

Among  Mexican  proverbs,  social  ideas  are  not 
missing.  The  reader  will  catch  the  social  signifi- 
cance of  the  following :  ( 1 )  A  howling  cat  is  not 
a  good  hunter;  (2)  Everybody  can  climb  up  the 
limbs  of  the  fallen  tree;  (3)  A  rich  widow  cries 
with  one  eye  and  rings  the  wedding  bells  with  the 


EARLIEST  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  33 

other;  (4)  The  tongue  slow,  the  eyes  quick;  (5) 
From  January  to  January  the  bankers  have  all  the 
money. 

The  illustrations  which  have  been  given  from 
several  racial  sources  will  suffice  to  show  the  nature 
of  the  earliest  social  thought  of  primitive  peoples. 
By  way  of  comparison,  a  few  social  proverbs  which 
are  common  among  English,  Scotch,  French,  and 
German  speaking  peoples,  and  which  are  of  various 
origins,  will  be  given.  It  will  be  unnecessary  to 
comment  upon  the  social  thought  which  is  stated  or 
implied  in  these  proverbs. 

That  is  not  lost  which  a  friend  gets. 

The  shortest  road  is  where  the  company's  good. 

A  man  is  known  by  the  company  he  keeps. 

Do  unto  others  as  you  would  have  others  do  to 
you. 

A  man  who  would  have  friends  must  show  him- 
self friendly. 

One  bad  example  spoils  many  precepts. 

Honesty  is  the  best  policy. 

One  good  turn  deserves  another. 

Birds  of  a  feather  flock  together. 

As  the  twig  is  bent,  the  tree  is  inclined. 

People  who  live  in  glass  houses  mustn't  throw 
stones. 

Bare  is  the  gift  without  the  giver. 

What  is  not  good  for  the  swarm  is  not  good  for 
the  bee. 


54  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

He  laughs  best  who  laughs  last. 

To  make  a  happy  couple,  the  husband  must  be 

deaf  and  the  wife  blind. 
Charity  gives  itself  rich;  covetousness  hoards 

itself  poor. 

The  nature  of  the  primitive  social  thought  that 
has  been  preserved  through  proverbs  and  sayings 
justifies  the  following  observations.  ( 1 )  Primitive 
social  thought  was  exceedingly  simple,  crude,  and 
undeveloped.  (2)  It  was  uncorrelated  and  unsys- 
tematic. (3)  A  classification  of  the  total  number 
of  known  proverbs  of  any  primitive  people  into  in- 
dividual and  social  types  shows  that  not  more  than 
ten  per  cent  are  social.  Primitive  thinking  was 
done  in  terms  of  the  welfare  of  the  individual  him- 
self. The  social  thought  was  commonly  of  indi- 
vidualistic origin.  A  social  idea  was  originally  not 
suggested  for  its  own  sake  or  disinterestedly,  but 
for  the  reason  that  its  observance  would  enable  in- 
dividuals to  live  together  more  harmoniously  and 
prosperously.  (4)  Social  proverbs  employ  figures 
of  speech.  Similes  from  nature  are  frequent ;  phys- 
ical analogies  are  not  uncommon.  Many  of  these 
figures  disclose  a  rural  or  bucolic  mind.  (5)  Fre- 
quently, the  social  proverbs  of  the  various  races 
pertain  to  family  and  community  relationships. 
The  sense  of  social  responsibility  does  not  penetrate 
as  a  rule  beyond  the  small  group.  The  responsi- 
bility of  group  to  group  is  rarely  expressed  or  im- 


EARLIEST  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  35 

plied.  The  social  vision  does  not  extend  to  large 
groups.  (6)  A  comparative  study  of  primitive  so- 
cial sayings  indicates  countless  similarities,  and  tes- 
tifies to  the  uniformity  of  human  experiences  and 
social  needs,  irrespective  of  racial  distinctions. 
These  resemblances  do  not  imply  collaboration,  col- 
lusion, or  imitation.  They  mean  that  the  needs  of 
primitive  individuals  in  various  and  unrelated  parts 
of  the  world  have  everywhere  led  the  human  mind 
out  in  search  of  socially  satisfactory  explanations. 
Primitive  thinking  produced  fundamental  social 
concepts,  such  as  kinship,  authority,  dependence, 
and  tribal  loyalty. 


CHAPTER  III 
THE  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  OF  ANCIENT  CIVILIZATIONS 


In  this  chapter  the  discussion  of  earliest  social 
thought  will  be  presented  from  the  standpoint  of 
the  ancient  civilizations  of  Egypt,  Babylonia  and 
Assyria,  India,  China,  and  Persia.  The  evidences 
of  social  thought  are  meagre  and  inchoate.  Never- 
theless, there  are  data  which  cannot  be  ignored. 
Inferential  evidence  and  proverbial  references  con- 
stitute the  main  portion  of  these  data. 

(1)  The  ancient  Egyptian  social  order  was 
bureaucratic  and  autocratic.  The  king  was  su- 
preme. With  the  rise  of  the  Theban  hierarchy, 
the  priestly  class  came  to  power  and  established  a 
theocratic  regime.  Then  military  leaders  came 
into  prominence  and  overthrew  the  theocracy  of 
the  priests. 

With  the  historical  rise  of  Egypt,  about  4000 
B.  C,  the  emphasis  upon  law  as  the  basis  of  the 
social  order  stands  out  prominently.  The  books  of 
laws  early  acquired  sacred  significance.  They  were 
reputed  to  be  of  divine  and  monarchical  origins; 
they  provided  courts  of  justice ;  and  they  prescribed 
punishments  for  offenses. 

The  social  ideas  are  to  be  gleaned  almost  entirely 


ANCIENT  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  37 

from  proverbial  sayings.  Egyptian  scholars  refer 
to  collections  of  these  moral  precepts  as  being  of 
a  practical  rather  than  a  systematic  philosophical 
nature.  The  most  frequently  mentioned  of  the 
Egyptian  books  of  proverbs  are  the  Proverbs  of 
Ptah-hotep,  and  the  Prescriptions  of  Ani. 

The  social  order  was  dominated  as  a  rule  by  the 
king,  who  was  supposed  to  be  divine.  The  king 
and  a  relatively  small  number  of  nobles  owned  the 
land.  The  large  percentage  of  the  people  were 
serfs  and  slaves.  Throughout  ancient  Egyptian 
history,  the  middle  class  must  have  been  weak,  and 
small  in  numbers.  When  the  lands  passed  under 
the  control  of  the  temple  authorities  no  change  oc- 
curred in  the  social  conditions  of  the  masses.  The 
priests  shared  the  authority  with  their  auxiliaries, 
the  soldiers.  The  unprivileged  classes  included  the 
farmers,  boatmen,  mechanics,  trades-people,  besides 
the  slaves.1 

Egyptian  life  was  rural.  Commerce  was  unde- 
veloped. Higher  education  was  reserved  for  the 
very  few,  although  it  appears  that  elementary  edu- 
cation was  widespread.  The  priests  often  used 
their  educational  advantages  to  prey  upon  and  ex- 
cite the  superstitions  of  the  people,  thereby 
strengthening  the  social  control  which  they  enjoyed. 

An  anomalous  phase  of  the  Egyptian  mind  was 
that  it  shifted  back  and  forth  from  a  hedonistic 
enjoyment  of  the  moment  to  a  serious  contempla- 
tion of  the  future  life.  Amusements  were  fostered ; 


38  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

the  drinking  of  intoxicating  liquors  was  extensive, 
and  music  was  promoted.  The  game  of  draughts 
was  perhaps  the  national  pastime.  The  people 
were  not  warriors.  They  employed  mercenaries, 
who  ultimately  became  socially  powerful. 

Polygamy  was  countenanced  and  practised,  but 
only  of  course  among  the  wealthy.  A  relatively 
high  degree  of  freedom  was  granted  the  women 
among  the  privileged  classes.  They  appeared  in 
public  with  their  husbands;  they  publicly  engaged 
in  religious  ceremonies;  and  they  were  given  un- 
usual property  rights.  At  one  time  it  is  reported 
that  Egyptian  women  could  not  only  own  property, 
but  could  dispose  of  it  as  they  wished,  or  could  loan 
money  at  interest  to  their  husbands.  At  another 
time  the  following  injunction  seems  to  have  been 
issued :  "Thou  shalt  never  forget  thy  mother,  and 
what  she  has  done  for  thee,  that  she  bore  thee,  and 
nurtured  thee  in  all  ways."  Children  were  en- 
joined to  obey  their  parents,  to  be  respectful  to 
their  superiors,  and  to  be  reserved.  Greatness  was 
identified  with  kindness.  Justice  and  kindliness 
were  urged  upon  the  leaders.2 

The  belief  in  the  future  world  claimed  a  lion's 
share  of  the  attention  of  the  Egyptian.  As  a  re- 
sult, sculpture  flourished.  It  was  believed  that  if 
the  human  figure  was  copied  and  the  copy  pre- 
served, the  spirit  and  the  body  of  the  departed  per- 
son could  be  more  easily  re-united.  Architecture 
developed,  but  with  the  tombs  or  pyramids  and 


ANCIENT  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  39 

other  monuments  as  the  chief  forms.  Urban  mural 
divisions  and  fortified  walls  are  still  to  be  found 
as  evidences  of  Egyptian  social  institutions. 

It  was  taught  that  in  the  next  world  the  indi- 
vidual would  be  held  accountable  for  his  deeds  in 
this  life.  This  belief  acted  as  a  powerful  social 
control;  it  involved  specific  social  obligations.  The 
individual  must  deal  openly  with  his  fellowmen. 
He  must  observe  the  rights  of  the  weaker  members 
of  society.  For  example,  he  must  not  make  false 
charges  against  a  slave  to  the  master  of  the  slave. 
He  must  show  that  he  has  respected  the  social 
rights  that  were  invested  in  property.  From  the 
moral  and  social  writings  of  the  Egyptian  scribes, 
it  is  apparent  that  in  religious  matters,  the  indi- 
vidual was  moved  to  give  thought  to  his  duties  as 
a  citizen  and  as  a  neighbor. 

(2)  The  ancient  Babylonian  and  Assyrian  so- 
cial order  was  similar  in  many  ways  to  Egyptian 
civilization.  The  Babylonian  description  of  a  great 
deluge  resembles  the  account  of  the  Flood  that  is 
given  in  the  Old  Testament,  and  indicates  thought 
about  morals  and  social  life.  Both  Babylon  and 
Assyria  developed  a  religion  which  was  expressed 
in  terms  of  the  nation-group.  The  boundaries  of 
one,  with  Merodach  at  the  head,  and  of  the  other 
with  Assur  in  supreme  control,  marked  the  national 
group  divisions.  Merodach,  it  was  believed,  ac- 
companied the  king  in  the  wars  and  fought  for  the 
nation.  He  was  concerned  entirely,  according  to 


40  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

traditions,  with  the  welfare  of  Babylonia  as  a  popu- 
lation group. 

The  attitude  in  Babylonian  society  toward  the 
institution  of  slavery  was  distinctly  different  from 
that  in  Rome,  but  similar  to  the  Egyptian  practices. 
The  slave  was  considered  in  a  more  social  way  than 
by  the  Romans.  He  was  frequently  regarded  as 
one  of  the  family;  he  could  even  become  a  free 
member  of  society.  "Slavery  was  no  bar  to  his 
promotion."  Moreover,  slavery  did  not  necessarily 
imprint  a  social  stigma  upon  the  slave. 

The  social  rights  of  women  were  similar  to  the 
Egyptian  customs.  The  married  woman  of  the 
ruling  classes  possessed  definite  property  rights. 
She  could  use  the  property  that  she  owned  as  she 
saw  fit;  she  could  even  bequeath  it  as  she  chose. 
Her  dowry  gave  her  economic  independence ;  it  was 
her  absolute  property,  which  she  could  bequeath  by 
will  in  any  way  that  she  desired. 

The  earliest  well-known  Babylonian  ruler  was 
Hammurapi  (2124-2081).  He  is  known  best 
through  his  famous  book  of  laws,  the  Code  of 
Hammurapi.  The  Code  bespeaks  for  the  author 
the  desire  to  rule  Babylonian  society  justly.  There 
are  minute  regulations  of  private  business  and  of 
labor  conditions  which  give  the  Code  some  of  the 
characteristics  of  modern  mercantilistic  thought. 

The  Code  contains  perhaps  the  earliest  forms  of 
labor  legislation  that  were  enacted.  Hammurapi 
sought  through  legislation  to  determine  wages  for 


ANCIENT  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  41 

different  classes  of  labor.  The  Code  prescribed 
severe  punishment  for  anyone  who  sheltered  a  run- 
away slave.  In  this  and  similar  ways,  property 
rights  were  protected  and  human  elements  sub- 
ordinated. It  was  not  until  the  Deuteronomic  Code 
was  written  that  the  rights  of  labor  received  legis- 
lative recognition. 

Hammurapi  stood  for  a  paternalistic  control  of 
society.  His  idea  of  justice  was  literally  that  of 
an  eye  for  an  eye.  "If  a  man  has  caused  the  loss 
of  a  patrician's  eye,  his  eye  shall  one  cause  to  be 
lost."3  Justice,  moreover,  was  subject  to  the  law 
of  social  gradation.  An  offense  against  a  man  of 
lower  rank  might  be  atoned  by  paying  money.  "If 
a  man  has  caused  a  poor  man  to  lose  his  eye,  he 
shall  pay  one  mina  of  silver."4  Additional  light  is 
thrown  on  the  concept  of  justice  by  other  passages 
from  the  Code,  especially  by  this  one :  "If  a  builder 
has  built  a  house  for  a  man  and  has  not  made  strong 
his  work,  and  the  house  he  has  built  has  fallen, 
and  he  has  caused  the  death  of  the  owner  of  the 
house,  that  builder  shall  be  put  to  death."5 

The  intellectual  progress  and  the  inventions  of 
the  Babylonians  are  indicative  of  social  status.  The 
development  along  artistic  lines,  particularly  in 
architecture  and  sculpture,  must  have  exerted  an 
indirect  but  important  social  influence.  Significant 
advances  in  surgery  had  been  made  preceding  the 
reign  of  Hammurapi.  In  medicine,  however,  the 
demonic  theory  of  the  causes  of  disease  enslaved 


42  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

the  people. 

The  Assyrians,  who  lived  to  the  north  of  the 
Babylonians,  were  less  social  in  type.  They  were 
little  concerned  about  the  future  life ;  their  religion 
was  relatively  undeveloped.  The  Assyrian  artists 
gave  their  attention  chiefly  to  the  king,  the  court, 
and  to  war.  They  reproduced  in  artistic  form  the 
king  and  the  soldier,  but  ignored  the  life  and  cus- 
toms of  the  people. 

(3)  When  we  turn  to  early  East  Indian  rec- 
ords, we  find  a  higher  development  of  social  ideals 
than  among  any  peoples  which  have  thus  far  been 
considered.  In  the  Vedic  documents  there  is  con- 
siderable evidence  of  communal  life  and  of  a  re- 
markable degree  of  social  spirit  and  brotherliness. 
In  the  East  Indian  account  of  a  Deluge — similar  to 
the  Deluge  that  is  described  in  Genesis — there  is  a 
conception  of  punishment  that  falls  upon  the  group 
because  of  the  sins  of  individuals.  Sacrifice,  among 
the  Vedic  believers,  had  acquired  a  positive  social 
function.  It  was  considered  as  a  social  act,  in 
which  the  worshipper  and  the  god  took  part.  The 
food  strengthened  the  god  and  the  spiritual  contact 
strengthened  the  worshiper.  Hence  mutual  sym- 
pathy was  generated. 

With  the  rise  of  Brahmanism,  the  caste  system 
developed.  It  divided  society.  It  gave  structure 
to  the  concept  that  some  people  are  naturally — and 
artificially — superior  to  other  people.  In  the  laws 
of  Manu,  several  social  concepts  are  broached.  The 


ANCIENT  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  43 

nature  of  marriage  and  the  duties  of  a  householder 
are  explained.  The  duties  of  a  woman  are  pre- 
scribed. The  nature  of  private  and  public  law  is 
noteworthy,  and  the  recognition  of  the  obligation 
of  one  caste  to  another  in  times  of  distress  marks 
the  beginning  of  a  reaction  against  the  caste  sys- 
tem. It  was  considered  possible  for  an  individual 
to  fall  from  a  caste  to  the  one  below,  but  not  for 
an  individual  to  rise  in  caste.  The  moral  standards 
for  individuals  reached  a  level  comparable  to  those 
represented  in  certain  of  the  teachings  of  Jesus. 
For  example,  notice  this  instruction: 

Let  him  patiently  bear  hard  words,  let  him  not 
insult  anybody,  nor  become  anybody's  enemy  for 
the  sake  of  this  perishable  body.  Against  an  angry 
man  let  him  not  in  return  show  anger ;  let  him  bless 
when  he  is  cursed. 

Buddhism  inaugurated  a  set  of  social  ideas  which 
involved  the  abolition  of  the  caste  system.  In  the 
fourth  of  the  "Four  Noble  Truths"  the  principles 
which  are  formulated,  are  partly  of  social  import. 
Commendation  is  extended  to  right  speech — speech 
that  is  friendly,  and  sincere  toward  others.  The  re- 
quirements include  right  conduct — conduct  which 
is  peaceable  and  honorable  toward  other  persons. 
Stress  is  placed  upon  right  means  of  securing  liveli- 
hood— methods  which  do  not  involve  the  injury  or 
the  taking  of  life.  There  are  types  of  modern  busi- 
ness enterprise  that  are  extolled  in  our  Christian 
America  which  would  fall  under  the  ban  of  the 


44  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

"Noble  Truths"  in  pagan  India. 

Among  the  "ten  commandments"  of  Buddha, 
eight  represent  social  ideas  and  obligations: 

( 1 )  Not  to  kill  any  living  being. 

(2)  Not  to  take  that  which  is  not  given  (not  to 
steal). 

(3)  To  refrain  from  adultery. 

(4)  To  speak  no  untruth  (not  to  lie  to  other 
people). 

(5)  To  abstain  from  intoxicating  liquors. 

(6)  Not  to  slander. 

(7)  Not  to  covet. 

(8)  Not  to  be  angry. 

Buddha  taught  that  hatred  is  to  be  repaid  by 
love,  that  life  is  to  be  filled  with  kindness  and  com- 
passion, that  the  widest  toleration  is  to  be  practised. 
The  teachings  of  Buddha  engendered  a  delicate 
social  consciousness  regarding  the  relation  of  the 
individual  to  his  fellows.  The  precepts  were  strong 
enough  to  break  down  rigid  class  barriers.  The 
underlying  conception  was  broadly  human. 

Additional  light  is  thrown  on  the  social  thought 
of  Buddha  by  the  following  sayings  which  are  cred- 
ited to  him: 

Pity  and  sympathy  is  the  Buddha's  mind. 

Pity  to  his  parents  is  the  Supreme  Law. 

Honesty  is  the  Paradise  of  the  Bodhisattva. 

O  my  Disciples,  flee  from  fornication,  know  how 
to  be  content  with  your  own  wife,  and  do  not  even 
for  a  single  moment  lust  after  another  woman. 


ANCIENT  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  45 

A  state  without  a  ruler  is  like  a  body  without  a 
head;  it  cannot  exist  very  long. 

The  king  looks  upon  his  subjects  with  a  heart  of 
mercy,  as  if  they  were  his  children ;  and  the  people 
regard  the  king  as  their  father. 

If  there  is  no  Buddha  in  the  world,  be  good  to 
your  parents ;  for  to  be  good  to  one's  parents  is  to 
minister  unto  Buddha. 

Nursing  a  sick  man  is  the  great  field  where  the 
righteous  tree  of  mind  grows. 

Even  a  strong  man  cannot  lift  himself. 

Ten  people  have  ten  colors  (opinions). 

The  paint  which  is  painted  by  ten  fingers  (men) 
is  accurate.  (In  the  multitude  of  counsellors  there 
is  safety.) 

The  sayings  of  Buddha  may  be  summed  up  in 
the  statement  that,  like  many  of  the  teachings  of 
Jesus,  they  accent  the  gentle  virtues  and  the  passive 
traits  of  a  people  bearing  a  yoke  against  which  they 
are  powerless  to  revolt,  the  virtues  of  obedience, 
respect  to  those  in  authority,  long-suffering,  pa- 
tience, even  resignation. 

(4)  The  social  thought  of  early  China  can  best 
be  gleaned  from  the  writings  of  Confucius.  This 
scholar  was  not  a  reformer  or  a  religious  leader, 
but  primarily  a  conserver.  He  was  interested  in 
civil  and  political  affairs.  His  books  reflect  not  his 
own  ideas,  for  his  originality  was  not  great,  but 
the  concepts  which  had  been  worked  out  before  his 
time.  In  the  Li  Ki,  or  Record  of  Rites,  there  are 


46  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

many  social  and  domestic  precepts.  In  a  way  the 
Li  Kif  "the  Chinamen's  manual  of  conduct,"  is  a 
treatise  on  social  as  well  as  individual  ethics. 
Around  the  family  group,  Chinese  social  ideas  re- 
volved. On  the  death  of  his  mother,  Confucius, 
for  example,  went  into  seclusion  for  twenty-seven 
months.  On  sacrificial  occasions  the  living  mem- 
bers and  the  departed  spirits  of  the  household  were 
accustomed  to  gather  in  one  filial  communal  group. 
The  welfare  of  the  individual  was  completely  sub- 
ordinated to  the  interests  of  the  family  group  of 
spirits. 

The  Chinese  worship,  or  honor,  their  ancestors. 
The  worship  of  the  past  has  paralyzed  new  thought. 
Custom  imitation  has  ruled  and  tradition  has  been 
reverenced. 

Marriage  receives  special  attention,  but  the  ar- 
rangements are  made  by  parents  or  "go-betweens." 
Socially,  the  sexes  do  not  intermingle.  The  par- 
ents exercise  complete  control  over  the  children; 
the  mother  bears  a  considerable  portion  of  the  bur- 
dens of  parental  discipline.  Filial  piety  is  the  car- 
dinal virtue.  Although  polygamy  is  discounte- 
nanced, concubinage  is  permitted.  The  sexes  dress 
very  much  alike,  except  in  headdress  and  footgear. 
The  style  of  wearing  apparel  is  not  only  simple  and 
aesthetic,  but  it  "minimizes  the  visible  distinctions 
of  sex." 

Confucius,  or  Kung-fu-tsze,  believed  in  the  effi- 
cacy of  setting  good  examples.  Imitation  would 


ANCIENT  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  47 

then  accomplish  the  desired  results.  By  these  meth- 
ods, Confucius  expected  that  society  would  be  im- 
proved. Fundamental  principles  of  a  stable  social 
order,  more  than  of  social  progress,  were  in  the 
mind  of  Confucius.  He  conceived  of  the  universe 
as  a  perfect  order.  Likewise,  he  thought  of  the 
state  as  a  perfect  social  order.  Confucius  urged 
that  the  individual  strive  for  perfection.  Accord- 
ing to  the  Confucian  doctrine  of  the  Superior  Man, 
the  individual  should  master  his  own  passions  and 
desires,  substituting  an  enjoyment  of  music,  cere- 
mony, and  of  friendship,  for  the  enjoyment  that 
comes  from  the  exercise  of  the  bodily  passions. 
He  should  seek  salvation  through  the  study  of 
nature  and  of  things.  Moral  character  and  intel- 
ligence if  accompanied  by  bravery  will  produce  the 
highest  type  of  personality. 

In  Chinese  social  thought  the  family  and  state 
were  early  recognized  as  the  two  leading  institu- 
tions in  society.  In  the  civil  organization  it  is 
worth  while  to  note  the  hien,  or  city  district.  The 
hien  has  been  pronounced  "the  real  unit  of  Chinese 
corporate  life" ;  and  the  hien  magistrate,  "the  heart 
and  soul  of  all  official  life."  Since  this  magistrate 
keeps  closely  in  touch  with  the  masses,  he  is  called 
by  the  people  "the  father  and  mother  officer."  The 
hien  contains  some  of  the  germ  ideas  of  democ- 
racy; it  emphasizes  local  self-government. 

The  ancient  laws  were  elaborate,  giving  an  un- 
usual degree  of  power  to  the  judges.  Although 


48  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

customs  ruled,  the  judges  often  possessed  a  liberal 
margin  of  freedom  in  determining  the  nature  of 
punishments.  Contrary  to  Western  procedure,  the 
Chinese  consider  an  accused  man  as  guilty  until 
proved  otherwise.  Excessive  corporate  punishment 
is  deplored.6  Confucius  objected  to  the  mainte- 
nance of  a  government  by  the  use  of  fear  and  of 
coercive  measures.  He  predicted  that  capital  pun- 
ishment (even  in  a  land  ruled  by  custom)  would  be 
abolished  in  a  hundred  years. 

The  ideas  of  peace  and  harmonious  social  rela- 
tionships have  long  held  sway  in  China.  Militarism 
has  been  scorned,  and  war  held  in  contempt.  It  is 
ironical  that  as  China  begins  to  function  as  a  world 
power  in  contact  with  Western  and  Christian  na- 
tions, she  is  compelled  to  find  her  chief  defense  in 
an  uncivilized  and  unChristian  militarism. 

Sympathy  is  a  fundamental  concept  among  the 
Chinese.  Unfortunately,  it  has  been  instrumental 
in  producing  a  highly  specialized  and  professional- 
ized class  of  beggars.  Industry  and  patience  are 
characteristic  social  virtues.  Lao-tse,  the  founder 
of  Taoism  and  a  contemporary  of  Confucius, 
taught  the  social  precept :  Recompense  injury  with 
kindness.  Confucius,  who  disagreed,  taught  that 
kindness  should  be  paid  with  kindness,  and  in- 
jury with  injury.  This  conception  led  Confucius 
to  formulate  his  golden  rule  of  human  conduct: 
Do  not  do  to  others  what  you  would  not  have  others 
do  to  you. 


ANCIENT  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  49 

Obedience  to  authority  has  been  for  centuries  a 
cardinal  social  principle  of  the  Chinese.  It  was 
enunciated  by  Confucius,  who  spoke  as  a  repre- 
sentative of  the  ruling  classes.  In  stressing  obedi- 
ence to  temporal  authorities  and  in  shunning  the 
gods,  Confucius  has  been  accused  of  fostering  a 
materialistic  philosophy.  This  charge  is  partly  off- 
set by  his  ethical  teachings.  Confucius  was  a  hu- 
manitarian rather  than  a  materialist;  he  was  a 
utilitarian  rather  than  an  idealist.  In  these  attitudes 
he  reflects  not  his  own  opinions  so  much  as  the 
thought  of  the  generations  which  preceded  him. 

Mencius,  who  lived  shortly  after  Confucius,  was 
an  environmentalist  in  the  sense  that  he  believed 
that  external  evil  influences  have  corrupted  man's 
original  good  nature.  On  the  other  hand,  Mencius 
urged  progress  through  regeneration  of  the  heart. 
Mencius  was  a  more  thoroughgoing  humanist  than 
Confucius,  for  he  made  the  happiness  of  the  people 
the  supreme  goal  for  the  individual.  He  con- 
demned war  and  warriors  alike  and  declared  that 
generals  are  criminals.  He  asserted  that  it  is 
wrong  to  conquer  a  territory  against  the  will  of  the 
people  of  that  territory. 

Additional  sidelights  upon  early  Chinese  social 
thought  are  afforded  by  the  following  social  prov- 
erbs of  ancient  Chinese  origin : 

If  a  cat  cries  after  eating  the  mouse,  this  is  false 
sympathy. 

Follow  good,  learn  good ;  follow  beggar,  learn  to 


50  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

beg. 

Gentlemen  use  heart;  lesser  men  use  strength. 

New  clothes  but  old  friends  are  good. 

Within  the  four  seas  all  are  brothers. 

If  two  people  were  1000  miles  apart  and  be  like- 
minded,  they  will  come  together;  if  they  sit  opposite 
one  another  and  are  not  like-minded  there  will  be 
no  mutual  acquaintance. 

Speak  language  fitting  to  station  of  man  you 
meet. 

All  under  heaven  is  one  home. 

Although  a  man  is  away  from  home,  his  heart  is 
there. 

The  big  fish  eat  the  little  ones,  the  little  ones  eat 
the  shrimps,  and  the  shrimps  are  forced  to  eat  mud 
(applied  to  the  classes  of  society  who  pay  taxes). 

He  who  praises  me  on  all  occasions  is  a  fool  who 
despises  me  or  a  knave  who  wishes  to  cheat  me. 

Govern  thyself,  and  you  will  be  able  to  govern 
the  world. 

The  hearts  of  the  people  are  the  only  legitimate 
foundations  of  an  empire. 

By  nature  all  men  are  alike;  but  by  education, 
widely  different. 

For  the  sake  of  one  good  action,  a  hundred  evil 
ones  should  be  forgotten. 

To  forget  one's  ancestors  is  to  be  a  brook  with- 
out a  source,  a  tree  without  a  root. 

Rogues  differ  little;  each  began  first  as  a  dis- 
obedient son. 


ANCIENT  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  51 

Of  all  man's  actions,  there  is  none  greater  than 
filial  piety. 

When  they  saw  an  old  man,  people  walking  or 
driving  gave  him  the  road.  Men  who  had  white 
hairs  mingling  with  the  black  did  not  carry  burdens 
along  the  highways  (care  for  the  aged). 

When  the  man  of  high  station  is  well  instructed, 
he  loves  men;  when  the  man  of  low  station  is  well 
instructed,  he  is  easily  ruled. 

Three  friendships  are  advantageous:  friendship 
with  the  upright,  friendship  with  the  sincere,  and 
friendship  with  the  man  of  observation.  Three  are 
injurious:  friendship  with  a  man  of  spurious  airs, 
friendship  with  the  insinuatingly  soft,  and  friend- 
ship with  the  glib-tongued. 

Who  taught  you  politeness  ?    The  impolite. 

To  be  a  successful  monarch,  one  must  be  a  just 
monarch. 

Of  the  different  peoples  which  have  thus  far  been 
considered,  the  Chinese  have  furnished  the  most 
elaborate  degree  of  social  thought.  While  the  so- 
cial ideals  of  the  Chinese  are  largely  unsystematic, 
they  accent  the  family  and  the  state  as  essential 
social  institutions.  They  also  reveal  even  a  sig- 
nificant conception  of  world  brotherliness.  The 
Chinese  have  probably  created  more  social  proverbs 
than  any  other  people,  past  or  present.  For  the 
stage  of  civilization  that  is  represented  by  proverbs 
and  sayings,  the  social  thought  of  the  Chinese  is 
unsurpassed.  In  this  regard  the  Chinese  have  but 


52  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

one  close  competitor,  the  ancient  Hebrews. 

(5)  The  Persians,  who  after  their  defeat  by 
Alexander  the  Great  in  331  B.  C.  have  been  cred- 
ited with  having  turned  over  the  torch  of  civiliza- 
tion to  the  Greeks,  made  a  contribution  to  social 
thought  similar  to  that  of  the  other  ancient  peoples. 
Under  Cyrus  the  Great,  Darius,  and  Xerxes  a  sys- 
tem of  state  education  was  fostered  which  was  de- 
signed chiefly  to  train  soldiers.  It  did  not  stress 
social  and  intellectual  development,  although  it  ex- 
isted in  a  land  that  produced  the  Magi.  The  indi- 
viduals who  were  not  in  the  army  received  slight 
educational  benefits. 

It  is  in  the  teachings  of  Zoroaster  of  the  six- 
teenth century  B.  C.  that  we  first  find  the  main 
trend  of  Persian  social  thought.  The  Zend  Avesta, 
the  document  from  which  Zoroasterism  and  the 
modern  Parsee  religion  have  evolved,  emphasizes 
the  principle  of  kindliness  in  all  important  human 
relationships.  Sanitation,  business  honesty,  and 
chastity  in  family  relationships  are  taught 

The  ancient  Hebrews  and  the  Greeks  each  made 
such  large  contributions  to  social  thought  that  sepa- 
rate chapters  will  be  devoted  to  these  peoples.  In 
a  summary  of  the  social  thought  of  the  Egyptians, 
Babylonians  and  Assyrians,  East  Indians,  Chinese, 
and  Persians,  it  may  be  said  that  there  is  a  rather 
uniform  emphasis  upon  the  elemental  virtues,  par- 
ticularly upon  kindliness.  While  the  individual's 
salvation  is  given  prominence,  the  individual  is 


ANCIENT  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  53 

urged  to  be  socially  considerate  and  to  cultivate 
sympathetic  relationships  with  the  gods  and  with 
his  fellow  human  beings. 


CHAPTER  IV 
THE  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  OF  THE  HEBREWS 

Ancient  Egyptian,  Babylonian  and  Assyrian, 
East  Indian,  Chinese,  and  Persian  records  disclose 
a  set  of  elemental  and  yet  more  or  less  passive  so- 
cial backgrounds  against  which  the  social  ideals  of 
the  Hebrew  prophets  shine  forth  like  stars  of  the 
first  magnitude.  The  Pentateuch  and  the  writings 
of  the  Hebrew  wise  men  are  rich  in  gleams  of  a 
social  spirit,  while  the  Hebrew  prophets,  notably, 
Amos,  Hosea,  Isaiah,  and  Jeremiah,  uttered  flam- 
ing indictments  of  social  evils. 

The  Hebrews  stood  head  and  shoulders  above 
their  contemporaries  in  social  thinking.  They  left 
a  series  of  historical  documents,  covering  several 
centuries  and  revealing  a  specific  evolution  in  social 
concepts.  They  expressed  the  fundamentals  from 
which  Christian  social  thought  developed,  and  from 
which  much  of  the  ethical  and  social  thinking 
of  Western  civilization  on  its  practical  side  has 
evolved. 

The  social  thought  of  the  Hebrews  was  born  of 
group  suffering.  Through  the  mists  of  the  earliest 
Hebrew  traditions  we  discern  that  conflicts  oc- 
curred in  the  Euphrates  Valley  which  sent  Abra- 


HEBREW  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  55 

ham  out  on  his  perilous  journey  toward  unknown 
and  hostile  Canaan.  The  gaunt  spectre,  famine, 
brought  distress  to  the  household  of  the  domestic- 
loving  Abraham  and  drove  him  to  Egypt  where  he 
sojourned  for  a  time.  Abram,  exalted  father,  or 
Abraham,  father  of  a  multude,  became  the  founder 
in  a  sense  of  three  world  religions,  for  to  him 
Judaism,  Christianity,  and  Mohammedanism  trace 
their  origins. 

Throughout  the  years  of  migration,  exile,  and  , 
suffering,  Abraham  maintained  his  religious  faith 
and  belief.  By  means  of  his  simple  religion  he  was 
able  to  interpret  sanely  the  troubles  and  conflicts  of 
life.  Out  of  suffering  interpreted  religiously, 
Abraham  developed  a  remarkably  well-balanced  and 
social  personality.  From  this  beginning,  Hebrew 
social  thought  evolved.  Ultimately,  Israel  created 
social  concepts  which  has  won  for  her  the  distinc- 
tion of  being  "  the  leading  social  teacher  of  the 
human  race/" 

As  a  social  entity  the  Hebrews  were  the  result  of 
"a  titanic  social  struggle ;"  they  arose  out  of  an  in- 
dustrial crisis.  The  scene  was  laid  in  Egypt.  The 
descendants  of  Jacob  were  working  long  hours  with 
little  pay,  as  slaves,  and  under  harsh  social  condi- 
tions. One  of  their  number,  more  favored  than  the 
rest  by  heredity  and  environment,  saw  a  Hebrew 
workman  being  beaten  by  an  Egyptian  "boss."  The 
favored  one,  Moses,  felt  the  surging  passions  of 
social  injustice  rising  within  his  breast — and  he 


56  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

slew  the  boss.  Moses  thereby  became  the  founder 
of  the  world's  labor  movement.  By  an  act  of  vio- 
lence in  the  impassioned  days  of  youth,  Moses  be- 
came "a  social  agitator" ;  by  years  of  patient  service 
of  his  people  in  the  name  of  Jehovoh,  he  became 
one  of  the  world's  greatest  social  seers. 

Rameses  II  was  "an  unprincipled  captain  of  in- 
dustry." He  was  haughty,  hard-hearted,  and  with- 
out social  conscience.  Moses  was  sympathetic, 
socially  sensitive,  and  keenly  religious.  Rameses  II 
was  a  leading  representative  of  an  ancient  aristoc- 
racy ;  Moses  was  the  first  great  exponent  of  an  in- 
cipient democracy,  and  "the  first  man  in  history 
with  a  well-developed  social  consciousness." 

According  to  the  Exodus  record  Moses,  as  the 
murderer  of  an  Egyptian  boss,  felt  no  qualms  of 
conscience,  but  he  did  fear  the  mighty  Pharaoh.  At 
that  time  in  history  it  was  a  minor  matter  to  kill 
a  slave ;  but  to  have  killed  a  boss  was  vastly  differ- 
ent. The  slave  represented  weakness ;  the  boss  was 
the  official  representative  of  political  and  financial 
power.  Consequently,  Moses  fled  the  country.  In 
Egypt  he  was  helpless,  and  in  danger  of  losing  his 
life.  He  fled  to  Midian. 

In  Midian,  Moses  pondered  over  the  economic 
and  social  injustices  to  which  his  people  were  being 
subjected.  He  communed  with  God,  from  whom  he 
received  the  motive  power  to  correct  a  gigantic 
social  wrong.  His  vision  of  Jehovah  gave  him  the 
conviction  that  Jehovah  is  a  God  of  justice  and 


HEBREW  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  57 

mercy  who  understands  social  and  industrial  evils 
and  sympathizes  with  the  socially  defeated  classes. 
Moses  reports  this  remarkable  social  message  from 
Jehovah : 

"I  have  surely  seen  the  affliction  of  my  people 
that  are  in  Egypt,  and  have  heard  their  cry  of 
anguish  because  of  their  taskmasters,  for  I  know 
their  sorrows,  and  I  am  come  down  to  deliver  them 
out  of  the  power  of  the  Egyptians."5 

In  other  words,  against  the  union  of  great  wealth 
and  political  power  in  the  hands  of  an  unjust  man, 
God  revolted,  and  God  said  to  Moses :  "Rescue  this 
Israelitish  people  from  the  heels  of  autocracy." 
Moses  conceived  of  Jehovah  as  a  God  who  is  "full 
of  sympathy  for  the  afflicted  and  dependent  and 
ever  eager  to  champion  their  cause  against  cruel 
oppression."  Moses'  conception  of  Jehovah  as  a 
socially  spirited  God  is  unique  for  that  day  in 
human  history.  God  is  described  as  a  lover  of 
justice  and  even  a  lover  of  mankind.  When  God 
speaks,  it  is  usually  in  terms  of  democracy.  The 
first  social  teachings  of  the  Old  Testament,  consid- 
ered chronologically,  are  those  against  social  and 
industrial  oppression. 

A  momentous  conflict  ensued.  Fired  by  the 
promises  and  presence  and  power  of  Jehovah, 
Moses  journeyed  back  to  Egypt.  He  proceeded  to 
organize  the  first  labor  strike  known  to  mankind. 
Thereupon,  the  angry  Pharaoh  commanded  the 
workers  to  make  brick  without  straw.  And  when 


58  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

the  workers  cried  out  against  the  impositions  and 
burdens,  the  agents  of  "the  first  great  captains  of 
industry"  taunted  the  workers  and  cried  at  them: 
"Ye  are  idle,  ye  are  idle."  But  God  and  Moses  won 
against  the  hosts  of  autocracy  and  plutocracy.  The 
workers  were  freed. 

Out  of  these  struggles  the  Hebrew  nation  took 
form.  Group  loyalty,  or  patriotism,  became  a  con- 
scious Hebrew  concept.  The  idea  of  kinship  was 
supplemented  by  an  appreciation  of  the  meaning  of 
national  life.  Furthermore,  a  sense  of  social  and 
economic  justice  received  a  clear-cut  and  positive 
human  expression  and  divine  approval.  For  the 
first  time  the  social  problem  was  defined. 

The  major  social  chord  which  the  Hebrew 
prophets  kept  vibrating  was  justice.  Some  of  the 
recurring  interpretations  of  the  needs  of  the  hour 
were:  Let  justice  roll  down  like  waters;  Rulers 
shall  govern  in  justice ;  Hear,  I  pray  you,  ye  heads 
of  Israel,  is  it  not  for  you  to  know  justice  ? 

The  Hebrew  word  for  the  English  "justice"  is 
mishpat.  It  is  used  in  various  senses,  such  as, 
justice,  order,  law,  right,  legal  right.  Amos  wanted 
mishpat  established  in  the  land.  Micah  asserted 
that  Jehovah  requires  the  individual  to  do  mishpat, 
and  to  love  kindness,  and  to  walk  humbly  with  his 
God.  Isaiah  urged  the  people  to  do  well  and  to  seek 
mishpat;  he  pronounced  woe  upon  those  who  turned 
aside  the  needy  from  mishpat;  he  declared  Jehovah 
to  be  a  God  of  mishpat.  Jeremiah  made  plain  that 


HEBREW  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  59 

Jehovah  exercises  mercy  and  mishpat  among  the 
people. 

Amos  protested  vigorously  against  special  class 
privileges.  He  denounced  the  wealthy  classes  be- 
cause of  their  social  arrogance  and  economic  in- 
justice. In  describing  them,  he  points  out  a  funda- 
mental principle  of  social  procedure.  By  their  re- 
pression of  those  who  are  protesting,  they  "are 
heaping  up  violence" ;  that  is,  autocratic  repression 
will  never  right  injustice,  but  will  foster  ultimate 
revolution.  Amos  charged  the  rulers  and  all  per- 
sons in  positions  of  social  power  with  the  primary 
obligation  of  seeing  that  the  poor  and  the  outcast 
are  protected  from  exploitation.  What  satire  in  a 
day  when  rulers  were  noted  for  their  exploitation 
of  the  weak  social  classes ! 

A  special  responsibility  rests  upon  judges.  Amos 
severely  arraigned  all  who  turn  judgment  to  worm- 
wood and  cast  righteousness  to  the  ground.  Anath- 
emas were  heaped  upon  the  takers  of  bribes,  espe- 
cially if  they  sit  in  places  of  public  authority  and 
wear  the  robes  of  law  and  patriotism.  Hot  denun- 
ciation fell  also. upon  the  private  doer  of  injustice; 
upon  the  merchant  who  makes  smaller  the  measure 
and  perverts  the  false  balances ;  upon  all  who  tram- 
ple in  any  way  upon  the  needy,  who  trample  on  the 
head  of  the  poor,  who  sell  the  righteous  for  silver, 
who  turn  aside  the  way  of  the  humble.3  The  con- 
cept of  justice  was  vividly  defined  by  Amos.  More- 
over, the  shepherd  prophet  of  Tekoa  had  the  cour- 


60  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

age  and  ability  to  make  the  concept  clear  to  all  who 
would  listen  to  him.  Amos  spoke  for  justice  on 
the  throne,  on  the  judge's  bench,  in  the  activities  of 
the  wealthy,  in  the  transactions  of  merchants,  and 
in  the  daily  dealings  of  individuals  with  one  an- 
other. 

The  campaign  against  injustice  is  carried  for- 
ward by  the  first  Isaiah,  the  statesman  and  orator. 
In  the  Kingdom  of  Judah,  Isaiah  found  the  same 
social  evils  that  Amos  had  earlier  preached  against 
in  the  Northern  kingdom.  The  boldness  of  his 
attack  is  startling: 

Thy  princes  are  rebellious,  and  companions  of 
thieves :  everyone  loveth  gifts,  and  followeth  after 
rewards :  they  judge  not  the  fatherless,  neither  does 
the  cause  of  the  widow  come  unto  them.4 

Then  Isaiah  enters  upon  perhaps  the  most  open, 
daring,  and  indignant  challenge  to  doers  of  social 
iniquity  that  is  to  be  found  anywhere: 

Ye  have  eaten  of  the  vineyard;  the  spoil  of  the 
poor  is  in  your  houses.  What  mean  ye  that  ye  beat 
my  people  to  pieces,  and  grind  the  faces  of  the 
poor  ?5 

After  the  manner  of  Amos,  Isaiah  protested  vig- 
orously against  the  judges  and  officers  of  the  law 
who  for  a  bribe  vindicate  the  wicked  and  deprive 
the  innocent  man  of  his  innocence.  He  denounced 
in  no  doubtful  language  the  scribes  who  devote 
themselves  to  writing  oppression,  who  turn  aside 
the  dependent  from  securing  justice,  who  prevent 


HEBREW  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  61 

Jehovah's  followers  from  receiving  honest  treat- 
ment, who  prey  upon  widows  and  despoil  orphans. 
Special  condemnation  was  heaped  upon  those  who 
set  up  iniquitous  decrees. 

Isaiah  was  a  forerunner  in  an  indirect  sense  of 
Henry  George,  for  he  vehemently  rebuked  land 
monopolists.  His  new  principle  is  contained  in  a 
pronouncement  of  woes  upon  the  persons  who  join 
house  to  house  and  add  field  to  field,  until  there  is 
no  land  left  except  for  the  monopolist  who  dwells 
as  a  lord  over  all.  Isaiah  protested  against  social 
injustice  not  only  because  of  the  harmful  effects 
upon  the  individual  but  also  because  of  the  destruct- 
ive and  enervating  national  results. 

After  the  fashion  of  Amos  and  Isaiah,  Micah 
conceived  of  Jehovah  as  a  just  God.  Micah  de- 
picts the  social  injustice  of  his  day  in  terms  of  the 
persons  who  hate  the  good  and  love  the  evil,  who 
pluck  off  the  skin  of  the  weak,  even  the  flesh  from 
the  bones  of  Jehovah's  followers ;  "who  also  eat  the 
flesh  of  my  people,  and  flay  their  skin  from  off 
them;  and  they  break  their  bones,  and  chop  them 
in  pieces,  as  for  the  pot,  and  as  flesh  within  the 
caldron."6 

Micah  unhesitatingly  condemns  the  priests  who 
are  giving  oracles  for  a  reward,  and  the  prophets 
who  are  divining  for  silver  and  who  are  trusting 
in  Jehovah  to  protect  them.  Micah  was  perhaps 
the  first  person  to  describe  the  activities  of  the 
criminaloid  which  have  been  so  carefully  analyzed 


62  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

by  Professor  E.  A.  Ross.  He  grasped  the  concept 
of  the  social  sinner  who  keeps  within  the  law.  He 
attacked  wealthy  landowners  who  crush  the  small 
holders ;  he  spared  neither  high  officials,  nor  priests. 
He  presented  his  social  concepts  with  precision  and 
effectiveness. 

The  invectives  against  social  injustice  are  carried 
into  the  teachings  of  Jeremiah.  They  appear  later 
in  the  Deuteronomic  Code.  The  Psalmists  depre- 
cated injustice.  The  wisdom  teachers  uttered  pro- 
found warnings  on  the  subject.  The  writer  of  Job 
deplored  injustice.  Throughout  the  Old  Testament 
the  almost  countless  references  justify  the  conclu- 
sion that  justice  is  the  leading  social  concept  which 
is  presented  by  ancient  Hebrew  thought. 

The  Old  Testament  parallels  its  denunciation  of 
unjust  social  relationships  with  diatribes  against 
luxury.  The  evil  effects  of  great  riches  are  again 
and  again  described.  Amos  boldly  pointed  the 
finger  of  scorn  at  the  idle  rich,  at  those  who  "lie 
upon  beds  of  ivory  and  stretch  themselves  upon 
their  couches." 

The  possession  of  vast  wealth  has  usually  been 
considered  by  those  persons  who  are  immediately 
concerned  as  an  expression  of  divine  favor.  Amos 
exposed  the  fallacies  in  this  belief,  commanded  the 
owners  of  wealth  to  assume  social  responsibility, 
and  instantly  to  cease  their  unholy  practices  of  se- 
curing gain. 

Isaiah  united  with  Amos  in  treating  the  posses- 


HEBREW  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  63 

sion  of  wealth  not  as  a  matter  of  favor  or  luck, 
but  as  a  social  trust.  With  one  stroke  Jeremiah 
tore  off  the  gilded  frame  from  about  the  life  of 
the  self-indulgent,  luxury-loving  King  Jehoiakim. 
What  powerful  and  autocratic  monarch  was  ever 
charged  with  indulging  in  luxury  in  such  relentless 
and  uncompromising  language  as  this? 

Woe  unto  him  that  buildeth  his  house  by  unright- 
eousness, and  his  chambers  by  injustice.  ..... 

Shalt  thou  reign,  because  thou  closest  thyself 
in  cedar?  

But  thine  eyes  and  thine  heart  are  not  but  for  thy 
covetousness,  and  for  to  shed  innocent  blood,  and 
for  oppression,  and  for  violence,  to  do  it. 

The  ways  of  the  dishonest  rich  are  vividly  de- 
scribed by  Jeremiah.  They  set  snares  and  catch 
people  with  lying.  Their  houses  are  full  of  evi- 
dences of  their  crooked  dealings.  They  maintain 
themselves  in  luxury  despite  wanton  expenditures 
by  violating  the  needs  of  the  fatherless  and  the 
needy. 

Zephaniah  was  no  less  direct  in  pointing  out  the 
dangers  in  wealth.  He  declared  that  ill-gotten  gains 
shall  themselves  become  a  prey  and  that  the  houses 
of  the  sinful  rich  shall  become  desolate.  All  their 
silver  and  their  gold  shall  not  be  able  to  deliver 
them  from  their  ultimate  desolation. 

In  a  beautiful  and  effective  style  the  Wisdom 
writer  in  Proverbs  unconsciously  sums  up  the  Old 
Testament  philosophy  concerning  wealth: 


64  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

Labor  not  to  become  rich ;  cease  from  thine  own 
wisdom.  Wilt  thou  set  thine  eyes  upon  that  which 
is  not?  For  riches  certainly  make  themselves 
wings ;  they  fly  away  as  an  eagle  toward  heaven. 

The  Old  Testament  with  surprising  uniformity 
supports  the  cause  of  labor.  The  welfare  of  the 
slave  is  frequently  espoused.  According  to  the 
Deuteronomic  Code  a  runaway  slave  who  was 
caught  did  not  necessarily  need  to  be  returned  to 
his  owner.  In  fact,  a  person  who  harbored  such 
a  slave  was  expressly  enjoined  not  to  return  him. 
By  this  injunction  the  rights  of  property  and  vested 
interests  in  slaves  were  ignored.  Such  an  attitude 
was  in  opposition  to  the  Code  of  Hammurapi  and 
to  the  codes  of  vested  interests  throughout  history. 
Slavery,  however,  was  a  well-established  institution 
among  the  ancient  Hebrews.8 

Although  the  law  book  of  Hammurapi  fixed  the 
wages  of  laborers,  the  Old  Testament  law  book  re- 
stricted the  hours  of  labor.  Not  only  is  the  master 
to  limit  his  labor  to  six  days  a  week,  but  he  is  com- 
manded to  see  that  his  slaves,  male  and  female,  do 
not  work  more  than  six  days.  Modern  industry, 
even  twentieth  century  manufacturing  enterprise 
in  the  United  States,  has  been  persistently  violating 
the  labor  rules  of  the  Hebrew  law-givers.  Employ- 
ers are  commanded  not  to  take  advantage  of  poor 
and  needy  hired  servants.  They  shall  not  oppress 
labor  simply  because  they  are  powerful  and  labor 
is  weak.  Even  the  poor  immigrant  laborer  is  not 


HEBREW  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  65 

to  be  exploited! 

The  first  legislation  in  behalf  of  immigrants  is 
found  in  Deuteronomy.  Employers  must  respect 
the  needs  of  alien  workers.  The  foreigner  shall  not 
be  oppressed.  In  the  ordinary  dealings  between 
citizens  and  foreigners,  justice  must  not  be  per- 
verted. The  Hebrew  law  makers  even  went  so  far 
as  to  issue  the  command:  Love  ye  therefore  the 
strangers,  for  ye  were  strangers  in  the  land  of 
Egypt. 

The  institution  of  marriage  is  early  accented  in 
the  Old  Testament.  In  the  second  chapter  of  Gene- 
sis divine  approval  is  placed  upon  marriage.  In 
accordance  with  biological  and  social  needs  the  in- 
stitution of  marriage  is  made  sacred.  Although 
the  Hebrews  are  noted  for  their  emphasis  upon  the 
responsibility  of  children  to  parents,  the  husband  is 
ordered  to  forsake  his  father  and  his  mother  and 
cleave  unto  his  wife.  A  man's  obligation  to  his 
helpmate  exceeds  even  his  obligations  to  his  father 
and  mother. 

The  concept  of  a  long-suffering,  patient  husband 
is  extensively  elaborated  in  the  teachings  of  Hosea. 
This  prophet  of  the  eighth  century,  B.  C.,  demon- 
strated the  sanctity  of  the  marriage  relation  by  re- 
maining true  to  it  even  after  his  wife  bore  children 
of  whom  he  was  not  the  father.  It  is  remarkable 
that  Hosea  should  not  have  divorced  his  wife  at 
once  when  he  learned  of  her  unfaithfulness  to  the 
marriage  vow.  Hosea  taught,  by  example,  that 


66  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

divorce  should  be  the  last  resort  after  all  the  means 
of  love  have  been  used  in  trying  to  win  back  the 
erring  partner. 

The  description  of  Hosea's  domestic  difficulties, 
whether  allegorical  or  not,  is  an  early  protest 
against  the  double  standard  of  morals  for  man  and 
woman.  The  attitude  of  people  in  modern  society 
who  blame  and  shun  the  fallen  woman  but  permit 
the  guilty  man  to  continue  to  enjoy  the  company  of 
respectable  men  and  women  is  vigorously  chal- 
lenged by  Hosea. 

The  last  word  against  sex  immorality  was  pro- 
nounced by  Hosea.  His  description  of  the  effects 
of  widespread  sex  immorality  is  brief  but  incisive. 

Whoredom  and  wine  and  new  wine  take  away 
the  heart. 

Their  glory  shall  fly  away  like  a  bird,  from  the 
birth,  and  from  the  womb,  and  from  the  concep- 
tion. 

Their  root  is  dried  up,  they  shall  bear  no  fruit. 

In  the  Deuteronomic  laws  we  find  the  duties  of 
parents  to  children  and  of  children  to  parents  care- 
fully outlined.  Parents,  primarily,  are  made  re- 
sponsible for  moral  and  religious  education  in  the 
home;  and  children  are  under  obligations  to  obey 
their  parents.  This  teaching  is  summed  up  in  the 
injunction:10  Honor  thy  father  and  thy  mother, 
that  thy  days  may  be  long  upon  the  land  which  the 
Lord  thy  God  giveth  thee ;  and  in  the  imprecation : 
Whoso  curseth  his  father  or  his  mother,  his  lamp 


HEBREW  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  67 

shall  be  put  out  in  obscure  darkness.11 

The  Wisdom  writers  dwell  at  considerable  length 
upon  the  proper  relationships  of  husbands  and 
wives  and  of  parents  and  children.  They  point  the 
finger  of  shame  at  the  quarrelsome  woman.  They 
warn  against  the  woman  whose  chief  asset  is  her 
beauty.  A  virtuous  wife  is  a  crown  to  her  hus- 
band, but  an  immoral  wife  is  as  rottenness  in  his 
bones.12 

The  Wisdom  teachers  do  not  minimize  the  im- 
portance of  parental  discipline.  On  occasion  par- 
ents must  act  with  force.  Correction  of  children 
is  commanded.  The  situation  is  pictured  in  the  fol- 
lowing language  :13 

The  word  and  reproof  give  wisdom;  but  a  child 
left  to  himself  bringeth  his  mother  to  shame. 

In  other  words,  it  is  necessary  that  parents  as- 
sume a  positive,  definite  attitude  in  regard  to  child 
nurture.  They  must  see  that  their  children  are 
actually  trained  in  the  ways  in  which  they  should 
go.  Even  the  loving  parent  must  sometimes  show 
his  affection  for  his  child  by  chastising  the  child. 
Only  by  such  a  procedure  do  children  grow  up  to 
be  a  comfort  to  parents  in  their  old  age. 

On  the  other  hand  the  child  must  assume  his 
share  of  responsibility.  It  is  the  part  of  wisdom 
for  children  to  receive  willingly  the  instruction  that 
parents  can  give.  The  wise  son  loves  parental  ad- 
vice. He  listens  gladly  to  his  father;  he  does  not 
despise  his  mother's  counsels. 


68  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

It  has  already  been  intimated  that  the  Old  Testa- 
ment writers  frequently  stress  the  importance  of 
high  standards  of  conduct  for  women.  Amos  re- 
buked the  wives  of  nobles  and  the  wealthy  who 
fritter  away  their  best  impulses  in  idleness  and 
sinful  living  and  who  dissipate  their  deepest  in- 
stincts in  debauchery.  Amos  and  Isaiah  agreed,  ap- 
parently, that  a  nation's  welfare  depends  on  the 
attitudes  of  its  women.  The  wrath  of  God  will  fall 
upon  women  who  are  haughty,  who  walk  with  heads 
held  high  and  with  wanton  glances,  who  go  trip- 
ping along,  "making  a  tinkling  with  their  feet." 

The  anti-social  character  of  sin  was  pointed  out 
in  Genesis.  Cain  was  the  first  to  raise  naively  and 
blandly  the  question:  Am  I  my  brother's  keeper? 
Sinful  living  narrows  the  soul,  increases  selfishness, 
and  vitiates  a  genuine  social  attitude.  Sinning  is 
repudiating  social  responsibility.  Amos  advanced 
the  idea  that  selfish  living  was  nothing  less  than  dis- 
loyalty to  one's  country.  To  dissipate  one's  energy 
is  to  undermine  one's  usefulness  to  his  country. 

Intemperance  was  deplored.  Isaiah  has  been 
called  the  first  temperance  reformer  of  the  world. 
His  impassioned  and  classic  utterances  are  well  rep- 
resented by  the  following  lines:1* 

Woe  unto  them  that  rise  up  early  in  the  morning 
that  they  may  follow  strong  drink;  that  continue 
until  night,  till  wine  inflame  them. 

Isaiah  warned  especially  the  priests  and  prophets 
of  the  evils  of  intemperance.  Wine  will  swallow 


HEBREW  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  69 

them  up,  it  will  put  them  out  of  the  way,  it  will 
cause  them  to  err  in  wisdom  and  to  stumble  in  judg- 
ment. 

In  both  Leviticus  and  Numbers  the  danger  that 
lurks  in  the  wine  cup  is  recognized.  The  special 
servants  of  Jehovah  are  commanded  to  separate 
themselves  from  wine  and  strong  drink.  In  Prov- 
erbs the  Wisdom  writer  declares:15  Wine  is  a 
mocker,  strong  drink  is  raging  and  whoever  is 
deceived  thereby  is  not  wise.  The  same  authority 
admonishes  rulers  and  judges  not  to  drink  wine 
lest  they  forget  the  law  and  pervert  the  judgment 
of  the  afflicted.  On  the  other  hand,  a  reversion  to 
a  lower  standard  is  made  in  Proverbs  when  the 
legitimacy  of  giving  strong  drink  to  the  poor  and 
miserable  is  recognized,  so  that  they  may  forget 
their  poverty  and  misery.16  The  general  teaching, 
however,  is  that  strong  drink  leads  to  social  in- 
efficiency and  the  disintegration  of  human  person- 
alities. 

The  cities  of  refuge  represent  a  new  social  idea. 
A  person  who  has  taken  life  without  intention  may 
flee  to  and  find  protection  in  the  cities  of  refuge. 
The  altar  and  the  sanctuary  are  designated  as  places 
to  which  persons  may  flee  who  are  not  wilful  mur- 
derers.17 

The  social  concept  of  democracy  occupies  an  in- 
teresting place  in  the  Old  Testament  literature.  In 
the  days  of  Abraham  the  kinship  group  prevailed. 
Within  this  group  there  were  many  households, 


I 


70  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

ruled  by  patriarchs.  Within  the  kinship  groups 
high  standards  of  honor  were  maintained,  but  anti- 
social attitudes  toward  outside  and  foreign  groups 
were  encouraged.  It  was  justifiable,  for  example, 
to  lie  to  foreign  groups  and  even  to  kill  the  repre- 
sentatives of  such  peoples. 

The  concept  of  democracy  developed  pari  passu 
with  the  evolution  of  the  idea  of  Jehovah.  In  the 
minds  of  the  Hebrews,  Jehovah,  or  Jahweh,  was 
first  a  tribal  god,  then  a  national  god;  and  finally, 
a  universal  God,  that  is,  a  being  who  is  interested 
in  the  welfare  of  all  peoples,  and  not  simply  in  the 
welfare  of  "the  chosen  people." 

The  Hebrew  conception  of  the  state  contained 
several  democratic  elements.  The  fundamental 
purpose  of  the  state  was  declared  to  be  the  welfare 
not  of  an  irresponsible  monarch,  but  of  the  people 
themselves.  This  idea  stands  out  in  marked  con- 
tradiction to  the  practices  of  the  Canaanites,  who 
submitted  themselves  helplessly  to  capricious  and 
autocratic  rulers. 

The  Hebrews  treated  the  state  as  a  part  of  a  the- 
ocracy. But  when  Jehovah  spoke,  he  usually  ar- 
raigned false  wealth,  arbitrary  political  power, 
selfish  ambition  of  kings,  luxurious  living,  and  spe- 
cial privileges.  Jehovah  spoke  for  the  oppressed, 
the  poor,  the  defeated,  the  laborer,8  in  short,  for 
humanity. 

Consequently,  loyalty  to  the  nation  was  positive 
and  persistent.  Consider  this  statement  from  Psalm 


HEBREW  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  71 

137  of  Hebrew  patriotism  on  the  part  of  exiled 
Hebrews  who  longed  for  their  native  land  : 

By  the  rivers  of  Babylon,  there  we  sat  down,  yea, 
we  wept,  when  we  remembered  Zion. 

We  hanged  our  harps  upon  the  willows  in  the 
midst  thereof 

If  I  forget  thee,  O  Jerusalem,  let  my  right  hand 
forget  her  cunning. 

If  I  do  not  remember  thee,  let  my  tongue  cleave 
to  the  roof  of  my  mouth ;  if  I  prefer  not  Jerusalem 
above  my  chief  joy. 

According  to  Hosea,  Jehovah  charged  the  citi- 
zens of  the  land  to  deal  with  one  another  on  the 
basis  of  fidelity  and  true  love,  and  to  stamp  out  all 
social  evils,  such  as  perjury,  stealing,  committing 
adultery,  and  mob  violence.  The  writer  of  the  Book 
of  Job  portrayed  a  good  citizen  as  one  who  delivers 
the  poor,  who  helps  those  about  to  perish,  who 
causes  the  widow's  heart  to  sing  for  joy.18  He  is 
eyes  to  the  blind,  feet  to  the  lame,  and  a  father  to 
the  needy.  He  searches  out  the  cause  of  social 
evils.  Moreover,  he  breaks  the  jaws  of  the  un- 
righteous, and  plucks  the  prey  from  their  mouths. 
He  defends  the  blameless.  He  does  not  put  his 
confidence  in  gold  or  rejoice  at  his  enemies  when 
evils  beset  them  or  they  are  destroyed.  It  may  be 
truly  said  that  fundamental  ideas  of  democracy 
were  originated  by  the  Hebrews. 

Amos  raised  the  question  of  internationalism. 
For  the  first  time  in  history,  the  idea  of  a  universal 


72  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

God  was  postulated.  Amos  pronounced  Jehovah 
the  God  of  other  peoples  besides  the  Israelites. 
"Have  not  I  brought  up  Israel  out  of  the  land  of 
Egypt?"  said  Jehovah,  "and  the  Philistines  from 
Caphtor,  and  the  Syrians  from  Kir?"1  The  day 
would  come,  according  to  Isaiah  and  Micah,  when 
Jehovah  would  judge  over  many  peoples  and  rebuke 
strong  nations.  The  conception  of  Jehovah  as  a 
Being  who  transcends  both  time  and  space  gave  to 
the  Hebrew  mind  at  its  best  a  broader  cast  and  a 
more  universal  comprehension  than  the  peoples  of 
contemporary  tribes  and  nations  possessed. 

The  concept  of  universal  peace  was  invented  by 
the  Hebrews.  Isaiah  and  Micah  share  the  honor 
of  being  the  first  persons  to  advocate  world  peace, 
and  to  predict  the  day  when  all  nations  shall  wor- 
ship a  just  God  and  thereby  be  enabled  to  beat  their 
swords  into  plowshares  and  their  spears  into  prun- 
ing-hooks,  when  nation  shall  not  stand  against  na- 
tion, and  when  the  methods  of  warfare  shall  no 
longer  be  taught.  The  spirit  of  hatred  and  of 
blind,  selfish  antagonism  shall  pass  away.  No  mod- 
ern writer  has  ever  spoken  the  doom  of  militarism 
so  trenchantly  as  the  Old  Testament  prophet, 
Isaiah,  who  said,  according  to  the  translation  by 
Charles  Foster  Kent:20 

"For  every  boot  of  the  warrior  with  noisy  tread, 

And  every  war-cloak  drenched  in  the  blood  of  the  slain 

Will  be  completely  burned  up  as  fuel  for  the  flame." 


HEBREW  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  73 

The  Hebrews  strongly  emphasized  laws  as  a  so- 
cial dynamic.  Love  will  make  socialized  individuals. 
It  will  demonstrate  to  a  person  his  responsibilities 
as  a  member  of  society  and  his  duties  to  his  fellow 
human  beings.  It  will  stifle  hatred.  It  will  even 
return  good  for  evil.  It  is  the  cardinal  virtue  and 
an  eternal  principle  of  right  living. 

The  Old  Testament  teaches  social  salvation.  Je- 
hovah is  fundamentally  interested  in  the  improve- 
ment of  social  and  living  conditions.  He  com- 
manded the  socialization  of  all  human  relationships. 
His  teachings,  as  given  by  the  prophets  and  Wis- 
dom writers,  take  cognizance  of  the  influence  of  en- 
vironment upon  character. 

Hebrew  social  thought  deals  largely  with  social 
injustice.  Social  evils  are  vividly  described  and 
evil-doers,  chiefly  kings  and  judges,  are  vigorously 
and  fearlessly  arraigned.  The  family  is  made  the 
chief  social  institution,  and  love  is  crowned  servant 
of  all.  Education  is  centered  in  the  home,  and  moral 
discipline  is  made  the  keynote  of  education;  hence 
the  Hebrews  survived  the  Greeks  and  Romans.  A 
new  and  perfect  social  order,  directed  by  a  just  Je- 
hovah, and  motivated  throughout  all  its  individual 
and  social  relationships  by  love,  is  prophesied. 


CHAPTER  V. 
PLATO  AND  GRECIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 


In  turning  to  a  study  of  Grecian  civilization  we 
find  a  development  of  social  thought  which  on  the 
rational  side  excels  in  many  particulars  the  social 
thinking  of  the  Hebrews,  but  which  in  its  affective 
elements  falls  far  below  the  quality  of  Hebrew  so- 
cial thought.  We  may  expect  to  find,  therefore,  in 
Grecian  social  thought  important  new  contributions 
which  are  complementary  to  the  legacies  from  the 
Hebrews,  and  which  when  taken  in  conjunction 
with  the  early  Christian  forms  of  Hebrew  social 
thought  constitute  the  main  foundations  of  modern 
social  thought. 

The  thought  life  of  the  Greeks  reached  the  cre- 
scendo in  the  idealism  of  Plato  (427-347  B.  C.)  and 
the  opportunism  of  Aristotle  (384-322  B.  C.).  In 
an  idea-world  Plato  depicted  an  ideal  society.  After 
studying  158  constitutions,  Aristotle  formulated 
rules  of  practical  social  procedure.  Plato's  Repub- 
lic and  Aristotle's  Politics  are  the  two  leading 
source  books  of  Grecian  social  thought. 

Plato  and  Aristotle  were  the  first  two  thinkers 
in  history  who  left  definitely  organized  analyses  of 
societary  life.  Although  in  point  of  time  they  stand 


GRECIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  75 

close  together,  in  content  of  social  reasoning  they 
are  at  many  places  antagonistic.  However,  their 
high  rank  as  thinkers  need  not  blind  anyone  to  the 
fact  that  their  social  thought  was  in  part  an  out- 
growth of  theories  held  by  predecessors.  Antece- 
dent to  Plato  was  Socrates  and  the  Sophists;  ante- 
cedent to  these  scholars  was  a  large  number  of 
thinkers  who,  incidentally  to  their  main  intellectual 
efforts,  gave  expression  to  isolated  but  significant 
social  ideas. 

As  early  as  the  ninth  century,  B.  C,  Lycurgus  de- 
clared that  the  state  owned  the  child,  and  urged  a 
system  of  education  which  would  prepare  the  child 
for  the  state.  Despite,  however,  of  a  similar  em- 
phasis by  many  later  Greek  leaders,  "Hellas"  never 
developed  a  genuine  national  unity.  She  experi- 
enced a  temporary  national  patriotism  only  when 
attacked  by  the  Persians  and  at  the  seasons  when 
the  national  games  were  at  their  height. 

It  was  Hesiod,  the  founder  of  Greek  didactic 
poetry,  who  about  700  B.  C.  described  the  Golden 
Age  and  the  subsequent  ages  of  society.  Hesiod 
protested  mildly  against  the  social  injustice  in  his 
time.1  In  the  following  century,  Anaximander,  the 
philosopher,  and  Theognis,  the  elegiac  poet,2  dis- 
cussed the  value  to  society  of  providing  that  chil- 
dren should  be  well  born  and  well  trained — the 
fundamental  concepts  of  current  eugenics  and  eu- 
thenics. 

Solon,  the  Athenian  lawgiver,  about  590  B.  C., 


76  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

began  to  put  into  legislative  practice  certain  ideas  of 
social  reform,  .thereby  preventing  revolution.  At 
that  time  it  was  customary  to  sell  persons  into 
slavery  who  could  not  pay  their  debts — a  procedure 
which  Solon  ended.  The  cost  of  living  was  very 
high,  consequently  Solon  forbade  the  export  of  food 
products  and  thereby  reduced  prices  for  the  con- 
sumer. He  introduced  a  measure  which  today 
would  be  considered  revolutionary,  namely,  the 
limiting  of  the  amount  of  land  which  an  individual 
might  hold.  For  the  classification  of  people  on  the 
basis  of  wealth,  he  substituted  a  classification  on 
the  basis  of  income.  He  lessened  the  severity  of  the 
laws  of  Draco,  and  in  other  ways  increased  the 
freedom  of  the  individual.  Although  Solon's  regime 
was  followed  by  a  tyranny,  Solon  is  credited  with 
initiating  certain  essential  ideas  of  democracy. 

After  the  Tyrants,  Athens  under  the  leadership 
of  men  like  Cleisthenes  became  "a  pure  democracy." 
Cleisthenes  democratized  the  Athenian  Constitu- 
tion. For  the  four  phylae  he  substituted  ten  phylae, 
or  units  of  government,  thus  securing  a  new  and 
better  distribution  of  authority.  He  is  credited  with 
introducing  ostracism  as  a  mode  of  punishment ;  he, 
it  is  alleged,  was  the  first  individual  to  be  ostracised 
by  his  government. 

The  fifth  century  precursors  of  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle were  numerous.  Aeschylus  (525-456  B.  C), 
the  first  of  the  famous  Athenian  tragic  poets,  de- 
scribed in  general  terms  the  evolution  of  civilized 


GRECIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  77 

society.3  The  artistic  historian,  Herodotus,  devel- 
oped through  his  imagination  a  world  point  of  view. 
From  an  almost  unlimited  store  of  legendary  and 
ethnological  materials,  he  elaborated  a  planetary 
theme  which  had  its  beginning  in  the  Trojan  War 
and  its  culmination  in  the  conflict  between  Eastern 
and  Western  civilizations.  The  basic  social  prin- 
ciple in  the  writings  of  Herodotus  is  that  downfall 
awaits  the  insolent  autocrats  of  earth.  Herodotus 
describes  the  customs  and  habits  of  the  peoples4 
whom  he  visited  on  his  numerous  foreign  travels  in 
such  a  detailed  and  elaborate  fashion  that  he  has 
been  styled  the  world's  first  descriptive  sociologist. 

Pericles  (495P-429  B.  C),  perhaps  the  greatest 
statesman  of  Greece,  furthered  the  cause  of  democ- 
racy. His  conception  of  democracy  led  him  to  make 
the  entire  body  of  citizens  eligible  to  office-holding. 
Pericles  initiated  a  social  program  which  in  cer- 
tain aspects  was  paternalistic.  He  instituted  the 
plan  of  granting  allowances  for  performing  public 
duties.  As  a  result,  unselfish  public  service  was 
minimized  and  political  morale  was  weakened. 
Pericles  was  led  into  this  error5  by  the  desire  to 
compete  for  public  esteem  with  Cimon,  who  made 
extensive  gifts  to  the  poor  in  the  form  of  dinners 
and  clothes. 

In  his  tragedies,  Euripides  (480-406  B.  C.), 
aroused  interest  in  the  experiences,  not  of  legendary 
characters  as  many  of  his  predecessors  had  done, 
but  of  the  ordinary  members  of  Athenian  society. 


78  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

He  was  a  spokesman  for  the  emancipation  of 
woman  ;6  his  writings  reveal  the  social  changes  that 
were  occurring  in  the  fifth  century  in  Athens. 
Likewise,  the  comedies  of  Aristophanes  reflected 
social  changes,  and,  in  addition,  caricatured  social 
conditions. 

Hippocrates,  the  so-called  father  of  medical  sci- 
ence, wrote  several  works  which  attracted  the  studi- 
ous attention  of  Plato.  He  gave  as  the  first  of  two 
chief  causes  of  disease,  the  influence  of  climate, 
seasons,  weather  on  the  individual.7  He  might  be 
called  the  first  anthropo-geographer.  At  any  rate  he 
opened  the  field  which  has  recently  been  so  well 
covered  by  Ellen  C.  Semple  in  her  Influences  of 
Geographic  Environment. 

By  their  disconcerting  and  sceptical  teachings  the 
Sophists,  who  also  lived  in  the  fifty  centucy,  B.  C., 
stimulated  the  intellectual  activities  of  Socrates. 
The  influence  of  the  Sophist  leaders,  such  as  Pro- 
tagoras, Gorgas,  Callicles,  Thrasymachus,  brought 
forward  the  problem  of  training  pupils  to  solve 
civic  questions  rather  than  scientific  or  philosoph- 
ical questions.  According  to  Plato,  Callicles  be- 
lieved that  government  was  an  instrument  for  ex- 
ploiting the  masses.  Thrasymachus  argued  that 
so-called  justice  is  that  type  of  activity  which  favors 
the  interest  of  the  strongest  members  of  society, 
and  that  might  determines  what  is  called  right.8 
Epaminondas,  the  Theban  statesman,  personified  in 
his  own  career  an  unusually  high  interpretation  of 


GRECIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  79 

the  concept  of  patriotism,  perhaps  a  more  unselfish 
expression  of  patriotism  than  is  represented  by  any 
other  political  spokesman  of  the  Hellenic  states. 

The  argument  of  the  Sophists  that  what  is  best 
for  the  individual  is  best  for  society  aroused  the 
antagonism  of  Socrates  (469-399  B.  C),  whose 
ideas  are  reported  by  Plato  and  Xenophon.  Socra- 
tes, the  son  of  an  Athenian  sculptor,  asserted  that 
the  qualities  of  justice,  wisdom,  temperance,  and 
courage,  which  make  a  person  a  good  member  of 
society  and  which  increase  social  welfare,  are  the 
same  qualities  which  make  a  person  a  good  indi- 
vidual and  secure  his  individual  advancement. 
Socrates  spent  many  years  at  the  market  places,  on 
the  streets  where  people  congregate  and  at  the  pub- 
lic resorts  in  studying  the  actions  of  individuals  and 
in  engaging  them  in  conversation  concerning  their 
moral  life.  As  a  result  Socrates  evolved  a  signifi- 
cant social  philosophy.  The  heart  of  this  philoso- 
phy is  found  in  the  statements  that  virtue  is  knowl- 
edge, not  in  the  sense  of  mere  memorized  facts  but 
of  a  thorough  understanding.  If  a  person  under- 
stands completely  the  good  and  evil  phases  of  a 
proposed  act,  he  will  choose  the  right.  For  example, 
when  one  is  completely  convinced  of  the  harmful 
effects  of  poor  teeth,  he  will  employ  the  regular 
services  of  a  dentist  to  keep  his  teeth  in  good  con- 
dition. When  he  perceives  the  evil  effects  of  dis- 
honesty, he  will  establish  honest  habits.  The  con- 
clusion might  be  drawn  that  social  virtue  rests  upon 


80  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

societary  knowledge. 

Socrates  was  convinced  that  something  was  fun- 
damentally wrong  with  Athenian  society.  Every- 
where he  saw  that  ignorance  led  to  vice.  Only  in 
the  mechanical  and  professional  activities  did  he 
discover  correct  action,  but  this  was  preceded  by 
correct  knowledge.9 

A  good  carpenter  is  an  individual  who  thoroughly 
understands  carpentry;  a  good  man  is  an  individual 
who  truly  knows  the  value  of  good  actions.  Simi- 
larly, it  might  be  said  that  a  good  urban  resident 
is  an  individual  who  deeply  appreciates  what  it 
means  to  have  a  city  of  mutually  developing  people. 

Socrates  wished  to  make  all  men  intelligent.  His 
teachings  raised  the  deep-seated  social  question: 
How  can  social  organization  be  made  highly  advan- 
tageous to  the  individual,  and  the  individual  made 
so  aware  of  these  advantages  that  he  will  always 
act  socially?10  Inasmuch  as  Socrates  left  no  writ- 
ings, it  is  impossible  to  explain  with  certainty  his 
teachings.  Fortunately,  he  left  a  permanent  im- 
press of  his  personality  on  the  lives  of  his  associ- 
ates, and  particularly,  upon  his  able  and  brilliant 
pupil,  Plato. 

In  the  fundamental  dictum  that  virtue  is  knowl- 
edge, Socrates  is  theoretically  correct,  but  prac- 
tically he  ignores  the  overpowering  influence  that 
oftentimes  is  exerted  by  the  instincts  and  estab- 
lished habits.  He  underestimates  the  power  that  is 
represented  by  a  deeply  ingrained  instinct  or  a  habit 


GRECIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  81 

which  has  existed  for  several  years.  Instincts  and 
nearly  all  habits  are  firmly  established  neurologic- 
ally,  whereas  knowledge  is  often  new  to  the  indi- 
vidual and  merely  a  veneer  on  the  surface  of  the 
individual's  life.  The  acquisition  of  knowledge  is 
no  guarantee  that  instincts  centuries  old  will  be 
promptly  overcome  or  re-directed. 

Furthermore,  with  a  young  child  the  instinctive 
tendencies  begin  to  assert  themselves  and  to  give 
direction  to  the  growth  of  the  character  of  the  child, 
long  before  his  mentality  has  unfolded  and  devel- 
oped to  the  point  where  he  is  capable  of  genuinely 
understanding  the  real  meaning  of  many  forms  of 
activity,  and  where  many  phases  of  knowledge  are 
entirely  beyond  his  ability  to  comprehend. 

Little  is  known  concerning  Plato's  early  life  and 
training.  The  most  influential  factors  were  the 
life  and  teachings  of  Socrates.  The  strong  Socratic 
personality  left  its  indelible  impress  upon  the 
thought-life  of  Plato.  As  a  young  man,  Plato 
became  greatly  interested  in  Athenian  social  and 
civic  life.  When  he  was  perhaps  twenty-three  years 
of  age,  the  self-styled  "Fair  and  Good"  rulers  came 
into  control  of  Athens.  The  failure  of  these  men, 
whom  history  calls  the  Thirty  Tyrants,  to  govern 
wisely,  produced  an  attitude  of  thorough  disgust  in 
the  mind  of  Plato.  Further,  the  legalized  murder 
of  Socrates  by  the  restored  democracy  in  399  B.  C. 
aroused  the  bitter  antagonism  of  Plato  to  the  exist- 
ing forms  of  government.  In  the  years  which  fol- 


82  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

lowed  the  death  of  Socrates,  popular  rule  produced 
loose  and  licentious  social  conditions.  As  a  conse- 
quence, Plato  turned  to  the  realms  of  the  thought 
world  in  order  to  find  a  perfect  society.  As  a  result 
of  his  contact  with  every-day  life  and  government, 
Plato  evolved  in  his  mind  an  ideal  republic. 

The  Socratic  principle  that  virtue  is  knowledge 
was  accepted  by  Plato.  In  Plato's  thinking  this 
proposition  led  to  the  generalization  that  education 
is  the  most  important  thing  in  the  world.  Upon 
this  doctrine  more  than  any  other,  Plato's  twentieth 
century  influence  thrives. 

What  shall  be  the  nature  of  a  world-molding 
education?  Theoretically,  Plato  gives  his  answer 
in  his  epistemology.  Ideas  are  the  ruling  forces  in 
life.  Over  against  the  uncertain  fluctuating  sense 
world,  Plato  set  up  a  realm  of  eternal,  changeless 
ideas.  An  individual  man  is  simply  an  ephemeral 
expression  of  Man.  Plato  created  a  concept  of  un- 
changeable reality  which  he  found  in  Ideas.  These, 
alone,  are  the  permanent,  worth-while  elements 
which  man  must  seek  to  know  and  understand. 

Because  of  his  aristocratic  attitudes  and  of  his 
early  disgust  with  the  experiments  in  democracy  in 
his  day,  Plato  turned  away  in  his  social  philosophy 
from  the  direct  study  of  the  people,  such  as  had 
engaged  the  attention  of  Socrates,  to  a  search  for 
a  just  society  in  the  world  of  ideas.  This  line  of 
thinking  found  expression  chiefly  in  the  Republic, 
written  during  Plato's  mature  manhood.  A  dis- 


GRECIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  83 

cussion  of  these  idealistic  concepts  is  found  in  the 
Laws  and  the  Politicus,  the  latter  being  written 
in  Plato's  old  age  and  representing  a  partial  reac- 
tion from  the  idealism  of  the  Republic.  Because  of 
its  consideration  of  nearly  every  aspect  of  social 
life  from  a  specific  viewpoint,  the  Republic  may  be 
called  the  first  treatise  in  social  philosophy.  While 
it  falls  below  the  social  writings  of  the  Hebrews  in 
its  dynamic  and  practical  phases,  it  excels  them  in 
its  unity,  its  profundity,  and  its  philosophic  quality. 

Inasmuch  as  Plato  had  turned  away  from  an  in- 
viting though  strenuous  public  career  to  a  private 
life  of  scholarly  thought,  his  perfect  society  as- 
sumed characteristics  that  were  far  from  mundane. 
Because  Plato  lived  in  a  day  of  small  political 
groups  and  in  a  country  of  limited  size,  he  limited 
his  ideal  society — to  a  group  represented  by  5040 
heads  of  families.  Consequently  it  is  impossible 
to  apply  Plato's  social  ideas  with  accuracy  to  a 
modern  metropolitan  center  of  5,000,000  people,  or 
to  a  nation-state  of  100,000,000  people.  Several 
phases  of  Plato's  thought,  however,  were  given  a 
practical  turn  in  the  Laivs.  In  revealing  Plato's 
social  philosophy,  the  Politicus,  or  Statesman  ranks 
third.12 

In  Plato's  ideal  society  there  is  a  hierarchy  of 
rank,  which  includes  three  classes  of  people:  the 
rulers,  or  true  guardians;  the  soldiers,  or  aux- 
iliaries ;  and  the  artisans,  or  the  industrial  and  agri- 
cultural workers.  In  introducing  the  ideal  state 


84  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

Plato  uses  mature  individuals.13  Out  of  the  needs 
and  through  the  activities  of  fully-developed  per- 
sons, Plato  builds  an  ideal  commonwealth. 

No  individual  is  self-sufficing.  Each  has  his 
peculiar  bias,  or  ability.  By  uniting,  all  will  profit. 
There  are  not  only  specialized  classes,  but  there  is 
specialization  within  the  occupational  groups.  An 
essential  rule  for  the  building  of  a  just  society  is 
that  each  individual  shall  find  his  place  in  the  social 
order  and  shall  fulfil  his  special  function.  Plato 
recognized  the  need  for  correlating  the  diversities 
of  nature  and  the  different  types  of  occupation.14 

The  common  people  are  engaged  in  the  foun- 
dational  occupations  as  skilled  artisans.  The  ad- 
vantages of  a  special  education  are  not  open  to 
them.  They  receive  the  common  education,  in- 
cluding gymnastic  and  music  training.  But,  in 
accordance  with  the  aristocratic  strain  in  Plato's 
social  philosophy,  it  is  useless  to  try  to  give  a  higher 
education  to  that  large  proportion  of  the  population 
who  are  mentally  incapable  of  profiting  by  higher 
education.  The  logic  is  good  but  the  major  premise 
is  faulty  in  this  pedagogical  rule. 

The  second  class,  the  soldiers,  will  maintain  order 
at  home,  repel  invaders,  and  conduct  territorial 
wars.  The  growth  of  population  will  create  a  de- 
mand for  more  territory.  Other  states  likewise  will 
need  more  territory,  and  war  will  become  inevit- 
able.15 Plato  frankly  admits  the  territorial  basis  of 
wars.  From  this  factor  he  sees  no  escape,  al- 


GRECIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  85 

though  he  declares  peace  to  be  better  than  war.16 
In  his  Tamias  and  Critias  he  pictured  a  peace-state, 
"Atlantis." 

The  soldier's  occupation  is  an  art  which  requires 
years  of  training.  The  chief  physical  trait  of  a  true 
soldier  is  courage.  The  social  psychological  sig- 
nificance of  a  military  regime  is  that  soldiers  are 
continually  inciting  their  country  to  go  to  war. 
Such  a  regime  raises  up  enemies  against  itself, 
many  and  mighty,  and  results  either  in  ruining  the 
specific  people  or  in  enslaving  the  foes  of  these 
people.17  On  the  other  hand,  the  non-soldier  classes, 
since  they  prefer  to  lead  a  peaceful  life  and  seek  to 
conduct  their  affairs  quietly,  unduly  endeavor  to 
avoid  war.  By  degrees  they  become  unwarlike; 
their  children  develop  a  like  attitude.  Eventually, 
they  find  themselves  at  the  mercy  of  their  enemies 
and  are  enslaved.18 

Among  the  members  of  the  state  there  will  be  a 
few  especially  able  individuals,  destined  by  birth 
and  reinforced  by  training  to  be  rulers  and  true 
guardians  of  the  welfare  of  all.19  They  are  lovers 
of  wisdom  and  philosophy.  Flabbiness  of  charac- 
ter, drunkenness,  selfishness  are  unbecoming  to 
them.20  Selfish  living  is  condemned.21  The  guar- 
dians are  characterized,  according  to  Plato,  by  the 
greatest  eagerness  to  do  what  is  for  the  good  of 
their  country.  They  show  utter  repugnance  to  any- 
thing that  is  contrary  to  the  best  interests  of  the 
state.22 


86  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

The  guardians,  however,  rule  aristocratically.23 
They  do  not  inquire  of  the  citizens  the  kind  of  laws 
which  they  want  passed,  for  the  same  reason  that  a 
physician  does  not  ask  the  patient  the  kind  of  medi- 
cine which  he  wants.  In  the  Republic,  the  Laws,  and 
the  other  dialogues  where  the  nature  of  rulers  and 
philosophers  is  discussed,  Plato's  "best  men"  show 
an  indifference  to  earthly  or  material  things  and 
uniformly  seek  righteousness,  even  social  righteous- 
ness. 

The  candidates  for  guardianship  receive  first  the 
elements  of  education.  At  twenty  years  of  age  they 
must  pass  a  general  education  in  order  that  they 
may  go  on  with  a  special  course,  including  arith- 
metic, geometry,  and  astronomy.24  At  thirty  they 
are  subjected  to  a  further  examination,  after  which 
the  successful  individuals  devote  five  years  to  the 
study  of  philosophy.  At  thirty-five  they  enter  prac- 
tical life,  hold  minor  offices,  balance  their  theoretical 
training  by  practical  studies,  and  submit  to  diverse 
temptations.25  They  undergo  a  civil  service  exami- 
nation which  extends  over  a  period  of  years.  At 
the  close  they  are  subjected  to  a  final  series  of  three- 
fold tests.  The  first  test  is  that  of  logic ;  they  must 
argue  successfully  that  it  pays  an  individual,  espe- 
cially a  guardian,  to  serve  society.  The  second 
test  is  that  of  fear;  they  are  faced  with  dangers, 
for  example,  the  dangers  to  life,  which  beset  those 
who  undertake  to  rule  without  favoritism  and  with- 
out compromising  their  principles  when  confronted 


GRECIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGPIT  87 

with  the  ambitions  and  desires  of  powerful  selfish 
interests.  The  third  test  is  that  of  pleasure;  they 
are  submitted  to  all  the  pleasures  which  thrill  the 
heart  of  man.  In  other  words,  they  must  show 
proof  that  the  highest  interest  of  the  state  is  to 
be  the  ruling  interest  of  their  lives.26  Neither  pain 
nor  threats  must  affect  their  loyalty.  The  tempta- 
tions which  come  from  pleasures  and  enchantments 
must  not  disturb  their  self-control  or  weaken  their 
qualities  of  guardianship.  From  these  requirements 
it  will  be  seen  that  Plato  provided  for  a  long  period 
of  intensive  and  extensive  training  for  the  rulers. 
His  idea  varied  widely  from  the  ancient  theory  of 
the  divine  right  of  kings  and  from  the  current  prac- 
tice of  distributing  political  spoils  to  friends. 

Plato  saw  that  the  rulers  when  once  selected  and 
installed  in  office  would  be  tempted  to  become  avari- 
cious at  the  expense  of  the  state.  Instead  of  be- 
coming and  remaining  allied  to  all  the  citizens,  they 
will  be  prone  to  become  tyrannical.27  Plato  per- 
ceived that  it  would  be  difficult,  after  good  rulers 
had  been  selected,  to  keep  them  on  the  plane  of  good 
rulership.  In  order  to  preserve  their  virtue  as  guar- 
dians and  to  remove  the  powerful  temptation  to 
wink  at  exploitation  that  is  carried  on  by  the  eco- 
nomically powerful,  Plato  indicated  certain  pro- 
tective devices.  The  guardians  shall  be  permitted 
no  private  property  beyond  a  few  incidentals.  They 
shall  not  live  in  private  houses,  but  shall  dwell  and 
eat  together.  They  shall  receive  a  fixed  salary, 


88  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

sufficient  to  meet  necessary  expenses  but  no  more. 
They  shall  not  be  allowed  to  touch  gold  and  silver 
or  to  wear  gold  and  silver  ornaments.  They  shall 
be  taught  that  they  are  made  of  divine  gold  and 
silver,  and  therefore  shall  have  no  need  of  the 
earthly  dross.  They  shall  not  be  subject  to  pollu- 
tion from  any  earthly  contacts.  If  the  guardians 
should  acquire  lands  or  moneys  or  homes  of  their 
own,  they  would  be  unable  to  give  their  undivided 
attention  to  the  state,  and  they  would  become  not 
guardians  of  the  welfare  of  the  citizens,  but  tyrants, 
plotting  and  being  plotted  against.28  In  his  zealous 
care  that  the  rulers  might  not  be  distracted  from 
guarding  with  undivided  attention  the  interests  of 
the  state,  Plato  advocated  community  of  wives  and 
children  for  the  rulers.29 

The  question  arose :  Will  the  people  be  content 
to  accept  the  division  of  the  population  into  hierar- 
chal  classes?  In  reply,  Plato  suggested  that  the 
power  of  public  opinion  be  utilized,  and  that  all  the 
inhabitants  of  the  state  be  taught  that  they  are 
brothers,  that  is,  children  of  their  common  Mother 
Earth.  This  instruction  will  serve  to  keep  the 
masses  in  a  humble  attitude.  Further,  they  are  to 
be  told  that  different  metals  have  been  used  by 
Mother  Earth  in  making  different  individuals. 
Those  persons  in  whose  make-up  gold  has  been  min- 
gled have  the  power  of  command  and  may  become 
rulers.  Others  who  are  made  of  silver  may  become 
auxiliaries,  or  soldiers;  while  the  masses,  being 


GRECIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  89 

made  of  brass  and  iron,  are  destined  to  become 
artisans.30 

The  objection  is  raised  that  people  will  not  be- 
lieve this  "audacious  fiction."  The  truth  of  the 
objection  is  admitted,  and  a  solution  of  the  problem 
is  offered.  Teach  the  children  the  gold,  silver,  brass 
and  iron  fiction ;  and  they  will  believe  it.  When  they 
grow  to  maturity,  they  will  tell  their  children,  who 
in  turn  will  teach  it.  Posterity,  thus,  will  accept 
it.31  In  this  way  Plato  founded  his  social  philosophy 
upon  education.  Plato  made  clear  that  any  kind 
of  social  or  economic  theory  can  be  foisted  upon 
a  whole  people  through  the  utilization  of  the  educa- 
tional processes.  A  few  selfish  exploiters,  by  con- 
trolling the  educational  system,  can  ruin  a  nation 
in  a  generation. 

The  guardians  are  instructed  to  examine  the  chil- 
dren in  order  to  discover  of  what  metals  they  are 
made.  Plato  admitted  a  democracy  of  talent  in 
the  sense  that  talent  is  likely  to  appear  in  the  chil- 
dren of  brass  and  iron  parents,  while  gold  parents 
may  beget  brass  and  iron  children.  If  a  gold  child 
is  found  among  the  children  of  the  artisans,  he  is 
to  be  encouraged  and  trained  to  become  a  guardian. 
If  a  brass  and  iron  child  is  found  among  the  chil- 
dren of  the  gold  parents,  he  must  descend  the  social 
scale  and  be  trained  for  husbandry  or  artisanship.32 
Plato  foresaw  the  fact,  now  scientifically  estab- 
lished, that  geniuses  are  born  indiscriminately 
among  all  classes  of  society  from  the  highest  to  the 


90  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

lowest.  They  are  just  as  likely  to  be  born  in  the 
hovel  or  overcrowded  tenement  as  in  the  spacious 
and  luxuriant  palace.  Consequently,  society  should 
seek  out  potential  genius  and  give  it  opportunities 
commensurate  with  its  possibilities  and  not  allow 
its  dynamic  and  divine  spark  to  be  snuffed  out  in 
a  heavy-laden  tenement  atmosphere. 

Furthermore,  according  to  Plato,  the  guardians 
are  to  seek  out  the  imperfect  children  and  put  them 
out  of  the  way  as  easily  as  possible  and  without 
attracting  public  attention.33  If  the  capable  must 
devote  their  energies  to  the  care  of  imperfect  chil- 
dren, they  would  presumably  be  wasting  their 
ability  and  would  be  prevented  from  devoting 
themselves  to  upbuilding  the  state.  This  doctrine 
neglects  the  consideration  of  the  harsh,  unsympa- 
thetic attitude  which  it  would  engender.  Although 
rigorously  eugenic,  the  doctrine  is  undemocratic, 
unchivalric,  and  unChristian.  It  is  thoroughly 
aristocratic. 

The  guardians  are  to  supervise  marriage.  Plato 
especially  deplores  the  fact  that  almost  all  persons 
choose  their  life-partners  in  marriage  without 
proper  regard  to  the  kind  of  children  that  will  be 
procreated.34  The  marriage  relationship  should 
not  be  primarily  an  individual  affair,  but  should 
be  governed  by  the  thought  of  the  children  that  are 
not  yet  born  and  by  due  regard  to  the  welfare  of 
the  state  and  society.35  The  true  purpose  of  mar- 
riage is  not  found  in  wealth  or  power  or  rank,  but 


GRECIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 


91 


in  the  procreation  of  healthy  minded  children.  Mar- 
riage is  sacred  in  the  highest  degree  because  it  is 
socially  necessary.  Plato  deplores  class  marriages, 
that  is,  marriage  within  temperamentally  similar 
groups.  Persons  of  gentle  nature  seek  persons  of 
gentle  nature ;  the  courageous  seek  the  courageous. 
It  would  be  better  if  the  gentle  would  seek  the 
courageous  in  marriage,  and  vice  versa.36  Mar- 
riage is  sacred,  and  hence  should  be  subjected  to 
strict  eugenic  safeguards. 

The  guardians  shall  prevent  the  extremes  of  pov- 
erty and  riches.  With  far-sighted  social  wisdom 
Plato  points  out  that  poverty  is  the  parent  of  mean- 
ness and  viciousness,  and  that  wealth  leads  to  lux- 
ury and  indolence.37  Both  result  in  discontent  and 
both  cause  the  deterioration  of  the  arts.  The  poor 
man  cannot  properly  equip  or  train  himself,  or  enter 
into  his  work  painstakingly ;  the  rich  man  will  grow 
careless  and  no  longer  act  diligently  when  he  comes 
into  the  possession  of  unlimited  wealth.38 

In  the  acquisition  of  wealth  the  laws  of  imitation 
function  powerfully.  One  person  accumulates 
property;  others  are  immediately  stimulated  to  do 
likewise.  In  consequence,  all  the  citizens  may  be- 
come lovers  of  money.39  But  a  money-loving  public 
would  be  disastrous  to  the  state. 

The  larger  the  amount  of  wealth  that  an  indi- 
vidual accumulates,  the  more  he  will  want  to  ac- 
cumulate. The  momentum  of  the  desire  for  money- 
getting  is  socially  destructive.  The  more  the  indi- 


92  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

vidual  is  hypnotised  by  the  wealth-getting  delusion, 
the  less  attention  does  he  give  to  the  maintenance 
of  virtue.  When  the  desire  for  virtue  is  in  compe- 
tition with  the  desire  for  riches,  the  former  de- 
creases as  the  latter  increases.40 

When  the  state  becomes  established  on  a  property 
basis,  the  rich  exercise  power  and  the  poor  are 
deprived  of  it.41  In  ordinary  times  the  rich  are  as 
indifferent  to  the  welfare  of  the  poor  as  to  the  de- 
velopment of  virtue,  but  in  times  of  group  crises 
they  will  not  despise  the  poor.  In  the  days  of  pros- 
perity and  peace  the  poor  man  is  given  the  hind- 
most position,  but  when  war  comes,  "the  wiry,  sun- 
burnt poor  man"  is  placed  in  battle  at  the  side  of 
the  wealthy  man42 — and  social  democracy  obtains. 
But  in  battle  the  poor  man  fights  longer  and  better 
than  the  rich  man  "who  has  never  spoilt  his  com- 
plexion and  has  plenty  of  superfluous  flesh."  In 
the  words  of  the  poor  man  Plato  draws  the  astound- 
ing conclusion  that  many  persons  are  rich  because 
no  one  has  had  the  courage  to  despoil  them.43  At 
this  point  Plato  has  given  a  striking  explanation  of 
the  rise  of  socialism,  syndicalism,  and  economic 
radicalism. 

When  you  see  paupers,  according  to  Plato,  you 
may  safely  conclude  that  somewhere  there  are  also 
present  thieves,  robbers  of  temples,  and  malefac- 
tors.44 The  causes  of  pauperism  are  given  as  (1) 
a  lack  of  proper  education,  (2)  ill-training,  and  (3) 
unjust  social  laws  and  an  unjust  constitution  of  the 


GRECIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  93 

state." 

Plato  suggested  two  instruments  for  preventing 
extreme  wealth  and  poverty — legislation  and  edu- 
cation. Each  individual  is  to  be  guaranteed  a  mini- 
mum amount  of  property.  He  may  acquire  as  much 
as  four  times  this  amount,  but  above  the  maximum 
a  one  hundred  per  cent  excess  tax  operates.46  Plato 
planned  a  form  of  communism,  not  primarily  to  se- 
cure the  material  well-being  of  the  state,  but  to 
safeguard  the  rulers  against  falling  before  selfish 
temptations.  Plato  also  wanted  to  protect  the  state 
from  splitting  asunder  because  of  the  distractions 
that  arise  from  labor-capital  controversies.  By 
educational  means  the  children  are  to  be  trained  to 
be  satisfied  with  the  necessaries  of  life47 — at  least 
some  children  are  to  be  so  trained.  Parents  should 
bequeath  to  their  children  not  riches  but  the  spirit 
of  reverence.48 

The  guardians  shall  be  censors.  They  shall  es- 
tablish a  censorship  over  the  arts  in  order  to  protect 
the  children  from  seeing  indecent  sights  and  hear- 
ing vulgar  sounds.  The  works  of  fiction  shall  be 
censored  in  order  to  prevent  the  children  from  read- 
ing and  adopting  bad  ideas.  The  creative  artists 
shall  be  prevented  from  exhibiting  forms  of  vice 
and  intemperance,  in  order  that  the  future  guar- 
dians may  not  grow  up  in  an  atmosphere  contami- 
nated by  images  of  moral  deformity,  and  in  order 
that  all  children  may  develop  in  an  environment 
of  fair  sights  and  should  and  may  receive  unhin- 


94  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

dered  and  unhampered  the  good  in  everything.49 

The  guardians  shall  protect  the  mores.  When 
Plato  described  a  perfect  state,  any  change  in  the 
established  customs  would  mean  retrogression.50 
Hence,  the  rulers  should  jealously  guard  the  cus- 
toms, allowing  no  insidious  innovations.  Further, 
if  any  change  is  permitted  to  take  place  in  small 
things,  there  may  be  no  stopping  the  spirit  of 
change. 

Plato  rested  his  argument  for  an  ideal  society 
upon  the  education  of  wise  leaders.  Their  judg- 
ment is  better  even  than  government  by  law.  Law 
is  too  rigid  and  inflexible.  In  view  of  the  change- 
able character  of  human  conditions,  which  Plato 
recognized,  no  final  or  absolute  laws  can  be  laid 
down.51  The  chief  advantage  of  laws,  however,  is 
not  that  they  make  men  honest  but  that  they  make 
men  act  uniformly,  and  hence  in  a  socially  reliable 
way.  Laws  are  to  be  respected  because  they  repre- 
sent the  ripe  fruits  of  long  experience.52 

Considerable  attention  is  given  to  penology  in  the 
Laws.  2  In  view  of  the  sanctity  of  custom  and  of 
the  necessity  of  law,  obedience  is  a  highly  important 
social  virtue.  In  theory  Plato  is  modern  and  scien- 
tific, for  he  advocated  punishment,  not  as  a  vindic- 
tive but  as  a  preventive  and  reformatory  measure.54 
Reformation  is  the  true  aim  of  punishment.55  In 
practice  Plato  is  rigid  and  harsh.  For  example, 
beggars  are  simply  to  be  sent  out  of  the  city  and 
out  of  the  country.58  The  death  penalty  is  utilized 


GRECIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  95 

freely." 

Plato  opened  all  occupations  to  women  as  well  as 
men,  even  the  highest,  that  of  ruling.58  The  only 
difference  between  the  sexes  that  needs  to  be  recog- 
nized occupationally  is  that  men  are  stronger  phys- 
ically than  women.59  Women,  like  men,  vary  in 
occupational  temperament.  One  individual  is  fitted 
for  one  kind  of  vocation;  another,  for  some  other 
type  of  work. 

Although  the  fundamental  importance  of  bearing 
children  is  appreciated,  Plato  observed  that  it  is 
unnecessary  that  a  woman  devote  her  whole  life 
to  the  rearing  of  children.  All  women  should  have 
opportunities  for  the  development  of  their  per- 
sonalities. Those  women  who  have  special  talent 
for  public  service  should  enter  thereupon.  Al- 
though a  social  conservative  Plato  admits  an  inno- 
vation in  the  ideal  republic — universal  woman 
suffrage. 

Since  women  have  the  same  duties  as  men,  they 
receive  the  same  opportunities  for  training. 
Women  must  share  in  the  toils  of  war  and  the  de- 
fense of  their  country.60  Women  are  priestesses  ;61 
they  serve  on  committees  for  the  regulation  of  mar- 
riage, and  for  deciding  divorce  cases.62 

Although  Plato  was  averse  to  change,  he  advo- 
cated a  dynamic  type  of  education.  This  educa- 
tional system,  however,  is  to  be  definitely  controlled 
by  the  guardians.  It  is  also  paternalistic.  Common 
education  shall  be  of  two  kinds :  gymnastic,  for  the 


96  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

body ;  music,  for  the  soul.03  Gymnastic  training  will 
produce  a  temper  of  hardness,  and  music  will  lead 
to  gentleness.  The  extreme  of  the  one  is  ferocity 
and  brutality;  the  extreme  of  the  other  is  softness 
and  effeminacy.64  When  taken  together,  they  pro- 
duce a  well-ordered  personality.  The  one  sustains 
and  makes  bold  the  reason,  the  second  moderates 
and  civilizes  the  mildness  of  passion.65  Gymnastic 
exercises  provide  for  the  care  and  training  of  the 
body  through  childhood  and  youth  so  that  in  ma- 
turity the  body  may  best  serve  the  soul.66  Music, 
including  literature,  trains  through  the  influence  of 
its  qualities  of  harmony  and  rhythm.  For  example, 
through  exercises  in  harmony  the  child  develops 
a  harmonious  temperament. 

Education  is  not  a  process  of  acquisition,  but  of 
the  development  of  the  powers  within  the  indi- 
vidual.67 It  is  a  life-long  process;  it  begins  with 
birth  and  continues  until  death.  It,  however,  slows 
up  as  the  individual  grows  old.  An  aged  person 
cannot  learn  much,  no  more  than  he  can  run  much.68 
Education  in  the  early  years  of  life  is  the  most  im- 
portant. As  a  child  is  educated,  so  will  his  future 
be  determined.69  A  child  should  be  taught  early  to 
respect  his  parents.  Great  care  should  be  given  to 
the  first  years  of  life.  From  three  to  six  years  of 
age  the  children  in  Plato's  republic  come  under  the 
supervision  of  chosen  matrons  and  nurses. 

Education  shall  be  universal,  but  not  compulsory, 
that  is,  all  shall  be  taught,  but  not  compelled  to 


GRECIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  97 

learn.  Education  shall  be  made  attractive,  almost 
a  form  of  government.70  The  laws  of  imitation 
shall  be  utilized.  The  tutor  shall  carry  out  his 
teachings  in  practice.71 

A  well-trained  individual  is  a  replica  of  a  just 
society.  Plato  draws  a  parallelism,  which  is  inac- 
curate, between  the  three  classes  in  society  and 
three  traits  of  the  individual.  The  rulers,  soldiers, 
and  artisans  are  compared  respectively  to  the  rea- 
son, the  spirit,  and  the  passions  of  the  individual. 
The  passions  must  be  subordinated  to  the  spirit, 
and  both  must  be  controlled  by  reason.  The  result 
will  be  a  just  individual.72  In  society  a  similar 
hierarchal  relation  shall  hold  between  the  rulers, 
soldiers,  and  artisans.  The  fundamental  aim  in 
education  shall  be  to  secure  a  change  in  the  atti- 
tudes of  people.  Such  changes  are  more  important 
than  modification  in  external  matters.  Thus,  ac- 
cording to  Plato,  the  divine  foundations  of  a  state 
are  laid  in  education. 

Religion  plays  a  basic  role  in  the  ideal  Republic. 
Plato  held  that  belief  in  God  superseded  in  import- 
ance the  doctrine  that  might  is  right.  Impiety  un- 
dermines the  strength  of  the  social  kingdom.  God 
created  the  individual  for  the  whole,  but  not  the 
whole  for  the  individual.  The  worship  of  God  is 
necessary  for  the  individual  in  order  to  prevent  him 
from  reverting  to  selfishness  and  from  making  his 
humanitarian  beliefs  purely  egoistic  phenomena. 

Inasmuch  as  Plato  outlined  at  the  start  a  perfect 


98  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

republic,  any  change  would  likely  constitute  a  de- 
terioration. But  even  an  ideal  state  is  not  immune 
to  the  entry  of  destructive  ideas.  The  wise  men, 
the  rulers,  are  not  proof  against  the  temptations 
of  absolute  power.  To  remove  the  stirrings  of 
self-interest  in  the  minds  of  the  guardians,  Plato 
planned  a  communistic  order.  He  overlooked,  how- 
ever, the  weaknesses  of  communism,  but  these  were 
pointed  out  at  a  later  time  by  Aristotle. 

In  spite  of  excellent  safeguards  the  wisdom  of 
the  best  rulers  will  occasionally  fail  them.  Sooner 
or  later  they  will  err.  In  examining  the  youth  they 
will  allow  warrior  youth  to  be  trained  for  the  guar- 
dian class.  With  their  spirit  of  contention  and  of 
ambition  for  honor  these  adventitious  guardians 
will  start  the  perfect  state  upon  the  downward 
road.74  When  the  rulers  seek  personal  power  and 
honor,  the  ideal  republic  will  be  superseded  by  a 
timocracy. 

In  a  timocracy  the  ruler  with  the  most  private 
wealth  will  possess  the  greatest  personal  power  and 
receive  the  highest  honor.  Moreover,  other  persons 
will  be  stimulated,  thereby,  to  acquire  wealth  and 
power.  In  the  meantime  the  masses  will  lose  nearly 
everything.  The  result  is  an  oligarchy  in  which 
the  wealthy  are  honored  and  made  rulers.75  The 
poor  are  treated  with  dishonor  and  deprived  of 
position. 

In  such  an  oligarchic  state  there  is  a  fundamental 
division;  there  are  two  states  instead  of  one.  In 


GRECIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  99 

spirit,  the  rich  and  the  poor  comprise  separate 
states.  They  live  in  the  same  territory  but  are  con- 
spiring against  one  another.78  Social  stability  is  de- 
stroyed by  the  conflicts  between  the  extremes  of 
countless  riches  and  utter  poverty.  The  property- 
less  hate  and  conspire  against  the  propertied.77 
Civil  war  ensues.  Because  the  wealthy  have  fallen 
into  carelessness  and  extravagance,  and  because  the 
poor  possess  superior  numbers,  the  poor  are  the 
victors.  A  democracy — the  rule  of  the  Demos — 
comes  into  being.  Everyone  rules. 

But  the  populace  is  not  fitted  to  rule.  They  are 
without  experience.  Since  the  drones  are  numerous 
among  the  common  people,  the  drones  manage 
almost  everything  in  a  democracy.78  Excess  of  lib- 
erty among  people  untrained  for  liberty  leads  to 
anarchy.  Individuals  will  set  themselves  up  as  the 
special  friends  of  the  common  people.  These  self- 
appointed  friends  of  the  people  will  prove  to  be 
self-seeking  tyrants;  the  democracy  will  be  trans- 
formed into  a  tyranny — the  lowest  state  of  all  in 
Plato's  five-fold  devolution. 

With  distrust  of  the  masses  and  with  a  paternal- 
istic government,  Plato  coupled  a  belief  that  the 
individual  must  participate  in  the  life  of  society. 
Social  justice  does  not  consist  in  doing  good  to  one's 
friends  and  ill  to  one's  enemies,  or  in  catering  to 
the  interests  of  the  most  powerful.  The  theory  that 
might  is  right  is  repudiated.79  A  just  society  is  one 
in  which  every  person  has  found  his  place  of  great- 


100  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

est  usefulness  to  the  state  and  fulfils  his  entire  obli- 
gations in  that  place.  On  the  whole  Plato  exhibited 
an  impassioned  faith  in  the  moral  and  social  order. 
Plato  believed  that  Ideas  are  real  and  that  they 
are  the  tools  with  which  the  world  is  made  over. 
He  perceived  perfect  Forms;  even  a  perfect  social 
Form.  Through  intellectual  control,  Plato  planned 
a  new  social  order. 


CHAPTER  VI. 
ARISTOTLE  AND  GRECIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 


Aristotle  (384-322  B.  C),  the  distinguished  pupil 
of  Plato,  did  not  make,  like  his  master,  a  unified 
contribution  to  social  thought.  He  sacrificed  unity 
for  the  examination  of  parts.  Aristotle  was  an 
opportunist,  a  pragmatist,  and  a  practical  student 
of  conditions  and  constitutions.  Unlike  Plato,  Aris- 
totle did  not  look  for  Ideas  separate  from  but  in 
things. 

Aristotle  studied  158  constitutions  inductively 
and  comparatively.  His  primary  attention  was 
given  to  what  is,  rather  than  to  what  ought  to  be. 
His  eyes  were  directed  first  of  all  to  the  parts,  and 
then  to  the  whole.  In  this  examination  he  found 
that  the  parts  are  related,  and  further,  that  they 
hold  a  developmental  relation.  Instead  of  Plato's 
perfection,  we  shall  now  consider  Aristotle's  proc- 
ess of  becoming.  Although  unsystematic,  the  social  "t 
ideas  of  Aristotle  reveal  the  concepts  of  process  and  1 
progress. 

In  Aristotle's  Ethics  the  discussion  of  virtue  is 
socially  valuable.  Virtue  is  a  mean.  Virtue  is  an 
impulse  which  is  expressed  neither  in  excess  or  in 
deficiency.  It  is  an  impulse  expressed  temperately 


102  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

until  it  becomes  a  habit.  Excess  and  deficiency 
are  equally  fatal.  The  coward  is  he  who  avoids 
and  fears  anything;  the  foolhardy  is  he  who  rushes 
into  danger  anywhere.1  Liberality  is  the  mean  be- 
tween prodigality  and  avarice;  civility  is  the  mean 
between  obsequiousness  and  insolence.  Virtue  itself 
is  the  mean  between  self-indulgence  and  asceticism. 
In  virtue,  lies  happiness,  man's  summum  bonum. 

Aristotle's  Politics  affords  a  searching  analysis 
of  many  phases  of  societary  life.  The  family  and 
the  state  are  by  nature  prior  to  the  individual,  since 
the  whole  must  exist  before  any  individual  part.2 
When  isolated,  the  individual  is  not  self-sufficient. 
Thus,  the  state  is  founded  on  the  social  needs  of 
the  individual.  By  virtue  of  these  social  needs, 
man  possesses  the  gregarious,  or  social,  instinct. 
By  nature,  man  is  a  political  animal,3  that  is,  he  is 
a  being  who  by  nature  or  necessity  lives  in  associa- 
tion with  his  kind.  Man  can  attain  his  highest  good 
only  as  a  member  of  society. 

Property  is  accorded  by  Aristotle  a  fundamental 
social  position.  Physical  necessities  can  best  be 
provided  through  the  efforts  of  individuals.  Com- 
munal ownership  of  property  on  a  large  scale  will 
fail.  In  referring  to  Plato's  communism,  Aristotle 
declared :  "For  that  which  is  common  to  the  great- 
est number  has  the  least  care  bestowed  upon  it."4 
Further,  when  one  feels  a  thing  to  be  his  own,  how 
much  greater  is  his  pleasure  in  it.5  Then,  if  one  has 
private  property,  he  may  have  the  great  pleasure 


GRECIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  103 

which  comes  from  making  gifts  to  others.  More- 
over, communism  will  lead  to  an  unusual  amount 
of  quarrelling;  those  who  work  faithfully  will  feel 
aggrieved  when  they  see  that  those  who  work  dilet- 
tantishly  receive  and  consume  a  full  portion.6 

Aristotle  deprecated  land  equalization.  Equali- 
zation of  the  desire  for  land  is  urged.  Instead  of 
dividing  land  equally  or  of  establishing  communism 
in  land,  Aristotle  advocated  that  the  higher  classes 
be  trained  not  to  desire  more  land.  He  also  stated 
that  speculators  and  land  schemers  should  be  pre- 
vented from  getting  more  land.7 

The  communism  in  wives  and  children  that  Plato 
suggested,  Aristotle  denounced  as  impracticable  and 
foolish.  Such  a  procedure  will  weaken  friendship 
and  destroy  love.  Moreover,  it  will  break  up  the 
unity  of  the  state.8 

Aristotle  held  the  prevalent  disdainful  attitude 
toward  manual  labor,  and  theoretically  justified 
slavery.  A  slave  is  a  person  who  by  nature  is  a 
slave,  a  person  who  by  nature  expresses  himself 
through  bodily  action.  He  is  unable  to  guide  him- 
self by  means  of  reason.9 

The  subject  of  social  control  and  government  re- 
ceived extended  treatment  from  Aristotle.  After 
considering  a  great  variety  of  forms  of  government, 
he  avoided  a  dogmatic  choice  of  any  particular 
form.  He  arrived  at  what  is  the  modern,  scien- 
tific conclusion,  namely,  that  no  one  form  of  gov- 
ernment is  to  be  worshipped  to  the  exclusion  of  all 


104  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

other  types.  A  successful,  or  virtuous,  government 
depends  on  the  attitude  of  the  people.  Human  na- 
ture must  be  changed.  All  people  must  become 
socially  virtuous  before  a  perfected  government 
can  be  established. 

Theoretically,  Aristotle  believed  that  the  best 
government  would  come  through  the  absolute  ruler- 
ship  of  one  man,  provided  that  there  is  available  a 
man  pre-eminently  wise  and  virtuous.  But  prac- 
tically, Aristotle  held  that  in  choosing  a  form  of 
government  which  will  succeed,  it  is  necessary  to 
consider  the  actual  social  conditions,  the  state  of 
development  of  the  people,  and  the  attitude  of  the 
ruler  or  rulers.  It  does  not  matter  whether  one 
person,  or  a  few  persons,  or  a  large  number  of  per- 
sons perform  the  function  of  ruler  so  long  as  the 
best  interests  of  the  state  are  kept  uppermost.  If 
the  interests  of  the  entire  group  are  the  guiding 
principles,  then  royalty,  aristocracy,  or  constitution- 
alism is  commendable.  The  one,  the  few,,  or  the 
many  are  good  rulers,  providing  they  are  dominated 
by  the  common  interests.  In  these  declarations 
Aristotle  overlooked  the  fact  that  participation  in 
government  by  the  governed  is  essential.  He  also 
neglected  the  fact  that  a  "best"  ruler  would  be  sub- 
ject to  very  many  temptations  as  a  result  of  personi- 
fying in  himself  all  the  forms  of  political,  economic, 
and  social  power  that  exist  within  the  state.  After 
a  period  of  time  he  would  probably  yield  to  some 
interests  which  are  inimical  to  the  welfare  of  the 


GRECIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  105 

whole.10 

When  private  interests  control  the  government, 
the  resultant  forms  of  government  are  either 
tyranny,  oligarchy,  or  democracy.  According  to 
Aristotle  the  chief  difference  between  oligarchy  and 
democracy  is  that  an  oligarchy  is  the  rule  of  the 
rich  and  a  democracy  is  the  rule  of  the  poor.  Evi- 
dently, he  believed  that  the  poor  are  as  selfish  as  the 
rich  and  that  the  poor  are  incapable  of  being 
trained  to  the  levels  of  virtuous  citizenship. 

Although  Aristotle  is  aristocratic  in  his  political 
science  and  advocated  frequently  the  rule  of  the 
best  few,  he  endorsed  a  constitutional  republic. 
Such  a  form  of  government  will  succeed  where 
there  are  many  wise  and  virtuous  individuals.  He 
admitted  that  in  large  numbers  there  is  a  stability 
of  judgment  and  that  common  sense  bulks  large. 
Under  constitutional  government,  the  extremes  will 
cancel  one  another,  and  the  virtuous  mean  will  rule. 
Large  numbers  of  persons  are  less  likely  to  be  cor- 
rupted than  a  few  persons  or  even  the  one  best  per- 


son.11 


There  are  two  fundamentals  in  a  good  govern- 
ment: first,  actual  obedience  of  the  laws  by  the 
citizens;  second,  the  social  goodness  of  the  laws. 
Aristotle's  formula  for  an  ideal  society  is  this: 
virtuous  people  and  good  laws,  both  judged  by  the 
common  welfare.  And  practically,  the  form  of 
political  organization — a  monarchy,  an  aristocracy, 
or  a  constitutional  republic — depends  upon  the  place 


106  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

of  the  members  of  the  social  order  on  the  incline  of 
socialization. 

If  a  constitutional  republic  is  established,  then 
rotation  in  office  should  be  practiced.  The  tenure 
of  office  should  be  restricted  to  six  months.12  An 
office  should  rarely  be  held  more  than  once  by  the 
same  person. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  laws  should  be  changed 
slowly.13  Law  has  no  power  to  make  people  obey 
in  spirit,  except  through  force  of  habit.  The  state 
must  guard  itself  against  small  changes  in  laws. 
Any  apparently  slight  neglect  or  disregard  of  law 
is  insidious;  transgression  creeps  in  unperceived.14 
At  first,  small  transgressions  may  not  be  observed ; 
then,  they  may  gain  such  momentum  that  they  will 
ruin  the  state.  Hence,  there  should  be  at  all  times 
strict  observance  of  laws. 

The  major  chord  in  Aristotle's  ideal  society  is  the 
social  mean.  The  existence  of  two  classes  only,  the 
very  rich  and  the  very  poor,  will  bring  disaster  to 
the  state.  The  very  wealthy  consider  themselves 
above  legalistic  or  social  authority;  the  very  poor 
are  too  degraded  to  understand  the  necessity  for 
and  the  reason  for  authority.15  In  fact,  all  who 
possess,  not  simply  an  unusual  degree  of  wealth,  but 
great  beauty,  great  strength  or  a  "noble"  birth  feel 
that  they  should  be  accorded  special  privileges. 
Further,  not  only  those  who  are  very  poor,  but  also 
the  persons  who  are  very  weak,  or  very  disgraced 
find  it  difficult  to  follow  the  dictates  of  law  or  of 


GRECIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  107 

social  reason.  With  the  privileged  characters  who 
possess  a  superabundance  of  advantages,  the  arro- 
gant attitude  developed  when  they  were  yet  chil- 
dren. At  home,  they  received  special  considera- 
tions ;  they  did  not  learn  obedience  within  the  small 
family  group.  In  consequence,  how  could  they  be 
expected  to  be  obedient  citizens  within  the  larger 
nation-group?  The  rich  are  likely  to  become  inso- 
lent and  avaricious;  they  will  rule  despotically.16 
Not  everyone  can  bear  either  prosperity  or  adver- 
sity. An  increase  in  prosperity  in  any  part  of  so- 
ciety should  be  carefully  noted,  and  that  part  of 
society  should  be  placed  under  surveillance.  No  one 
should  receive  extraordinary  power,  either  from 
friends  or  through  money.  Even  the  pre-eminent 
are  not  above  egotism. 

A  society  is  safest  when  the  middle  class  is  in 
control.17  The  states  will  likely  be  well  administered 
in  which  the  middle  class  is  numerous.  Persons  of 
about  equal  condition  do  not  plot  against  others; 
neither  are  they  plotted  against.  A  middle  class 
prevents  both  the  arrogant  wealthy  and  the  impetu- 
ous proletariat  from  dominating  the  state.  "In- 
equality is  the  source  of  all  revolutions." 

Poverty  is  a  cause  of  revolution  and  crime.18  In 
time  of  war,  it  is  important  that  the  poor  be  well 
fed  else  they  will  cause  disturbances.  Aristotle 
might  have  added  that  in  time  of  peace  the  poor 
should  be  able  to  feed  themselves  well  else  they  wrill 
in  due  season  cause  revolution. 


108  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

But  poverty  is  not  the  only  cause  of  crime. 
Riches  often  lead  to  crime.  Wealth  causes  the  com- 
mitment of  greater  crimes  than  does  poverty.  The 
greatest  offenses  are  not  occasioned  by  necessity  but 
by  excess.19  In  order  to  gratify  some  passion  or 
desire,  crime  is  often  committed.  Of  the  passions 
ambition  and  avarice  are  the  chief  causes  of  crime.20 
Intoxication  produces  crime.21 

The  causes  of  social  revolution  are  manifold. 
The  desire  for  equality  and  the  desire  for  inequality 
are  common  factors.22  Inferiors  revolt  in  order  that 
they  may  attain  a  state  of  equality  with  other  per- 
sons. Equals  revolt  in  order  that  they  may  gain 
superior  levels  of  honor  and  status.  Aristotle  cited 
a  long  list  of  additional  factors  in  social  revolu- 
tion: insolence,  fear,  political  graft,  a  dispropor- 
tionate increase  of  wealth  in  some  part  of  the  state, 
neglect  of  trifles  in  the  observance  of  laws,  dissimi- 
larity in  elements  such  as  racial.  The  fundamental 
cause,  however,  of  social  revolution  is  love  of  gain 
and  honor. 

Aristotle  was  not  a  militarist,  for  he  believed  that 
war  in  itself  is  not  a  social  good.  No  people  should 
be  trained  to  conquer  and  obtain  dominion  over 
neighboring  states.23  Military  states  are  safe  only 
when  they  are  at  war.  After  they  declare  peace  the 
weight  of  their  military  burdens  brings  about  their 
downfall.24 

The  principle  of  social  telesis,  which  has  been 
recently  developed  by  Lester  F.  Ward,  was  foreseen 


GRECIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  109 

by  Aristotle.  A  society  of  individuals,  like  the  in- 
dividual himself,  has  a  work  to  do.25  It  should 
adapt  itself  to  its  task. 

Aristotle  was  a  public  health  advocate.  The  loca- 
tion for  an  ideal  city  should  be  carefully  chosen.  It 
should  be  selected,  first  of  all,  with  reference  to  the 
health  of  the  citizens.  This  point  is  of  greater  im- 
portance than  that  of  locating  a  city  wisely  for  the 
purpose  of  public  administration  or  war.26  The  im- 
portance of  a  pure  water  supply  is  given  almost  a 
modern  emphasis. 

The  question  of  eugenics  received  the  attention 
of  Aristotle.  In  order  that  children  may  be  as 
physically  sound  as  possible,  legislators  should  give 
special  attention  to  the  institution  of  marriage. 
Youthful  marriages  are  condemned  because  the 
children  that  are  born  to  such  unions  will  be  want- 
ing in  respect  for  their  parents.27  Late  marriages 
will  be  unsatisfactory  because  there  will  be  too  great 
difference  between  the  ages  of  the  parents  and  their 
children.  The  marriage  of  a  man  and  a  woman 
whose  ages  are  widely  disproportionate  will  lead 
to  misunderstandings  and  quarrels.  According  to 
the  rigorous,  unsympathetic  dictum  of  Aristotle,  no 
deformed  child  shall  be  permitted  to  live.28  Even 
the  advocates  of  modern  birth  control  may  turn  for 
encouragement  to  Aristotle. 

In  the  marriage  relation  there  is  inequality.  The 
man  is  by  nature  better  fitted  to  command  than  the 
woman.29  The  chief  characteristic  of  a  good  wife 


110  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

is  obedience  to  her  husband — a  doctrine  which  is 
patriarchal.  Unfaithfulness  of  either  sex  in  mar- 
riage is  disgraceful.30 

Aristotle,  like  Plato,  considers  education  the  lead- 
ing social  force.  There  is  a  fundamental  educa- 
tional problem:  Shall  youth  be  trained  primarily 
(1)  to  do  useful  work,  (2)  to  be  virtuous,  or  (3)  to 
gain  higher  knowledge  ?31  No  final  answer  is  given. 
Aristotle's  conception  of  education,  however,  is 
paternalistic. 

Utilitarian  education  possesses  a  danger  line. 
To  be  seeking  always  after  the  useful  prevents  one 
from  developing  a  free  and  exalted  soul.32  Utili- 
tarian education  should  cease  when  it  cramps  the 
body  or  spirit  and  makes  either  less  fit  for  the  prac- 
tice of  virtue. 

Gymnastic  education  should  never  be  profession- 
alized or  allowed  to  hinder  the  individual's  higher 
education.33  The  excessive  training  which  leads  to 
Olympic  victories  is  anti-social,  because  the  consti- 
tution of  the  given  individual  is  exhausted.  Music 
is  valuable  inasmuch  as  it  has  the  power  of  form- 
ing character.34  The  persons  who  are  engaged 
in  seriously-minded  occupations  need  amusements 
which  will  give  relaxation. 

In  summary  of  Aristotle's  social  thought  it  may 
be  said  that  the  Stagirite  introduced  the  compara- 
tive method  of  studying  human  institutions.  He 
demonstrated  the  relative  value  of  institutions, 
showing  that  those  which  are  best  for  one  age  of 


GRECIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  111 

society  will  be  worthless  for  a  later  period.  In 
order  to  meet  changing  social  needs  and  conditions, 
institutions  must  change.  There  is  a  fundamental 
evolution  in  social  changes. 

A  communistic  social  organization,  according  to 
Aristotle,  is  psycho-sociologically  untenable.  The 
importance  of  the  middle  classes  is  socially  in- 
estimable. Laws  should  be  respected  in  small  par- 
ticulars. The  attitude  of  the  members  of  society 
toward  their  social  organizations  is  more  important 
than  the  type  of  organization  itself.  Human  con- 
duct in  the  mass  is  to  a  degree  predictable. 

After  the  time  of  Aristotle,  Hellenic  life  degen- 
erated. Political  corruption,  military  intrigue,  and 
intellectual  scepticism  vitiated  the  Hellenic  morality 
that  was  founded  on  custom.  The  ideal,  held  by 
Plato  and  Aristotle,  of  man  as  an  integral  part  of 
a  constructive  social  order  was  supplanted  by  a 
philosophy  of  pure  individualism. 

In  Athens,  Epicurus  (341-270  B.  C.)  became  the 
leader  of  the  popular  hedonistic  philosophy  with  its 
emphasis  upon  pleasure.  Self-sacrifice  and  noble 
conduct  in  the  social  sense  are  foreign  to  Epicu- 
reanism. Friends  should  be  sought,  not  for  the 
sake  of  cultivating  their  friendship,  but  for  the 
pleasure  to  the  seeker.  If  you  treat  other  persons 
unjustly,  they  will  retaliate;  therefore,  treat  others 
justly. 

Stoicism  which  was  founded  in  Athens  by  Zeno 
reached  its  culmination  among  the  Romans  and 


112  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

hence  will  be  discussed  in  the  following  chapter. 
Polybius  (203-121  B.  C),  known  as  the  last  Hel- 
lenic social  philosopher,  developed  a  theory  of  social 
evolution,  based  on  the  belief  that  people  associate 
because  of  the  selfish  benefits  that  accrue,  and  on 
the  fact  that  group  approval  and  disapproval  play  a 
leading  part  in  the  development  of  human  attitudes. 

Grecian  social  thought  is  noteworthy  because  of 
its  intellectual  foundations.  It  ignored  many  affec- 
tive elements,  and  for  that  reason  it  became  one- 
sided and  unbalanced.  It  was  rational  rather  than 
affective  or  supernatural.  It  was  designed  to 
meet  the  needs  of  this  life.  It  moved  away  from 
authority  and  towards  opportunism. 

Economically,  Hellenic  social  thought  assumed 
or  justified  human  slavery.  It  postulated  a  democ- 
racy, but  a  democracy  builded  on  the  backs  of  thou- 
sands of  slaves.  In  practice  at  the  height  of  the 
Athenian  democracy  there  were  only  about  25,000 
free  Athenians  as  against  300,000  slaves.  Women 
were  not  enfranchised.  The  governments  put 
slaves  into  the  armies,  and  ultimately  attempted  to 
throw  out  a  commercial  net  over  the  other  Mediter- 
ranean states.  As  a  result  they  lost  the  spirit  of 
democracy.  The  whole  system  and  concept  of 
democracy  was  undermined  by  the  debilitating  in- 
fluences of  an  industrial  autocracy.  The  social 
thought  of  the  Greek  was  limited  in  its  actual  ap- 
plication largely  to  the  privileged  few,  who  aris- 
tocratically ignored  the  needs  of  the  helpless  many. 


GRECIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  113 

Grecian  social  thought  at  the  height  of  the 
Athenian  democracy  did  achieve,  however,  for  its 
day  and  epoch,  a  unique  degree  of  expression 
among  the  free  citizens.  For  example,  in  the 
matter  of  athletics  and  recreation,  the  Athenians 
worked  together  in  furnishing  themselves  organ- 
ized group  activities.  Their  athletic  contests  were 
of  a  free  community  nature,  untrammelled  by  com- 
mercialized motives.  In  furnishing  recreation  for 
themselves,  'they  co-operated,  they  acted  as  com- 
munity units.  Moreover,  in  these  community  ac- 
tivities they  generated  in  themselves  the  spirit  of  a 
genuine  democratic  consciousness.  ^ 

The  fundamentals  of  Grecian  social  thought  were 
preserved  by  the  Romans,  without  being  augmented 
by  them.  Together  with  the  Hebrew  and  early 
Christian  social  thought,  Grecian  social  thought 
laid  the  foundations  for  the  rise  of  modern  social  , 
science,  and  even  of  sociology. 


CHAPTER  VII 
ROMAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 


Roman  social  thought  is  an  outgrowth  of  Hel- 
lenic philosophic  movements.  It  is  represented  in 
part  by  the  codification  of  important  phases  of 
societary  control — the  product  of  the  legalistic 
genius  of  the  Romans.  Stoicism,  moreover,  greatly 
affected  and  conditioned  the  meager  social  thinking 
of  the  Roman  scholars. 

Lucretius  (99-55  B.  C.)  was  the  chief  Roman 
exponent  of  Epicureanism.  In  his  story  of  social 
evolution  he  began  with  the  various  phases  of  the 
biological  struggle  for  existence,  and  proceeded  to 
depict  in  a  remarkably  significant  fashion  the 
origins  of  social  practices  and  customs.1  Although 
his  data  are  of  questionable  value,  his  descriptions 
of  social  origins  often  run  strangely  parallel  to 
modern  findings. 

The  ideal  commonwealth  of  Cicero  (106-43 
B.  C.)  is  founded  on  the  belief  that  Rome  has  the 
possibility  of  becoming  an  ideal  state.2  The  best 
ideas  in  this  connection  were  selected  by  Cicero 
from  the  Aristotelian,  Epicurean,  and  Stoic  phil- 
osophies. Cicero  was  apparently  an  exponent  of 
honest  statesmanship  and  finally  gave  his  life  for 


ROMAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  115 

civic  efficiency.  He  argued  that  a  child  should  not 
be  punished  by  either  a  parent  or  a  teacher  in  a  fit 
of  anger.  Corporal  punishment  should  be  con- 
sidered only  when  other  methods  fail  to  discipline. 

The  descriptive  studies  of  Julius  Caesar  (100-44 
B.  C.)  are  noteworthy.  The  Commentaries  present 
social  studies  of  contemporary  conditions ;  they  pos- 
sess modern  value.  In  a  large  number  of  instances 
the  accuracy  of  Caesar's  social  notes  has  been 
verified. 

The  teachings  of  the  Roman  Stoics  may  be  traced 
back  to  the  Socratic  formula :  Virtue  is  knowledge. 
Virtue  is  knowledge  which  grows  out  of  practical 
human  conduct.  Unlike  Aristotle,  the  Stoics  be- 
lieved that  sympathy  is  a  disease.  It  is  pathological 
and  hence  must  be  overcome.  In  helping  other  peo- 
ple the  wise  individual  does  not  allow  the  emotion 
of  pity  to  appear. 

Contrary  to  the  theory  of  the  Epicureans,  the 
Stoics  taught  that  pleasure  is  a  tiresome  and  sickly 
goal.  Seneca  (4  B.  C.-65  A.  D.),  a  leading  Roman 
Stoic,  declared :  "I  am  seeking  to  find  what  is  good 
for  a  man,  not  for  his  belly."3  Virtue,  according  to 
Stoic  philosophy,  consists  in  living  a  free  and  un- 
disturbed life.  A  line  was  drawn  between  the  vir- 
tuous and  non-virtuous,  between  a  few  virtuous  and 
a  multitude  of  fools.  This  doctrine  tends  to  en- 
gender in  the  few  virtuous  a  contemptuous  regard 
for  the  pig-trough  philosophy  of  the  many. 

This  tendency,  however,  was  offset  by  the  Stoic 


116  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

belief  that  all  persons  originally  possess  the  same 
nature  and  that  all  are  children  of  the  same  uni- 
versal Spirit.  Social  differences,  hence,  are  exter- 
nal and  superficial.  Beneath  the  surface  of  human 
nature  there  is  a  cosmopolitanism  which  constitutes 
a  passive  brotherhood  of  man.  Brotherly  love 
should  rule,  according  to  the  Stoics,  but  it  should 
rule  temperately,  and  not  in  such  a  way  as  to  disturb 
the  individual's  self  control.  Brotherly  love  should 
be  not  a  passionate  but  an  intellectual  element. 

In  his  treatise  on  Benefits,  Seneca  makes  benevo- 
lence the  most  social  of  all  virtues ;  and  ingratitude 
the  most  venal  of  all  crimes.  Marcus  Aurelius 
(121-180  A.  D.)  gave  the  social  injunction:  Love 
mankind.*  Living  should  consist  in  passing  from 
one  social  act  to  another.5  This  is  a  social  world; 
men  exist  for  the  sake  of  one  another.6 

The  Stoic  Emperor  declared  that  God  is  social 
and  that  individuals  are  part  of  God's  universe. 
Each  individual  is  a  component  part  of  the  social 
system,  and  hence  every  act  of  the  individual  is  an 
integral  phase  of  social  life.7  Inasmuch  as  the  In- 
telligence of  the  universe  is  social,  human  society! 
functions  as  a  phase  of  the  cosmic  co-ordination. 
We  are  all  co-laborers  and  co-operators.  Even  the 
persons  who  find  fault  and  who  hinder  what  hap- 
pens, are  performing  useful  co-operative  functions.8 
That  which  is  harmful  to  the  swarm  is  likewise 
harmful  to  the  individual.  Man  is  a  citizen  of  the 
world.9  The  services  of  a  good  citizen  are  never 


ROMAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  117 

lost.     The  good  citizen  does  good  chiefly  by  the 
example  he  sets.10 

But  the  cosmopolitanism  of  the  Stoics  never 
extended  beyond  a  passive  interest  in  the  world  of 
affairs.  It  meant  that  the  individual  should  be 
agreeable  with  other  persons,  that  he  should  be 
tolerant  of  the  weaknesses  of  others,  and  that  he 
should  be  aware  constantly  that  others  are  watch- 
ing him  and  likely  to  copy  the  example  he  sets.11 
Stoicism  requires  the  suppression  of  anger  and  the 
exercising  of  clemency  toward  all  human  beings. 
While  Stoicism  does  not  extend  so  far  in  its  pro- 
fession as  Christianity's  doctrine  of  brotherhood 
of  man,  it  represents  a  broader  viewpoint  of  life 
than  any  code  of  conduct  which  previously  had 
developed  in  the  non-Christian  world. 

The  purpose  of  punishment,  according  to  Seneca, 
is  two-fold:  either  to  reform  the  evil-doer;  or  to 
prevent  the  operation  of  his  evil  influence  and  to 
stop  him  from  setting  harmful  examples.12  The 
social  medicine  must  be  determined,  quantitatively 
and  qualitatively,  by  the  nature  of  the  offender  and 
the  offense.  Above  all  things  else,  he  who  adminis- 
ters punishment  must  not  act  in  anger.  Justice 
cannot  be  angry.13  Lynch  procedure  is  entirely  con- 
trary to  the  teachings  of  Stoicism. 

First  of  all,  thieves  and  robbers  should  be  in- 
structed in  the  error  of  their  ways.  Obtain  their 
point  of  view  and  administer  punishment  accord- 
ingly. Pity  them.  The  individual  who  understands 


118 


HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 


why  criminals  commit  offenses  is  prevented  from 
becoming  angry  with  them.14  Aurelius,  like  Jesus,15 
gave  the  injunction:  Love  even  those  who  do 
wrong.  Aurelius,  like  Paul,16  urged  an  attitude  of 
charity  toward  wrong-doers.17 

The  Stoics  condemned  luxurious  living  and 
fashion  racing.  True  riches  consists  not  in  aug- 
menting one's  fortune,  but  in  abating  the  desires 
for  securing  material  wealth.18  The  words  of  Em- 
peror Aurelius  regarding  ostentatious  living  do  not 
seem  out  of  place  when  applied  to  the  modern  dis- 
play of  wealth.  Seneca  asserted  that  he  would 
despise  wealth  as  much  when  he  has  it  as  when  he 
does  not  possess  it. 

Stoicism  urged  the  Aristotelian  social  mean  re- 
garding property.  Much  property  is  a  burden  and 
a  cause  of  worry  and  fear.  It  excites  envy  in 
others.  The  best  society  is  that  which  is  charac- 
terized by  neither  poverty  nor  plenty.  The  poor 
should  not  condemn  riches,  and  the  wealthy  err  in 
extolling  the  benefits  of  poverty — each  is  speaking 
of  a  situation  which  is  objective  to  him  and  outside 
his  sphere.  Since  it  is  objective  to  him,  he  is  not 
qualified  to  speak  concerning  it.  The  individual  is 
a  great  man  who  is  not  corrupted  by  his  wealth ;  but 
he  is  a  greater  man  who  is  honestly  poor  in  the 
midst  of  plenty.19  Riches  constitute  a  power  to  do 
evil,  hence  mediocrity  of  fortune  with  a  gentleness 
of  mind  represents  the  best  status.20 

Stoicism  enunciated  excellent  social  ideals,  which 


ROMAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  119 

were,  however,  passively  intellectual.  They  were 
not  affectively  dynamic.  Despite  their  implications, 
they  begat  social  inertia.  The  teachings  of  the 
Stoics  removed  rather  than  instilled  a  sense  of  pub- 
lic responsibility.  The  doctrines  are  available  to 
the  few  rather  than  to  the  masses,  although  a 
Roman  slave,  Epictetus,  as  an  exception,  rose  to  a 
full  interpretation  of  Stoic  principles.  The  social 
ideals  and  concepts  of  the  Stoics  did  not  possess 
enough  power  to  regenerate  a  degenerate  society. 
They  had  sufficient  strength,  however,  to  maintain 
themselves  in  a  voluptuous  and  pleasure-seeking 
world.  They  performed  the  exceedingly  useful 
function  of  preparing  the  way  for  the  invasion  of 
the  Roman  Empire  by  the  new  and  active  Christian 
propaganda.  The  teachings  of  the  Stoics  made 
easier  the  conquest  of  Rome  by  Christianity.  They 
softened  a  little  an  otherwise  hard-hearted  world. 

As  a  class  the  Romans  were  men  of  action. 
They  were  soldiers  and  administrators.  The  name 
of  Rome  is  still  synonymous  with  power.  On  the 
whole  it  must  be  said  that  the  Romans  made  little 
contribution  to  societary  thought. 

The  constructive  work  of  the  Romans  was  legal 
and  administrative.  They  built  up  a  special  social 
science — legal  science.  The  legal  genius  of  the 
Romans  emphasized  the  rights  of  contract,  of  pri- 
vate property,  of  interest.  Although  this  attention 
to  the  development  of  individualistic  institutions 
was  fatal  to  the  rise  of  new  social  attitudes  and  to 


120  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

an  increase  in  the  sense -of  social  responsibility,  it 
nevertheless  was  instrumental  in  constructing  a 
stable  framework  for  the  evolution  of  the  social 
process. 

The  Romans  preserved  a  portion  of  Hellenic  cul- 
ture. The  teachings  of  Plato  and  Aristotle  were 
saved  to  modern  civilization.  Credit  is  due  the 
Romans  for  receiving,  keeping,  working  over,  and 
handing  on  a  part  of  the  best  Hellenic  civilization. 

Roman  thought  accentuated  military  principles  of 
authority,  even  to  the  point  of  autocracy.  It  tended 
to  crush  the  unprivileged  populace.  It  tried  to  keep 
the  masses  contented  by  generous  state  aid.  It 
denied  to  personality  its  complete  individual  and 
social  expressions.  In  building  an  individualistic 
framework  which  would  provide  an  orderly  milieu 
for  the  rise  of  the  institution  of  private  property, 
it  ignored  the  needs  of  the  uneducated  and  poverty- 
enslaved  masses  for  a  full  measure  of  liberty. 

Rome  developed  the  concept  of  organized  power. 
The  organizing  ability  of  the  Romans  was  mar- 
velous, an  organizing  power  that  lives  today  in  and 
through  the  Catholic  Church. 

The  greatest  gift  of  Rome  was  its  Stoic  concepts. 
Although  these  originated  in  Hellas,  they  attained 
their  maturity  in  Rome.  They  opened  the  way  for 
the  reception  of  the  Christian  social  concepts  of 
love,  service,  brotherhood  of  man. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
EARLY  CHRISTIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 


Christian  social  thought  is  the  direct  outgrowth 
of  Hebrew  social  concepts.  Amos  and  Hosea  and 
Isaiah  paved  the  way  for  the  social  teachings  of 
Jesus.  The  social  commandments  of  the  Old  Tes- 
tament were  the  progenitors  of  the  modified  social 
injunctions  of  the  New  Testament.  Job,  the  social 
citizen,  was  not  an  unworthy  precursor  of  Jesus, 
the  lover  of  humanity.  Out  of  the  love  and  tender 
care  for  children  which  thrived  in  Hebrew  homes 
there  arose  the  concept  of  the  brotherhood  of  man 
and  the  Fatherhood  of  God — the  two  cardinal  prin- 
ciples of  Christianity. 

Jesus  gave  expression  to  no  system  of  social 
thought,  but  uttered  social  principles  and  concepts 
which,  when  put  together,  constituted  the  basis  of 
a  new  social  order.  He  dealt  with  personalities 
rather  than  with  institutions.  He  looked  to  the  in- 
dividual rather  than  to  the  mass.  He  emphasized 
functions  rather  than  structures.  He  proclaimed 
the  need  for  socio-religious  personalities.  If  he 
could  get  these,  he  was  sure  of  the  ultimate  societal 
results.  He  foresaw  a  perfect  society — the  King- 
dom of  God, 


122  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

Unlike  Plato  and  Aristotle,  Jesus  was  a  continual 
student  of  everyday  life.  Like  Socrates,  Jesus  was 
fond  of  people.  He  was  a  student  of  individual 
and  social  affairs.  He  mixed  with  all  types  of 
human  beings.  Like  Socrates,  he  wrote  practically 
nothing.  Unlike  Socrates,  Jesus  had  a  dynamic  ele- 
ment in  his  nature  which  forbade  him  to  remain 
content  to  argue  with  people  (after  the  Socratic 
manner),  but  which  drove  him  to  help  and  to  heal. 
He  went  about  doing  good.  The  Gospel  records 
are  replete  with  instance  after  instance  of  his  work 
in  healing  the  sick  of  their  infirmities.  He  was  not, 
however,  a  physician  but  a  teacher  and  a  savior 
from  sin  and  evil. 

Behind  all  the  teachings  of  Jesus,  there  is  the 
concept  of  a  perfect  human  order.  This  Kingdom 
begins  in  the  hearts  of  individuals.1  It  is  a  spirit 
or  an  attitude  of  mind  which  leads  the  individual 
toward  co-operative  living.  The  Kingdom  may 
come  on  earth  as  well  as  in  heaven.  Consider  the 
picture  of  a  harmonious  community  life  which 
Jesus  gave  when  lamenting  over  Jerusalem :  "How 
often  would  I  have  gathered  thy  children  together, 
as  a  hen  doth  gather  her  brood  together  under  her 
wings,  and  ye  would  not!"2 

Jesus  extended  the  concept  of  brotherhood. 
Whoever  shall  do  the  will  of  God  is  a  brother  to 
me.8  The  world,  under  God,  is  one  family.  The 
Kingdom,  therefore,  is  to  include  all  human  beings, 
who  worship  God  in  spirit  and  in  truth  and  who  at 


EARLY  CHRISTIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT      123 

the  same  time  love  their  fellowmen  in  justice  and 
co-operative  living. 

The  ideal  society  is  organic.  It  grows  from  good 
examples.  Live  so  that  other  persons,  seeing  the 
helpfulness  of  your  life,  may  live  likewise.  The 
Kingdom  grows  like  a  grain  of  mustard  seed,  which 
finally  becomes  a  tree  in  whose  branches  the  birds 
find  homes.4  Love  grows,  and  like  leaven,  per- 
meates and  transforms  the  whole  mass, — the  result 
is  the  perfect  Kingdom. 

God  is  the  spiritual  leader  of  the  new  society,  to 
whom  Jesus  prayed  in  the  social  term,  Our  Father. 
God  is  the  personification  of  love.  God  loved  the 
sinful  world  so  much  that  he  gave  his  only  son  to 
the  task  of  saving  not  simply  the  Jews  or  modern 
Europeans,  but  the  whole  world  from  all  sins.  The 
Star  which  guided  the  Magi  was  God's  service  Star, 
announcing  that  he  had  given  his  only  son  in  the 
war  against  sin. 

Love  is  the  new  note  that  is  to  re-form  the  world. 
Love  is  the  scientific  principle  from  which  all  other 
true  sociological  concepts  are  derived.  Love  re- 
ceived the  most  perfect  human  expression  in  the 
personality  and  life  of  Jesus,  who  came  not  for  self 
glory  but  to  save  people  from  hate  and  sin;  who 
sought  not  the  sheep  to  oppress  and  slay  them  for 
his  own  gratification,  but  to  direct  them,  when  lost, 
back  to  safe  living;  who  sought  not  to  weigh  down 
the  burdened  with  unjust  taxes  and  harsh  living 
conditions,  but  to  relieve  and  give  rest  to  the  heavy- 


124  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

laden ;  who  cared  less  for  the  upper  Four  Hundred 
than  for  the  lower  Four  Hundred  Million. 

The  principle  of  love  compels  the  members  of  the 
Kingdom  to  show  mercy.  God  is  full  of  mercy, 
therefore,  let  his  followers  show  mercy.  Love  for- 
gives. The  Christian  citizen  is  instructed  to  be- 
come reconciled  with  his  brother  citizen  before 
worshipping  at  the  altar  of  God.6  If  the  individual 
would  be  forgiven  of  his  sins,  he  must  acquire  the 
habit  of  forgiving  other  persons.  He  must  be  care- 
ful not  to  judge  harshly,  lest  other  persons  judge 
him  harshly.  He  should  forgive  others  seventy 
times  seven  times,  that  is,  without  stint  or  measure. 

St.  Luke,  the  physician,  recites  the  story  of  a 
loving  father.  The  prodigal  son  impetuously  de- 
manded his  share  of  the  inheritance,  and  going  into 
a  far  country,  wasted  his  substance  in  riotous  liv- 
ing. But  upon  showing  true  remorse  for  these 
exceedingly  grave  offenses,  his  father  received  him 
back  with  a  loving,  forgiving  heart,  a  feast,  the 
best  robes,  and  music  and  dancing.  One  of  the 
malefactors  who  was  crucified  with  Christ,  showed 
a  penitent  heart  at  the  last  moment  and  received 
forgiveness  from  the  loving,  dying  Christ.  Since 
no  one  is  without  sin,  no  one  has  a  right  to  be  un- 
forgiving. Even  the  woman  taken  in  adultery  came 
within  the  law  of  forgiving  love. 

The  societary  principle  of  love  is  the  major  chord 
of  Christianity.  It  is  Christianity's  unscientific  but 
greatest  gift  to  sociology.  It  has  become  the  funda- 


EARLY  CHRISTIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT      125 

mental  concept  of  sociology.  To  the  Old  Testa- 
ment type  of  love  which  urged  the  individual  to 
love  his  neighbor  and  to  love  the  alien  and  stranger, 
Jesus  repeatedly  insisted  upon  a  love  that  is  still 
greater,  namely,  a  love  which  will  include  enemies. 
Love  your  enemies.7  Jesus  himself  exemplified  this 
form  of  love.  He  made  no  idle  interpretation  of  an 
impossible  love,  but  demonstrated  and  lived  a  love 
which  forgave  his  enemies,  even  those  who  mock- 
ingly, shamelessly  nailed  him  to  a  cross.  So  great 
is  the  drawing  power  of  this  almost  superhuman 
love  which  Jesus  expressed  in  deeds  that  he  himself 
predicted  that  if  he  were  lifted  up  he  would  draw 
all  people  unto  him. 

Love  fills  people  with  compassion.  The  Gospels 
are  replete  with  references  to  the  fact  that  wherever 
Jesus  saw  sickness,  poverty,  sin,  he  was  moved  with 
compassion.  The  illustrations  range  from  the 
blind  men  by  the  wayside  to  the  bread-hungry  mul- 
titudes, from  the  unclean  leper  in  Galilee  to  mur- 
derous Jerusalem. 

Love  is  cosmopolitan.  All  peoples  are  entitled  to 
know  the  meaning  of  Christian  love.8  Both  Jew 
and  Gentile  shall  feel  its  warming  glow.  The 
Samaritan  lives  it.  Loving  neighborliness  includes 
more  than  priestly  and  Levitical  acts;  it  involves 
Samaritan  kindness.  The  love  in  the  heart  of  Jesus 
reached  first  to  a  few  close  friends,  then  to  sinners 
and  outcasts,  then  to  the  Samaritans  and  the  Gen- 
tiles, and  finally  to  the  whole  world.  It  led  ulti- 


126  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

mately  to  that  most  unselfish  of  all  human  enter- 
prises— the  missionary  movement. 

Love  leads  to  humility  and  self-sacrifice.  Alms- 
giving is  done  in  private,  not  for  social  plaudits. 
The  individual  prays,  not  to  be  seen  of  men  and 
thereby  to  be  accounted  good.9  He  who  seeks  to 
save  his  life  shall  lose  it ;  whoever  loses  his  life  for 
the  sake  of  the  Kingdom  shall  save  it.  He  who 
stores  up  for  himself  the  wealth  of  the  world  shall 
lose  himself.  Salutations  in  the  market  places  and 
chief  seats  in  the  synagogues  in  themselves  are  un- 
worthy. The  poor  in  spirit  are  blessed. 

Love  shuns  positions  of  worldly  power,  lest  they 
be  secured  at  the  loss  of  one's  soul.10  The  best 
positions  in  life  are  not  to  be  seized;  they  are  ob- 
tained through  the  exercise  of  love;  they  are  be- 
stowed in  recognition  of  merit  and  worth.  He  who 
exalts  himself  will  be  abased;  the  humble  will  be 
exalted. 

Love  creates  true  greatness.  The  members  of 
the  society  of  perfect  love  are  characterized  by  the 
sincerity,  purity,  humility  of  little  children.11  He 
who  serves  most  is  greatest.  The  Kingdom  of  God 
is  an  aristocracy,  not  of  Might  but  of  Service.  The 
Son  of  God  came  to  serve,  not  to  be  served.  For 
the  sake  of  those  outside  the  Kingdom,  Jesus  sanc- 
tified himself,  sacrificing  even  his  life  in  that  cause. 

Love  makes  the  Golden  Rule  the  best  sociologi- 
cal proposition  in  Hebrew  and  Jewish  literature. 
"Whatsoever  ye  would  that  men  should  do  to  you, 


EARLY  CHRISTIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT      127 

do  ye  even  so  to  them."  In  reply  to  a  lawyer  of  the 
Pharisees,  Jesus  enunciated  a  twofold  command- 
ment, the  first  part  of  which  invoked  complete  love 
to  God;  and  the  second  part,  to  man.  The  love  of 
the  individual  for  his  fellow  man  as  shown  in  both 
attitude  and  deeds  is  the  test  of  the  love  of  the 
individual  for  God.  Love  means  service.  Love 
does  not  connote  lip-service;  neither  does  it  mean 
divided  service.  No  one  can  serve  two  masters, 
God  and  mammon. 

Christian  love  implies  definite  and  continued  pub- 
lic service.  Social  service  is  the  test  of  entrance  to 
the  Kingdom,  and  of  the  sincerity  of  the  indi- 
vidual's religious  profession.12  On  the  judgment 
day  those  on  the  right  hand  will  be  blessed  and 
given  life  eternal,  and  to  them  the  king  of  the  judg- 
ment will  say: 

I  was  an  hungered,  and  ye  gave  me  meat; 

I  was  thirsty,  and  ye  gave  me  drink; 

I  was  a  stranger,  and  ye  took  me  in ; 

Naked  and  ye  clothed  me ; 

I  was  in  prison,  and  ye  came  unto  me. 

Then  the  righteous,  with  surprise,  will  inquire 
of  the  Lord  of  the  judgment:  When  did  we  see 
you  hungry  and  feed  you;  or  thirsty,  and  give  you 
drink?  When  did  we  see  you  a  stranger  and  take 
you  in?  Then  the  Lord  of  the  judgment  will  an- 
swer them  that  when  they  had  served  the  weak  and 
poor  and  the  heavy-laden  on  earth,  they  had  been 
serving  him  and  thereby  had  proved  their  loyalty  to 


128  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

God  and  earned  the  rewards  of  everlasting  life. 
And  those  who  fail  to  measure  up  to  the  social 
service  test,  whether  professing  Christians  or  not, 
will  be  turned  away. 

The  importance  and  nature  of  religio-social  serv- 
ice is  indicated  by  Jesus  when  he  symbolizes  the 
giving  of  a  cup  of  cold  water  in  his  name  as  a  test 
for  receiving  eternal  life.13  He  who  has  two  coats 
should  give  one  to  him  who  has  none.  The  share- 
ing  of  food  with  those  who  have  no  food  is  com- 
manded. Give  liberally;  give  all  thou  hast.14  It  is 
blessed  to  give  under  all  circumstances.  Material 
riches  are  insignificant  in  value  when  compared 
with  spiritual  wealth.  To  give  the  things  of  this 
world  is  to  receive  the  greater  things  of  the  spirit. 
He  is  richest  who  gives  most,  both  of  material  and 
spiritual  goods.  As  an  expression  of  his  love  for 
God,  Jesus  lived  a  life  of  social  and  human  service. 

Whenever  Jesus  mentioned  the  ten  command- 
ments— all  three  synoptic  writers  agree  on  this 
point — he  omitted  the  four  commandments  of  in- 
dividual import  and  repeated  only  the  social  rules, 
or  principles : 

(1)  Thou  shalt  do  no  murder, 

(2)  Thou  shalt  not  commit  adultery, 

(3)  Thou  shalt  not  steal, 

(4)  Thou  shalt  not  bear  false  witness, 

(5)  Honor  thy  father  and  mother, 

(6)  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself. 


EARLY  CHRISTIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT      129 

After  the  fashion  of  the  major  social  prophets, 
Jesus  cried  out  vehemently  against  social  injustice. 
He  denounced  the  persons  who  devour  widows' 
houses,  or  who  lay  unnecessary  economic  burdens 
upon  their  fellowmen. 

Anti-social  religion,  above  all  things  else,  angered 
Jesus.  He  wanted  no  followers  who  were  prac- 
ticing social  or  political  injustice.  Cursed  are  those 
persons  who  appear  righteous,  who  make  long 
prayers,  or  who  go  about  in  long  robes,  but  who 
inwardly  are  hypocrites,  are  full  of  dead  men's 
bones,  of  uncleanness,  of  extortion  and  excess.15 
The  shedding  of  innocent  blood  is  condemned.  The 
paying  of  money  in  order  to  expiate  sin  will  avail 
nothing.  Such  money  is  tainted ;  it  is  blood  money.16 

Anti-social  and  commercialized  religion  so  an- 
gered Jesus  that,  contrary  to  his  customary  atti- 
tudes toward  sinners,  he  committed  violence  on  one 
occasion  against  offenders.  He  overthrew  the 
tables  of  the  money  changers  in  the  temple,  and, 
making  a  scourge  of  small  cords,  he  drove  out  the 
money  changers.  In  so  doing,  he  declared  that  the 
worship  of  God  should  not  be  commercialized.17  He 
would  not  have  the  house  of  worship  turned  into  a 
cultured  den  of  thieves. 

So  furious  were  the  scribes  and  the  chief  priests 
because  of  the  attack  of  Jesus  upon  anti-social 
religious  practices  that  they  planned  how  they 
might  kill  him.18  It  appears  that  as  a  direct  result 
of  the  antagonism  of  Jesus  to  the  anti-social  prac- 


130  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

tices  of  the  religious,  or  temple,  authorities  and  of 
the  other  religious  leaders  the  conspiracy  against 
Jesus  finally  brought  about  his  death.  Jesus  went 
about  stirring  up  the  common  people  in  a  demo- 
cratic movement  against  the  autocratic,  hypocriti- 
cal, anti-social  religious  leaders  among  the  Jews. 
He  met  his  death  while  championing  the  needs  of 
the  masses  who  were  being  exploited  in  the  name 
of  religion. 

Jesus  was  the  highest  type  of  social  democrat. 
The  perfected  social  order  which  he  foresaw  is  a 
democracy,  ruled  by  the  principles  of  love  and 
service  in  the  name  of  God.  Furthermore,  no  one 
shall  be  compelled  to  come  into  the  Kingdom.  The 
good  tidings  shall  be  presented  to  all  individuals, 
but  the  liberty  of  the  individual  shall  not  be  vio- 
lated. The  principle  of  voluntary  assent,  not  com- 
pulsion or  conscription,  rules  in  recruiting  for  the 
Kingdom.  Moreover,  within  the  Kingdom,  com- 
pulsion is  unknown.  Love  sufficeth. 

Jesus  hated  sin.  To  him,  sin  was  anything  which 
overcomes  love  and  which  causes  the  individual  or 
society  to  disintegrate.  Sin  is  that  which  defeats 
or  hinders  the  coming  of  the  Kingdom  of  Love. 
Sin  breaks  up  or  holds  back  the  social  process.  Sin, 
like  love,  is  organic.  Sin  grows.  An  evil  tree 
brings  forth  evil  fruit;  grapes  and  figs  are  not 
gathered  from  thorns  or  thistle-bearing  plants. 

Jesus  forgave  sinners;  even  social  sinners.  By 
means  of  his  imagination,  he  put  himself  in  the 


EARLY  CHRISTIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT       131 

place  of  the  sinner  and  sought  to  understand  the 
causes  of  the  sinning.  As  his  mind  filled  with  an 
understanding  of  sin,  his  heart  overflowed  with  pity 
and  forgiveness  for  the  sinner.  He  sought  pri- 
marily to  reclaim ;  he  thought  secondarily  of  punish- 
ment. Even  in  the  case  of  the  adulterous  woman, 
he  sought  to  save  what  was  left  of  the  broken  spirit 
rather  than  to  punish.  His  cardinal  penological 
principle  was  reformation. 

It  is  significant  that  the  social  institution  which 
Jesus  supported  above  all  others,  even  above  the 
church  and  the  state,  was  the  family.  Jesus  spoke 
frequently  for  the  family.  He  commanded  that 
children  should  unwaveringly  act  loyally  toward 
parents ;  he  used  not  only  the  clear-cut  terms  of  the 
writer  of  Exodus  but  added  a  curse  of  death  upon 
those  who  abuse  their  parents.19 

An  even  stronger  command  was  given  by  Jesus 
concerning  loyalty  to  the  marriage  relation.  A 
man's  genuine  loyalty  to  his  parents,  undiminished 
in  intensity,  must  be  subordinated  to  faithfulness 
to  his  wife.20  This  social  theory  is  opposite  in  char- 
acter to  that  of  Confucius  concerning  attitudes 
toward  parents  and  wives.  The  conception  which 
Jesus  urged  leads  to  social  progress,  while  the 
teaching  of  Confucius  leads  to  social  stagnation. 

A  man  and  woman  who  have  been  spiritually 
joined  together  in  wedlock  are  one  flesh,  above  and 
beyond  separation  by  civil  authorities.  Jesus  ut- 
tered the  stern  and  awe-inspiring  sanction:  What 


132  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

therefore  God  hath  joined  together,  let  not  man  put 
asunder.  The  family  as  an  institution  is  accorded 
a  sacredly  fundamental  place  in  the  social  order. 

Jesus  recognized  woman  as  equal  with  man  spir- 
itually. His  attitude  toward  his  mother  and  the 
other  women  of  his  day  was  one  of  respect,  chiv- 
alry, and  gentleness.  He  laid  the  foundations  of  a 
social  process  in  which  women  function  on  terms 
of  equality  with  men. 

Honor  to  parents  and  honor  to  wife  must  be  sup- 
planted by  honor  to  children.  Jesus  worshiped 
little  children.  In  them  he  saw  the  innocence  and 
purity  of  God.  When  he  wished  to  describe  the 
attributes  of  the  Kingdom,  he  selected  a  little  child 
and  held  him  up  as  typifying  the  simple,  natural 
spirit  of  perfect  living.  Although  without  children 
himself,  Jesus  loved  little  children,  choosing  them 
for  special  honors,  and  declaring  that  of  such  is 
the  Kingdom  of  God.  It  is  not  God's  will  that  one 
of  these  little  ones  should  perish ;  it  is  the  stupidity 
of  man  and  the  lack  of  social  conscience  that  causes 
a  high  mortality  rate  of  little  children.  He  who 
harms  the  trustful  child  shall  be  cursed.  It  were 
better  for  such  a  miscreant  that  a  millstone  were 
tied  about  his  neck  and  that  he  were  thrown  into 
the  sea.21 

In  regard  to  the  influence  of  private  property 
Jesus  was  fearful.  His  zeal  for  and  whole-hearted 
loyalty  to  spiritual  values  made  him  suspicious  of 
vested  interests.  He  repeatedly  warned  in  vigorous 


EARLY  CHRISTIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT      133 

language  against  the  lure  of  gold  and  the  baneful 
influences  of  material  wealth  upon  the  attitudes  and 
acts  of  the  individual.  He  himself  showed  no  in- 
terest in  owning  property.  He  lived  without  a 
home  of  his  own  and  without  private  means.  If 
he  had  possessed  these,  his  life-work  probably 
would  have  failed.  He  urged  his  disciples  to  re- 
main free  from  the  desire  for  money ;  he  even  com- 
manded them  to  rely  for  the  means  of  material 
subsistence  upon  the  people  with  whom  they  la- 
bored. Jesus  believed  that  private  property  hin- 
dered the  realization  of  the  principle  of  brotherhood 
of  man.  He  made  a  sharp  distinction  between  the 
interests  of  God  and  mammon.  He  believed  that 
these  two  sets  of  interests  are  diametrically  op- 
posed to  each  other.  To  the  extent  that  the  indi- 
vidual relies  upon  property,  he  separates  himself 
from  God  and  the  things  of  the  Spirit.  The  dis- 
ciples were  instructed  to  scorn,  not  only  the  earn- 
ing of  wealth,  but  if  they  possessed  earthly  goods, 
they  were  to  sell  these  and  give  the  proceeds  to  the 
poor.22  The  disciple  of  the  spiritual  life  must 
divorce  himself  from  the  love  of  monetary  gain. 

Toward  the  poor,  Jesus  was  sympathetic.  The 
Gospel  shall  be  preached  chiefly  to  the  poor,  not 
because  the  poor,  per  se,  need  it  more  than  the  rich 
and  not  because  the  poor  should  be  specially  fa- 
vored, but  because  they  recognize  their  needs. 
They  are  in  a  receptive  attitude  whereas  the  atti- 
tude of  the  rich  has  been  calloused  by  their  wealth. 


134  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

The  response  to  the  Gospel  is  not  likely  to  be  whole- 
hearted by  persons  who  possess  an  extensive  in- 
terest in  riches. 

Jesus  taught  a  spiritual  socialism.  He  thought 
in  terms  of  spiritual  love  for  all  persons,  not  of 
material  well-being  for  the  proletariat.  But  he 
seemed  to  prefer  the  company  of  the  poor.  Blessed 
are  the  poor,  was  his  attitude;  for  they  are  in  a 
frame  of  mind  which  makes  them  fit  subjects  for 
the  perfect  Kingdom.  The  possession  of  property 
gives  the  individual  a  feeling  of  self-exaltation; 
poverty  gives  rise  to  humility — a  cardinal  virtue  of 
the  Kingdom. 

Jesus  did  not  attack  poverty  with  preventive 
measures.  Poverty  will  continue  to  exist.23  Per- 
haps it  is  well  that  it  should  continue,  for  a  nation 
of  economically  satisfied  people  might  not  be  reli- 
giously minded.  It  is  harder  for  a  camel  to  go 
through  a  needle's  eye  than  for  a  rich  man  to  get 
into  the  swing  of  an  untrammeled  social  process. 
Woe  unto  the  rich,  because  they  are  self-centered, 
materially  inclined,  and  pleasure-loving.  The  man 
who  pulled  down  his  barns  in  order  to  build  larger 
barns,  saying  to  himself,  "Take  thine  ease,  eat, 
drink,  and  be  merry/'  is  scathingly  condemned  by 
Jesus.24  He  is  ostracized  from  the  ideal  society. 
In  the  story  of  Lazarus  and  the  rich  man,  the 
former  is  carried  to  Abraham's  bosom,  but  the  lat- 
ter, in  torments,  begs  for  a  cup  of  water  and  the 
company  of  Lazarus.  He  wanted  Lazarus  sent  to 


EARLY  CHRISTIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  135 
him;  he  longed  for  the  company  of  him  whom  he 
once  ignored.  The  attention  of  Jesus  was  continu- 
ally centered  on  the  dangers  of  wealth,  but  rarely 
on  the  need  of  preventing  poverty. 

Zaccheus,  a  rich  man,  was  called  as  a  disciple  of 
Jesus.  But  before  the  discipleship  began,  the  super- 
intendent not  only  had  to  come  down  from  the 
mulberry  tree  and  declare  his  allegiance  to  God, 
but  he  had  to  become  socially  converted  as  well. 
He  promised  to  give  one-half  of  his  wealth  to  the 
poor  and  to  restore  falsely  acquired  possessions 
fourfold. 

T}ien  there  was  the  rich  young  man  who  came 
to  Jesus,  asking  how  he  might  obtain  admittance 
to  the  Kingdom,  declaring  that  he  observed  the 
commandments.  One  more  thing,  however,  was 
required  of  him,  namely,  that  he  sell  all  his  pos- 
sessions and  give  the  returns  to  the  poor.  Only  by 
so  giving  might  he  have  treasure  in  the  social 
Kingdom. 

The  teaching  of  Jesus  concerning  the  Sabbath 
throws  light  on  the  exceedingly  human  element  in 
his  thought.  The  Sabbath  is  a  special  day  for  doing 
good  deeds.25  The  Sabbath  is  to  be  treated  not  pri- 
marily from  the  standpoint  of  religious  rites  but 
from  the  viewpoint  of  human  welfare.  Works  of 
necessity,  and  deeds  of  mercy  and  kindness  to  man 
and  beast  are  proper  to  the  Sabbath.28  Man  was 
not  made  for  the  Sabbath,  but  the  day  of  rest  and 
good  deeds  was  designed  for  the  benefit  of  man. 


136  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

The  attitude  of  Jesus  toward  the  problem  of 
peace  versus  war  has  aroused  considerable  contro- 
versy. There  are  certain  of  his  sayings  which  seem 
to  contradict  each  other.  But  an  analysis  of  all  his 
teachings  demonstrates  that  his  emphasis  was  on 
peace.  The  exceptions  to  the  rule  will  be  stated 
first.27  On  one  occasion  he  said:  I  came  not  to 
send  peace,  but  a  sword.  The  context  shows  that 
Jesus  was  speaking  in  an  individual  and  not  a 
national  way.  He  had  in  mind  the  conflicts  which 
arise  between  the  individuals  who  are  converted  to 
the  ideals  of  the  Kingdom  and  those  who  are  not. 
Jesus  explained  that  those  who  love  him  must  do 
so  even  at  the  expense  of  forsaking  father  and 
mother.28  Loyalty  to  the  Kingdom  may  mean  that 
the  son  will  oppose  the  practices  of  his  father  in 
business,  the  daughter  will  object  to  the  time  wasted 
in  the  un-Christian  practices  of  her  mother,  the 
parents  will  protest  the  sowing  of  "wild  oats"  by 
son  or  daughter. 

In  the  temple,  on  one  occasion,  Jesus  displayed 
anger  and  used  violence.  He  was  dealing,  how- 
ever, with  a  group  of  criminals,  cultured  criminals, 
who  apparently  would  respond  to  no  treatment  ex- 
cept violence.  They  would  not  cease  their  nefarious 
practices  except  through  compulsion. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  illustrations  are  many 
where  Jesus  used  love  in  order  to  change  the  ways 
of  people.  He  never  used  force  in  his  own  behalf, 
even  to  save  his  life.  He  rebuked  Simon  Peter  for 


EARLY  CHRISTIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT      137 

drawing  his  sword  and  cutting  off  the  right  ear  of 
the  servant  of  the  high  priest  who  in  company  with 
others  were  seeking  Jesus  in  order  to  bind  him  and 
kill  him.29  At  another  time  Jesus  specifically  en- 
joined: Resist  not  evil;  and  instructed  his  fol- 
lowers when  smitten  upon  the  right  cheek  to  turn 
the  left  also.  Those  who  take  the  sword  shall  per- 
ish by  the  sword;  the  nation  that  builds  itself  up 
by  the  sword  shall  be  destroyed  by  it. 

The  birth  of  Jesus  was  accompanied  by  glad  tid- 
ings and  song,  proclaiming  peace  on  earth  and  good 
will  toward  men.31  Blessed  are  the  peacemakers. 
In  the  perfect  society,  good  will  by  all  to  all  will  be 
shown,  perfect  love  will  reign,  and  permanent  peace 
will  prevail. 

Jesus  may  or  may  not  have  expressed  himself  on 
several  important  issues  of  his  day.  The  incom- 
plete records  do  not  indicate  his  attitude  upon  many 
vital  social  problems.  It  appears  that  Jesus  usually 
spoke  in  remedial  rather  than  preventive  social 
terms.  However,  beneath  this  remedial  termin- 
ology there  are  fundamental  social  principles, 
which,  if  put  into  common  practice,  would  solve  all 
social  problems.  Jesus  proposed  to  build  an  ideal 
society  by  re-making  and  regenerating  individuals. 
He  dared  to  promulgate  the  radical  program  of  re- 
making human  nature  itself.  He  commanded  that 
all  selfish  impulses  and  instincts  be  completely  sub- 
ordinated to  the  altruistic  and  socializing  desires. 

Jesus  insisted  throughout  his  life-work  upon  the 


138  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

principle  that  material  factors  must  be  subjected  to 
spiritual  values.  In  order  to  make  this  principle 
clear  he  often  took  particular  pains  to  treat  ma- 
terial goods  with  the  utmost  insignificance.  He 
perceived  that  individuals  are  made  slaves  by  the 
worship  of  wealth,  either  on  the  part  of  themselves, 
of  the  privileged  classes,  or  of  society  itself.  He 
inaugurated  a  program  of  spiritualization  which 
would  free  the  world  from  the  slavery  which  may 
come  from  economic  forces. 

Although  a  religious  teacher  above  all  things  else, 
Jesus  insisted  upon  the  necessity  of  the  existence 
of  something  more  than  saving  faith  alone.  He 
required  a  social  attitude  of  mind,  a  heart  of  social 
love,  and  a  spirit  of  service.  Give  freely  to  others. 
Serve  others.  By  giving  himself  for  others,  the 
individual  will  function  in  the  Kingdom  of  perfect 
love,  and  win  other  individuals  to  that  Kingdom. 

Jesus  required  that  love  be  substituted  for  hate. 
Unkind  deeds  must  be  supplanted  by  kind  deeds. 
According  to  this  principle,  employers  and  em- 
ployees must  learn  to  love  one  another;  and  busi- 
ness must  be  put  upon  the  basis  of  love  and  service. 
Government  must  be  a  series  of  mutual  services. 
Religion  must  harbor  no  selfishness.  In  all  human 
relationships,  Jesus  reiterated  the  principle :  Love, 
love,  love.  This  is  the  spiritualizing  and  socializing 
principle  by  which  Jesus  proposed  to  make  over  the 
social  process. 

Paul,  the  apostle  to  the  Gentiles,  by  virtue  of 


EARLY  CHRISTIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT       139 

unique  experiences  and  many  travels,  possessed  a 
cosmopolitan  attitude  of  mind.  He  gave  a  prac- 
tical application  of  the  teaching  of  Jesus  concern- 
ing the  brotherhood  of  man.  He  urged  the  equal 
treatment  of  Jews  and  Gentiles,  bond  and  free.32 
He  preached  the  essential  unity  of  mankind.  God 
is  no  respecter  of  persons ;  his  Kingdom  is  a  spirit- 
ual democracy.  We  are  all — Jew  and  Gentile — 
children  of  the  same  Father,  who  gave  his  son  in 
service  for  all.33  To  the  call  to  come  over  into 
Macedonia  for  the  purpose  of  rendering  aid,  Paul 
responded  immediately  and  favorably.  By  so  doing 
he  believed  that  he  was  carrying  out  the  true  im- 
plications of  the  love  of  God. 

The  greatest  tribute  that  has  ever  been  paid  to 
love  as  a  social  force  was  given  by  Paul.34  Al- 
though possessing  the  highest  educational  qualifica- 
tions and  being  able  to  speak  with  the  greatest  elo- 
quence, any  individual  leads  a  practically  useless 
life  unless  that  life  is  motivated  by  love.  Giving 
one's  possessions  to  the  poor  and  sacrificing  one's 
body  counts  little  if  one  does  these  things  in  any 
other  spirit  than  that  of  love.  Love  protects  the 
individual  from  envying  his  neighbors,  from  be- 
coming proud  and  haughty  and  boastful.  Love  is 
the  greatest  principle  of  life. 

The  members  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  should 
love  one  another  under  all  circumstances.35  They 
should  bear  one  another's  burdens.38  They  should 
do  good  to  all  men,  even  to  those  who  persecute. 


140  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

Above  all,  they  should  not  recompense  any  man 
with  evil  for  evil,  or  fail  to  feed  their  enemies  if 
the  latter  hunger.  Love  is  the  law  of  God.  Perfect 
love  is  more  powerful  than  principalities  and  pow- 
ers and  even  death.37  Love  conquers  all  evil.  Love 
is  more  powerful  than  might.  A  practical,  cos- 
mopolitan brotherhood  of  man  is  one  of  the  funda- 
mental concepts  of  Paul's  teachings. 

Paul  taught  the  organic  unity  of  mankind.  In 
the  perfect  Christian  order  each  individual  has  a 
specific  function  to  perform  which  is  a  part  of  the 
whole  process.  Paul  compares  this  situation  to  the 
human  body  in  which  there  are  many  organs,  each 
performing-  its  individual  but  correlated  function.88 
No  one  liveth  to  himself,  no  one  dieth  to  himself.89 
Every  individual,  even  in  dying,  influences  the  so- 
cial equilibrium  and  affects  group  progress.  All 
individuals  in  the  perfect  Kingdom  are  co-laborers 
and  co-operators.  Whatever  weakens  one  indi- 
vidual weakens  society;  whatever  strengthens  the 
individual  strengthens  society,  providing  that 
strength  is  used  societarily. 

Another  fundamental  element  in  the  social 
thought  of  Paul  was  his  concept  of  sin.  Sin  is  so- 
cially and  individually  destructive.  The  wages  of 
sin — a  generic  term — is  death.  Paul  made  a  long 
list  of  social  sins,  namely :  covetousness,  malicious- 
ness, drunkenness,  wantonness,  dishonesty,  fraud, 
stealing,  fornication,  murder.  In  nearly  all  his  let- 
ters, Paul  warned  his  followers  against  the  evils 


EARLY  CHRISTIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT      141 

which  beset  mankind.  He  urged  people  to  beware 
of  the  appearance  of  doing  evil.  Paul's  rule  of 
conduct  was  the  Aristotelian  mean :  Be  temperate 
in  all  things. 

On  the  other  hand,  Paul  cited  long  lists  of  vir- 
tues. Love  is  continually  urged.  Temperance, 
meekness,  gentleness,  honesty,  purity,  and  justice 
are  repeatedly  stressed.  Paul's  description  of  a 
good  man  and  bishop  is  the  delineation  of  the  char- 
acter of  a  social  citizen,  who  is  temperate,  a  good 
husband,  who  is  not  mercenary  nor  covetous,  and 
who  ruleth  well  his  household,  with  good  reputation 
and  character. 

In  all  Paul's  thought,  righteous  living  was  up- 
permost. Cheerful  giving  was  commended.  The 
strong  should  bear  the  infirmities  of  the  weak,  not 
only  for  the  sake  of  the  weak,  but  in  order  that  the 
strong  may  not  become  self-centered. 

Paul  taught  a  gospel  of  peace.  He  deprecated 
strife  between  individuals.  He  trusted  in  the  opera- 
tion of  the  law  of  love.  Love  will  bring  order  out 
of  confusion,  and  peace  out  of  discord.  The  social 
Kingdom  of  God,  motivated  by  love,  moves  or- 
derly, harmoniously,  and  constructively. 

Paul  firmly  supported  the  family  as  an  essential 
institution  of  society.  He  admonished  children  to 
obey  their  parents,  to  honor  their  fathers  and 
mothers.  He  commanded  wives  to  obey  their  hus- 
bands, and  husbands  to  love  their  wives  even  as 
Christ  loved  the  church  and  as  men  love  them- 


142  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

selves.40  He  commanded  men  to  remain  true  in  the 
marriage  relation,  and  to  keep  the  single  standard 
of  morals  inviolate. 

The  dangers  of  wealth  were  frequently  pointed 
out  by  Paul.  We  brought  no  riches  into  this  life; 
we  can  not  take  any  riches  out.  Riches  continually 
subject  us  to  temptations,  snares,  and  lusts.  The 
love  of  money  is  the  root  of  all  evil.41  The  greatest 
wealth  which  any  person  can  acquire  is  the  wealth 
of  good  deeds  done  to  other  persons. 

The  thought  of  Paul  concerning  law  is  exceed- 
ingly modern.  Law  is  not  for  the  righteous;  law 
is  for  the  lawless  and  disobedient.  The  honest  and 
righteous  and  just  are  above  the  law  in  the  sense 
that  a  well-mated  husband  and  wife  are  above  the 
law  of  divorce.  If  there  were  none  other  than 
happily-mated  husbands  and  wives,  there  would  be 
no  need  of  divorce  laws.  In  a  similar  way,  if  per- 
fect love  prevailed  among  all  people,  law  could  be 
entirely  discarded.  The  teachings  of  Paul  run  the 
gamut  of  brotherly  love.  Paul  thought  in  terms  of 
concepts  such  as  these :  being  well-grounded  in  love ; 
abounding  in  love;  let  brotherly  love  continue; 
the  love  of  Christ  constraineth.  Paul  carried  a 
message  of  love  to  all  men,  and  established  the 
church  as  a  home  for  all  who  would  accept  Chirst's 
message  of  love. 

The  apostle  James  spoke  in  no  uncertain  terms  of 
the  democracy  of  God,  the  need  of  helping  the  weak, 
the  dangers  of  riches,  the  evils  of  strife,  and  the 


EARLY  CHRISTIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT       143 

social  commandments.  James  made  social  service 
a  fundamental  test  of  religion.*2 

Peter  attacked  the  same  social  sins  that  Jesus 
and  Paul  had  flayed,  argued  in  behalf  of  the  justice 
of  God,  and  proclaimed  with  new  vigor  the  law  of 
love. 

John  is  the  chief  exponent  of  the  principle  of 
love.  God  is  love.  The  reign  of  God  is  a  reign  of 
love ;  the  Kingdom  of  God  is  a  Kingdom  of  perfect 
love.  In  the  Book  of  Revelation,  John  describes 
two  cities ;  one  wicked ;  and  the  other,  perfect.  The 
first  is  elegantly  clothed  in  purple  and  gold,  be- 
decked with  precious  stones.  But  her  heart  is  rot- 
ten. Lust  and  vice  have  ruined  her.  Her  dom- 
inating sins  are  sex  immorality  and  luxury.  The 
perfect  city  is  the  new  Jerusalem,  a  community  of 
happy  people,  motivated  in  all  things  by  love. 
Nothing  that  defileth  is  permitted  in  the  New 
Jerusalem,  nor  anything  that  worketh  abomination, 
or  maketh  a  lie.43 

The  fundamentals  of  early  Christian  social 
thought  may  now  be  summarized.  The  New  Testa- 
ment authorities  offered  no  system  of  sociology; 
they  did  not  submit  a  scientific  program  for  the 
social  reorganization  of  the  world,  but  made,  how- 
ever, substantial  contributions. 

(1)  Early  Christian  social  thought  represented 
a  system  of  changing  the  attitudes  of  individuals. 
By  making  over  individuals  the  world  can  be  im- 
proved. The  individual  is  exalted.  The  individual 


144  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

must  be  re-educated.  The  right  sort  of  men  will 
produce  the  right  sort  of  social  structure  and  the 
proper  type  of  social  process  and  society.  Chris- 
tianity indicated  socialized  principles  of  conduct 
which  the  disciples  of  Christianity  must  accept. 

(2)  The  Fatherhood  of  God  is  made  a  cardinal 
principle  of  the  Kingdom.    When  all  persons  recog- 
nize the  Fatherhood  of  God,  they  will  have  a  strong 
tie  binding  them  together  and  impelling  them  to 
regenerated  living. 

(3)  The  universal  brotherhood  of  man  is  a 
natural  corollary  of  the  principle  of  the  Fatherhood 
of  God.    When  everyone  recognizes  the  underlying 
brotherhood  of  all  individuals,  the  prejudices  of 
race  which  now  so  bitterly  divide  mankind  will  be- 
gin to  dissolve. 

(4)  Marriage  is  a  divine  right,  and  husbands 
and  wives  shall  work  together  in  behalf  of  their 
children.    The  family  is  the  chief  social  institution 
which  the  New  Testament  writers  supported. 

(5)  Little  children  set  examples  of  simple  faith 
and  trust.     They  call  for  sacrifice  and  transform 
parents  into  altruistic  beings. 

(6)  Early  Christian  thought  was  missionary. 
It  was  not  self-centered.    It  said :  Go.    It  drove  out 
its  adherents  unto  all  forms  of  unselfish  living.    It 
required  that  its  followers  help  the  sick,  preach  the 
gospel,  travel  into  foreign  lands.    It  was  an  activity 
religion.    It  defined  in  living  terms  the  dynamic  and 
driving  principle  of  love. 


CHAPTER  IX 
SOCIAL  THOUGHT  IN  THE  MIDDLE  AGES 


The  social  thought  of  the  Middle  Ages  was  in 
part  a  reflection  of  the  unsettled  social  conditions, 
and  in  part  an  outgrowth  of  the  thought  and  life 
of  the  five  centuries  which  intervened  between  the 
beginning  of  the  Christian  Era  and  the  Fall  of 
Rome.  During  these  centuries  the  Church  Fathers 
moved  away  from  the  pristine  Christian  teachings. 
While  they  accepted  the  underlying  social  nature  of 
mankind  and  believed  that  government  and  social 
organization  were  necessary  in  order  to  curb  evil 
tendencies,  their  teachings  treated  government  as  a 
divine  institution  and  transformed  rulers  into 
super-powerful  beings  with  divine  rights.  The 
autocratic  rather  than  the  democratic  element  in 
government  received  support. 

The  strong  Roman  bias  for  organization  and 
administration  was  builded  into  the  church — the 
result  was  the  powerful  Church  of  Rome  with  its 
hierarchal  structure.  After  the  Fall  of  Rome,  the 
Roman  proclivity  for  centralization  of  government 
lived  on  and  produced  within  the  Church  a  center 
of  power  that  has  been  the  marvel  of  church 
history. 


146  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

The  Church  Fathers  directed  the  attention  of  the 
people  to  the  next  world  and  to  preparation  there- 
for. Sacramental  and  sacrificial  methods  of  salva- 
tion were  elaborated.  The  importance  of  improv- 
ing social  conditions  was  ignored.  In  fact,  the  in- 
justices in  the  current  social  order  were  considered 
as  disciplinary  measures  for  the  soul  in  its  prepara- 
tion for  the  next  world.  The  improvement  of  liv- 
ing conditions  was  considered  to  be  wasted  effort, 
if  not  indicative  of  heretical  tendencies  of  mind. 

By  the  third  century,  loyalty  to  creed  had  become 
a  dominant  note  in  Christianity.  The  poor  con- 
stituted a  decreasing  influence  in  church  life;  wealth 
was  exerting  unChristian  influences.  The  aristo- 
cratic elements  in  church  organization  began  to 
transform  the  poor  into  a  special  class  within  the 
church.  Poverty  was  not  viewed  preventively.  By 
the  time  of  the  Fall  of  Rome  the  poor  had  become 
objects  upon  which  to  bestow  alms  as  a  means  of 
expiating  sin. 

The  greatest  of  the  Latin  Fathers  was  Saint 
Augustine  (354-450).  Among  other  works,  he 
wrote  a  large  set  of  twenty-two  volumes  under  the 
title  of  The  City  of  God.  In  this  gigantic  under- 
taking social  thought  was  submerged  beneath  theo- 
logical discussions.  A  part  of  the  argument  is  de- 
voted to  an  explanation  of  the  Fall  of  Rome.  The 
leading  causal  elements  are  described  as  economic 
factors,  such  as  the  rise  of  luxury;  and  religious 
unbelief,  such  as  the  worship  of  pagan  gods.  Au- 


MEDIEVAL  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  147 

gustine  describes  two  cities,  one  of  this  world,  ma- 
terialistic and  debasing;  and  one  of  the  next  world 
—the  City  of  God,  which  through  the  will  of  God 
will  finally  triumph. 

During  the  first  half  of  the  Middle  Ages  the 
dominant  tendencies  are  Roman  and  Christian. 
The  Roman  power  of  organization  gains  increasing 
strength  in  its  new  form — the  Church.  The  Chris- 
tian influences  were  expressed  in  high  ideals,  new 
duties,  and  asceticism.  The  church  acted  as  a 
soothing  and  quieting  force  in  the  centuries  of  un- 
rest. It  built  elaborate  monasteries  and  gathered 
together  under  its  protecting  wing  large  numbers 
of  people,  chiefly  the  poor.  Under  the  supervision 
of  the  church,  these  religious  believers  lived  in  com- 
munal and  sympathetic  fashion.  Along  with  these 
developments  the  church  also  manifested  grave 
abuses.  At  the  expense  sometimes  of  the  ignorant 
and  the  poor  the  church  grew  powerful. 

Out  of  the  period  of  social  disorder  which  char- 
acterized the  early  Middle  Ages  there  developed 
educational  movements,  such  as  that  which  Charle- 
magne sponsored,  and  the  system  of  Feudalism, 
which  gave  to  the  Middle  Ages  its  most  distinctive 
set  of  characteristics.  Feudalism  made  land  the 
central  institution  of  society.  The  ownership  of 
land  gave  power;  land  constituted  social  and  polit- 
ical power.  Land  was  parcelled  out  upon  the  re- 
ceipt of  oaths  of  homage  and  fealty.  Under  this 
land  system  there  were  three  classes  of  people:  the 


148  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

nobles,  the  clergy,  and  the  peasants.  The  nobles 
were  the  rulers  and  exercised  military  prerogatives. 
The  clergy  were  either  the  privileged  subjects  of 
the  nobles,  or  else  through  the  institution  which 
they  represented  they  acquired  land  power.  The 
peasants  often  despised  the  nobles,  although  they 
worked  for  and  supported  them. 

As  an  outgrowth  of  feudal  industry  various 
forms  of  guilds  or  industrial  organizations  flour- 
ished from  the  tenth  to  the  fifteenth  centuries. 
Sometimes  the  masters  and  workmen  jointly  be- 
longed to  guilds,  as  in  the  case  of  the  merchant 
guilds.  Sometimes  the  guilds  became  local  monop- 
olies. Always  they  possessed  the  aim  of  improving 
the  conditions  of  the  membership. 

The  religious  wars,  or  Crusades,  of  the  eleventh 
to  the  thirteenth  centuries  inaugurated  many 
changes.  They  gave  the  restless  nobility  major 
themes  of  attention  and  even  removed  many  nobles 
through  death  in  battle  from  the  European  arena. 
They  created  intellectual  unrest.  They  enlarged 
the  horizons  of  many  individuals  and  gave  rise  to 
skepticism.  They  led  to  the  Reformation. 

Social  thought  in  the  Middle  Ages  received  a 
considerable  stimulus  from  Teutonic  sources.  The 
barbarous  Teutons  contributed  ideas  of  freedom. 
They  increased  the  emphasis  upon  the  individual. 
They  were  rough,  bold  exponents  of  "personal  lib- 
erty," and  disregarded  mere  churchly  procedure, 
social  traditions,  and  some  of  the  finer  ideals  of  life 


MEDIEVAL  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  149 

and  character.  On  the  other  hand,  chivalry  and 
knighthood  were  perhaps  of  Teutonic  origin. 

The  church  utilized  chivalry.  It  became  the 
duty  of  the  knight  to  defend  the  church  and  that 
which  belonged  to  the  church.  Chivalry  became  a 
form  of  social  discipline  which  ruled  in  the  latter 
part  of  the  Middle  Ages.  It  softened  manners  and 
became  the  sponsor  for  virtue.  It  remained,  how- 
ever, a  modified  military  structure  with  military 
traditions. 

The  rise  of  scholasticism  took  place  in  opposition 
to  monasticism.  In  the  ninth  century  the  lead- 
ing thinkers  had  not  advanced  beyond  the  concep- 
tion of  a  natural  social  state,  characterized  by 
chaotic  conditions,  and  organized  by  political  ma- 
chinery. By  the  twelfth  century  only  the  faintest 
glimmerings  of  a  doctrine  of  popular  sovereignty 
had  begun  to  appear.  The  thought  of  the  day  was 
largely  theological. 

The  church  through  its  systems  of  monasteries 
had  maintained  centers  where  religious  and  intel- 
lectual traditions  had  been  preserved.  These  cen- 
ters were  undoubtedly  important  factors  in  conserv- 
ing much  that  was  valuable  in  an  age  when  ruth- 
less disregard  for  civilized  values  prevailed. 

Because  of  the  abuses  which  sprang  up  in  con- 
nection with  the  monasteries,  certain  positive  reac- 
tions against  the  monasteries  arose.  St.  Francis  of 
Assisi  (1181-1226)  turned  from  the  monastery  to 
actual  life.  He  inaugurated  a  method  for  the  re- 


150  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

generation  of  society.  He  and  his  followers  lived 
and  spent  themselves  among  the  actual  poor,  sub- 
jecting themselves  to  the  economic  conditions  of 
the  poor.  They  helped  the  poor,  not  by  giving  alms 
as  an  expiation  for  sin  and  to  secure  self-salvation, 
but  by  the  first-hand  giving  of  their  lives.  St. 
Francis  ignored  the  regular  ecclesiastical  conception 
of  charity  and  gave  it  all  the  reality  of  a  new  and 
genuine  social  force.  By  renouncing  the  possession 
of  property  and  living  as  the  poor  live,  he  obtained 
what  he  could  secure  in  no  other  way — the  poor 
man's  point  of  view.  In  this  way,  also,  he  secured 
an  entrance  into  the  poor  man's  mind  and  heart 
that  could  not  be  had  so  well  by  any  other  method. 
By  renouncing  wealth  and  accepting  literal  poverty 
he  reached  the  core  of  the  problem  of  poverty.  St. 
Francis  was  motivated  by  a  desire  to  live  a  life  of 
love.  He  spent  not  wealth  but  his  life  for  the  poor. 
Scholasticism  developed  as  a  reaction  against 
churchly  asceticism.  According  to  scholasticism 
the  individual  should  look  to  reason  rather  than  to 
church  dogma  for  religious  and  spiritual  guidance. 
Scholasticism  repudiated  church  traditions  as  a 
guide  for  individual  action;  it  turned  to  Aristo- 
telian logic  for  its  technique.  Thomas  Aquinas 
(1226-1274),  the  best  known  of  the  scholastic 
philosophers,  pushed  forward  the  Aristotelian 
premises  as  follows:  Man  is  a  social  being;  he 
unites  with  other  individuals  in  a  social  organiza- 
tion in  order  to  gain  his  own  purposes.  The  indi- 


MEDIAEVAL  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  151 

vidual  looks  to  able  rulers  for  wise  political  guid- 
ance ;  he  accords  the  requisite  power  to  these  rulers. 
Aquinas  thus  recognized  a  tacit  social  compact,  or 
contract,  foreshadowing  Rousseau. 

In  religion,  scholasticism  reduced  religious  mys- 
ticism to  rational  forms.  It  based  religion  on 
learning  rather  than  on  authority;  it  pursued  the 
methods  of  reasoning  rather  than  of  contemplation. 

Scholasticism  furthered  the  advancement  of 
learning;  it  aided  and  developed  the  life  of  the 
universities.  It  encouraged  the  growth  of  inde- 
pendent thinking,  although  its  decline  set  in  about 
the  fourteenth  century,  before  it  had  had  a  fair 
opportunity  to  inaugurate  a  movement  which  would 
lead  to  an  inductive  or  a  positivistic  philosophy,  or 
sociology. 

Various  other  thought  elements  appeared  in  the 
closing  centuries  of  the  Middle  Ages.  As  early  as 
the  ninth  century  a  maritime  code,  a  military  code, 
and  a  rural  code  were  formulated  in  the  Byzantine 
Empire  in  order  to  meet  new  social  needs.  Until 
the  fall  of  Constantinople  the  Byzantine  influence 
was  a  deterrent  against  the  forces  from  the  East. 
Byzantium  preserved  and  gave  a  new  impetus  to 
Grecian  literature,  art,  architecture,  and  law. 

In  Arabia  the  celebrated  historian  and  philos- 
opher Ibn  Khaldun  (1332-1406),  made  a  detailed 
and  surprisingly  accurate  description  of  the  social 
life  of  the  Arab  tribes.  With  the  evolution  of  the 
life  of  the  individual,  he  compared  the  development 


152  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

of  the  successive  stages  in  social  life.  This  dis- 
tinguished historian  urged  that  history  should  con- 
sider not  simply  rulers,  dynasties,  and  wars,  but  also 
racial  factors,  climatic  forces,  the  laws  of  associa- 
tion, and  the  stages  of  associative  life.  He  wished 
to  make  history  scientific,  even  a  social  science.  He 
formulated  an  evolutionary  doctrine  of  social  prog- 
ress. He  evolved  a  spiral  theory  of  social  evolu- 
tion, beginning  with  the  crudest  primitive  life  and 
ending  with  the  most  civilized  urban  life. 

In  the  latter  part  of  the  fourteenth  century,  Eng- 
land's great  popular  poet,  William  Langland,  wrote 
an  allegorical  poem  entitled,  Piers  Ploughman. 
In  this  work  the  oppressed  laboring  and  peasant 
classes  cry  aloud  their  longings  for  improved  con- 
ditions. They  are  personified  in  Piers  the  Plough- 
man, who  as  a  dignified  laborer,  plays  for  the 
first  time  the  leading  role  in  serious  thought.  He 
is  the  leader  of  a  field  of  all  types  of  people  who 
are  laboring  together  and  longing  for  a  better  social 
order.  Along  with  the  agricultural  laborers  we 
see  weavers  and  tailors,  friars  and  minstrels,  mer- 
chants and  knights.  Labor  of  every  sort  is  digni- 
fied. All  living  laborers  who  work  with  their  hands 
and  minds,  truly  earning,  living  in  love  and  accord- 
ing to  the  laws  of  social  order  and  progress,  will 
become  the  pure  and  perfected  leaders  of  truth. 

Langland  depicted  well  the  living  and  working 
conditions  of  the  English  laboring  classes.  Pro- 
ductive toil,  he  argued,  will  receive  its  crown  of 


MEDIAEVAL  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  153 

glory.  But  he  did  not  indicate  practical  solutions. 
Langland  was  sure,  however,  that  the  service  of 
labor  to  society  is  sacred.  He  pronounced  patient 
poverty  to  be  the  prince  of  all  virtues.  He  personi- 
fied Jesus  in  the  form  of  a  working  man.  Lang- 
land's  fourteenth  century  social  message  was  that 
the  individual  should  renounce  wealth,  join  the 
honest  laboring  poor,  and  follow  Christ's  example 
of  living  a  life  of  labor  and  love.1 

Social  thought  in  the  Middle  Ages  is  frag- 
mentary. While  several  centuries  are  included  in 
the  period,  new  social  ideas  are  very  few.  The  cen- 
turies of  unrest  and  transition,  the  paucity  of  great 
leaders,  the  intellectual  stagnation,  and  the  prev-/ 
alent  illiteracy  of  the  masses  produced  situations  in 
which  little  social  thinking  of  importance  was  stim- 
ulated. New  thought  of  any  type  was  almost  neg- 
ligible except  as  an  isolated  individual  stood  forth, 
such  as  Augustine,  Charlemagne,  Ibn  Khaldun, 
Aquinas.  A  portion  of  the  social  thinking  of  the 
preceding  age,  however,  was  preserved,  constituting 
a  foundation  for  the  renaissance  of  social  thought 
that  was  coming. 


CHAPTER  X 
MORE  AND  UTOPIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 


Shortly  after  the  close  of  Middle  Ages  with  its 
modicum  of  social  thinking,  the  idealism  of  Plato 
appeared  in  a  new  form,  namely,  in  descriptive 
Utopias.  Of  these,  the  chief  and  subtlest  was  the 
work  of  England's  sane,  shrewd,  tolerant  student 
of  society,  Sir  Thomas  More  (1478-1535).  More's 
Utopia  deserves  a  degree  of  attention  which  is  not 
customarily  accorded  it. 

More  mediated  Plato  to  modern  social  philos- 
ophy; he  moved  in  the  field  of  Platonic  ideas  and 
ideals.  He  was  also  indebted  to  Plutarch's  account 
of  Spartan  life.  At  the  dawn  of  the  Renaissance 
he  presented  the  concept  of  a  perfect  common- 
wealth. 

If  one  would  understand  the  social  thought  of 
More,  a  contemporary  of  Columbus,  he  must  put 
himself  under  the  spell  of  fifteenth  and  sixteenth 
century  conditions  in  England.  He  must  remind 
himself  of  Henry  VII  and  Henry  VIII,  two  auto- 
cratic rulers  whom  it  was  difficult  for  any  individ- 
ually-minded person  to  please.  The  living  condi- 
tions of  the  peasants  were  almost  intolerable.  Un- 
employment was  common.  Punishments  were  se- 


UTOPIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  155 

vere  and  brutalizing.  Even  thieves  were  subject 
to  capital  punishment.  If  an  individual  stole  a  loaf 
of  bread,  he  might  as  well  kill  the  person  who  saw 
him  steal  the  bread.  In  fact,  by  so  doing,  he  might 
be  better  off — the  only  witness  to  his  theft  would 
thus  be  unable  to  testify  against  him. 

Sir  Thomas  More  could  not  have  openly  criti- 
cised the  unjust  social  conditions  of  his  day,  and 
long  escaped  death.  It  was  necessary  for  him  to 
put  his  radical  ideas  into  the  mouth  of  a  fictitious 
traveler,  Raphael  Hythloday,  and  thereby  disown 
them.  At  is  was,  More  became  a  martyr  to  his 
religious  faith  and  to  the  cause  of  social  freedom. 

More  wrote  the  Utopia  in  two  parts.  Part  one 
was  written  as  an  explanation,  or  introduction,  to 
part  two.  In  part  one  a  conversation  involving 
three  persons  is  reported.  A  conservative  Dutch 
citizen  of  Antwerp  converses  with  Raphael  Hyth- 
loday, an  experienced  traveler,  and  with  More. 
Hythloday,  however,  is  the  chief  speaker.  He  is 
well  versed  in  Latin  and  especially  in  Greek  culture. 
Moreover,  he  has  traveled  extensively,  even  with 
Amerigo  Vespucci,  the  Florentine  navigator.  In 
this  way  he  is  given  prestige  in  the  mind  of  the 
reader.  It  is  not  impossible  in  part  one  of  Utopia 
to  recognize  a  distinct  resemblance  to  the  dialogue 
form  of  Plato. 

Part  one  describes  certain  factors  in  the  polit- 
ical situation  in  England.  The  untoward  phases  of 
poverty  and  the  vicious  forms  of  punishment  that 


156  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

prevailed  are  painted  in  gloomy  colors.  The  reader 
is  glad  to  turn  from  this  unpleasant  social  picture 
to  the  description  in  part  two  of  Utopia,  where  the 
people  are  living  under  well-ordered  conditions. 

The  ideal  commonwealth  is  located  on  the  mys- 
tical island  of  Amaurote,  where  Raphael  Hythlo- 
day  lived  for  five  years.  On  this  island  the  eco- 
nomic and  social  life  is  communistic,  somewhat 
after  the  manner  of  Plato's  Republic.  It  is  a  funda- 
mental communism  which  More  postulates.  Com- 
plete communism  of  goods  exists  on  Amaurote.1 
All  possess  equal  portions  of  wealth.  The  Utopian 
communistic  state  implies  a  radical  change  in  hu- 
man nature.  More  justifies  communism  on  the 
grounds  that  it  roots  out  that  serious  social  evil, 
covetousness.2  Likewise,  the  incentive  for  stealing 
and  plundering  is  removed.  If  there  is  a  scarcity 
of  economic  commodities  in  any  part  of  Utopia,  the 
surplus  in  any  other  part  is  immediately  drawn 
upon  to  meet  the  need.  Thus  the  whole  land  con- 
ducts itself  as  if  it  were  one  family  or  household.5 
The  guiding  principle  in  regard  to  economic  goods 
is  that  of  human  needs. 

In  Utopia  everyone  finds  his  greatest  pleasun 
in  giving  to  others.  The  strongest  league  of  peo- 
ples or  of  nations  is  not  that  which  is  united  chiefly 
by  covenants  or  treaties,  but  one  which  is  knit  t( 
gether  by  love  and  a  benevolent  attitude.4  Th< 
strongest  league  in  the  world  is  that  which  is  base( 
on  the  fellowship  of  kindred  natures — a  genuin< 


UTOPIAN   SOCIAL  THOUGHT  157 

Christian  brotherhood  of  nations. 

In  Utopia,  agriculture  is  the  most  highly  re- 
spected occupation.  Agriculture  is  a  science  in 
which  all  Utopian  men  and  women  are  expert.  In 
the  harvest  days  the  urban  people,  both  men  and 
women  (farmerettes)  go  out  into  the  country  and 
help  gather  in  the  crops.5  Urban  and  rural  co- 
operation at  harvest  time  solves  the  farmer's  em- 
ployment problems  to  the  pleasure,  good  feeling, 
and  advantage  of  all  concerned.  The  food  ques- 
tion is  considered  of  paramount  national  import- 
ance. The  agriculturist  is  equipped  with  the  best 
tools  and  follows  intensive  methods.6 

In  addition  to  agricultural  science,  every  citizen 
of  Utopia  learns  at  least  one  trade  or  craft.7  Even 
every  woman  learns  a  skilled  trade.  The  advan- 
tages of  learning  a  trade  by  every  citizen  are  obvi- 
ous— they  include  a  great  increase  in  the  potential 
industrial  resources  of  a  people.  The  question 
may  be  raised  here,  if  it  would  not  be  a  worth-while 
asset  for  every  citizen  in  our  modern  days  to  learn 
a  trade.  Such  an  accomplishment  would  give  a 
sense  of  economic  independence  to  every  individ- 
ual; it  would  afford  to  everyone  the  point  of  view 
of  the  skilled  workman;  it  would  add  a  gigantic 
potential  force  to  production. 

In  Utopia,  there  is  one  leader,  or  syphogrant,  to 
every  thirty  families.  Although  there  are  other 
officers,  including  a  prince  for  each  city  and  a  king 
for  the  island,  the  syphogrants  are  in  reality  the 


158  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

leading  officials.  It  is  noteworthy  that  no  public 
matters  are  to  be  decided  until  they  have  been  con- 
sidered and  debated  for  at  least  three  days.  By 
this  scientific  procedure  the  necessity  of  rescinding 
hasty  legislative  action  is  reduced  to  a  minimum. 

An  important  duty  of  the  syphogrants  is  to 
regulate  employment.  Not  only  is  everyone  in 
Utopia  to  have  a  trade,  but  all  are  to  work.  There 
are  no  idle  poor  or  idle  rich.  All  rich  men,  com- 
monly called  "gentlemen,"  all  women,  priests, 
monks,  and  friars  (except  a  few)  engage  in  pro- 
ductive labor.  Even  the  syphogrants,  or  officials, 
work  spontaneously.  All  useless  occupations  are 
prohibited.  In  countries  where  the  dollar  rules, 
there  are  many  vain  occupations  which  serve  only 
to  augment  riotous  superfluities.8  Thus,  since  all 
persons  work  and  since  only  needed  occupations 
are  permitted  in  Utopia,  the  working  day  is  short- 
ened to  six  hours. 

In  the  case  of  a  season  of  unemployment,  the 
simple  device  is  adopted  of  shortening  temporarily 
the  labor  day.  By  cutting  down  the  hours  of  labor 
to  four  a  day  during  an  unemployment  period, 
work  is  provided  for  all.  When  an  individual,  it 
may  be  added,  visits  his  friends,  he  works  the  same 
as  if  he  were  at  home.  He  sets  himself  to  the  task 
in  which  his  friends  are  engaged.  No  one  in 
Utopia  is  encumbered  with  visitors  who  sit  about  j 
doing  nothing  and  at  the  same  time  hinder  their  | 
hosts  from  productive  activities. 


UTOPIAN   SOCIAL   THOUGHT  159 

The  syphogrants  prevent  idleness;  they  also  pre- 
vent overwork.  They  permit  no  one  to  work  at  a 
task  like  a  laboring  and  toiling  beast;  they  allow 
no  one  to  become  a  slave  to  his  labor. 

Laws  in  Utopia  are  few  in  number.  Inasmuch 
as  all  the  people  are  well  instructed  and  socially 
minded,  many  laws  are  needless.9  Each  citizen  is 
above  the  law  in  the  same  way  that  an  honest  per- 
son is  above  the  law  against  stealing.  In  the  case 
of  those  disputes  which  must  necessarily  arise,  the 
plaintiff  and  defendant  go  before  the  judge  and 
plead  for  themselves.  Utopia  is  noted  for  its 
scarcity  of  laws  and  the  absence  of  attorneys.  No 
crafty  and  subtle  interpretation  of  laws  by  attor- 
neys is  permitted.  Every  man  is  his  own  attorney 
and  simply  states  the  facts  in  the  given  dispute ;  the 
judge  knows  the  law  and  decides  the  case. 

The  organization  of  the  cities  is  interesting.  In 
the  middle  of  each  quarter  of  each  city  there  is  a 
market  place  for  the  exchange  of  all  manner  of 
goods.  Public  abattoirs  are  in  operation.  Splen- 
didly appointed  hospitals  are  located  outside  the 
cities  in  a  quiet  environment.  Contagious  wards 
are  provided.  So  excellent  is  the  care  which  is  af- 
forded the  patients  in  the  public  hospitals  that  any 
person  who  falls  sick  prefers  to  go  to  a  hospital 
than  to  be  cared  for  by  the  kindly  ministrations  of 
relatives  at  home.  It  may  be  noted  that  every  city 
is  provided  with  a  hall  of  fame. 

Every  urban  community  is  a  garden  city;  every 


160  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

house  has  a  garden  plot.  Furthermore,  the  people 
take  much  pride  in  their  gardens ;  they  compete  with 
one  another,  endeavoring  to  excel  in  the  fruitage 
and  in  the  beauty  of  the  gardens.10 

City  planning  rules  in  Utopia.11  Overcrowding 
is  not  permitted ;  whenever  a  city  exceeds  the  norm, 
a  new  city  is  established.  New  urban  communities 
are  established  by  public  action. 

Social  centers  are  common  on  the  island  of 
Amaurote.  In  the  winter  when  the  people  cannot 
work  in  their  gardens  after  the  supper  hour,  they 
gather  in  their  community  halls,  where  they  engage 
in  music,  wholesome  conversation,  and  games. 
Dice-play  and  similar  foolish  and  pernicious  games 
are  unknown.12  Wine  taverns,  alehouses,  "stewes," 
lurking  corners,  and  places  of  wicked  counsels  are 
prohibited.13 

Good  health  is  a  virtue  in  Amaurote ;  great  pleas- 
ure is  derived  from  possessing  a  well-ordered  state 
of  public  health.  Health  is  considered  a  sovereign 
pleasure  in  itself.14  Preventive  measures  are  sub- 
stituted for  remedial  medicines. 

Fashions  are  regulated  rigidly.  Fashion  imita- 
tion is  prevented.  The  garments  for  men  are  all 
of  one  mode;  and  for  women,  of  another  mode.15 
The  married  are  distinguished  from  the  unmarried 
by  the  style  of  wearing  apparel.  Thus,  there  are 
simply  four  sets  of  styles  in  Amaurote.  Coats  of 
uniform  colors — the  natural  color  of  wool — are 
worn.  It  is  argued  that  coats  of  many  colors  are 


UTOPIAN   SOCIAL   THOUGHT  161 

no  warmer  and  hence  no  more  practical  than  coats 
of  the  one  natural  color;  they  are  more  expensive 
and  hence  more  wasteful. 

In  Utopia,  gold  and  silver  are  held  in  reproach. 
They  are  not  considered  to  be  as  useful  as  iron. 
Consequently,  the  Utopians  load  down  their  slaves 
with  gold  and  silver  ornaments  and  pearls.16  In 
this  connection  the  description  of  the  visit  of  a 
group  of  ambassadors  to  Amaurote  is  amusing. 
The  ambassadors  from  an  adjoining  country  were 
dressed  in  gorgeous  apparel  like  the  very  gods. 
They  came  to  Amaurote  wearing  chains  of  gold 
and  displaying  peacock  feathers.  The  citizens  of 
Amaurote,  coming  out  to  meet  the  guests,  rushed 
past  the  ambassadors  and  saluted  the  plainly 
dressed  slaves  of  the  ambassadors.  They  mistook 
the  ambassadors  for  fools  and  knaves.  Even  the 
little  children  of  Amaurote,  when  they  saw  the  jew- 
elry of  the  ambassadors,  looked  at  their  mothers 
and  said:  "See,  how  great  a  lubber  doth  wear 
pearls  and  precious  stones,  as  if  he  were  still  a  little 
child."17  After  being  in  Amaurote  a  short  time, 
the  ambassadors  perceived  how  foolish  it  was  to 
set  emphasis  on  the  doubtful  glistenings  of  trifling 
stones.  They  recognized  that  it  is  foolish  to  con- 
sider oneself  nobler  than  other  selves  because  one 
can  wear  clothes  that  are  spun  from  finer  wool  than 
the  clothes  of  other  persons.  After  all,  whether  the 
wool  is  coarse  or  fine,  it  may  have  come  from  the 
self-same  sheep. 


162  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

An  individual  does  not  become  a  god  by  wearing 
precious  stones.  The  more  the  individual  burdens 
himself  with  heavy  stones  and  gorgeous  apparel, 
the  more  insignificant  he  is. 

Although  in  Utopia  no  man  is  wealthy,  yet  in  a 
sense,  all  men  are  wealthy.  All  live  joyfully,  with- 
out worrying,  and  without  fearing  that  they  or 
their  children  will  fall  into  poverty.  Amaurote  is 
a  gigantic  household,  wherein  the  more  able  take 
a  personal  interest  in  the  less  able  and  in  the  un- 
fortunate. No  one  lives  in  idleness  and  no  one 
lives  by  virtue  of  any  form  of  unnecessary  economic 
enterprise.  Rich  men  are  not  permitted  by  either 
private  fraud  or  common  law  to  snatch  away  from 
the  poor  man  some  portion,  great  or  small,  of  his 
daily  earnings.  There  are  no  idle  rich,  conniving 
how  they  may  keep  their  unearned  wealth  or  how 
they  may  grind  down  the  poor  in  order  to  get  more 
wealth.  Since  the  love  of  money  is  unknown  in 
Amaurote,  other  passions  are  also  absent.  Since 
the  people  do  not  love  money,  they  have  lost  the 
desire  to  perpetrate  the  money  crimes,  such  as 
fraud,  theft,  murder,  treason.  Likewise,  pride 
which  measures  its  satisfaction,  not  in  terms  of  its 
own  merits,  per  se,  but  by  comparison  with  the  pov- 
erty of  human  beings,  is  destroyed.  The  Utopians 
have  conquered  materialism.  They  are  not  subject 
to  the  death  grapples  which  are  caused  by  the  love 
of  money.  Luxuries  have  been  suppressed  and  the 
leisure  class  has  been  eliminated.  Social  extremes 


UTOPIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  163 

are  unknown. 

People  are  honored,  not  for  their  wealth  but  for 
their  serviceableness  to  the  community.18  In  the 
halls  of  fame,  to  which  allusion  has  already  been 
made,  benefactors  of  the  commonwealth  are  re- 
warded by  having  images  of  themselves  set  up  in 
perpetual  memory  of  their  good  deeds  to  their 
fellows.  t 

The  family  is  the  fundamental  social  unit,  but  it 
is  of  the  patriarchal  type.  Pure  monogamic  love  is 
idealized.  Especial  care  is  taken  that  neither  of  the 
parties  of  a  marriage  vow  possesses  any  hidden 
vices.  Adultery  is  the  chief  justification  for  break- 
ing the  marriage  bond.  A  single  standard  of 
morals  for  both  husband  and  wife  is  set.  Love 
may  be  won  by  beauty,  but  it  can  be  kept  and  pre- 
served only  by  virtue  and  obedience. 

Because  of  freedom  from  long  hours  of  monoto- 
nous labor,  nearly  every  one  in  Utopia  is  able  to 
maintain  his  intellectual  interests  and  to  experience 
intellectual  growth  throughout  life.  It  is  the  solemn 
custom  to  have  daily  lectures  early  every  morning 
and  it  is  the  habit  of  multitudes  of  people  of  all 
types  to  attend.19  All  of  the  time  that  it  is  possible 
to  spare  from  the  necessary  occupations  is  devoted 
to  the  development  and  garnishing  of  the  mind.20 
Nearly  all  the  citizens  devote  their  extra-occupa- 
tional hours  throughout  their  lives  to  the  arts  and 
sciences.  The  chief  felicity  of  life  is  said  to  be 
found  in  learning.  In  training  the  mind,  the  Uto- 


164  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

plans  never  weary.  As  a  matter  of  course,  a  com- 
mon school  education  is  provided  for  every  indi- 
vidual. Classes  for  adults  and  adult  education  are 
made  the  outstanding  features  of  the  public  school 
system  in  Amaurote.  One  must  learn  to  live  and 
must  go  on  learning  throughout  life.  Hence,  the 
provisions  of  public  education  should  be  adequate 
for  the  adult  as  well  as  for  the  adolescent. 

Religious  education  and  practice  are  considered 
essential.  More's  tolerant  attitude  in  an  age  of 
brutal  intolerance  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  Uto- 
pians are  permitted  whatever  religion  they  prefer. 
Superstitious  beliefs  are  taboo.  More  makes  a 
subtle  thrust  when  he  observes  that  the  priests  of 
Amaurote  are  possesed  of  great  holiness  and  hence 
are  few  in  number.21  It  is  no  esoteric  or  monastic 
religion  which  More  endorses.  Future  happiness 
may  be  secured  best  by  busy  labors  and  social  efforts 
in  this  life.22  Public  service,  including  the  care  of 
the  sick,  is  religiously  emphasized. 

War  is  beastly.  Contrary  to  the  attitudes  of  the 
people  in  all  other  countries,  the  people  of  Amau- 
rote count  nothing  so  inglorious  as  the  glory  that  is 
obtained  in  fighting  and  killing.23  No  imagination 
is  necessary  in  order  to  understand  the  courage 
which  More  displayed  in  making  a  vigorous  attack 
in  the  sixteenth  century  upon  war. 

Under  limited  conditions,  however,  war  is  justifi- 
able. More  gives  three  worthy  reasons  for  declar- 
ing war:  (1)  the  defense  of  one's  own  country; 


UTOPIAN   SOCIAL  THOUGHT  165 

(2)  the  defense  of  the  country  of  one's  friendly 
neighbors;  and  (3)  delivering  oppressed  peoples 
anywhere  from  the  yoke  and  bondage  of  tyranny.24 
From  the  twentieth  century  point  of  view,  these 
justifications  of  war  are  sound. 

These  reasons  are  all  "defense"  factors, — which 
is  remarkable  in  view  of  the  fact  that  they  were 
enunciated  in  an  age  when  "offensive"  wars  were 
common.  The  only  reason  for  assuming  the 
offensive  in  matters  of  war  is  the  social  one  of  tak- 
ing land  away  from  people  who  deliberately  with- 
hold land  from  cultivation  and  fail  to  produce 
food  for  the  nourishment  of  mankind.25  By  this 
plan,  More  severely  indicts  the  holders  of  large 
landed  estates  which  are  held  chiefly  for  the  selfish 
gratification  of  the  owners. 

Hired  or  mercenary  soldiers  are  employed  in 
war.  The  people  of  Amaurote  employ  hideous, 
savage  fighters  from  the  wild  woods  and  the  high 
mountains  to  do  their  fighting  for  them.  The 
larger  the  number  of  these  impetuous  barbarians 
who  are  killed  in  battle,  the  better  off  is  the  world. 

More  opposed  conscription.  Ordinarily,  no  one 
is  forced  to  fight,  because  under  such  circumstances 
he  will  not  fight  well.  In  the  case,  however,  of  de- 
fending Amaurote,  the  cowards  are  distributed 
among  the  bold-hearted.  In  warfare,  the  people  of 
Amaurote  do  not  allow  their  warriors  to  lay  waste 
or  destroy  the  land  of  their  enemies.  Neither  for- 
aging nor  the  burning  of  food  supplies  is  permit- 


166  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

ted.    No  one  who  is  unarmed  is  to  be  hurt. 

More's  penological  ideas  are  modern.  He  points 
out  the  folly  of  making  theft  a  capital  offense  the 
same  as  murder.  The  temptation  will  be  to  steal, 
or  rob,  and  to  kill  also,  whereas  under  a  more  rea- 
sonable law  the  temptation  in  many  cases  would  be 
to  steal  only.  A  law  which  makes  theft  a  capital 
offense  is  harsher  than  even  the  harsh  Mosaic  law 
of  an  eye  for  an  eye,  a  life  for  a  life,  because  the 
former  justifies  the  government  in  taking  the  life 
of  an  individual  who  is  guilty  of  stealing  money. 
In  Utopia  the  thief  is  compelled  to  restore  the  stolen 
goods  to  the  person  from  whom  he  stole,  and  not  to 
the  king,  as  in  many  lands  in  More's  time.  The 
thief  is  put  at  common  labor,  not  thrown  into  a  city 
or  county  jail  and  left  in  idleness.  Compulsory 
labor  is  the  common  method  of  punishment.25 

The  fundamental  penological  principle  which 
More  developed  was  that  crime  should  be  prevented 
by  taking  away  the  occasion  of  offense.27  He  con- 
demned the  prevailing  method  in  England  of  allow- 
ing wickedness  to  increase,  and  then  of  punishing 
the  sinners  after  they  had  been  permitted  to  grow 
up  in  an  environment  of  sin.  He  objected  to  tak- 
ing men  from  the  trades  for  war  service  and  then 
later  irresponsibly  discharging  them,  leaving  many 
of  them  industrially  stranded,  unemployed,  and  sub- 
ject to  the  temptation  of  stealing.  More's  dictum 
was :  Show  people  how  to  live ;  do  not  let  them  steal 
and  then  take  their  lives  away.  Life  in  Utopia  is 


UTOPIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  167 

more  or  less  equally  divided  between  five  factors : 
industry,  study,  music,  travel,  and  domesticity. 

In  the  Utopia,  Sir  Thomas  More  made  a  direct 
criticism  of  conditions  in  England ;  he  showed  him- 
self an  able  student  of  social  problems;  and  his 
ideas  are  noted  for  their  "modernness."  Alto- 
gether, the  Utopia  has  made  a  remarkable  impres- 
sion, not  simply  upon  social  idealists  but  also  upon 
practical  thinkers.  As  a  literary  invention  for 
shrewdly  suggesting  criticisms  of  vicious  but  en- 
trenched social  wrongs  it  has  been  followed  by  imi- 
tations, but  remains  unparalleled  in  quality. 

In  the  New  Atlantis,  Sir  Francis  Bacon  (1561- 
1628),  wrote  an  unfinished  description  of  a  Utopian 
island  where  there  is  a  high  degree  of  social  wel- 
fare and  where  "social  salvation  by  scientific  edu- 
cation" obtains.  An  Order  or  Society  of  "Solo- 
mon's House"  is  established  which  sends  out  every 
twelve  years  merchants  of  light  (intellectual)  who 
travel  for  the  following  period  of  twelve  years, 
gathering  facts  in  all  branches  of  science  and  art.28 
Upon  being  relieved  by  the  next  group  of  traveler 
scholars,  they  return  home  and  contribute  their 
knowledge  to  the  acquired  store,  which  in  the  mean- 
time has  been  added  unto  by  many  trained  experi- 
menters and  research  scholars.  Airplanes,  horse- 
less wagons,  and  submarines  are  not  unknown  in 
the  New  Atlantis.  Superstition  is  banished.  Social 
knowledge  will  lead  to  a  nation  of  socialized  per- 
sons,— this  is  the  Baconian  implication. 


168  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

Tommaso  Campanella  (1568-1639),  a  monk,  a 
philosopher,  and  an  Italian  contemporary  of  Fran- 
cis Bacon,  urged  that  human  nature  should  be  stud- 
ied rather  than  books.  Because  of  so-called  heret- 
ical ideas,  he  was  imprisoned  for  twenty-seven 
years.  Shortly  after  his  release  he  fled  to  Paris, 
where  he  died.  In  prison  he  wrote  The  City  of  the 
Sun,  a  crude  but  significant  psychological  analysis 
of  society.  It  is  a  social  order  based  on  the  balanced 
relations  of  the  three  principles  of  Power,  Intelli- 
gence, and  Love.  These  forces  are  equally  ex- 
expressed  in  the  social  process  and  produce  a  per- 
fect society. 

Oceana,  "a  Midsummer  Night's  Dream  of  poli- 
tics," is  the  title  of  a  romance  which  was  written  by 
James  Harrington  (1611-1677).  His  social  order 
rests  on  economic  factors,  chiefly  landed  estates. 
However,  the  author  advocates  the  election  of 
rulers  by  ballot  every  three  years  and  the  choosing 
of  the  rulers  from  the  intellectually  elite. 

In  this  chapter  it  is  impossible  to  note  all  the 
"utopias"  that  have  been  written.  The  Utopian  and 
communistic  systems  of  socialists,  such  as  Fourier, 
Saint  Simon,  and  Owen  will  be  referred  to  in  Chap- 
ter XIV.  There  are  other  important  Utopian  con- 
tributions, such  as  those  by  William  Morris  and 
Edward  Bellamy.  In  News  from  Nowhere,  Wil- 
liam Morris  (1834-1896),  an  English  artist  and 
socialist,  describes  his  native  England  as  a  per- 
fected society  under  a  regime  of  socialism.  Because 


UTOPIAN   SOCIAL  THOUGHT  169 

of  its  American  setting,  Bellamy's  Looking  Back- 
ward will  be  presented  in  some  detail  in  the  follow- 
ing paragraphs. 

In  recent  decades  the  Utopian  postulates  of  Ed- 
ward Bellamy  (1850-1898),  in  Looking  Backward 
and  Equality  have  had  a  wide  reading.  The  author 
was  the  first  American  to  command  attention  in  the 
field  of  Utopian  thought.  Bellamy  presents  a  plan 
of  industrial  organization  on  a  national  scale  with 
individuals  sharing  equally  in  the  products  of  labor, 
or  in  public  income,  in  the  same  way  that  "men 
share  equally  in  the  free  gifts  of  nature."  Bellamy 
protests  against  an  economic  order  whose  chief  evil 
is  summed  up  in  the  following  question :  How  can 
men  be  free  who  must  ask  the  right  to  labor  and 
to  live  from  their  fellows,  and  seek  their  bread  from 
the  hand  of  others? 

Society  is  likened  to  a  gigantic  coach  to  which 
the  masses  of  humanity  are  harnessed,  toiling  along 
a  very  hilly  and  sandy  road.  The  best  seats  are  on 
top  of  the  coach.  The  occupants  of  the  elegant  seats 
are  constantly  in  fear  of  falling  from  their  cushions 
of  ease,  splendor,  and  power, — and  hence  their  in- 
terest in  the  toilers. 

In  Looking  Backward  the  entire  social  process 
is  made  an  expression  of  service.  Service  is  a  mat- 
ter of  course,  not  of  compulsion.  No  business  is  so 
fundamentally  the  public's  business  as  the  industry 
and  trade  on  which  the  livelihood  of  the  public  de- 
pends.29 Therefore,  to  intrust  industry  and  com- 


170  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

merce  to  private  persons  to  be  managed  for  private 
profit  is  a  folly  "similar  to  that  of  surrendering  the 
functions  of  political  government  to  kings  and 
nobles  for  their  personal  glorification." 

Buying  and  selling  are  pronounced  anti-social. 
They  are  an  education  in  self-seeking  at  the  expense 
of  others.30  Citizens  who  are  so  trained  are  unable 
to  rise  above  a  very  low  grade  of  civilization.31 
They  are  sensible  chiefly  to  such  motives  as  fear 
of  want  and  love  of  luxury.  For  buying  and  sell- 
ing, credit  books  are  substituted  which  are  good  at 
any  public  warehouse.  In  place  of  higher  wages, 
the  chief  motives  to  activity  are  honor,  men's  grati- 
tude, the  inspiration  of  duty,  patriotism,  the  satis- 
faction of  doing  one's  work  well — in  other  words, 
the  same  motives  that  now  influence,  for  example, 
the  members  of  the  teaching  profession. 

The  arduousness  of  the  trades  are  equalized,  so 
that  all  shall  be  equally  attractive,  by  making  the 
hours  of  labor  in  different  trades  to  differ  inversely 
according  to  arduousness.82  Everyone  works  as  a 
common  laborer  for  three  years  and  then  chooses 
an  occupation — agriculture,  mechanics,  the  profes- 
sions, art.  The  working  life  is  twenty-four  years 
long,  from  the  ages  of  twenty-one  to  forty-five, 
after  which  all  may  devote  themselves  to  self-im- 
provement and  enjoyment,  but  subject  to  emergency 
calls  along  industrial  and  other  social  service  lines. 

Bellamy  challenges  an  individualism  which  inca^ 
pacitates  people  for  co-operation.  He  builds  his 


UTOPIAN   SOCIAL  THOUGHT  171 

society  upon  solidarity  of  race  and  brotherhood  of 
man.  He  does  not  fear  corruption  in  a  society 
"where  there  is  neither  poverty  to  be  bribed  nor 
wealth  to  bribe."33 

All  cases  of  criminal  atavism  are  treated  in  hos- 
pitals. There  are  no  jails.  Under  capitalism  nine- 
teen-twentieths  of  misdemeanors  are  due  to  eco- 
nomic inequality.  The  remainder  are  the  outcrop- 
ping of  ancestral  traits.  In  Bellamy's  ideal  society 
there  are  no  private  property  disputes  and  no  law- 
yers. 

The  educational  system  in  Looking  Backward 
does  not  educate  some  individuals  highly  and  leave 
others  untrained.34  It  gives  everyone  "the  complet- 
est  education  that  the  nation  can  give/'  in  order 
that  individuals  may  enjoy  themselves,  in  order  that 
they  may  enjoy  one  another,  and  in  order  that  the 
unborn  may  be  guaranteed  an  intelligent  and  re- 
fined parentage. 

Bellamy  holds  that  human  nature  in  its  essential 
quality  is  good,  not  bad,  and  that  men  are  naturally 
generous,  not  selfish;  pitiful,  not  cruel;  godlike  in 
aspirations,  moved  by  divine  impulses  of  goodness, 
images  of  God  and  not  the  travesties  upon  Him 
which  they  have  seemed.35  It  is  our  economic  order 
which  has  fostered  shameless  self-assertion,  mutual 
depreciation,  a  stunning  clamor  of  conflicting 
boasts,  and  a  stupendous  system  of  brazen  beggary. 

In  three  Utopias,  H.  G.  Wells  portrays  societary 
conditions  that  are  kinetic  rather  than  static  and 


172  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

world-wide  rather  than  local  in  scope.36  While  the 
author  provides  a  changed  economic  system,  social- 
istic in  nature,  he  urges  that  changed  social  atti- 
tudes are  also  needed. 

In  the  Utopian  social  thought  that  has  been  pre- 
sented in  this  chapter  and  in  similar  works  which 
are  not  mentioned  here  there  is  generally  displayed 
(1)  a  common  weakness  of  impracticability  under 
current  circumstances,  (2)  an.  over-emphasis  upon 
simply  changing  the  economic  order,  and  (3)  static 
rather  than  dynamic  principles.  The  strength  of 
Utopian  social  thought  is  found  (1)  in  its  drastic 
criticism  of  current  social  evils,  (2)  in  its  relative 
harmlessness  at  the  given  time,  (3)  in  the  force  of 
its  indirect  suggestion,  (4)  in  the  widespread  hear- 
ing which  it  secures,  and  (5)  in  its  social  idealism. 


CHAPTER  XL 
INDIVIDUALISTIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 


At  the  dawn  of  the  Renaissance,  tradition  and 
dogmatism  were  ruling  mankind.  Here  and  there, 
however,  individuals  were  perceiving  the  nature  of 
the  bondage.  Occasionally  a  cry  for  individual  free- 
dom was  uttered.  Petrarch  dared  to  say  that  the 
world  was  made  for  man's  enjoyment.  The  early 
Teutons  crudely  developed  the  idea  of  personal  lib- 
erty. In  France  a  movement  arose  which  culmi- 
nated in  the  doctrines  of  natural  rights  and  "Back 
to  Nature."  The  stress  upon  individualism  in 
England  became  so  deeply  ingrained  that  it  exists 
today  as  a  powerful  form  of  traditionalism.  The 
United  States  was  founded,  in  part,  upon  a  doctrine 
of  natural  rights. 

Absolutely  unlike  Sir  Thomas  More  in  many 
ways,  Niccolo  Machiavelli  (1469-1527),  an  Italian 
contemporary,  broke  with  tradition  and  received 
the  sobriquet,  the  Galileo  of  social  science.  Unfor- 
tunately, many  people  think  of  the  Italian  writer 
in  terms  of  the  adjective  which  bears  his  name, 
Machiavellism,  or  political  intrigue.  While  he  de- 
serves this  reputation,  he  also  should  be  considered 
in  another  light.  He  cut  loose  from  the  customary 


174  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

ways  of  thinking  of  his  time  and  asserted  that  it  is 
not  necessary  to  take  all  things  on  fiat  or  alleged 
divine  decree.  Although  this  may  be  dangerous 
doctrine,  it  serves  a  useful  and  constructive  purpose 
when  people  are  ruled  by  political  and  ecclesiastical 
autocrats.  Machiavelli  was  no  idealist  in  the  ac- 
cepted sense  of  the  term,  but  a  man  who  mixed  with 
people,  traveled  extensively,  and  studied  actual  con- 
ditions. He  declared  that  people  should  be  con- 
sidered as  they  are,  and  not  according  to  false 
teachings  about  them. 

A  century  before  the  time  of  Sir  Francis  Bacon, 
the  inaugurator  of  the  so-called  inductive  or  scien- 
tific method  of  study,  Machiavelli  was  observing 
human  conditions  and  upon  the  basis  of  these  ob- 
servations was  drawing  conclusions.  He  believed 
that  it  does  not  pay  to  be  guided  in  one's  conduct 
by  abstract  ethics  or  impracticable  ideals — and  said 
so,  in  an  age  when  imprisonment,  exile,  or  death 
awaited  anyone  who  opposed  the  autocratic  authori- 
ties. From  abstract  ethics,  Machiavelli  swung  to 
the  extreme  of  concrete  expediency.  He  lived  and 
thought  in  the  exigencies  of  the  moment.  He  is 
an  example  of  one  who  reacts  so  strongly  against 
the  stress  and  strain  of  the  hour  that  he  cannot  get 
the  larger  vision  that  is  necessary  for  balanced 
thinking  on  fundamental  issues. 

Machiavelli  wrote  on  the  subject  of  leadership 
and  government.  He  advocated  either  an  auto- 
cratic or  democratic  form  of  government — accord- 


INDIVIDUALISTIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT       175 

ing  to  the  conditions  of  the  time  and  place.  In  the 
Prince  he  described  with  noteworthy  accuracy  the 
traits  and  methods  of  a  leader  whose  constituents 
must  be  treated  with  absolute  authority.  In  the 
Discourses  he  dealt  with  a  democratic-republican 
type  of  leadership  and  control. 

The  succesful  prince,  or  leader,  in  the  selfish 
sense,  makes  himself  both  beloved  and  feared  by 
his  people.1  On  occasion  he  uses  force  and  even 
fraud.  Sometimes  he  must  either  exterminate  or 
be  exterminated.  He  must  repeal  or  suppress  old 
laws  and  make  new  ones  to  fit  the  social  situation. 
He  seeks  to  be  considered  merciful*  rather  than 
cruel.  He  exercises  universal  pity  in  order  to  pre- 
vent social  disorders  from  occurring  and  produc- 
ing rapine  and  murder.2  He  does  not  allow  his 
mercy  to  be  taken  advantage  of  by  ungrateful  and 
hypocritical  persons.  He  is  strong-minded;  he  is 
either  a  sincere  friend  or  a  generous  foe.  He  is 
paternalistic,  urging  that  his  subjects  be  well-fed 
and  have  a  good  livelihood,3  thus  gaining  and  main- 
taining the  affection  of  the  people.  In  international 
affairs  he  acts  with  a  strong  hand,  fortifying  well 
his  city  or  nation,  and  providing  good  laws  for  in- 
ternal growth.4  He  errs  grossly,  however,  in  his 
fundamental  philosophy  that  any  plan  or  action  that 
is  for  the  welfare  of  the  state,  or  nation,  considered 
as  a  supreme  unit  of  authority  in  itself,  is  morally 
sound. 

Sir  Francis  Bacon,  whose  contribution  to  Utopian 


176  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

social  thought  has  been  indicated  in  the  foregoing 
chapter,  placed  all  social  and  sociological  thinkers 
under  deep  obligations  by  his  emphasis  upon  induc- 
tive reasoning.  He  helped  to  free  the  individual 
from  control  by  dogma  and  superstition.  He  pro- 
vided the  individual  with  a  technique  for  securing 
a  new  sense  of  individual  freedom.  In  freeing  him- 
self the  individual  discards  his  irrational  pre-judg- 
ments,  whether  socially  inherited  or  individually 
developed.  He  protects  himself  from  anthropo- 
morphic judgments,  i.  e.,  from  judgments  which 
he  makes  because  he  looks  upon  life  and  the  uni- 
verse through  human  eyes.  These  pre-judgments 
are  common  to  all  mankind — they  are  "the  idols  of 
the  tribe."  On  the  other  hand,  the  individual  avoids 
purely  personal  preferences,  which  he  is  likely  to 
hold  because  of  his  own  peculiar  experiences,  and 
which  thus  place  him  outside  the  pale  of  common 
experience — these  are  "the  idols  of  the  cave." 

Then  there  are  "the  idols  of  the  forum,"  which 
cause  the  individual  to  give  undue  dependence  to 
words  and  language.  "The  idols  of  the  theater" 
are  traditional  systems  of  thought.  Bacon's  dictum 
has  been  stated  as  follows :  Get  as  little  of  your- 
self and  of  other  selves  as  possible  in  the  way  of 
the  thing  which  you  wish  to  see. 

Having  eliminated  human  predispositions,  the  in- 
dividual is  ready  to  gather  facts,  arrange  them  in 
groups,  draw  conclusions  from  them,  and  act  ac- 
cording to  the  resultant  laws.  Knowledge  gives 


INDIVIDUALISTIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT        177 

power/  Social  knowledge  gives  power  to  improve 
human  conditions  and  makes  possible  wise  social 
control.  Thus,  Bacon  opened  the  road  to  individual 
freedom. 

Too  much  individual  freedom,  however,  destroys 
government  and  the  social  order.  If  each  individual 
is  a  law  unto  himself,  anarchy  reigns  and  progress 
is  prevented.  Consequently,  the  question  arises: 
How  can  individually  free  persons  unite  in  a  society 
without  giving  up  their  freedom?  The  answer  to 
this  question  took  the  form  of  a  controversy  on  the 
subject  of  the  social  contract,  i.  e.,  the  contract  or 
agreement  of  individuals,  as  units,  to  form  and 
maintain  societies.  This  controversy  arose  in  the 
seventeenth  century  and  was  waged  vigorously  in 
the  eighteenth  century. 

Thomas  Hobbes  (1588-1678),  the  distinguished 
social  philosopher  of  England,  introduced  his  analy- 
sis of  society  with  the  idea  that  man  was  originally 
self-centered,  egoistic,  and  pleasure-loving.  He  was 
an  independent  center.  His  interest  in  other  people 
was  based  on  their  ability  to  cater  to  his  own  good. 
He  and  they  desired  the  same  things  in  life.  His 
hand  was  thus  raised,  in  competition,  against  every 
other  man.  This  state  of  continual  conflict  became 
mutually  destructive  and  unbearable.5  In  conse- 
quence, each  individual  agreed  to  give  over  some 
of  his  precious,  inalienable  rights  to  a  central  au- 
thority or  sovereign,  whose  decrees  should  consti- 
tute law  and  serve  as  the  guide  for  conduct.  The 


178  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

war  of  each  against  all,  with  the  concomitant  state 
of  fear,  was  thus  supplanted  by  a  mutual  contract, 
conferring  sovereignty  by  popular  agreement  upon 
the  ruler.  In  this  way  Hobbes  met  the  dilemma  of 
supporting  an  absolute  form  of  government  in 
which  he  believed  and  of  denying  the  divine  right 
of  kings  which  he  abhorred.  Hobbes  performed  a 
useful  service  in  intellectually  destroying  the  idea 
of  the  divine  right  of  kings,  but  urged  after  all  an 
undemocratic  political  absolutism.  Hobbes  con- 
ferred humanly  derived  but  irrevocable  authority 
upon  the  king.  He,  however,  traced  sovereignty 
back  to  the  people  rather  than  to  a  divine  right. 

In  getting  away  from  the  conditions  "of  Warre 
of  every  one  against  every  one"  in  the  natural  state 
where  "every  man  has  a  Right  to  everything/' 
Hobbes  s^vimgTo~~aTrTrr^  His 

Puritanic  training  gave  an  undue  severity  to  his 
social  thought.    The  Puritans,  however,  believed  in 
the  complete  eradication  of  the  savage  human  ten- 
dencies  and  also  in  the  ultimate   elimination 
kings.    Hobbes  did  not  analyze  deeply  the  instinct- 
ive bases  of  human  nature.    He  built  his  Leviathw 
out  of  natural  human  qualities  and  tied  its  unil 
together  by  means  of  a  strong,  central  will— thi< 
was  his  perfect  society. 

Baruch  Spinoza  (1632-1677),  the  Portugues< 
Jewish  philosopher  of  Holland,  improved  the  soci; 
contract  idea.  He  believed  that  man  was  originall; 
of  an  anti-social  and  a  tooth-and-fang  nature,  pos- 


INDIVIDUALISTIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT        179 

sessing  only  incipient  social  impulses.  Hence,  man 
is  not  naturally  bad,  but  naturally  anti-social.  So- 
cial organization  was  effected  for  purposes  of  indi- 
vidual gain  and  glory;  it  was  promulgated  and 
furthered  by  individuals  in  order  that  they  might 
escape  the  miseries  of  unregulated  conflict.  Agree- 
ments were  made  whereby  sovereignty  was  embod- 
ied in  a  ruler,  but  if  the  ruler  abused  the  sover- 
eignty entrusted  to  him,  it  reverted  immediately  to 
the  people.  This  democratic  conception  was  vastly 
superior  to  the  idea  of  Hobbes,  that  sovereignty  is 
delegated  by  the  people  to  the  king  as  an  irrespon- 
sible monarch. 

John  Locke  (1632-1704)  strengthened  the  social 
contract  theory,  elaborating  the  idea  that  sover- 
eignty reverts  to  the  people  whenever  the  king  be- 
comes a  tyrant.  He  held  that  the  natural  state  of 
individuals  is  a  condition  of  perfect  freedom  to 
order  their  actions,  not  asking  leave  of  any  man.6 
This  state  of  liberty  is  not  a  state  of  license  to  indi- 
viduals to  destroy  themselves  or  their  neighbors.7 
The  state  of  liberty  has  the  law  of  nature  to  govern 
it.  Since  all  are  equal,  no  one  ought  to  harm  an- 
other in  his  liberty  or  possessions. 

Locke  affirmed  that  men  are  in  a  state  of  nature 
until  by  their  own  consent  they  join  in  a  political 
society.8  In  order  to  meet  their  needs  effectively, 
they  join  in  societies.  One  of  these  important  needs 
is  the  preservation  of  property.  Locke  defended 
private  property  on  the  ground  that  it  is  a  normal 


180  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

expression  of  individuality  and  necessary  to  indi- 
viduality. 

Right  and  wrong  are  not  determined  by  the  ruler 
or  the  state;  they  existed  before  society  developed. 
Here  the  Puritanism  of  Locke  enters.  He  stressed 
moral  values.  He  made  the  natural  rights  of  indi- 
viduals supreme ;  individuals  may  even  overturn  the 
government  and  still  keep  within  their  rights. 

Locke's  justification  of  revolution  is  his  most 
startling  doctrine.  Imagine  the  heart-throb  of  the 
common  people  who  heard  Locke's  contention  that 
the  end  of  government  is  the  good  of  mankind, 
that  people  should  not  submit  to  tyranny,  that  who- 
ever uses  his  force  without  right  and  law  puts  him- 
self in  a  state  of  war  with  those  against  whom  he 
uses  it,  and  that  in  such  a  state  the  people  have  a 
right  to  resist  and  defend  themselves.9  Further, 
the  people  have  a  right  to  act  as  the  supreme  social 
force  and  to  put  legislation  into  new  forms  and 
into  the  hands  of  new  executives.  By  these  bold 
declarations  Locke  created  a  new  public  opinion, 
and  aroused  new  moral  power  in  the  minds  and 
hearts  of  the  common  people. 

By  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century  the  con 
cept  of  individual  freedom  became  crystallized  in 
the  doctrines  of  the  natural  rights  of  the  individual, 
the  contractual  societary  relationships  between  in- 
dependent individuals,  and  the  laissez  faire  prin- 
ciple in  governmental  science.  The  physiocrats, 
who  took  up  the  ideas  of  natural  liberty  and  eco- 


INDIVIDUALISTIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT        181 

nomic  freedom,  exercised  a  tremendous  influence  in 
France  during  the  three  decades  following  1750. 
Their  leaders  were  Quesnay,  de  Gournay,  Con- 
dorcet,  and  Turgot.  They  believed  that  there  was 
a  natural  law  ruling  human  lives,  just  as  there  is  a 
natural  law  ruling  the  physical  world.  They  chafed 
under  social  restraints.  Under  the  natural  law, 
every  individual  has  natural  rights,  chief  of  which 
is  the  right  to  the  free  exercise  of  all  his  faculties 
so  long  as  he  does  not  infringe  on  the  similar  right 
of  other  individuals.  Unlike  John  Locke  and  other 
English  thinkers  who  accepted  the  idea  of  indi- 
vidual liberty,  the  physiocrats  argued  that  this 
natural  liberty  could  not  be  abridged  by  a  social 
contract. 

According  to  the  physiocrats  the  chief  function 
of  governmental  control  is  to  preserve  the  natural 
liberty  of  individuals.  Industry  and  commerce 
must  not  be  governmentally  regulated,  for  by  such 
regulation  the  rights  of  some  men,  chiefly  employ- 
ers, will  be  infringed  upon.  Employees,  on  the 
other  hand,  who  are  being  treated  unjustly  will 
freely  quit  a  harsh  employer  and  obtain  employ- 
ment with  considerate  masters.  Thus,  an  unjust 
employer  will  be  unable  to  secure  workers  and  be 
forced  to  discontinue  his  unjust  practices — without 
government  regulation.  Likewise,  a  dishonest  mer- 
chant will  lose  his  customers  and  be  forced  to 
become  honest  or  to  close  his  shop — and  again  with- 
out government  regulation.  The  physiocrats  be- 


182  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

came  known  by  their  famous  phrase,  laissez  faire, 
laissez  passer. 

Jean  Jacques  Rousseau  (1712-1778),  an  able  but 
baffling  character,  is  the  best  known  champion  of 
the  social  contract  idea.  Although  he  advocated 
the  family  as  a  social  institution  and  praised  father- 
hood, he  reports  that  he  carried  his  own  children 
to  a  foundling  asylum.  He  deprecated  the  disin- 
tegrating elements  in  civilization  and  urged  a  re- 
turn to  nature's  simple  ways.  In  his  chief  works, 
the  Contrat  social  and  Entile,  he  attacked  civiliza- 
tion vigorously.  He  asserted  that  civilization  had 
almost  destroyed  the  natural  rights  of  man.  His 
dictum  was :  Trust  nature,. 

According  to  Rousseau  the  early  life  of  mankind 
was  nearly  ideal  in  its  simplicity  and  pleasantness. 
War  and  conflict  were  relatively  unknown.  In  his 
later  writings,  Rousseau  modified  his  belief  and 
asserted  that  primitive  confusion  made  necessary 
some  kind  of  social  organization.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  became  the  belief  of  Rousseau  that  civiliza- 
tion generates  social  evils  and  results  sooner  or 
later  in  social  deterioration.  Corruption  in  society 
has  become  notorious.  Social  inequality  is  rampant 
and  unbearable.  "Man  is  born  freehand  is  every- 
where in  chains."  People  have  become  so  engrossed 
in"  the  artificialities  of  social  life  and  so  bewildered 
by  its  complexities  that  happiness  has  been  lost. 

Leave  the  individual  free  to  carry  out  his  own 
plans,  untrammelled  by  complex  social  rules,  re- 


INDIVIDUALISTIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT        183 

strictions,  and  duties.  There  is  no  social  sanction 
at  all;  there  is  no  authority  except  nature,  which 
is  necessity.  In  Emile,  Rousseau  takes  his  two 
leading  characters  to  an  island,  where  they  live 
alone — happily !  Liberty  not  authority  reigns.  But 
Emile,  who  has  declared  for  liberty  as  opposed  to 
authority,  insists  in  his  discussions  of  domestic  rela- 
tionships that  "woman  is  made  to  please  man." 
The  "unselfish,  unsocial  life"  of  Emile  and  Sophie 
turns  out  to  be  more  than  purely  individualistic — 
it  is  anarchic  and  sensual.  Emile  fails  to  demon- 
strate the  merit  of  Rousseau's  own  theories,  such 
as  "Man  is  good  naturally  but  by  institutions  he  is 
made  bad,"  and  "Everything  is  good  as  it  comes 
from  the  hands  of  the  Author  of  Nature;  every- 
thing degenerates  in  the  hands  of  man." 

Slavery  is  wrong,  according  to  Rousseau.11  It  is 
a  contract  or  agreement,  at  the  expense  of  the  slave 
and  for  the  profit  of  the  slaveholder,  in  which  the 
slaveholder  asserts :  I'll  observe  the  agreement  and 
you  will  observe  it — as  long  as  it  pleases  me. 

Strength  does  not  make  right.  Strength  and 
moralforce  are  noTfiecessar  ily  the  same.  Strength 
may  often  be  ironically  accepted  in  appearance  and 
established  in  principle.  By  a  social  contract  man 
loses  his  natural  liberty  and  gains  civil  and  moral 
liberty.12  In  this  connection  Rousseau  was  simply 
the  spokesman  of  a  point  of  view  which  found  fre- 
quent expression  in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth 
centuries.  For  example,  in  1635,  John  Winthrop, 


184  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

the  first  governor  of  the  Massachusetts  colony, 
made  a  clear-cut  distinction  between  natural  liber- 
ties, and  civil  and  moral  liberties.  Natural  liberty 
is  liberty  to  do  what  one  lists,  to  do  evil  as  well  as 
good.  Civil,  or  moral,  liberty  is  liberty  under  the 
covenant  between  God  and  man,  under  the  political 
covenants  between  men  and  men,  and  under  the 
moral  law.  It  is  a  liberty  to  do  only  that  which  is 
good,  just,  and  honest.13 

Itjwas  Rousseau  who  rnn tended  that  life,  liberty^ 
jindjhejmrsuit  of  happiness  arejnan's  inalienable 
rights.  It  was  this  doctrine  which  profoundly  in- 
fluenced Thomas  Jefferson,  as  evidenced  in  the 
Declaration  of  Independence.  Sovereignty  rests  not 
in  a  ruler  or  monarch  but  in  the  community  of 
people — this  was  perhaps  Rousseau's  main  contri- 
bution to  social  thought. 

Before  Rousseau,  however,  wrote  the  Contrat 
social,  the  social  contract  theory  had  been  over- 
thrown. The  writings  of  Montesquieu  (1689-1755) 
offer  an  elaborate  analysis  of  social  and  political 
processes.  These  analyses  are  similar,  in  some 
ways,  to  Aristotle's  analyses  of  158  constitutions. 
Montesquieu  discussed  the  doctrine  of  natural 
rights,  but  did  not  believe  that  the  natural  state  of 
mankind  was  one  of  conflict,  in  which  social  or- 
ganization was  forced  as  a  means  of  meeting  the 
needs  of  individual  protection.  He  asserted  Jjial 
there  was  a  natural,  innatejtendcjicv  in  man  toward 
association.  In  the  support  of  this  belief,  Mon- 


.INDIVIDUALISTIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT        185 

tesquieu  drew  facts  from  the  lives  of  the  individual 
members  of  the  primitive  tribes  which  were  extant 
in  his  day.  The  influence  of  Montesquieu  was 
clearly  inimical  to  the  social  contract  doctrine. 

In  the  Esprit  des  lois,  Montesquieu  dissected  the 
laws  of  many  nations  and  tried  to  show  the  rela- 
tions between  these  laws  and  social  and  political 
conditions.  The  general  implication  is  that  laws 
are  a  natural  outgrowth  of  life  conditions  rather 
than  of  formal  contractual  agreements.  Hence, 
society  is  a  natural  evolution  rather  than  a  contract. 

Perhaps  the  chief  antagonist  in  the  eighteenth 
century  of  the  social  contract  theory  was  David. 
Hume  (1711-1776),  the  father  of  social  psychology. 
"According  to  Hume,  the  origin  of  society  was  not 
in  a  contract  arrived  at  by  intellectual  processes; 
it  was  instinctive.  Man  is  a  social  animal.  At  the 
basis  of  this  sociability  lies  the  sex  instinct,  which 
resulted  in  the  establishment  of  the  family.  The 
sex  instinct  is  strongly  supported  by  the  sentiment 
of  sympathy,  which  also  is  innate,  and  which  may 
develop  into  intelligent  co-operation.  Man  is  not 
entirely  self -centered;  he  takes  pleasure  in  other 
people's  pleasures  and  suffers  when  others  are  in 
pain,  or  the  victims  of  disease,  or  are  dying. 

Sympathy,  like  the  sex  instinct,  is  a  genuinely 
fundamental  element  in  human  nature  and  in 
society.  However,  the  combination  of  sympathy 
and  the  sex  instinct  is  not  strong  enough  to  sup- 
port the  family  in  either  its  simple  or  complex 


186  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

stages  from  the  attacks  upon  it  that  are  made  by 
inherent  human  selfishness.  Hence,  social  and  po- 
litical organizations  are  necessary  to  hold  the  selfish 
impulses  and  interests  of  mankind  in  check.  Intel- 
lectual control  of  society  thus  becomes  necessary 
and  consciously  recognized.  Environment  alone 
does  not  cause  people  in  a  given  community  to  act 
alike.  It  is  imitation,  primarily,  which  operates  to 
bring  about  group  conformity.14 

Man  in  ajarge  measure  isgQyerned  by  interest.  ( 
It  is  impossible  for  men  to  consult  their  interests 
"in  so  effective  a  manner  as  by  a  universal  and  in- 
flexible observance  of  the  rules  of  justice,  by  which 
alone  they  can  preserve  society,  and  keep  them- 
selves from  falling  into  that  wretched  and  savage 
condition,  which  is  commonly  represented  as  the 
state  of  nature."15 

According  to  the  contract  theory,  people  expect 
protection  and  security.  If  they  meet  with  tyranny 
and  oppression,  they  are  freed  from  their  promises 
and  return  to  that  state  of  liberty  which  proceeded 
the  institution  of  government.  But  Hume  main- 
tained that  if  people  entered  into  no  contract  and 
made  no  promises,  government  would  still  be  neces- 
sary in  all  civilized  societies.  The  obligation  of  sub- 
mission to  government  is  not  derived  from  any 
promise  of  the  subjects.16 

Adam  Ferguson  (1723-1816)  wrote  an  Essay  on 
the  History  of  Civil  Society  and  The  History  of  the 
Progress  and  Termination  of  the  Roman  Republic. 


INDIVIDUALISTIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT        187 

He  argued  that  social  institutions  and  social  con- 
venience lead  to  inherent  sociability,  and  pointed  out 
that  competition  and  conflict  are  vital  to  social 
development.  Thomas  Paine  (1737-1809)  asserted 
that  man  is  inherently  social  and  that  social  organi- 
zation is  a  natural  development. 

The  natural  rights  theory  and  the  resultant  in- 
dividualism not  only  repudiated  their  false  deriva- 
tive, the  social  contract  concept,  but  also  wrestled 
with  considerable  success  with  the  socio-economic 
concept  of  mercantilism.  Mercantilism  was  a  sys- 
tem of  regulating  industrial  enterprise  by  govern- 
ments in  order  to  build  up  strong  nation-states. 
Mercantilism  reached  its  strictest  form  in  France 
in  the  writings  of  Colbert  (1619-1683).  It  pre- 
vailed in  Europe  during  the  sixteenth  and  seven- 
teenth centuries,  and  the  first  four  decades  of  the 
eighteenth  century.  It  was  a  system  which  grew 
out  of  feudalism  and  the  city-state  type  of  society. 
It  operated  to  bring  together  towns  and  cities  into 
national  unities.  Under  feudalism,  the  town  had 
regulated  industry  for  its  own  advancement  and 
against  the  welfare,  perchance,  of  neighboring 
towns.  Mercantilism  served  to  unite  towns  and  to 
Create JTL  townspeople  a  national  loyalty. 

Under  mercantilism,  the  nation  entered  upon  the 
task  of  regulating  industryjmd  finance_so_jis  to 
build^a  strong  state.  AJiasfDrable  balance  of  trade 
was  sought  in  order  to  add  to  the  bullion  within 
the  state.  High  tariffs  were  enacted,  which  some- 


188  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

times  defeated  the  intended  purposes.  A  dense  pop- 
ulation was  favored  as  a  means  of  securing  cheap 
labor,  and  hence  of  furthering  manufacture,  which 
in  turn  would  develop  foreign  trade  and  bring  in 
the  coveted  bullion — the  heralded  strength  of  a 
nation. 

In  the  eighteenth  century,  mercantilism  in  France 
and  England  met  defeat  in  the  contest  with  the 
laissez  faire  theory,  with  which  the  names  of  the 
physiocrats  and  of  Adam  Smith  are  inseparably 
connected.  It  often  fathered  too  stringent  regula- 
tions. Instead  of  supporting  national  ends,  mer- 
cantilistic  measures  frequently  furthered  private 
interests.  Mercantilism,  however,  played_a_strong 
part  in  building  up  the  concepts  of  national  unity 
and  loyalty. 

In  the  German  states  and  Austria,  cameralism 
represented  the  ideas  for  which  mercantilism  stood 
in  England,  France,  and  elsewhere  in  Western  and 
Southern  Europe.  Among  the  leading  cameralists 
were  Seckendorf,  Horing,  Justi,  and  Sonnenfels. 
Cameralism  obtained  a  far  deeper  hold  upon  the 
German  states  than  mercantilism  did,  for  example, 
in  England.  The  laissez  faire  philosophy  was  never 
able  to  make  a  deep  inroad  upon  cameralism.  In 
fact,  the  laissez  faire  philosophy  did  not  receive 
serious  consideration  in  the  German  states  be- 
fore 1800,  and  did  not  strike  deep.  National  self- 
sufficiency,  paternalistic  control,  minute  regulation 
of  internal  affairs,  rearing  of  large  families,  and 


INDIVIDUALISTIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT        189 

subordination  of  the  welfare  of  the  state — these 
are  the  concepts  which  ruled  in  Germany. 

Adam  Smith  (1723-1790),  primarily  an  econ- 
omist and  often  referred  to  as  the  father  of  political 
eoonomy,  exerted  a  profound  influence  upon  social 
thought.  He  coupled  a  modified  natural  rights 
theory  with  a  doctrine  of  sympathy;  he  spoke  for 
the  natural  righ^jofjthejndividual,  of  the  poorer 
classes  in  society,  and  of  the  smaller  nations.  He 
vigorously  attacked  mercantilism  with  its  system  of 
minute  regulation  of  individuals.  He  objected  to 
promoting  unduly  the  interests  of  one  class  of  men 
in  a  country,  for  by  so  doing,  the  interests  of  all 
other  classes  in  that  country  and  of  all  persons  in 
all  other  countries  are  harmed.17  He  pointed  out 
the  fallacy  of  building  a  nation  of  shopkeepers,  for 
in  so  doing  the  government  of  such  a  nation  will 
be  unduly  influenced  and  controlled  by  the  interests 
of  shopkeepers.  The  interests  of  other  classes  will 
be  more  or  less  ignored.  Adam  Smith  protested 
against  Great  Britain's  methods  of  regulating  the 
American  colonies.  To  prohibit  the  American 
colonies  from  making  all  they  could  of  every  part 
of  their  own  produce  or  from  employing  their  stock 
and  industry  in  the  way  that  they  judged  most  ad- 
vantageous to  themselves,  was  "a  manifest  violation 
of  the  most  sacred  rights  of  mankind."3 

Mercantilism  made  use  of  monopoly  of  one  kind 
or  another,  and  hence  is  objectionable,  according  to 
Smith.  Mercantilism  is  regulation,  and  regulation 


190  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

is  often  carried  on  for  the  benefit  of  the  rich  and 
powerful,  thus  neglecting  and  oppressing  the  poor.19 
Smith  failed  to  note,  however,  that  the  laissez  faire 
policy  likewise  favored  the  rich  and  powerful  and 
neglected  the  poor.  Mercantilism,  according  to 
Smith,  considers  production  and  not  consumption 
as  the  end  of  industry  and  commerce,  and  thus 
favors  one  class  at  the  expense  of  other  classes. 

"Wherever  there  is  great  property,"  said  Smith, 
"there  is  great  inequality."  For  every  very  rich 
man  there  must  be  at  least  500  poor  men,  and  the 
affluence  of  the  few  supposes  the  indigence  of  the 
many.20  But  no  society  can  be  flourishing  and 
happy  wherein  the  greater  part  of  the  members  are 
poor  and  miserable.21  The  laboring  men  should 
have  "such  a  share  of  the  produce  of  their  own 
labor  as  to  be  themselves  tolerably  well  fed,  clothed, 
and  lodged."  Poverty  does  not  prevent  the  pro- 
creation of  children,  but  is  on  the  other  hand  ex- 
tremely unfavorable  to  the  rearing  of  children.22 

Smith  pointed  out  four  causes  of  social  inequal^- 
Hyj23  (1)  Superiority_in  personal  qualifications, 
such  as  strength,  beauty,  agility  of  body;  or  wis- 
dom, virtue,  prudence,  justice,  fortitude,  modera- 
tion_ofjmind.  (2)  Superiority _of^age  and  experi- 
ence. (3)  Superiority_of  fortune.  Riches  give 
social  authority;  riches  possess  power  to  buy. 
(4)  Superiority  of  birth,  based  on  family  prestige. 

Smith  extolled  the  merits  of  division  of  labor 
in  industry  with  the  resultant  increase  in  the  quan- 


INDIVIDUALISTIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT        191 

tity  of  work.  There  are  three  sets  of  causal  circum- 
stances:24 (1)  the  increase  of  dexterity;  (2)  the 
saving  of  time  in  passing  from  one  kind  of  work 
to  another;  and  (3)  the  invention  of  a  large  num- 
ber of  machines.  Smith,  however,  deplored  the 
deadening  effect  upon  the  individual  of  repeating 
over  and  over  a  simple  process,  hundreds  or  thou- 
sands of  times  daily.  In  summary,  Adam  Smith 
(1)  applied  the  concept  of  naturaljjghts  to  indus- 
(2)  developed  Hume's  concept  of; 


sympathy  into  a  theory  of  mutual  aid  between  in- 
dividuals, classes,  and  nations  ;  and  (3)  supported 
the  necessity  oiLdivision  ,jo|  labor. 

The  natural  rights  and  social  contract  theories 
affected  in  one  way  or  another  the  thinking  not 
only  of  the  men  who  have  already  been  considered 
in  this  chapter,  but  also  of  many  other  individuals. 
Blackstone  (1723-1780)  held  that  man's  weakness 
in  isolation  led  to  association.  The  primary  group 
was  the  patriarchal  family.  Blackstone  was  not  an 
advocate  of  social  regulation.  His  exposition  of 
English  law  in  the  Commentaries  stood  for  law 
itself,  and  became  the  bulwark  at  once  of  the  doc- 
trines of  individual  rights  and  property  rights  in 
both  England  and  the  American  colonies.  In  the 
United  States,  its  influence  remained  dominant  for 
more  than  a  century  after  the  founding  of  the 
republic. 

Although  Edmund  Burke  (1729-1797)  believed 
in  a  corporate  unity  of  society,  he  became  in  his 


192  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

century  the  chief  spokesman  of  humanity  for  hu- 
manity's sake.  He  pleaded  for  justice  for  and  con- 
ciliation with  the  American  colonies;  he  spoke  for 
the  benighted  Hindus  who  were  being  plundered  by 
English  stockholders  ;  and  he  championed  the  rights 
of  slaves.  He  failed,  on  the  other  hand,  to  appre- 
ciate the  struggles  of  the  French  people  which  cul- 
minated in  the  French  Revolution. 

Immanuel  Kant  (1724-1817)  declared  man  in  a 
natural  state  is  both  social  and  unsocial^  and  re- 
ferred to  the  "unsocial  socia'bTeness"  of  man.  "Man 
cannot  get  on  with  fellows  and  he  cannotjdcuwith- 
out  them."  Man  has  an  inclination  to  associate 
with  others  and  also  a  great  propensity  to  isolate 
himself  from  others.  He  wishes  to  direct  things 
according  to  his  own  ideas  and  thus  courts  resist- 
ance and  conflict.  It  is  this  conflict,  however,  which 
leads  to  individual  advancement. 

Kant  laid  great  stress  upon  a  good  will.25  The 
individual  may  have  intelligence  and  sagacity, 
power  and  wealth,  but  he  may  still  be  a  pernicious 
and  hurtful  member  of  society.  He  is  not  even 
worthy  to  be  happy  unless  he  possesses  a  good  will. 
A  man's  will  is  good  not  because  of_th 


seeks_nor_because  of  the^  results  of  his_actiylties 
bnt_becaiise  he  inherently  wills  the  good.  It  is  this 
"good  will"  of  Kant  which  is  in  conflict  with  the 
utilitarianism  of  Bentham  and  Mill,  and  also  with 
modern  behavioristic  psychology  and  objective  so- 
ciology. To  Kant,  morality  is  subjective.  Social 


INDIVIDUALISTIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT        193 

laws  may  regulate  and  control  man's  conduct  but 
they  cannot  control  his  motives. 

Johann  Fichte  (1762-1814)  joined  with  Kant  in 
the  interpretation  of  a  good  will.  He  held  that 
property  is  essential  to  the  development  of  freedom. 
However,  he  pushed  the  social  contract  idea  to  an 
extreme  and  developed  a  doctrine  of  an  idealistic 
state  socialism,  including  the  superiority  of  Ger- 
many among  the  nations  of  the  world. 

Hegel  (1770-1831)  supported  cameralism  by  de- 
veloping the  State  idea,  with  the  implication  that 
Germany  would  become  the  supreme  State  in  the 
world.  Hege^even  asserted  that  man  has  his  exist- 
ence and  his  ethical  status  "only  in  being  a  member 
of  the  State."*  Morality  is  not  a  matter  of  striv- 
ing independently  to  realize  one's  inner  self,  but  of 
living  in  accord  with  the  traditions  of  one's  State. 

Perhaps  the  individual  rights  theory  never  mani- 
fested a  greater  aberration  than  in  the  mind  of 
Friedrich  Nietzsche  (1844-1900).  Power  is  su- 
preme. The  individual  or  the  nation  with  the 
greatest  power  has  the  greatest  right  to  live. 
Against  this  idea  or  the  expressions  of  this  idea, 
the  weaker  individuals  tend  to  combine  and  to  extol 
their  weaknesses  as  virtues,  even  building  a  religion 
out  of  these  glorified  weaknesses,  for  example, 
Christianity.  Nietzsche's  doctrine  of  the  super- 
man and  the  superstate  will  be  discussed  in  Chap- 
ter XXI. 

Closely   related   to   the    discussions    concerning 


194  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

natural  rights  and  the  social  contract  is  the  doc- 
trine of  utilitarianism,  a  modified  form  of  individ- 
ualism with  certain  objective  standards.  Jeremy 
Bentham  (1748-1832)  made  utilitarianism  well- 
known,  and  particularly  the  standard:  The  great- 
est good  of  the  greatest  number.  In  accordance 
with  a  formal  idea  of  social  change,  Bentham  urged 
that  social  improvements  be  made  by  legislation. 
He  demanded  objective  standards  as  opposed  to 
Kant's  emphasis  on  the  inner  motive.  Where  Kant 
accented  the  "how"  of  conduct,  Bentham  insisted 
on  the  "what"  of  conduct.  He  pointed  out  the 
need  for  improved  forms  of  government,  appar- 
ently ignoring  or  at  least  greatly  underestimating 
the  fact  that  real  progress  comes  chiefly  through 
modifying  organic  processes.  However,  Bentham 
may  be  rated  a  virile  social  reformer,  for  he 
strongly  advocated  such  measures  as  the  secret  bal- 
lot, woman  suffrage,  trained  statesmancraft.  He 
made  social  welfare  a  main  goal. 

The  doctrine  of  utilitarianism  was  carried  for- 
ward by  James  Mill  (1773-1836)  and  was  brought 
to  its  highest  fruition  by  the  son,  John  Stuart  Mill 
( 1806-1873  ) .  The  elder  Mill  contended  that  utility 
is  morality.  Like  Bentham  the  elder  Mill  urged 
many  social  reforms. 

John  Stuart  Mill  adopted  a  modified  form  of  the 
natural  rights  theory.  He  asserted  that  the  in- 
dividual should  have  all  the  rights  that  he  can  exer- 
cise without  infringing  upon  the  equal  rights  of 


INDIVIDUALISTIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT        195 

other  individuals.  Mill  recognized  a  gradation  in 
the  pleasures  which  satisfy  individuals.  He  de- 
clared that  it  is  better  to  be  a  man  dissatisfied  than 
a  pig  satisfied;  he  objected  to  the  prevailing  classifi- 
cation of  people  on  the  basis  of  poverty  and  wealth, 
and  urged  the  substitution  of  standards  of  personal 
worth,  honor,  and  true  leadership  as  bases  for  social 
classification. 

Sir  Henry  Maine  (1832-1888)  invented  the 
phrase:  From  status  to  contract.  He  applied  this 
phrase  to  a  program  of  social  welfare.  There  are 
many  illustrations,  he  pointed  out,  in  business  and 
industrial  life,  and  even  in  political  and  fraternal 
activities  where  people  make  social  contracts.  The 
marriage  contract  also  has  many  of  the  characteris- 
tics of  a  genuine  social  contract.  Maine  pushed  the 
social  contract  idea  to  its  furthest  practical  point; 
but  deprecated  the  possibility  that  the  masses  might 
come  into  power.  His  individualism  deprived  him 
of  a  faith  in  the  possible  social  development  of  the 
uneducated. 

whose  ideas  will  be  discussed 


more  extensively  in  a  subsequent  chapter,  became 
one  of  the  chief  exponents  of  the  doctrine  of  laissez 
faire  in  governmentaLmaJLters.  He  brought  a  vast 
reading  knowledge  and  able  arguments  to  the  sup- 
port of  individualistic  doctrines.  He  added  very 
little  that  was  new  to  individualistic  and  laissez 
faire  theories  although  he  was  at  one  time  perhaps 
their  leading  exponent.  One  of  his  chief  contribu- 


196  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

tions  to  social  thought  was  indirect  and  uninten- 
tional, namely,  the  way  in  which  his  writings  chal- 
lenged the  attention  of  an  American  paleontologist, 
Lester  F.  Ward,  and  led  him  to  point  out  the 
psychical  nature  and  hence  telic  possibilities  of 
civilization.  In  consequence  of  this  challenge  Spen- 
cer fell,  and  Ward  rose  to  the  rank  of  dean  of 
American  sociologists.  An  entire  chapter  will  be 
devoted  to  the  sociology  of  Lester  F.  Ward. 

William  G.  Sumner  (1840-1910)  was  the  last 
noted  champion  of  a  governmental  laissez  faire 
doctrine.  He  held  that  the  State  owes  nothing  to 
anybody  except  peace,  order,  and  the  guarantee  of 
rights.  It  is  not  true  that  the  poor  ought  to  care 
for  each  other,  and  that  the  churches  ought  to  col- 
lect capital  and  spend  it  for  the  poor ;  it  is  not  true 
that  if  you  get  wealth  you  should  support  others; 
and  that  if  you  do  not  get  wealth  others  ought  to 
support  you.  In  a  society  based  on  contract  there 
is  no  place  for  sentiment  in  public  or  common 
affairs.28  Every  individual  will  develop  the  self- 
reliance  of  a  free  person,  if  he  is  not  taught  that 
others  will  care  for  him  in  case  he  fails  to  care 
for  himself.  Sumner  spoke  vigorously  as  well  as 
harshly  in  support  of  liberty,  contract,  and  private 
property.  Although  he  took  an  extreme  and  un- 
tenable position  his  ideas  will  bear  careful,  unbiased 
study,  for  they  contain  a  large  amount  of  common 
sense.  His  ethnological  work  will  be  indicated  at 
some  length  in  another  chapter. 


INDIVIDUALISTIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  197 
A  noteworthy  statement  which  has  come  from  a 
current  American  school  of  legal  thinkers  concern- 
ing individualistic  social  thought,  is  found  in  the 
writings  of  Professor  Roscoe  Pound  of  Harvard 
Law  School.  In  "A  Theory  of  Social  Interests"  he 
has  summed  up  the  new  point  of  view.29  In  the  last 
century  all  interests  were  thought  of  in  terms  of 
individual  interests,  all  were  reduced  to  their  purely 
individual  elements  and  considered  as  rights. 

In  this  century,  Dean  Pound  indicates  that  law, 
for  example,  aims  primarily  to  conserve  some  gen- 
eral social  interest.  It  conserves  the  social  interest 
in  the  general  security,  that  is,  in  public  health  and 
in  peace.  It  conserves  the  social  interest  in  institu- 
tions,— domestic,  religious,  political.  It  conserves 
the  social  interest  in  natural  resources,  preventing 
the  waste  of  oil  and  gas  and  protecting  water 
rights.  In  conserves  the  social  interest  in  general 
progress,  in  economic,  political,  cultural  progress, 
although  its  main  contribution  in  other  fields,  such 
as  promoting  the  esthetic  interests,  are  yet  to  be 
made.  It  conserves  the  social  interests  in  individual 
life  and  in  seeing  that  people  live  humanly  and  that 
the  will  of  the  individual  is  not  trodden  upon. 
Legal  processes  have  thus  become  types  of  social 
engineering. 

The  doctrine  of  natural  rights  reached  its  largest 
degree  of  acceptance  in  England,  France,  and  the 
United  State  s.___  It  was  not  only  reflected  in  the 
thought  of  Thomas  Jefferson  but  in  the  funda- 


198  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

mental  principles  upon  which  the  United  States 
was  established.  It  suffered  an  aberration  in  the 
form  of  the  social  contract  theory  which  in  its  ex- 
treme forms  was  later  repudiated.  Its  greatest 
weakness  was  the  exaggerated  form  which  it  as- 
sumed, especially  in  England  and  the  United  States. 
In  the  latter  country  it  became  greatly  magnified 
through  contact  with  the  spirit  of  discovery,  inven- 
tion, and  pioneering  which  prevailed  for  over  a 
century.  Consequently,  it  dominated  the  thought 
life  of  the  United  States  throughout  the  nineteenth 
century.  Itjjennittejd  captains  of  jndustry  to  ex- 
ploit  the  helpless  masses,  and  encouraged  politicians 
to^  pursue  selfish^  practices^  until  governments  bg- 

pcame  honeycombed  with  graft.    It  nearly  capsized 

;  the  good  Ship  of  State — Democracy. 

Theories  of  natural  r^hts  have  been  supplanted 

f  by  considerations  of  naturaljieeds,  both  individual 
and  social.  Human  needs  are"now  considered  the 
only  imperatives,  but  even  they  are  relative  and 
changing. 


CHAPTER  XII 
MALTHUS  AND  POPULATION  CONCEPTS 


A  unique  and  distinctive  trend  in  social  thought 
with  important  sociological  implications  developed 
in  the  closing  years  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
namely,  Malthusian  thought  regarding  population. 
Malthusianism,  however,  was  preceded  by  the  ideas 
of  William  Godwin  and  Adam  Smith.  In  1775, 
Adam  Smith  had  stated  that  "every  s£££Je.s.  of 
animals  naturally  multiplies  in  proporiiQ&-4Q  the 
meansof^  their  subsistence,  and  no  species  can  ever 
multiply  beyond  it."1  Scanty  subsistence,  however, 
destroys  a  large  percentage  of  offspring.  Inasmuch 
as  men,  like  all  other  animals,  multiply  naturally 
in  proportion  to  the  means  of  their  subsistence,  food 
is  always,  more  or  less,  in  demand;  and  food,  or 
the  cost  of  living,  regulates  population.2  City  peo- 
ple must  depend  upon  the  country  for  their  sub- 
sistence, whereas  seaport  towns  can  command  food 
resources  from  all  parts  of  the  earth. 

The  population  ideas  of  William  Godwin  (1756- 
1836)  were  the  immediate  stimuli  which  set  Mal- 
thus  at  work.  In  1793,  Godwin's  Enquiry  Concern- 
ing Justice  was  published.  Godwin  elaborated  sev- 
eral radical  social  ideas  of  the  French  Physiocratic 


,  200  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

philosophers.  He  declared  that  human  misery  is 
caused  by  coercive  institutions.  Government,  he 
asserted,  is  an  evil  and  should  be  abolished.  He 
urged  also  the  abolition  of  strict  marriage  relations, 
although  he  personally  acquiesced  in  the  custom  and 
in  his  last  days  he  commended  marriage.  He 
thought  that  no  social  group  should  be  larger  than 
a  parish,  and  that  there  should  be  an  equal  distribu- 
tion of  property.  ^odwjruthus  carried  the  doc- 
trine of  natural  rights  jto  ^he^z£i^e_o^aji^^hj_a^l 
licentiousness.  His  ideas  furnished  a  basis  for  the 
nineteentE~century  experiments  in  communism. 
But  what  is  more  important,  Godwin's  ideas  regard- 
ing the  reconstruction  of  society  stimulated  Thomas 
Malthus,  who  developed  what  is  commonly  known 
as  the  Malthusian  doctrine  of  population. 

In  1798,  under  an  assumed  name,  Thomas  Robert 
Malthus  (1766-1834)  offered  to  the  world  the 
first  carefully  collected  and  elaborated  body  of 
data,  dealing  with  what  he  called  the  social  prob- 
lem, namely :  Wha^js_JJ]^jur^ 
human  unhappiness?  This  study  may  be  counted, 
in  a  sense,  the  beginning  of  modern  sociological 
study.  Early  in  life  Malthus  showed  an  interest 
in  social  questions.  Godwin's  ideas  had  centered 
Malthus'  attention  on  population.  Malthus'  well- 
known  treatise  entitled,  An  Essay  on  the  Principle 
of  Population  as  it  Affects  the  Future  Improve- 
ment of  Society,  undertook  two  important  tasks: 
( 1 )  To  investigaje_4h^^auses  thatjhave  impeded 


MALTHUSIAN  CONCEPTS  201 

the  progress  of^nankind  toward^Jiappiness^  and 
(2)  to  examine  probabilities  of_a  total  or  j>artial 
removaJLoj  these  causes . 3 

Among  both  plants  and  animals  there  is  a  con- 
stant tendency  to  reproduce  numerically  beyond  the 
subsistence  level.  Wherever  there  is  liberty,  this 
power  of  increase  blindly  asserts  itself.  After- 
wards, a  lack  of  nourishment  and  of  room  represses 
the  superabundant  numbers.4  It  appears,  there- 
fore, that  the  ultimate  check  to  population  is  lack 
of  food,  due  to  the  fact  that  population  increases 
faster  than  food  supply.  Nature,  in  other  words, 
sets  a  harsher  law  over  the  increase  of  subsistence 
than  she  does  over  the  birth  rate.  Man  fails  to 
take  cognizance  of  this  law  and  brings  untold 
misery  upon  himself.  The  lower  economic  classes 
are  the  chief  victims,  and  the  giants  of  poverty  and 
pauperism  rule  over  whole  sections  of  human  popu- 
lation. Mai  thus  considers  the  question  of  popula- 
tion the  fundamental  social  problem. 

Since  population  outruns  food  supply,  dire  human 
consequences  naturally  follow.  Food  supply,  as  a 
di^kjipQii_4K}pula^^^ 

representative  of  an  entire  series  of  rigorous 
natural,  or  positive,  checks  upon  population.  In 
this  list  there  are  unwholesome  occupations; 
forms  of  severe  labor;  extreme  poverty;  damp  and 
wretched  housing  conditions;  diseases,  epidemics, 
plagues,  poor  nursing ;  intestine  commotion,  martial 
law,  civil  war;  wars  of  all  forms;  excesses  of  all 


202  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

kinds.5  These  positive  checks  upon  population  are 
the  results  of  two  main  causes,  namely,  vice  and 
misery.  As  a  result  of  the  operation  of  these  fac- 
tors, population  is  being  continually  cut  down  and 
kept  near  the  mere  subsistence  plane. 

Malthus  pointed  out  another  check  upon  popula- 
tion,   the   preventive.      The    fear   of   falling   into 
poverty   causes   many   young   people   to  £ostpone_ 
marriage  until  theycan 


Thls~cEecK  so  far  as  voluntary  is  peculiar 
to  man  and,  to  the  extent  that  it  is  not  followed 
by  irregular  sex  gratification,  is  prudential.  The 
actual  pressure  of  population  upon  food  supply,  or 
the  fear  of  this  impingement,  prevents  people  from 
marrying  earlier  than  they  do  and  from  repro- 
ducing their  kind  faster  than  they  would  do  other- 
wise. This  pre^sure^^QjiJjie^fear  oJLJt  cutsjiowji 
^  rate_jn_times  of  economicjiepressiQn. 


But  let  prosperity  come  and  the  marriage  rate  leaps 
upward,  especially  among  the  poorer  classes. 

The  positive  and  preventive  checks  upon  popula- 
tion hold  a  definite  relation  to  each  other.  "In 
every  country  where  the  whole  of  the  procreative 
power  cannot  be  called  into  action,  the  preventive 
and  the  positive  checks  must  vary  inversely  as  each 
other."6  That  is  to  say,  when  positive  checks,  such 
as  famine  and  war,  slay  large  numbers  of  people, 
moral  restraint  is  diminished  and  the  population 
numbers  rapidly  increase.  When  the  preventive 
check  expresses  itself  strongly,  the  population  is 


MALTHUSIAN  CONCEPTS  203 

kept  down  numerically,  and  positive  checks,  such  as 
famine  or  even  war,  are  defeated. 

Malthus  attempted  to   establish  three  proposi- 
tions : 

(1)  The  limitation  of  population  by  the  restrjc- 
tipn  of  thejneans  of  subsistence. 

(2)  The  invariable  increase  of  population_wlien- 
eer  the  means  of 


(3)   The  f  actorswhichjceep  population  on  a  level 


three  :  jnoxaLre^traint,  vice,jmd  misery.7 

No  one  can  gainsay  the  importance  or  the  serious- 
ness of  the  problem  of  population.  Plato  wrestled 
with  it,  and  urged  that  procreation  when  it  goes 
on  too  fast  or  too  slow  should  be  regulated  by  the 
state  —  through  a  proper  distribution  of  marks  of 
ignominy  or  of  honor.  The  number  of  marriages 
should  be  determined  by  the  magistrates. 

Aristotle  suggested  that  the  ages  of  marriage  for 
both  sexes  should  be  regulated;  he  even  advocated 
the  regulation  of  the  number  of  children  for  each 
marriage.  Additional  children  should  be  aborted. 
Malthus,  however,  was  wiser  than  either  Plato 
or  Aristotle,  for  he  observed  that  the  cause  which 
has  the  most  lasting  effect  in 


dition_of_the  poorer  classes  is  the  conduct 
dence  of  the  individuals  themselves.8  Malthus  as- 
serted that  it  is  in  the  power  of  each  individual  to 
avoid  all  the  evil  consequences  to  himself  and  so- 


204  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

ciety  which  result  from  the  principle  of  population, 
"by  the  practice  of  a  virtue  clearly  dictated  to  him 
by  the  light  of  nature  and  expressly  enjoined  in 
revealed  religion/" 

Malthus  demonstrated  clearly  the  weakness  of 
liberal  poor-laws,  (jive  more  food  to  the  poor,  and 
they  will  produce_mpre  children^  anoVsuffer  more 
misery.  Poor-laws  increase  the  numbers  of  chil- 
dferTof  the  poor,  and  hence  increase  the  amount  of 
misery.  Both  private  benevolence  and  poor-laws 
increase  the  number  of  marriages  and  of  children.10 

Education,  is  the  solution  which  Malthus  de- 
manded.11 EducateJjiejDQojr  jo  po^stponejnarrlage, 
to  keep  the^  birthLj^ate_down,  and  tojpraciice  e.c.o- 
nomic_thrift.  To  a  great  extent  education  will 
secure  the  operation  of  the  prudential  check  upon 
population.  The  science  of  moral  and  political 
philosophy  should  not  be  confined  within  such  nar- 
row limits  that  it  is  unable  to  overcome  in  practical 
ways  the  obstacles  to  human  happiness  which  arise 
from  the  law  of  population.12 

There  are  factors  in  the  population  situation 
which  did  not  exist  at  the  time  of  Malthus,  or  which 
he  did  not  see.  Today  there  are  additional  preven- 
tive checks  upon  population,  for  example,  the  rise 
of  democracy  in  the  family  whereby  the  wife  and 
mother  no  longer  is  dominated  by  the  husband  and 
father,  but  has  a  voice  of  her  own  regarding  domes- 
tic matters,  such  as  the  number  of  children.  Closely 
related  to  this  tendency  is  the  feminist  movement, 


MALTHUSIAN  CONCEPTS  205 

or  woman's  rights  movement,  whereby  women  are 
demanding  that  they  not  be  confined  to  the  sphere 
of  bearing  and  rearing  children.  Increasing  intel- 
ligence and  foresight  has  served  as  a  powerful  pre- 
ventive check  upon  population.  The  current  em- 
phasis upon  luxury  is  inimical  to  the  birth  rate.  A 
higher  economic  status  almost  uniformly  cuts  down 
the  birth  rate.  Within  the  last  score  of  years  the 
new  science  of  eugenics  has  attracted  widespread 
attention.  Eugenjcs^tresses  qualitY_QJLpopulation. 
It  would  effect  a  decrease  in  the  numbers  of  chil- 
dren born  among  the  lower  classes,  among  the 
poorer  stocks,  and  prevent  procreation  among  the 
mentally  deficient.  iMvould  increase  the  birth  rate 
nong^jhe^jcultun^^ 

Malthus  appreciated  the  dependence  of  urban 
population  upon  rural  districts,  but  he  could  not 
foresee  the  degree  to  which  cities  would  grow  in  the 
nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries.  The  relative 
decrease  of  agricultural  labor  and  the  proportional 
increase  in  non-agricultural  labor  has  thrown  a 
burden  upon  the  food  supply  which  even  Malthus 
could  not  forecast. 

On  the  other  hand,  Malthus  did  not  realize  the 
extent  to  which  new  countries  such  as  the  United 
States,  Canada,  Australia,  Argentina  would  con- 
tribute to  the  world's  means  of  subsistence.  He 
could  not  predict  the  way  in  which  invention  would 
be  applied  in  solving  agricultural  problems,  and 
how  today  one  man  with  improved  machinery  and 


206  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

intensive  methods  can  produce  a  hundred  ears  of 
corn  where  one  was  produced  a  century  ago. 
Nevertheless,  the  "new  country"  argument  against 
Malthus'  principle  of  population  is  ultimately  falla- 
cious, for  new  countries  soon  become  old,  the  sup- 
ply of  new  countries  becomes  exhausted,  and  there 
is  even  a  limit  to  soil  productiveness.  The  very 
pressure  of  population  against  means  of  subsistence 
is,  however,  a  cause  of  inventiveness,  so  that  un- 
anticipated increases  in  food  supply  may  occur  at 
any  time. 

Socialism  has  criticized  Malthus  severely.    So 
cialism^  holds  thatjit_a  given  timejthe  food-^supply 
is^jsufficixmttoj^ 

poorly  or  unjustly  distribjutecU--  With  just  distribu- 
tion of  the  returns  from  industry,  food  supply 
would  not  impinge  strongly  on  population.  But 
socialism  might  greatly  endanger  the  prudential 
check  on  population,  and  hence  result  in  an  in- 
creased birth  rate;  which  in  turn  would  more  than 
balance  any  release  from  human  misery  that  a 
just  distribution  of  the  returns  from  industry  would 
effect. 

Another  point  which  Malthus  did  not  observe  is 
that  theJn£T£a^£JiiJ:ec^^ 

vocational  educationjsj^vercome  by  the  tendency  of 
the  world's  population  to  overtake  the_Horld!s_fQQjd 
productiveness^.  With  increase  in  population,  the 
price  of  land  rises,  the  rent  for  land  increases,  the 
cost  of  living  mounts  upward,  and  the  purchasing 


MALTHUSIAN  CONCEPTS  207 

power  of  the  dollar,  or  its  equivalent,  declines. 

Some  of  the  followers  of  Malthus  have  advocated 
birth  control  as  an  artificial  means  of  regulating 
population.  Birth  control  prevents  by  physical 
means  the  birth  of  children.  It  is  a  useful  weapon 
against  sexually  brutal  husbands.  It  does  not  pro- 
vide for  self  control  or  moral  control  of  the  sexual 
impulses.  It  encourages  rather  than  controls  grati- 
fication of  the  sexual  desires.  By  it  a  gain  is  made 
in  protecting  helpless  women  and  in  cutting  down 
the  birth  rate  among  the  lower  moral  classes, 
whether  wealthy  or  poor,  but  the  gain  is  more  than 
lost  by  the  opportunity  which  birth  control  gives  to 
the  irregular  gratification  of  sexual  impulses  and 
by  the  resultant  weakening  of  moral  fibre. 

Thomas  N.  Carver,  whose  work  will  be  referred 
to  again  in  subsequent  chapters,  has  developed  an 
interesting  population  theory  which  is  partly  Mal- 
thusian.13  The_increase  in  population  from_both 
immigration_sourc£g  a*^  t^p  hirth  rate 
cut  down,  thereby-decreasing  the  percentage 

urther,  persons  should  be  trained 
out  of  the  unskilled  group  into  the  skilled  group  and 
then  into  the  entrepeneur  class.  Thus,  by  greatly 
decreasing  the  number  of  unskilled  laborers  and  by 
increasing  the  number  of  entrepreneurs,  wages 
will  advance  and  profits  will  be  increasingly  sub- 
divided. The  poor  will  become  well-to-do,  and 
poverty  as  it  is  now  known  will  tend  to  disappear. 
This  theory  underestimates  the  importance  of  psy- 


208  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

chological  motives  and  of  social  attitudes  under  a 
system  where  a  marked  degree  of  competition  is 
encouraged. 

In  conclusion,  it  may  be  stated  that  the  principle 
of  population  as  given  by  Malthus  is  fundamental 
to  an  understanding  of  the  problems  of  social 
progress.14  There  is  a  positive  relation  between 
population  and  means  of  subsistence.  Positive  and 
preventive  checks  upon  population  are  continually 
at  work.  Moral  restraint  and  self  control,  based 
on  scientifically  devised  human  laws,  create  a  better 
moral  fibre  than  birth  control.  The  quality  of  per- 
sonality is  far  more  important  than  mere  numbers 
of  population.  The^struggle  f o£_quality  jn  person^ 
ality  must^be  supplemented  by  justice  in  industrial 
andsociaPprocesses  before  tHe"population 
can  be  solved. 


CHAPTER  XIII 


COMTE  AND  POSITIVE  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 


An  organized  foundation  for  the  field  of  social 
thought  was  not  laid  until  near  the  close  of  the 
first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century.  At  that  time 
Auguste  Comte  (1798-1857)  gave  at  least  an  or- 
ganized groundwork,  if  not  a  synthetic  introduc- 
tion to  sociology.  He  was  the  first  to  stake  out  the 
territory  of  social  thought,  to  show  the  relation  of 
social  thought  to  other  fields  of  knowledge,  and  to 
separate  social  statics  from  social  dynamics.  He 
was  the  first  important  social  philosopher,  and  his 
Positive  Philosophy  the  first  treatise  roughly  to 
outline  the  field  of  sociology. 

Auguste  Comte  invented  the  term,  sociology,  by 
which  he  meant  the  science  of  human  association. 
While  he  did  not  contribute  much  to  the  science 
itself,  he  laid  important  foundation  stones.  He  re- 
acted against  all  forms  of  loose  thinking  about  man, 
rejected  metaphysical  and  theological  speculations, 
and  insisted  upon  the  observation  and  classification 
of  social  phenomena.  He  repudiated  attempts  to 
discover  causes  of  social  uniformities,  and  coined 
the  name,  positivism,  for  the  philosophical  system 
upon  which  he  founded  sociology.  The  bases  of 


210  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

positivism  may  be  found  in  the  ideas  of  Bacon, 
Galileo,  and  Descartes.  As  each  of  these  three  men 
broke  with  tradition  and  sought  observed  facts 
in  their  respective  fields,  so  Comte  was  likewise 
prompted  to  do  in  the  field  of  social  thought. 

Auguste  Comte  was  born  at  Montpelier,  France, 
the  son  of  humble  and  law-abiding  Catholic  parents. 
At  the  age  of  nine  he  displayed  unusual  mental 
ability,  a  strong  character,  and  a  tendency  to  defy 
authority.  He  is  described  as  brilliant  and  recal- 
citrant. He  possessed  a  wonderful  memory  and  a 
remarkable  avidity  for  reading.  In  school  he  won 
many  prizes,  and  took  a  position  of  leadership 
among  his  fellow  students,  who  called  him  "the 
philosopher."  At  the  age  of  sixteen  he  was  de- 
voting his  energies  and  abilities  to  the  study  of 
mathematics. 

As  a  youth  Comte  demanded  the  resignation  of 
one  of  his  instructors,  criticized  Napoleon,  and  dis- 
regarded both  ecclesiastical  and  parental  authority. 
He  especially  enjoyed  to  point  out  the  stupidity  of 
his  superiors  and  to  oppose  tyranny. 

At  the  age  of  nineteen  Comte  made  the  acquaint- 
ance of  Saint  Simon,  the  well-known  socialist.  The 
friendship  lasted  for  only  a  few  years,  but  long 
enough  to  exert  a  deep  influence  upon  the  youthful 
mathematician.  Saint  Simon  (1760-1825)  had  in- 
dicated the  need  for  a  scientific  classification  of  the 
sciences  with  political  science  at  the  head  of  the  list, 
and  had  developed  a  new  fraternalism  under  the 


POSITIVE  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  211 

name  of  Le  nouvcau  Christianisme.  This  system 
was  optimistic  and  humanitarian,  but  dreamy. 
Comte  was  dissatisfied  with  it,  and  undertook  to 
work  out  a  better  scheme  of  social  analysis  and 
organization. 

In  1822,  Comte's  first  important  work  was 
published.  It  contained  an  introduction  by  Saint 
Simon,  and  was  entitled  A  Prospectus  of  the  Scien- 
tific Works  Required  for  the  Reorganization  of 
Society.  It  represented  an  important  beginning 
of  the  task  on  which  Comte  was  to  spend  his  life. 
Upon  the  problem  Comte  read  and  worked  assidu- 
ously, save  as  he  was  interrupted  by  an  unhappy 
married  life  and  by  mental  aberrations,  due  to 
overwork.  He  gave  courses  of  public  lectures,  but 
insisted  upon  working  gratuituously.  He  would 
not  accept  royalties  from  the  sale  of  his  books, 
despite  the  fact  that  he  lived  continually  on  the 
verge  of  starvation.  His  friends,  however,  made 
him  gifts  and  established  a  subsidy.  He  insisted 
upon  the  rule  that  all  his  literary  productions 
should  be  given  to  the  public  gratuitously.1 

His  method  of  composition  has  been  commented 
upon  by  his  biographers.  As  a  result  of  his  unusual 
memory  and  the  high  degree  of  mental  concentra- 
tion to  which  he  attained,  he  was  able  to  plan  chap- 
ters and  volumes  in  their  smallest  details,  and  then 
from  memory  to  put  them  into  written  form.  This 
method  enabled  him  to  secure  "an  extraordinary 
unity  of  conception  and  organic  symmetry  of  plan." 


212  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

Comte  manifested  an  unusual  regard  for  the 
truth.  This  attitude  required  him  to  modify  and 
qualify  statements  of  fundamental  principles  at 
great  length.  As  a  result  his  works  are  often 
tedious  reading.  He  preferred,  however,  to  write 
meticulously  and  thus  to  safeguard  truth,  rather 
than  speak  in  epigrams  and  sacrifice  truth. 

Comte's  two  leading  works  are:  the  Positive 
Philosophy  and  the  Positive  Polity.  The  first  ap- 
peared in  six  volumes  during  the  years  from  1830 
to  1842.  The  second  work,  in  four  volumes,  was 
published  in  the  years  from  1851  to  1854.  It  is  not 
the  equal  of  the  Positive  Philosophy,  which  was 
translated  into  English  in  1853  by  Harriet  Mar- 
tineau. 

John  Stuart  Mill  has  referred  to  Comte  as  among 
the  first  of  European  thinkers ;  and,  by  his  institu- 
tion of  a  new  social  science,  in  some  respects  the 
first.2  George  Henry  Lewes  called  Comte  the 
greatest  of  modern  thinkers.  John  Morley,  the 
English  statesman  and  author,  says  of  Comte: 
"Neither  Franklin,  nor  any  man  that  has  ever  lived, 
could  surpass  him  in  the  heroic  tenacity  with  which, 
in  the  face  of  a  thousand  obstacles,  he  pursued  his 
own  ideal  of  a  vocation."  Harriet  Martineau  sum- 
marizes his  methods  as  follows:  "There  can  be 
no  question  but  that  his  whole  career  was  one  of 
the  most  intense  concentration  of  mind,  gigantic 
industry,  rigid  economy,  and  singular  punctuality 
and  exactness  in  all  his  habits."3 


POSITIVE  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  213 

In  laying  the  foundations  for  a  new  social  scl- 
ence,  Comte  began  with  an  analysis  of  types  of 
thinking.  ( 1 )  Primitive  and  untrained  persons 
every wherejjiink  in  supernatural_texms.  They  sup- 
pose that  all  physical  phenomena  are  caused  by  the 
immediate  action  of  capricious  supernatural  beings. 
The  primitive  man  believes  in  all  kinds  of  fetiches 
in  which  spirits  or  supernatural  beings  live.  Fe- 
tishism admitted  of  no  priesthood,  because  its  gods 
are  individual,  each  residing  in  fixed  objects.4 

As  the  mind  of  primitive  man  became  better  or- 
ganized, fetishism  became  cumbersome.  Too  many 
fetishes  produced  mental  confusion.  A  coalescence 
of  gods  resulted  and  polytheism  arose.  The  poly- 
theistic gods  represented  different  phases  of  life. 
This  state  in  human  thought  is  well  illustrated  by 
the  Homeric  gods. 

But  a  large  number  of  capricious  divinities  are 
mentally  unsatisfactory.  They  create  mental  con- 
tradictions. Consequently,  the  gods  are  arranged 
in  a  hierarchy.  Finally,  the  idea  of  one  God,  or  of 
monotheism,  developed.  The  belief  arose  that 
every  phenomenon  is  produced  by  the  immediate 
action  of  the  one  God.  As  man's  vision  widened 
and  his  observations  increased  in  scope  and  depth, 
the  concept  of  a  monotheistic  universe  became 
clarified.  Monotheism  is  the  climax  of  the  theo- 
logical stage  of  thinking. 

But  rationalism  argues  that  God  does  not  stand 
directly  behind  every  phenomenon.  Pure  reason 


214  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

insists  that  God  is  a  First  Cause  or  an  Abstract 
Being.  Pure  reason  speaks  in  terms  of  inalienable 
rights ;  metaphysical  explanations,  however,  are  un- 
satisfactory to  the  mind. 

Hence,  Comte  developed  his  concept  of  positiv- 
ism, which  is  a  purely  intellectual  way  of  looking 
at  the  world.  Comte  held  that  the  mind  should  con- 
centrate on  the  observation  and  classification  of 
phenomena.  He  believed  that  both  theological  and 
metaphysical  speculations,  as  he  used  the  terms, 
were  as  likely  to  be  fiction  as  truth,  and  that  there 
is  no  way  of  determining  which  is  the  case.  Thus 
it  will  be  more  profitable  if  the  individual  should 
direct  his  thoughts  to  the  lines  of  thinking  which 
are  most  truly  prolific,  namely,  to  observation  and 
classification  of  data. 

Comte  even  took  the  position  that  it  is  futile  to 
try  to  determine  causes.  We  can  observe  uniformi- 
ties, or  laws,  but  it  is  mere  speculation  to  assign 
causes  to  these  uniformities.  Positivism  deified 
observation  and  classification  of  data.  Its  weak- 
nesses should  not  hinder  the  student,  however, 
from  seeing  the  importance  of  its  emphasis  upon 
the  scientific  procedure  of  observing  and  classifying 
data  in  an  age  when  dogmatism  and  speculation 
were  rife. 

The  three  stages  of  thought  which  Comte  de- 
scribed are  not  three  levels  of  thought,  as  Comte 
contended,  but,  as  Herbert  Spencer  indicated,  they 
may  represent  the  same  plane  of  thinking.  Each 


POSITIVE  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  215 

requires  about  the  same  degree  of  thinking  ability. 
Moreover,  as  John  Fiske  argued,  the  three  methods 
of  approach  to  problems  are  often  pursued  simul- 
taneously by  a  given  person.  Spjiie_phejipjrL£iia_are  /, 
explained  theologically-;  others,  metaphysically  ;  and 
othervpositively. 

A  second  main  contribution  which  Comte  made 
to  social  thought  is  that  each  of  the  three  modes 
of  thinking  determines  and  corresponds  to  a  type 
of  social  organization.  Speaking  from  the  stand- 
point of  his  own  religious  contacts,  he  declared 
that  theological  thinking  leads  to  a  military  and 
monarchial  social  organization,  with_God_at  the 
head_pf  the  hierarchy  as  King  of 


mighty  warrior,  ^and  with  human  beings  arranged 
in  a  military  organization.  Divine  sanction  rules. 
As  expressed  through  the  human  leaders,  this  di- 
vine sanction  must  not  be  questioned.  Dogmatism 
must  be  meekly  endurejd,  or  else  its  threatened  pun- 
ishments will  be  turned  loose  upon  helpless  offend- 
ers. Divine  rights  rule. 

Metaphysical   thinking  produces  a  government 
dominatecMD^  Nat^ 

uraLrights  are_^uj)stituted_jfpji__divirie  •  jjghts.  A 
priesthood  is  furthered.  Social  organization  be- 
comes legalistic,  formal,  structural,  without  ade- 
quate content. 

Positive_thinkin£_QTQd^iices  practical  results  jn_ 
thejform  of  industrial^enterprises,  and_jishers  in  an 
JndustriajLage.     It  inquires   into   the  nature   and 


216  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

utilization  of  natural  forces.  It  transforms  the 
material  resources  of  the  earth,  and  produces  mate- 
rial inventions. 

Comte  failed  to  postulate  a  fourth  mode  of  think- 
ing, namely,  socialized  thinking,  or_jL_system_of 
^^ 


of  natiiraUorces,  but  thejuse  ojijiatural  f  orces-£or 
social  ends,  for  the  purpase_of  building  construc- 
tive^just,  and  hariri^iious^societies,  and_oJ_d£y^lQp-- 
ing  personalities  who  will  evaluate  life  in  terms  of 
tlie_w£lfare  of  other-^ersorialities.  Comte,  how- 
ever, should  be  credited  with  opening  the  way  for 
the  rise  of  socialized  thinking. 

A  third  phase  of  Comte's  system  was  his  classi- 
fication of  the  sciences,  with  sociology  as  the  latest 
and  greatest  of  the  group.  The  Greek  thinkers, 
it  will  be  recalled,  undertook  to  classify  all  knowl- 
edge under  three  headings:  physics,  ethics,  and 
politics.  Bacon  made  the  divisions  correlative  to 
the  so-called  mental  faculties  of  memory,  imagina- 
tion, and  reason,  namely:  history,  poetry,  and 
science. 

Comte  chose  as  his  principle  of  classifying 
knowledge,  the  order  of  increasing  dependence.  He 
arranged  the  sciences  so  that  each  category  may 
be  grounded  on  the  principal  laws  of  the  preceding 
category,  and  serve  as  a  basis  for  the  next  ensuing 
category.5  The  order,  hence,  is  one  of  increasing 
complexity  and  decreasing  generality.  The  most 
simple  phenomena  must  be  the  most  general  —  gen- 


POSITIVE  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  217 

eral  in  the  sense  of  being  everywhere  present.6 

Comte  began  with  mathematics,  the  tool  of  the 
mind.  Accurate  thinking  is  always  done  in  terms 
of  mathematics.  With  mathematics  as  its  chief 
tool,  the  mind  of  man  can  go  anywhere  in  its  think- 
ing. Mathematics  is  the  most  powerful  instru- 
ment which  the  mind  may  use  in  the  investigation 
of  natural  laws.7 

Mathematics  is  not  a  constituent  member  of  the 
group  of  sciences.  It  is  the  basis  of  them  all.  It 
holds  the  first  place  in  the  hierarchy  of  the  sciences, 
and  is  the  best  point  of  departure  in  all  education, 
whether  general  or  special.8  It  is  the  oldest  and 
most  perfect  of  all  the  sciences.9 

Mathematics  is  the  science  which  measures  pre- 
cisely the  relations  between  objects  and  ideas.  It 
is  the  science.10  The  Greeks  had  no  other.  Its  defi- 
nition is  the  definition  of  all  science.  Its  function 
is  that  of  ascertaining  relationships,  a  process 
which  is  basic  to  scientific  thinking  in  all  fields. 
Education  that  is  based  on  any  other  method  is 
faulty,  inexact,  and  unreliable.  It  is  only  through 
mathematics  that  we  can  understand  science. 

The  highest  form  of  mathematics  is  calculus. 
There  is  no  scientific  inquiry  in  which  calculus  is 
not  used.  Even  the  physician  in  prescribing  for  the 
cure  of  a  disease,  must  provide  for  the  mixing  to- 
gether of  different  quantities  of  different  medicines, 
so  that,  when  taken  at  determined  intervals  of  time, 
they  will  possess  the  right  qualities  for  bringing 


218  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

the  human  body  back  to  its  normal  state.  Calculus 
is  the  branch  of  science  which  has  the  highest  in- 
tellectual dignity.  In  it  the  proportion  of  reason- 
ing to  observation  is  greater  than  elsewhere. 

With  mathematics  as  the  tool,  the  classification 
of  knowledge  may  proceed.  All  natural  phenomena 
fall  into  two  grand  divisions:  inorganic  and  or- 
ganic. The  inorganic  are  more  general  and  should 
be  considered  first.  Inorganic  phenomena  are  of 
two  classes:  astronomical  and  terrestrial.  Astro- 
nomical phenomena  are  the  most  general  of  all. 
The  stars  and  planets  appear  under  the  least  varied 
aspects.12  Astronomy  is  the  science  by  which  the 
movements  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  including  the 
earth,  are  measured.  How  can  we  thoroughly  un- 
derstand any  terrestrial  phenomena  without  con- 
sidering the  nature  of  the  earth  and  its  relation  to 
the  other  units  of  the  solar  system?13 

Terrestrial  physics  includes  two  fields:  physics 
proper  and  chemistry.  Material  bodies  may  be  re- 
garded in  either  their  physical  or  chemical  aspects. 
Physics  is  more  general  than  chemistry;  it  deals 
with  masses  rather  than  elements.  Chemical  phe- 
nomena depend  upon  the  laws  of  physics,  without 
being  influenced  by  them  in  turn.  Chemical  action 
is  conditioned  by  the  laws  of  weight,  heat,  elec- 
tricity. The  study  of  inorganic  phenomena  thus 
falls  under  three  scientific  heads :  astronomy,  phys- 
ics, and  chemistry. 

Organic  phenomena  include  two  types :  individual 


POSITIVE  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  219 

and  group.  The  first  refers  to  the  function  and 
structure  of  all  individual  forms  in  the  plant  and 
animal  worlds.  It  is  general  physiology,  or,  in 
modern  terms,  biology.  It  involves  the  study  of 
all  life  and  the  general  laws  pertaining  to  the  indi- 
vidual units  of  life. 

Biology  rests  on  chemistry,  because  it  is  in  chem- 
istry that  all  reliable  knowledge  about  nutrition  or 
secretion  is  found.  Biology  is  indebted  to  physics 
for  knowledge  concerning  the  weight  of,  tem- 
perature of,  and  related  facts  about  living  organ- 
isms. Biological  laws  are  partially  determined  by 
astronomical  factors.  If  the  earth  were  to  rotate 
faster  than  it  does,  the  course  of  physiological  phe- 
nomena would  be  accelerated,  and  the  length  of  life 
would  be  shortened.14  If  the  orbit  of  the  earth 
were  to  become  as  eccentric  as  that  of  a  comet, 
changes  of  a  fatal  nature  would  occur  to  all 
life  on  the  earth.  If  there  were  no  inclination  of 
the  earth's  axis,  the  seasons  would  be  unknown, 
and  the  geographical  distribution  of  living  species 
would  be  vastly  different  from  the  present  situa- 
tion. All  accurate  work  in  biological  studies  is 
mathematical  in  character.  Thus  biology,  the  sci- 
ence of  organic  phenomena,  is  dependent  on  all  the 
preceding  divisions  on  the  scale  of  knowledge. 

The  study  of  gregarious  or  associative  life  is  a 
special  field.  Comte  called  this  science  social 
physics,  and  for  it  invented  the  specific  term,  soci- 
ology. It  rests  in  turn  upon  biological,  chemical, 


220  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

physical,  astronomical  knowledge  and  uses  mathe- 
matics as  its  tool.  Comte  virtually  defines  six  sci- 
ences: mathematics,  astronomy,  physics,  chemistry, 
biology,  and  sociology.  He  treats  of  transcendental 
biology,  which  is  the  basis  of  modern  psychology. 
Comte  urged  that  no  science  could  be  effectually 
studied  without  competent  knowledge  concerning 
the  sciences  on  which  it  depends.  It  is  necessary 
not  only  to  have  a  general  knowledge  of  all  the 
sciences  but  that  they  should  be  studied  in  order— 
this  is  Comte's  dictum  to  the  student  of  sociology. 
Comte  insisted  that  one  general  science  could  not 
develop  beyond  a  given  point  until  the  preceding 
science  has  passed  a  given  stage. 

Each  of  the  six  general  sciences  has  passed 
through  the  three  stages  of  thought.  Mathematics, 
which  has  advanced  furthest  into  the  positive  stage, 
is  still  connected  with  superstition,  such  as  that 
which  hovers  round  the  number  13.  The  other 
general  sciences  are  less  further  along.  Sociology, 
the  latest  science  to  develop,  Comte  hoped  by  his 
works  to  push  over  into  the  positive  stage. 

Comte  divided  sociology,  or  social  physics,  into 
social  statics  and  social  dynamics.  Social  statics 
is  the  study  of  the  laws  of  action  and  reaction  of 
the  different  parts  of  the  social  order,  aside  for 
the  time  being  from  the  general  social  movements 
which  are  modifying  them.15  Social  dynamics  con- 
siders the  laws  of  progress.  Social  statics  inquires 
into  the  laws  of  co-existence  of  social  phenomena; 


POSITIVE  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  221 

social  dynamics  examines  the  laws  of  social  succes- 
sion. Sociology  is  the  study  of  social  organization 
and  of  social  progress. 

^society  is,!!!^  state  of  anarchy.  Individuals 
with  thejbest  of  purposes  are  continually  weaken- 
ing the  efforts  of  each  other.  Powerful  persons 
are  crushing  the  weak.  The  defeated  are  conniving 
against  the~strongT  Why  all  this  social  anarchy? 
To  Comte  the  answer  is  clear.  Behind  moral  and 
social-anarchy  there  is  intellectual  anarchy.  Peo- 
ple^dojnot  have,  a  knowledge  of  the  fundamental  ' 
Iqwg_nflgoria1  orjgLjmd  social  progress. 

Moreover,  people  fail  to  appreciate  the  necessity 
of  knowledge  of  social  laws.  They  are  insensible 
to  the  value  of  sound  social  theory.  They_want 

nothing  hu4^-4ka._ilpj^rtira1|"  ]\^mn^i\^r^^  fact 
that  thej^practical"  is  as  likely  to  be  based^gr^  in- 
correct sociaLjJi£or}LM  upon  sound_social  concep- 
tions^ 

The  necessity  of  fundamental  concepts  concern- 
ing society  underlies  social  organization.  In  the 
absence  of  these  general  ideas,  there  is  "no  other 
daily  resource  for  the  maintenance  of  even  a  rough 
and  precarious  social  order  than  an  appeal,  more 
or  less  immediate,  to  personal  interests."16  In  the 
absence  of  a  moral  authority,  the  material  order 
requires  the  use  of  either  terror  or  corruption;  the 
latter  is  less  inconvenient  and  more  in  accordance 
with  the  nature  of  modern  society.17  Moreover, 
politicians  and  other  public  men  work  against  the 


222  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

elaboration  of  the  social  theory  which  is  necessary 
for  the  salvation  of  society.  They  sneer  at  the 
development  of  social  science.  Many  of  those  who 
occupy  the  chief  political  stations  regard  with  an- 
tipathy the  true  reorganization  of  society.  Social 
principles  are  not  even  sought.  On  the  other  hand, 
social  charlatanism  attracts  by  the  magnificence  of 
its  promises  and  dazzles  by  its  transient  successes. 
Comte  deplored  attempts  to  re-make  society 
through  institutionalism,  regardless  of  social  the- 
ory. He  stressed  the  fundamental  importance  of! 
social  principles  as  the  only  means  of  guaranteeing] 
a  correct  institutional  procedure.  As  a  practical 
principle  of  social  adjustment,  Comte  endorsed  the 
Catholic  ideal  :  In  necessary  things,  unity  ;  in  doubt- 
ful things,  liberty  ;  in  all  things,  charity. 

Comte  protested  vigorously  against  materialism. 
He  pointed  out  that  for  three  centuries  the  best 
minds  had  been  devoted  to  material  science  and  had 
neglected  societary  problems.18  Ma/t^naLifi^ti^i^ 

tions    should   be_jnpdified   aild_JIl£Ldp    to   Viarmnniyp 

with  the_jmderlying  laws  of  social  evolution.  A 
moral  reorganization  of  society  must  precede  and 
direct  the  material  and  political  reorganization.19 

js_a  result  of  mental  develop- 


jnent.  This  development  favors  the  preponderance 
of  the  noblest  human  tendencies.  Prevision  and 
science  when  applied  to  society  will  bring  out  the 
best  phases  of  human  nature,  and  thus  result  in 
social  improvement.  Although  the  lower  instincts 


POSITIVE  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  223 

will  continue  to  manifest  themselves  in  modified 
action,  their  less  sustained  exercise  will  debilitate 
them  by  degrees.20 

The  three  chief  causes^of  social  variation  result 
from,  firstjj^c^j^secoji^dimale;  and  third,  polit- 
ical action  in  its  whole  scientific  content.  TheTfirsf 
and  second  factors  cannot  be  changed  greatly,  but 
the  political  influences  are  wide  open  to  modifica- 
tion by  social  prevision.  In  this  connection  soci- 
ology finds  its  manifestation. 

With  the  development  of  society,  intellectual  ac- 
tivity and  gregariousness  slowly  overcome  the  pre- 
ponderance of  the  affective  over  the  intellectual 
phases  of  life.  But  even  in  the  best  natures  the  per- 
sonally affective  elements  are  more  powerful  than 
the  social  affections.  Real  intellectual  development, 
however,  will  strengthen  man's  empire  over  his 
passions,  refine  his  gregariousness,  and  release  his 
energies  for  social  activities. 

Comte  makes  the  family  the  sociajjinit.  Man 
cannot  live  in  isolation,  but  the  family  can  survive 
by  itself.21  The  striking  characteristic  of  domestic 
organization  is  its  establishment  of  the  elementary 
idea  of  social  perpetuity,  by  directly  and  irresistibly 
connecting  the  future  with  the  past.22  Family  life 
will  always  be  the  school  of  social  life,  both  for 
obedience  and  for  command.32  Comte  failed  to 
escape  the  logic  of  the  patriarchal  family  life.  He 
did  credit  women,  however,  with  being  superior  to 
men  in  the  spontaneous  expansion  of  sympathy  and 


224  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

sociality,  although  inferior  in  understanding  and 
reason. 

The  direction  of  social  evolution  is  toward  fur- 
ther development  of  the  noblest  dispositions  and  the 
most  generous  feelings,  and  away  from  the  expres- 
sion of  the  animal  appetites  and  the  material  de- 
sires.24 The  trend  is  from  the  satisfaction  of  the 
selfish  impulses  to  the  habitual  exercise  of  the  social 
impulses.  Happiness  depends  on  the  presence  of 
new  stimuli  in  one's  form  of  activity.  A  life  of 
labor  that  is  full  of  constructive  stimuli  is  after  all 
the  fittest  to  develop  personality. 

Comte  was  the  friend  of  popular  education.25  He 
based  his  contention  on  the  invariable  homogeneity 
of  the  human  mind.  The  minds  of  people  of  all 
races  are  potentially  similar.  All  members  of  the 
race  are  capable  of  development  to  a  common  plane. 

In  his  Positive  Polity,  Comte  made  important 
changes  in  his  thinking.  This  work  was  the  prod- 
uct of  his  later  years,  and  shows  the  effects  of 
deprivation  and  struggle.  It  is  inferior  in  quality 
to  his  earlier  treatise  on  Positive  Philosophy.  It  is 
a  question,  therefore,  how  far  his  later  ideas  should 
be  permitted  to  supersede  his  thinking  when  he  was 
in  his  prime.  In  his  later  thought-life  he  receded 
from  his  emphasis  upon  the  intellectual  nature  and 
stressed  the  importance  of  the  affections.  He  made 
affection  the  central  point  of  life  and  developed  the 
concept  of  love.  We  tire  of  thinking  and  even  of  . 
acting,  he  asserted,  but  we  never  tire  of  loving.26  J  * 


POSITIVE  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  225 

The  Comtean  ideal  became  a  disinterested  love  of 
mankind.  Comtejieyelopg^^ 
His  contact  with  Christianity  gave  him  the  belief 
that  it  is  chiefly  ecclesiastical.  He  did  not  see  in 
Christianity  a  social  keynote.  Hence,  he  attempted 
to  create  a  purely  social  religion.  He  made  man- 
kind an  end  in  itself;  he  failed  to  see  that  human 
society  isjprobably  an  outcropping  of  universal 
purpose. 

If  we  judge  Comte  by  his  own  time  and  age,  we 
shall  see  the  importance  of  his  contributions  to 
social  thought,  which  were  as  follows:  1.  There 
isjieed  for  accurate  thinking  about  society.  Mathe- 
matics is  the  best  tool  for  obtaining  social  accuracy. 

2.  Comte  developed  positivism  with  its  emphasis 

npnp   nhgprvatinn   and   classification  of   SOCJal   data. 

3.  Knowledge  has  scientific  divisions,  according 
to  the  principles  of  increasing  dependence  and  de- 
creasing generality.    This  scale  begins  with  mathe- 
matics and  astronomy,  includes  physics,  chemistry, 
biology,  in  order,  and  ends  with  the  social  sciences, 
particularly    sociology.     4.     SnrjfJogy:   He?  Is    with 
the  static  andjdynamicj^asesjQ^^ 

5.  Comtejieyeloped  a_  humanitarian  philosophy. 

6.  Comte  insisted  on  an 


of  social_prqcesses_as  the  only  true  basis  for  over- 
coming social  anarchy  and  for  solving  the  problems 
of  society. 


CHAPTER  XIV 
MARX  AND  SOCIALISTIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 


Socialism  proper  had  its  beginning  in  the  second 
and  third  decades  of  the  nineteenth  century.  It  de- 
veloped primarily  in  continental  Europe  and  in 
England.  Although  Plato's  communism  and  More's 
utopianism  were  forerunners  of  socialism,  the  social 
unrest  in  Europe  in  the  early  years  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  was  the  direct  causal  factor.  So- 
cialism also  represented  a  reaction  against  the  pre- 
vailing laissez  faire  thought  regarding  the  evils  of 
society  and  the  suffering  of  the  poorer  classes. 

Socialism  began  with  the  concepts  and  experi- 
ments of  Saint  Simon  and  Fourier  in  France,  of 
Robert  Owen  in  England,  and  of  Rodbertus,  Las- 
salle,  Marx,  and  Engels  in  Germany.  In  France 
the  movement  was  carried  forward  by  Proudhon 
and  Blanc ;  and  in  England  by  the  Christian  social- 
ists, chiefly  Maurice  and  Kingsley.  In  Germany, 
Marx  maintained  the  position  of  leadership  for 
many  decades,  and  finally  became  the  best  known 
exponent  of  socialist  thought  in  the  world. 

In  his  New  Christianity,  Saint  Simon,  who  was 
referred  to  in  the  preceding  chapter,  made  a  unique 
contribution  to  social  thought.  His  thinking  was 


MARXIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  227 

not  deep,  or  systematic,  but  characterized  by  in- 
genuity. Saint  Simon  advocated  a  society  in  which 
only  useful  things  are  produced.  In  this  industrial 
order,  men  of  science  will  be  in  control.  Saint 
Simon  was  greatly  interested  in  the  welfare  of  the 
poorest  classes.  His  New  Christianity  was  essen- 
tially a  plea  that  the  whole  world  devote  itself  to 
the  improvment  of  the  living  conditions  of  the  very 
poor.  The  influence  which  Saint  Simon  had  upon 
Comte  has  already  been  mentioned. 

Another  important  socialistic  ideal  was  developed 
by  Fourier  (1772-1837),  who  worked  out  a  social 
system  in  which  the  phalange  is  the  chief  instru- 
ment in  securing  a  perfect  society.  The  phalange 
is  composed  of  from  twenty-four  to  thirty-two 
groups  of  people.  Each  group  comprises  from 
seven  to  nine  individuals.  The  unifying  bond  is 
natural  attraction,  or  free  elective  love  and  sym- 
pathy. The  members  of  each  phalange  live  com- 
munistically  in  a  large  commodious  structure  called 
a  phalanstere.  The  phalanges  were  to  unite  in  one 
large  world  federation,  with  headquarters  at  Con- 
stantinople. 

The  people  work  according  to  their  interests,  fre- 
quently changing  occupations.  The  products  of 
labor  are  subdivided;  a  minimum  goes  equally  to 
all,  irrespective  of  any  conditioning  factors;  of  the 
remainder  five-twelfths  goes  to  labor,  three- 
twelfths  to  special  ability,  and  four-twelfths  to 
capital.  Difficult  common  labor  is  paid  the  most, 


228  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

on  the  assumption  that  he  who  does  pleasant  labor 
receives  pay  in  mental  ways.  Every  individual 
should  have  an  opportunity  to  become  a  capitalist; 
and  every  woman  should  be  enabled  to  become  in- 
dependent economically.  These  Utopian  plans  of 
Fourier  called  for  a  sudden  and  complete  trans- 
formation of  human  nature.  They  underestimated 
the  force  of  human  selfishness. 

Socialistic  thought  was  carried  into  politics  by 
Louis  Blanc  (1811-1882).  He  declared  that  no 
genuine  reformation  of  society  could  take  place 
until  political  machinery  was  organized  democrat- 
ically. The  democratic  state  would  endow  national 
workshops.  These  workshops  would  be  operated 
by  industrial  associations  composed  of  workingmen, 
who  would  elect  their  own  officers,  regulate  their 
own  industries,  and  provide  for  the  distribution  of 
the  returns  from  industry.  Once  started  by  the 
state  these  industrial  associations  will  expand  and 
increase  in  number  until  the  whole  nation,  and  then 
the  world,  will  be  organized  in  this  way. 

Blanc  participated  in  the  French  Revolution  of 
1848  and  became  a  member  of  the  provisional  gov- 
ernment. His  national  workshop  idea  failed  in 
practice.  His  enemies  were  partly  responsible  for 
this  defeat,  because  the  essentials  of  productive 
work  and  guarantees  of  character  which  Blanc 
urged  were  disregarded.  The  fact,  however,  that 
these  two  essentials  were  considered  necessary  for 
the  successful  development  of  national  workshops 


MARXIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  229 

indicates  that  the  system,  under  average  conditions, 
might  not  be  a  success. 

Nearly  all  the  early  socialists  were  evolutionists 
rather  than  revolutionists.  They  did  not  advocate 
class  struggle  theories.  They  developed  bourgeois 
rather  than  proletariat  ideas.  An  outstanding  ex- 
ception to  these  statements  is  found  in  the  radical 
attitude  of  Babeuf  (1760-1797),  who  was  essen- 
tially a  forerunner  of  Marxian  socialism  and  also 
of  the  anarchistic  philosophy  of  Proudhon  and 
Bakunin.  Babeuf  vigorously  proclaimed  the  sov- 
ereignty of  the  proletariat,  and  advocated  the  aboli- 
tion of  inheritance  laws  and  of  private  property. 
He  urged  that  the  property  of  corporations  be  con- 
fiscated, and  that  a  communistic  state  be  estab- 
lished. 

The  well-known  principles  of  justice,  liberty,  and 
equality  were  utilized  by  Proudhon  (1809-1865),  a 
philosophic  anarchist.  He  would  have  the  same 
wages  paid  to  an  unskilled  workman  as  to  a  suc- 
cessful business  or  professional  man.  He  predicted 
that  equalization  of  opportunity  would  bring  about 
an  equalization  of  ability. 

Proudhon  attacked  property  rights.  He  declared 
that  property  is  theft.  In  itself  property  is  lifeless, 
but  it  nevertheless  demands  rent,  interest,  or  prof- 
its, or  all  three.  It  protects  itself  behind  law,  and 
in  order  to  guarantee  its  alleged  rights,  it  calls  out 
the  militia,  evicts  families,  and  takes  bread  from 
the  mouths  of  little  children.  It  robs  labor  of  its 


230  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

just  returns.1 

By  unsatisfactory  reasoning  Proudhon  urged  the 
free  development  of  individuals  in  society,  whereby 
each  individual  would  learn  to  govern  himself  so 
well  in  society  that  government  would  no  longer 
be  needed.  This  theory  is  Proudhon's  concept  of 
anarchy.  In  this  doctrine  Proudhon  neglects  to 
provide  an  adequate  dynamic  or  to  foresee  the  ulti- 
mate complexity  of  human  relations. 

In  England,  Robert  Owen  (1771-1858)  became 
a  founder  of  socialism.  As  a  factory  manager, 
Owen  developed  social  ideas.  Living  in  an  age  of 
long  hours,  woman  and  child  labor  of  the  worst 
forms,  and  deplorable  housing  conditions,  Owen 
deserves  the  credit  of  inaugurating  a  twentieth  cen- 
tury program  of  welfare  work.  It  was  Owen's 
theory  that  the  workingman  is  so  subject  to  his 
environment  that  even  his  character  is  determined 
for  him.  Owen  attempted  in  theory  and  practice 
to  prevent  the  impingement  of  the  economic  envi- 
ronment upon  the  workers.  He  believed  in  self- 
governing  organizations  of  labor.  He  inaugurated 
the  co-operative  movement  as  a  means  of  securing 
industrial  justice  and  of  giving  the  workingman  a 
chance  at  the  free  development  of  his  personality. 

Owen  objected  to  Malthus'  doctrine  of  popula- 
tion on  the  ground  that  it  failed  to  consider  the 
marvelous  increase  in  the  means  of  subsistence 
which  might  come  from  the  application  of  inventive 
genius  to  the  sources  of  the  food  supply.  He  also 


MARXIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  231 

protested  against  the  Malthusian  argument  for  the 
restriction  of  population,  because  this  argument  did 
not  give  due  weight  to  the  unjust  distribution  of 
wealth  and  to  the  enslaving  social  organization  to 
which  labor  is  subject. 

Owen's  experiments,  particularly  at  New  Har- 
mony, Indiana,  demonstrated  that  a  communistic 
organization  of  society  in  itself  cannot  save  society. 
The  strength  of  Owen's  social  thought  lay  in  its 
accentuation  of  the  need  for  providing  labor  with 
opportunities  of  industrial  initiative  and  co-opera- 
tion. 

During  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  in 
England,  the  Christian  socialists  flourished.  The 
founders  of  this  movement  were  Frederick  Mau- 
rice and  Charles  Kingsley.  These  men  were  clergy- 
men who  became  greatly  interested  in  the  welfare 
of  the  working  classes.  They  made  clear  the  evils 
of  the  prevailing  economic  order,  the  formality  of 
the  Manchester  school  of  economics,  and  proposed 
to  apply  the  principles  of  Christianity  to  the  eco- 
nomic system  of  the  day.  They  opposed  economic 
competition.  For  this  method  they  urged  the  sub- 
stitution of  the  ethical  and  spiritual  principles  of 
co-operation  and  love  in  industrial  relationships — 
for  both  employer  and  employee  in  all  their  dealings 
with  each  other.  Their  socialism  is  essentially  a 
vigorous  application  of  Christian  love  to  every-day 
relationships. 

The  influence  of  Christian  socialism  strengthened 


232  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

the  experiment  of  the  Rochdale  weavers  who  in 
1844  had  organized  a  consumers'  co-operative  soci- 
ety. The  concept  of  consumers'  co-operation  re- 
ceived its  original  impetus  from  the  thought  and 
practice  of  Robert  Owen,  achieved  a  measurable 
degree  of  concreteness  under  the  efforts  of  the 
Rochdale  weavers,  and  through  Maurice  and  Kings- 
ley  won  the  assistance  of  Christianity. 

In  Germany,  Rodbertus,  Lassalle,  Marx  and 
Engels  molded  the  thinking  of  socialists  about  the 
nature  of  human  society.  Rodbertus  (1805-1875), 
the  son  of  a  university  professor,  was  a  quiet,  deep 
thinker  about  social  processes.  According  to  his 
analysis  of  social  development,  three  stages  may  be 
pointed  out.  The  first  was  marked  by  slavery,  or 
by  private  property  in  human  beings.  The  second 
state  is  an  indirect  form  of  the  first,  namely,  one 
of  private  property  in  land  and  capital.  Through 
this  type  of  ownership  the  economically  fortunate 
or  shrewd  are  able  to  exercise  widespread  power 
over  the  unfortunate  and  the  uneducated.  In  the 
third  state,  toward  which  society  is  trending,  the 
concept  of  service  will  rule,  and  private  property 
as  a  dominant  concept  will  be  compelled  to  take  a 
thoroughly  subordinate  place  in  human  activities. 
The  ultimate  goal,  according  to  Rodbertus,  is  a 
world  communist  society,  with  land  and  capital  as 
national  property,  and  with  labor  rewarded  accord- 
ing to  its  productiveness.2 

Rodbertus  denied  the  validity  of  the  wages  funcj 


MARXIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  233 

theory  and  argued  that  wages  are  not  paid  by  capi- 
tal; it  is  that  part  of  the  productive  earnings  of 
labor  which  labor  receives.  His  fundamental  thesis 
is  that  labor  is  the  source  and  measure  of  all  value. 
He  advocated  an  evolutionary  procedure  whereby 
the  state  should  pass  legislation  that  would  guar- 
antee just  returns  to  labor.  This  form  of  state 
socialism  is  to  be  gradually  developed,  until  a  scien- 
tific socialism  is  reached  with  its  emphasis  upon  a 
government  of  labor,  for  labor,  and  by  labor. 

The  founder  of  Social  Democracy  in  Germany, 
Ferdinand  Lassalle  (1825-1864),  wrote  two  sig- 
nificant treatises,  the  Bastiat-Schulze  and  the 
Working  Men's  Programme.  Lassalle  believed 
that  natural  conditions  are  productive  of  misery 
and  vice,  and  that  it  is  the  chief  business  of  the 
state  to  extricate  men  from  this  thraldom.  The 
state  should  provide  means  for  lifting  the  laboring 
man  to  a  level  of  industrial  freedom. 

Lassalle  objected  to  the  theory  known  as  the  iron 
law  of  wages.  He  protested  against  the  smallness 
of  the  share  of  his  earnings  which  the  laborer 
really  receives.  He  advocated  the  establishment  of 
productive  associations  wherein  labor  might  per- 
form the  double  function  of  workman  and  capital- 
ist. In^  order  that  these  productive  associations 
might  be  started,  the  state  should  advance  funds. 
After  the  productive  associations  have  secured  mo- 
mentum they  will  continue  by  virtue  of  their  own 
strength.  Ultimately,  industry  will  be  conducted 


234  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

exclusively  through  productive  associations;  both 
industrial  and  social  democracy  will  finally  rule  in 
political  life.  Lassalle  became  the  founder  of  the 
Social  Democratic  party  in  Germany.  Lassalle 
boldly  denounced  the  reactionary  classes  that  were 
in  political  power  in  his  time  and  led  the  workers 
in  a  movement  to  overthrow  the  existing  social 
order.3 

The  name  of  Karl  Marx  (1818-1883)  is  supreme 
on  the  list  of  socialists.  Marx  was  born  in  Ger- 
many of  Jewish  parents,  and  educated  at  the  uni- 
versities of  Bonn  and  Berlin.  He  became  a  jour- 
nalist, but  the  paper  which  he  edited  was  considered 
too  liberal  and  was  suppressed.  Marx  went  to 
Paris  in  1842,  where  he  continued  editorial  work. 
At  this  time  he  was  influenced  by  French  socialism 
and  its  leader,  Proudhon.  In  1845,  he  was  expelled 
from  Paris  at  the  request  of  the  Prussian  govern- 
ment. He  went  to  Brussels.  In  the  meantime  a 
deep  friendship  with  Friedrich  Engels  (1820-1895) 
had  been  established. 

In  1847,  Marx  and  Engels  issued  the  Communist 
Manifesto.4  This  radical  document  was  circulated 
widely  and  became  extensively  accepted  by  social 
revolutionists.  Its  doctrines  were: 
*/!.  Abolition  of  property  in  lands;  rents  to  be 
used  for  public  purposes. 

2.  Abolition  of  all  rights  of  inheritance. 

3.  Progressive  income  tax. 

4.  Nationalization  of  the  means  of  transporta- 


MARXIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  235 

tion  and  commerce. 

5.  Extension  of  productive  enterprises  by  the 
state. 

6.  Compulsory  labor. 

7.  Free  education;  no  child  labor. 

8.  Elimination  of  the  distrust  between  town 
and  country. 

Marx  returned  to  Germany  and  established  the 
Neue  Rheinische  Zeitung  in  Cologne  in  1848.  En- 
gels  served  as  editor.  Because  of  revolutionary 
activity,  Marx  was  forced  to  leave  Germany  in 
1849.  He  went  to  Paris  and  then  to  London,  where 
he  became  a  newspaper  correspondent  and  where 
he  lived  until  his  death  in  1883. 

In  1859,  the  Kritik  der  politischen  Oekonomie 
was  published.  It  contains  the  essential  principles 
of  Marx's  system  of  thought.  In  1864,  Marx 
found  the  opportunity  for  which  he  had  long  been 
seeking,  namely,  to  organize  the  workers  of  the 
world  into  one  large  association.  On  September 
28,  in  St.  Martin's  Hall,  Marx  in  the  presence  of  a 
vast  concourse  of  people,  he  initiated  the  "Interna- 
tional Workingmen's  Association."  The  funda- 
mental idea  was  to  organize  the  societies  of  work- 
ingmen  which  have  a  common  purpose,  namely,  the 
emancipation  of  the  working  classes,  into  a  world 
or  international  union  for  co-operative  purposes, 
The  International  proposes  that  governments  shall 
put  the  interests  of  the  working  classes  to  the  fore- 
front of  national  concern,  and  subordinate  the  pres- 


236  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

ent  attention  they  give  to  war,  diplomacy,  and  na- 
tional jealousies. 

In  1869,  Marx,  aided  by  Karl  Liebknecht  (1826- 
1900),  Engels  and  others,  organized  in  Germany 
the  Social  Democratic  Labor  Party.  The  move- 
ment which  Lassalle  had  started  became  united  with 
the  Marxian  movement,  and  in  1875  the  German 
Social  Democracy  presented  a  united  front  to  capi- 
talism. Marx,  Engels,  Liebknecht,  and  Bebel  are 
its  best-known  leaders.  Bismarck  was  forced  to 
acknowledge  its  power,  and  condescended  to  inau- 
gurate a  system  of  social  insurance  in  order  to  ap- 
pease its  rank  and  file. 

In  1867,  1885,  and  1895,  the  three  volumes  of 
Das  Kapital  appeared,  in  chronological  order.5  By 
this  work,  Capital,  Marx  is  known  throughout  the 
world.  The  style  is  laborious;  the  analyses  are 
minute  and  in  places  difficult  to  follow.  The  method 
is  historical.  Marx  analyzes  social  evolution.  He 
traces  the  rise  of  capitalism  from  its  humble  be- 
ginnings to  its  autocratic  fruition.  In  this  develop- 
ment the  instruments  of  capital  showed  a  tend- 
ency to  congregate  in  a  decreasing  number  of 
hands.  By  this  token  it  will  be  seen  that  the  num- 
ber of  the  propertyless  ever  increases.  Likewise, 
their  influence  decreases.  In  this  way,  the  prole- 
tariat is  developed,  a  product  of  capitalism. 

A  definite  class,  the  capitalist,  acquires  increasing 
industrial,  political,  and  social  power.  The  prole- 
tariat suffer  increasing  misery.  They  own  nothing 


MARXIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  237 

except  their  ability  to  labor.  They  are  forced  to 
throw  this  human  quality  on  the  commercial  market 
and  sell  it  to  the  highest  bidder.  But  capitalism 
increases  the  number  of  the  proletariat.  This 
tendency,  together  with  the  increase  in  population, 
creates  a  superabundance  of  labor.  Laborers  are 
forced  to  compete  in  the  labor  market.  The  labor- 
ers who  will  sell  their  labor  for  the  least  wages  will 
be  employed.  Capitalism  thus  forces  wages  to  a 
mere  subsistence  level,  with  the  result  that  the  mis- 
ery and  suffering  of  the  proletariat  are  greatly  aug- 
mented. In  this  way  the  laborer  is  crushed  by  the 
operation  of  the  iron  law  of  wages. 

By  the  operation  of  the  iron  law,  the  capitalist 
is  enabled  to  appropriate  to  himself  an  increasing 
amount  of  the  earnings  of  labor.  This  appro- 
priated amount  is  called  the  surplus  value.  Marx 
developed  at  length  the  concept  of  surplus  value. 
Capitalism  exploits  the  laborer  by  taking  possession 
of  as  large  a  proportion  of  the  earnings  of  labor 
as  it  can  obtain — through  its  might  and  its  shrewd- 
ness. 

The  growth  of  capitalism,  also,  causes  a  class 
consciousness  to  develop  among  the  members  of  the 
proletariat.  This  class  consciousness  is  increasing. 
It  produces  labor  organizations;  these  organiza- 
tions are  acquiring  vast  power.  The  struggles  be- 
tween them  and  the  capitalistic  classes  go  on.  The 
two  groups  have  little  in  common.  By  force  of 
numbers  the  proletariat  are  bound  finally  to  win, 


238  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

and  to  overthrow  the  capitalistic  classes  which  are 
now  in  power.  They  will  seize  the  means  of  pro- 
duction and  manage  them  for  the  good  of  all. 

Marx  did  not  outline  an  Utopia.  He  described  the 
historical  evolution  of  society  as  he  saw  it,  and  he 
participated  in  plans  for  the  organization  of  all 
laborers  for  their  common  good.  Inasmuch  as 
Marx  advocated  compulsory  labor,  the  laboring 
class  under  Marxian  socialism  would  include  all 
people.  Marx  advocated  an  equal  distribution  of 
wealth,  not  in  the  sense  of  the  popular  misconcep- 
tion of  that  term,  but  in  the  sense  that  the  earnings 
from  the  industry  shall  be  distributed  to  the  work- 
ers in  proportion  to  their  achievements. 

In  Russia,  Marxian  socialism  in  1918  came  into 
power.  The  Bolsheviki  represent  the  radical  wing 
of  the  Marxian  followers.  They  established  essen- 
tially a  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat,  substituting 
it  for  the  dictatorship  of  capitalists  which  existed 
under  the  reign  of  the  czars.  Bolshevism  substi- 
tutes occupation  for  geographic  area  as  a  basis  of 
representative  government.  This  program  is  de- 
ficient and  sociologically  untenable,  because  occupa- 
tional groups  do  not  encompass  all  phases  of  human 
personality.  A  government  based  on  occupational 
group  needs  is  representative  of  only  a  portion  of 
the  elements  of  human  life.  When  seventy-five 
per  cent  of  the  people  are  illiterate,  as  has  been  the 
case  in  Russia,  no  form  of  government  whether 
democratic  or  not  can  be  other  than  a  dictatorship. 


MARXIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  239 

Revolutionary  socialism  coincides,  in  part,  with 
syndicalism,  a  movement  which  developed  in  France 
and  England.  Syndicalism  is  a  radical  form  of 
trade  unionism.  It  declares  that  workingmen  can- 
not hope  for  genuine  betterment  through  politics. 
They  must  organize  and  inaugurate  a  general 
strike.  This  universal  strike  will  paralyze  the  pres- 
ent regime  and  render  it  helpless.  As  a  result  the 
workers  will  come  into  power.  In  the  meantime, 
the  workers  must  keep  up  a  running  warfare  with 
capitalists  and  the  government  which  supports  capi- 
talism. Sabotage  is  a  common  concept  among 
syndicalists.  It  implies  a  program  of  destroying 
machinery,  hindering  the  production  of  economic 
goods,  and  creating  inefficiency  in  capitalistic  in- 
dustry. In  both  England  and  the  United  States, 
syndicalism  has  appeared.  In  the  United  States, 
the  Industrial  Workers  of  the  World,  or  I.  W.  W., 
i  confess  to  doctrines  similar  to  those  which  have 
i  been  espoused  in  Europe  under  the  name  of  syn- 
|dicalism.  The  philosophic  exponent  of  syndicalism 
>has  been  George  Sorel. 

Revolutionary  socialism  has  been  paralleled  in 
certain  ways  by  anarchism.  These  teachings  first 
iacquired  force  through  the  writings  of  Proudhon. 
Another  leading  anarchist  was  the  Russian  noble- 
man and  military  officer,  Michael  Bakunin  (1814- 
1876).  Although  of  aristocratic  birth,  Bakunin 
;became  furious  when  he  observed  the  human  misery 
;among  the  masses  which  Russian  autocracy  was 


240  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

producing.  He  became  an  agitator.  He  was  con- 
fined in  dungeons  and  exiled  to  Siberia.  He  es- 
caped from  Siberia,  and  by  way  of  California  went 
to  England  and  then  to  Switzerland.  His  chief 
work  is  God  and  the  State.  Vital,  vigorous,  mag- 
netic, fearless — these  are  the  adjectives  which  de- 
scribe the  personality  of  Bakunin. 

Bakunin  scorned  rank,  birth,  and  fortune.  He 
attacked  external  authority  of  all  kinds.  He  de- 
nied the  validity  of  concepts  such  as  "God"  and  the 
"state";  they  are  parts  of  systems  which  enslave 
the  free  will  of  man.  Classes  must  be  abolished 
and  the  masses  of  individuals  freed  from  all  en- 
slaving institutions,  such  as  marriage,  the  church, 
the  state. 

In  a  related  way  Prince  Kropotkin  (1842-1921) 
developed  anarchistic  principles.  Peter  A.  Kro- 
potkin was  of  aristocratic  Russian  birth  and  a  per- 
son of  mild,  courteous  manners.  His  father  was  a 
serf  owner ;  the  son  could  not  bear  to  see  the  suffer- 
ings which  the  serfs  underwent.  He  threw  away 
the  privileges  of  rank  and  became  a  defender  of 
the  oppressed.  He  attempted  to  correlate  the  theo- 
ries of  anarchism  with  those  of  mutual  aid,  and 
fought  socialism  with  the  concept  of  centralized 
control  on  the  ground  that  it  would  destroy  indi- 
vidual liberty.6  In  Chapter  XXII,  Kropotkin's 
theory  of  mutual  aid  will  be  analyzed. 

Anarchism  and  socialism  make  similar  attacks 
upon  the  evils  of  capitalism.  Both  are  determined 


MARXIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  241 

to  overthrow  capitalism.  Both  believe  in  revolt. 
They  part  ways  when  they  advocate  a  constructive 
program  for  the  new  order  which  shall  follow  the 
violent  overthrow  of  capitalism.  Unlike  socialism, 
anarchism  holds  that  all  government  is  an  evil  and 
that  industry  can  go  on  without  organization.  It 
advocates  a  free  communism. 

One  of  the  essentials  in  the  Communist  Mani- 
festo was  the  appropriation  of  rents  for  public  pur- 
poses. Starting  from  a  viewpoint  distinctly  differ- 
ent from  that  of  Karl  Marx,  Henry  George  (1839- 
1897)  became  the  founder  of  single  tax  propa- 
ganda. In  early  manhood  Henry  George  came  to 
San  Francisco  and  established  a  struggling  news- 
paper. At  once  he  found  himself  practically  over- 
whelmed by  the  brutal  competition  of  the  metro- 
politan press  and  telegraphic  news  service.  George 
was  crushed  by  monopoly.  It  was  this  defeat  which 
gave  him  a  new  idea — an  idea  that  was  to  com- 
mand the  attention  of  the  world. 

As  George  walked  the  streets  of  New  York  City 
he  puzzled  over  the  existence  of  indescribable  desti- 
tution and  suffering  in  the  shadow  of  the  princely 
rich  with  their  ostentatious  luxuries.7  Why  in  a 
land  blessed  with  generous  natural  resources  should 
there  be  such  poverty?  Although  discovery  has 
followed  discovery  and  invention  has  followed  in- 
vention, neither  has  lessened  the  toil  of  those  who 
most  need  respite.  With  material  progress  poverty 
takes  on  a  larger  aspect.  Material  progress  may 


242  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

be  likened  to  an  immense  wedge  which  is  being 
forced,  not  underneath  society,  but  through  society. 
"Those  who  are  above  the  point  of  separation  are 
elevated,  but  those  who  are  below  are  crushed 
down."8  George  set  himself  the  task  of  finding  out 
why  poverty  is  associated  with  progress. 

This  cause  George  found  in  the  land  situation. 
As  land  increases  in  value,  poverty  increases.  The 
price  of  land  is  an  index  of  the  disparity  in  the  eco- 
nomic conditions  of  the  people  at  the  extremes  of 
the  social  scale.  Land  is  more  valuable  in  New 
York  City  than  in  San  Francisco,  and  there  is  more 
squalor  and  misery  in  New  York  City  than  in  San 
Francisco.  Land  is  more  valuable  in  London  than 
in  New  York  City,  and  likewise  there  is  more 
squalor  and  destitution  in  London  than  in  New 
York  City. 

When  increasing  numbers  of  people  live  in  a  lim- 
ited area  under  a  system  of  private  property  in  land, 
rents  are  raised  and  land  values  go  up.  The  cost 
of  living  mounts,  wages  are  kept  to  a  minimum, 
overcongestion  of  population  ensues;  and  again, 
rents  and  land  values  are  increased. 

Upon  what  does  title  to  land  rest?  Where  did 
it  originate?  In  force.  But  has  the  first  comer 
at  a  banquet  the  right  to  turn  back  all  the  chairs, 
and  claim  that  none  of  the  other  guests  shall  par- 
take of  the  food  that  has  been  provided  ?  Does  the 
first  passenger  who  enters  a  railroad  car  thereby 
possess  the  right  to  keep  out  all  other  persons,  or 


MARXIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  243 

admit  them  only  upon  payment  to  him  of  sums  of 
money?  "We  arrive  and  we  depart,  guests  at  a 
banquet  continually  spread,  spectators  and  partici- 
pants in  an  entertainment  where  there  is  room  for 
all  who  come."3  These  illustrations  are  pertinent 
to  the  unjust  elements  in  the  present  economic 
order. 

As  a  result  of  private  property  in  land,  the  owner 
possesses  power  over  the  tenant,  a  power  which  is 
tantamount  to  a  system  of  slavery.  There  is  noth- 
ing strange,  therefore,  in  the  poverty  phenomena 
of  the  world.  The  Creator  has  not  placed  in  the 
world  the  taint  of  injustice.  The  fact  that  amid  our 
highest  civilization  men  faint  and  die  with  want,  is 
not  because  of  the  niggardliness  of  nature  or  the 
injustice  of  the  Creator,  but  is  due  to  the  injustice 
of  man.11  Since  the  owner  of  land  receives  wealth 
without  labor  to  an  increasing  degree,  so  there  is 
an  increasing  robbery  of  earnings  of  those  who 
labor. 

George  attacked  Malthusianism,  and  pointed  out 
the  deficiencies  in  the  proposed  remedies  for  pov- 
erty, such  as  greater  economy  in  government,  dif- 
fusion of  knowledge,  and  improved  habits  of  in- 
dustry. He  then  proceeded  to  give  his  own  and  well 
known  solution,  namely,  making  land  common  prop- 
erty through  a  system  of  taxation  of  land  values 
alone.  Since  land,  not  labor,  is  the  source  of  all 
wealth,  it  is  just  and  necessary  to  make  land  com- 
mon property. 


244  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

The  weakness  of  Henry  George's  argument  lies 
in  his  single  panacea  for  securing  justice.  He  over- 
emphasized the  importance  of  one  line  of  procedure. 
He  neglects  other  important  factors,  such  as  a 
selfish  human  nature.  He  rendered,  however,  a 
splendid  service  in  showing  the  weaknesses  in  the 
system  of  private  property  in  land.  In  this  con- 
nection he  has  been  unequaled  in  his  contribution 
to  social  thought. 

In  this  discussion  of  the  contributions  of  social- 
ism to  social  thought,  many  types  or  expressions  of 
socialism  have  not  been  presented.  The  educational 
propaganda  of  the  Fabian  socialists  in  England 
should  be  mentioned  as  being  very  effective.  Al- 
though small  in  number  this  group  of  intellectuals, 
the  best  known  being  Sidney  and  Beatrice  Webb, 
have  exerted  a  constructive  and  practical  influence 
upon  social  thought. 

Socialism  has  assumed  various  phases.  (1) 
It  originated  in  utopianism  and  in  a  loose,  broad 
type  of  communism.  (2)  It  then  took  the  form 
of  associationism,  urging  the  organization  of 
groups  of  associated  individuals,  such  as  phalanges. 
As  utopianism  was  in  part  the  expression  of  a  poetic 
imagination,  so  associationism  represented  a  bour- 
geois philosophy.  (3)  In  the  next  place  socialism 
assumed  political  aspirations,  and  advocated  a  gov- 
ernmental program  whereby  the  existing  govern- 
ments shall  gradually  extend  their  power  until  they 
exercise  control  over  rent-producing  land  and  in- 


MARXIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  245 

terest-producing  capital.  (4)  State  socialism,  how- 
ever, was  supplanted  in  many  minds  by  ideas  of 
more  radical  procedure.  Marxian  socialism  holds 
that  a  class  conflict  is  inevitable  and  that  the 
workers  must  overthrow  the  capitalists,  together 
with  the  governments  which  they  control.  (5)  To 
the  other  radical  extreme  is  philosophic  anarchism, 
with  its  emphasis  upon  the  abolition  of  all  existing 
governments  and  the  establishment  of  individual 
autonomy. 

Socialism  has  made  several  contributions  to 
social  thought.  ( 1 )  It  has  called  the  attention  of 
civilized  mankind,  and  particularly  of  the  economic- 
ally wealthy  classes,  to  the  needs  of  the  weaker 
classes.  It  has  introduced  humanitarian  concepts 
into  the  minds  of  the  socially  unthinking  educated 
classes.  (2)  It  has  jolted  many  economic  auto- 
crats from  their  thrones  of  power.  It  has  thrown 
the  spot  light  of  publicity  upon  the  selfish  and 
wicked  ostentation  of  the  hereditary  leisure 
classes.  (3)  It  has  held  social  theory  to  a  more 
practical  course  and  to  developing  more  immediate 
social  solutions  than  it  otherwise  would  have 
achieved.  (4)  It  has  developed  a  power  equal 
that  held  by  individualism.  It  has  helped  to  demon- 
strate the  dualistic  nature  of  social  evolution,  that 
is,  that  there  are  two  poles  to  human  life  rather 
than  one. 


CHAPTER  XV. 
BUCKLE  AND  GEOGRAPHIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 


It  has  long  been  observed  that  climate,  fertility 
of  soil,  rainfall,  and  similar  factors  have  had  a  pow- 
erful influence  upon  human  nature  and  upon  the 
development  of  civilization.  The  chief  founders  of 
this  line  of  thought  were  Buckle  and  Ratzel.  In 
recent  years  Semple  and  Huntington  have  become 
well-known  authorities.  Many  other  thinkers  have 
contributed  to  the  present  knowledge  concerning 
the  interactions  between  geographic  factors  and 
human  development. 

One  of  the  first  writers  to  elaborate  a  climatic 
theory  of  social  evolution  was  Bodin  (1530-1596). 
Hot  climates,  he  observed,  further  the  rise  of  all 
kinds  of  superstitious  beliefs.  Cold  climates  pro- 
duce brute  will-power.  Temperate  climates  consti- 
tute an  essential  basis  for  the  development  of  rea- 
son. In  the  ideal  commonwealth  which  Bodin  de- 
scribed, all  three  types  of  climate  are  represented.1 
The  northern  zone  furnishes  the  fighters  and  th< 
workers.  The  southern  zone  produces  poets, 
priests,  and  artists.  The  temperate  zone  is  the  par- 
ent of  legislative,  judicial,  and  scholarly  leaders. 

In  the  Spirit  of  Laws  to  which  reference  waj 


GEOGRAPHIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  247 

made  in  Chapter  XI,  Montesquieu  accentuated  the 
importance  of  environmental  influences  on  social 
processes.  He  attempted  to  show  the  effects  of  cli- 
mate upon  social  institutions.  Montesquieu  did  im- 
portant pioneer  work  in  what  is  now  known  as  the 
field  of  anthropo-geography. 

By  way  of  contrast,  the  attitude  of  Hume,  whose 
contributions  to  social  psychology  have  already 
been  noted,  stands  out  sharply.  According  to 
Hume,  physical  causes  have  no  particular  effect  on 
the  human  mind.  No  geographic  factors  influence 
either  the  temperament,  disposition,  or  ability  of 
people.  Hume  was  led  to  this  extreme  position  by 
his  staunch  faith  in  the  subjective  and  psychological 
factors  of  human  nature. 

The  distinguished  German  scientist,  Alexander 
von  Humboldt  (1769-1859),  travelled  extensively 
throughout  the  world,  observing  the  physical  geog- 
raphy of  many  lands  in  conjunction  with  the  me- 
teorological conditions  of  each.  At  the  same  time 
von  Humboldt  was  a  careful  observer  of  the  cus- 
toms, manners,  and  standards  of  the  various  peo- 
ples with  whom  he  came  in  contact.  In  these 
travels  and  studies,  von  Humboldt  was  careful  to 
note  relationships  between  soils  and  civilizations. 
His  contributions  to  social  thought  were  of  this 
descriptive  nature,  based  on  first-hand  observations 
in  many  parts  of  the  world. 

The  writings  of  Henry  Thomas  Buckle  (1821- 
1862)  contain  an  extensive  and  detailed  explanation 


248  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

of  the  ways  in  which  geographic  and  natural  factors 
modify  human  life.  Buckle  starts  with  a  decidedly 
dualistic  universe — a  dualism  which  is  disjunctive. 
The  dualism  consists  of  nature  and  mind,  each  sub- 
ject more  or  less  to  its  own  laws.  Rejecting  both 
the  doctrine  of  free  will  and  of  predestination, 
Buckle  concludes  that  the  actions  of  men  are  deter- 
mined solely  by  their  antecedents  and  that  they  have 
a  character  of  uniformity.2  Man  modifies  nature, 
and  nature  modifies  man,  but  in  the  past  in  many 
parts  of  the  world  the  thoughts  and  desires  of  men 
are  more  influenced  by  physical  phenomena  than 
they  influence  such  phenomena.  Because  of  this 
dominant  activity  of  the  physical  forces,  these 
should  be  studied  as  a  basis  for  understanding  the 
history  of  man. 

The  physical  factors  which  have  powerfully  in- 
fluenced men  are  four:  climate,  food,  soil,  and  the 
general  aspects  of  nature.  By  the  fourth,  Buckle 
refers  to  those  appearances  which  are  presented 
chiefly  through  the  medium  of  sight  and  which  pro- 
duce their  chief  results  by  exciting  the  imagination 
and  suggesting  superstitions.  The  three  first-men- 
tioned factors  do  not  operate  on  the  mind  directly.3 

The  first  effect  of  climate,  food,  and  soil  upon 
man  that  may  be  noted  is  that  they  lead  man  to  ac- 
cumulate wealth.  These  accumulations  permit  that 
degree  of  leisure  from  "making  a  living"  which  en- 
ables some  members  of  society  to  acquire  knowl- 
edge. Upon  these  acquisitions  of  knowledge,  par- 


GEOGRAPHIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  249 

ticularly  of  socialized  knowledge,  civilization  de- 
pends. This  progress  in  the  early  stages  of  civiliza- 
tion rests  on  two  circumstances:  "First,  on  the 
energy  and  regularity  with  which  labor  is  con- 
ducted, and  second,  on  the  returns  made  to  that 
labor  by  the  bounty  of  nature."4  Both  these  causes 
are  the  results  of  physical  antecedents.  The  returns 
which  are  made  to  labor  are  regulated  by  the  fer- 
tility of  the  soil.  Moreover,  Buckle  asserted,  the 
energy  and  regularity  with  which  labor  is  conducted 
will  be  entirely  dependent  on  the  influence  of  cli- 
mate.5 When  heat  is  intense,  men  will  be  indis- 
posed and  partly  unfitted  for  active  industry.  Cli- 
mate also  affects  the  regularity  of  the  habits  of 
laborers.  In  very  cold  climates,  the  weather  inter- 
feres with  regular  habits  and  produces  desultori- 

tess.     In  southern  countries  regular  labor  is  like- 

rise  prevented — this  time  by  the  heat.     Thus,  in 
early  stages  of  civilization  the  fundamental  law 

tay  be  stated :  the  soil  regulates  the  returns  made 
any  given  amount  of  labor ;  the  climate  regulates 
the  energy  and  constancy  of  labor  itself.6 
Of  the  two  primary  causes  of  primitive  societary 

growth,  the  fertility  of  the  soil  is  more  important 
tan  the  climatic  influences.     It  is  only  where  soil 

:ertility  exists  that  civilization  can  arise  at  all.7 

>ut  in  Europe,  climate  has  been  more  effective  than 
>il  fertility.  In  Europe  a  climate  has  existed  which 

las  stimulated  human  activities. 
Since  the  mental  powers  of  man  are  unlimited 


250  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

they  are  more  important,  once  they  get  started,  than 
the  powers  of  nature,  which  are  limited  and  station- 
ary. Man  has  endless  capacity,  through  his  dynamic 
mental  tendencies  to  develop  the  physical  resources 
of  the  earth. 

The  birth  rate  depends  on  food  supply.  In  hot 
countries,  where  less  food  per  capita  is  required 
than  in  cold  countries,  and  where  an  abundance  of 
food  exists,  the  birth  rate  is  very  high.  In  cold 
countries  highly  carbonized  food  is  necessary,  but 
this  food  is  largely  animal  in  origin  and  great  risk 
is  involved  in  procuring  it.  Hence  the  people  of 
cold  countries  become  adventuresome.8 

By  the  study  of  physical  laws  it  is  possible  to  de- 
termine what  the  national  food  of  a  country  will 
be.  In  India,  for  example,  the  physical  conditions 
are  decidedly  favorable  to  the  growth  of  rice,  which 
is  the  most  nutritive  of  all  cereals,  and  which,  con- 
sequently, is  a  causal  factor  in  a  high  birth  rate. 

But  where  there  is  a  cheap  national  food,  the  in- 
crease in  population  becomes  very  great.  As  a  re- 
sult, there  are  multitudes  of  people  who  are  able 
to  keep  just  above  the  subsistence  level.  A  few 
individuals  who  understand  the  operation  of  these 
physical  laws  are  able  to  manipulate  the  multitudes 
in  such  a  way  as  to  make  themselves  immensely 
wealthy.  Since  wealth,  after  intellect,  is  the  mos< 
permanent  source  of  power,  a  great  inequality  of 
wealth  has  been  accompanied  by  a  corresponding 
inequality  of  social  and  political  power.9  It  pro- 


GEOGRAPHIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  251 

duces  classes  and  even  castes.  Poverty  provokes 
contempt.  Class  conflict  results.  The  poor  are 
ground  low,  murmur,  and  are  again  subjected  to 
ignominy.  Under  such  conditions  democracy  has 
a  hard  struggle.  When  physical  conditions  favor 
one  class,  that  class  will  constitute  itself  the  govern- 
ment and  bitterly  oppose  the  extension  of  govern- 
ment to  all  other  classes.  In  Europe  there  was  no 
cheap  national  food,  no  blind  multiplication  of 
population,  and  hence  no  such  disparity  between 
classes  as  in  India.  In  Europe  it  has  been  easier 
for  democratic  movements  to  spread. 

Early  civilization  developed  in  the  Euphrates 
valley,  the  Nile  valley,  and  in  the  exceedingly  fer- 
tile regions  of  Peru,  Central  America,  and  Mexico. 
Modern  civilization  is  found  largely  in  fertile  river 
valleys,  such  as  the  Thames,  Seine,  Rhine,  Po,  Dan- 
ube, Hudson,  Mississippi.  But  in  the  Amazon  val- 
ley, the  fertility  of  soil  has  not  invited  the  growth 
of  a  large  population.  The  trade  winds  have 
brought  in  a  superabundance  of  moisture,  produc- 
ing torrential  rains,  and  a  luxuriance  of  plant  life 
and  a  complexity  of  virile  animal  life  which  thus  far 
have  defied  the  skill  of  man  to  overcome. 

The  fourth  physical  factor  which  Buckle  presents 
is  the  general  aspects  of  nature.  Of  these  the  first 
class  excites  the  imagination  and  the  second  stimu- 
lates the  rational  operations  of  the  intellect.10  In 
regard  to  natural  phenomena  it  may  be  said  that 
whatever  inspires  feelings  of  terror,  of  the  vague 


252  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

and  uncontrollable,  and  of  great  wonder  tends  to 
inflame  the  imagination  and  to  cause  it  to  dominate 
the  intellectual  processes.  Where  nature  is  continu- 
ally exhibiting  its  power,  man  feels  his  inferiority. 
He  assumes  a  helpless  attitude.  He  ceases  to  in- 
quire or  to  think.  His  imagination,  rather  than  his 
reason,  reigns.  On  the  other  hand,  where  nature 
works  smoothly  and  quietly,  man  begins  to  assert 
his  individuality.  He  even  essays  to  dominate  na- 
ture and  other  men.  His  cognition  develops  and 
his  volition  expresses  itself  vigorously. 

All  early  civilizations  were  located  in  the  tropics 
or  sub-tropics.  In  these  regions  nature  is  danger- 
ous to  man.  Earthquakes,  tempests,  hurricanes, 
pestilences  prevail.  Consequently,  the  imagination 
of  man  takes  exaggerated  forms.  The  judgment  is 
overbalanced;  thought  is  paralyzed.  The  mind  is 
continually  thrown  into  a  frantic  state.  These  re- 
actions throw  human  life  into  feeling  molds,  into 
poetic  rather  than  scientific  forms.  Religious  feel- 
ings are  promoted.  The  leading  religions  of  the 
world  originated  in  the  sub-tropical  and  tropical 
regions  of  the  earth. 

East  Indian  literature  and  thought  illustrate  the 
effect  of  nature  upon  the  feelings  and  the  imagina- 
tion. The  works  of  the  East  Indians  on  grammar, 
law,  history,  medicine,  even  on  mathematics,  geog- 
raphy, and  metaphysics  are  nearly  all  poems.11 
Prose  writing  is  despised.  The  Sanscrit  language 
boasts  of  more  numerous  and  more  complicated 


GEOGRAPHIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  253 

metres  than  can  any  European  tongue.  The  East 
Indian  literature  is  even  calculated  to  set  the  reason 
of  man  at  defiance.12 

The  imagination,  for  example,  in  India  has  pro- 
duced an  exaggerated  respect  for  the  past;  it  is 
this  situation  which  has  led  poets  to  describe  a 
Golden  Age  in  the  remote  past.  In  the  literature 
of  India  there  is  recorded  the  statement  that  in 
ancient  times  the  average  length  of  life  of  common 
men  was  80,000  years.  There  are  instances  of  poets 
who  lived  to  be  half  a  million  years  old. 

In  Greece,  on  the  other  hand,  nature  is  more 
quiet  and  the  mind  of  man  functioned  in  a  reason- 
ing way.  In  the  North  Temperate  zone  science 
developed.  "The  climate  was  more  healthy;  earth- 
quakes were  less  frequent;  hurricanes  were  less 
disastrous;  wild  beasts  and  noxious  animals  less 
abundant."13  Buckle,  in  other  words,  insists  that 
everywhere  the  hand  of  nature  is  upon  the  mind  of 
man. 

The  work  of  Buckle,  the  chief  exponent  of  the 
influence  of  physical  nature  upon  mental  man,  ac- 
centuates important  phases  of  the  growth  of  civili- 
zation. Buckle  over-emphasized  his  anthropo-geo- 
graphic  observations.  However,  they  constitute  a 
part  of  the  whole  picture  of  human  progress,  and 
when  seen  in  the  light  of  modern  mental  growth 
and  control  of  environment  they  shrink  into  proper 
proportions. 

The  field  which  Buckle  opened  has  been  devel- 


254  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

oped  extensively  by  Friedrich  Ratzel  (1844-1904). 
This  German  scholar,  traveler,  and  geographer  is 
generally  credited  with  putting  anthropo-geography 
on  a  scientific  basis.  Miss  Ellen  Semple  attempted 
to  translate  his  work  on  Anthropo-Geographie  into 
English,  but  found  the  German  constructions  so 
difficult  to  handle  accurately  that  it  was  necessary 
for  her  to  put  Ratzel's  observations  into  her  own 
words.  She  also  points  out  in  Buckle  a  lack  of 
system  and  an  undue  tendency  to  follow  one  gen- 
eralization after  another.  Her  own  Influences  of 
Geographic  Environment  has  now  become  a  stand- 
ard work  on  the  ways  in  which  physical  nature 
affects  mankind. 

Miss  Semple,  following  but  improving  upon  Rat- 
zel, has  shown  in  turn  the  influences  of  geographical 
location,  area,  and  boundaries  upon  people.  She 
indicates  the  various  ways  in  which  oceans,  rivers, 
and  coast  lines  have  molded  human  minds ;  she  dis- 
tinguishes between  mountain,  steppe,  and  desert 
effects  upon  mankind.  She  describes  man  as  a 
product  of  the  earth's  surface.  She  stresses  unduly 
the  physical  influences;  she  considers  nature  the 
dominating  force.  Even  where  civilized  man  has 
developed  inventive  powers  and  spiritual  prowess, 
nature  is  given  the  credit.14  Nevertheless,  Miss 
Semple  has  marshalled  facts  in  powerful  array  and 
increased  their  force  by  literary  skill.  No  student 
or  teacher  can  afford  to  neglect  Miss  Semple's  ex- 
tensive survey  of  the  interactions  between  physical 


GEOGRAPHIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  255 

nature  and  human  progress. 

Among  the  many  other  writers  upon  the  relation 
of  geographic  factors  to  civilization  the  investiga- 
tions of  Ellsworth  Huntington  are  significant.15 
He  has  described  the  climatic  conditions  that  are 
most  favorable  to  mental  stimulation  and  growth, 
and  then  has  classified  all  districts  of  the  earth  ac- 
cording to  the  degree  in  which  they  stimulate  or 
arrest  mental  advance. 

In  this  same  connection  William  Z.  Ripley  has 
investigated  the  relation  of  climate  to  races.16  After 
analyzing  races  and  distinguishing  between  them 
and  the  geographic  influences  upon  pigmentation, 
head,  form,  stature,  and  other  traits,  mainly  struc- 
tural, he  classifies  climatic  elements  in  order  of  im- 
portance, as  follows :  humidity,  heat,  and  monotony. 
A  high  humidity,  excessive  heat,  and  long  series  of 
sunshine  or  of  cloudy  weather  produce  mental  ener- 
vation, stagnation,  and  retrogression. 

Acclimatization  of  races  is  a  very  slow  process, 
according  to  Ripley.  It  requires  centuries.  Per- 
haps the  white  race  can  never  become  truly  accli- 
mated in  the  tropics.  Racial  differences  he  shows 
are  due  to  environmental  factors  far  more  than  is 
ordinarily  supposed. 

In  conclusion,  it  may  be  said  that  physical  forces 
have  operated  strongly  on  man.  But  when  man 
has  developed  modern  mental  tools,  he  has  been 
able  to  escape  a  part  of  the  enslaving  environmental 
influences.  The  history  of  the  relation  of  geo- 


X 


256  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

graphic  factors  to  human  progress  indicates  a 
fundamental  but  a  proportionate  decrease  in  those 
influences. 


CHAPTER  XVI 
SPENCER  AND  ORGANIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 


In  the  second  half  of  the  last  century  social 
thought  passed  under  biological  influence.  Society 
was  discussed  in  terms  of  biological  analogies,  that 
is,  it  was  compared  in  its  structure  and  functions 
to  organic  life.  Herbert  Spencer  was  the  leader 
among  those  writers  who  attempted  to  analyze  so- 
ciety in  terms  of  biological  figures  of  speech.  He 
also  stressed  the  structural  nature  of  society,  and 
in  his  Principles  of  Sociology  he  went  into  great 
detail  in  giving  a  historical  description  of  social 
institutions. 

The  Greek  writers,  the  Hebrews  before  them, 
the  founder  of  Christianity  made  references  to  the 
likenesses  between  human  society  and  plant  and 
animal  life.  Mankind  has  often  been  compared 
to  a  tree  or  a  plant  with  its  manifold,  evolving 
branches  and  fruit. 

Spencer's  famous  organic  analogies  were  pre- 
ceded by  the  studies  of  biologists,  such  as  Lamarck 
and  Darwin.  Lamarck  (1744-1829)  argued  that 
by  activity  and  use  man  could  develop  traits  which 
would  be  transmitted  by  inheritance.  Although 
this  theory  has  been  undermined  by  Weismann,  it 


258  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

served  as  a  basis  for  the  further  study  of  the  bio- 
logical laws  of  human  evolution. 

The  thought  of  Charles  Darwin  (1809-1882) 
upon  the  nature  of  evolution  wras  stimulated  in  part 
by  Malthus'  doctrine  of  surplus  population  and  the 
consequent  struggle  for  existence.  He  also  based 
his  ideas  on  the  Lamarckian  theory  of  transmission 
of  acquired  characters.  He  developed  the  concepts 
of  the  prodigality  of  nature  and  the  struggle  for 
existence,  which  led  to  the  resultant  concept  of 
natural  selection  and  survival  of  the  fittest.  The 
process  of  natural  selection  accounts  for  the  in- 
stincts, imitation,  imagination,  reason  as  well  as 
for  self-consciousness,  and  the  esthetic  and  religious 
impulses.  In  this  way  man,  according  to  the  Dar- 
winian formula,  has  ascended  by  stages  from  the 
lower  orders  of  life. 

The  fittest  to  survive,  concluded  Darwin,  are 
those  individuals  who  are  best  fitted  to  meet  the 
conditions  of  their  environment.  If  the  environ- 
ment be  competitive,  savage,  brutal,  then  the  fittest 
will  be  the  strongest  physically  and  the  most  vicious. 
If  the  environment  be  co-operative,  then  the  fittest 
will  be  the  individuals  who  co-operate  best.  With 
the  development  of  intelligence  and  sagacity  in 
early  human  society,  individuals  otherwise  cruel 
learned  to  co-operate.  A  tribe  of  co-operating  in- 
dividuals would  be  victorious  in  a  conflict  with  a 
tribe  of  non-co-operating  members.  Thus  co- 
operation and  a  co-operating  environment  them- 


ORGANIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  259 

selves  are  the  result  of  natural  selection. 

Unfortunately,  Darwin's  concept  of  natural  se- 
lection has  been  grossly  distorted.  Upon  this  mis- 
apprehension, a  doctrine  of  "social  Darwinism" 
has  gained  recognition.  According  to  this  false 
interpretation  of  Darwinism,  the  tooth  and  fang 
struggle  for  existence  among  animals  is  the  normal 
>rocedure  among  human  beings.  The  most  brutal, 
cruel,  and  shrewd  men  are  "fitted"  to  survive  in 
an  environment  of  physical  and  mental  competition. 
Likewise,  the  nations  which  can  marshal  together 
the  most  powerful  armies  and  navies  are  the 
"fittest"  to  survive  in  a  world  where  each  nation 
is  accountable  unto  itself  alone.  Thus,  it  is  seen 
that  human  society  is  simply  an  extension  of  the 
animal  society  and  that  the  fundamental  law  of 
social  progress  is  the  law  of  force  and  might,  first 
physical,  and  then  physical  and  psychical. 

But  this  interpretation  is  false  to  Darwin's  own 
principles.  While  Darwin  did  describe  and  lay 
great  emphasis  upon  the  tooth  and  fang  struggle 
for  existence,  he  noted  and  stressed  the  fact  that 
even  among  animals,  modifying  influences  were  at 
work.  He  made  clear  that  co-operation  exists 
among  many  species  of  animal  life,  and  that  this  co- 
operative tendency  is  an  important  survival  factor. 
He  also  saw  that  among  the  highest  types  of  ani- 
mals there  were  new  and  complex  expressions  of 
co-operation,  and  that  the  higher  mental  activity 
of  these  animal  types  seemed  to  be  a  correlate  in 


260  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

some  way  of  the  greater  co-operative  spirit.  The 
application  of  this  principle  to  human  progress  im- 
plies that  the  co-operative  spirit  may  ultimately 
become  the  chief  survival  force,  and  that  some  day 
the  "fittest"  to  survive  will  be  those  individuals  orv 
groups  of  individuals  who  co-operate  most  wisely. 
This  theory  will  be  developed  further  in  the  chap- 
ter upon  "Co-operation  Theories  in  Sociology." 
The  chief  contributors  have  been  Kropotkin  and 
Novicow. 

Darwin  made  another  important  contribution  to 
social  science  in  his  theory  of  sexual  selection. 
This  idea  is  a  phase  of  natural  selection.  Among 
the  higher  animals  the  females  choose  their  mates. 
The  males,  for  example,  with  the  singing  voice  and 
beautiful  plumage,  are  the  most  likely  to  be  chosen. 
These  males  thus  become  the  progenitors  of  the 
next  generation  of  the  given  species;  the  less  at- 
tractive males  mate  if  at  all  with  the  inferior  types 
of  females.  Thus  signs  of  male  attractiveness 
come  to  possess  survival  value.1 

Among  human  beings  the  principle  of  sexual 
selection  operates,  but  in  a  reversed  sexual  form. 
During  the  earlier  centuries  of  human  history  the 
custom  developed  whereby  the  males  took  the  initia- 
tive in  choosing  mates.  As  a  result,  the  females 
resorted  to  all  sorts  of  devices  to  make  themselves 
"attractive"  and  to  get  themselves  "selected." 

The  social  theories  of  Herbert  Spencer  (1820- 
1903)  have  caused  more  controversy  than  those  of 


ORGANIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  261 

any  other  writer  in  the  sociological  field.  The  fact 
that  in  these  controversies  the  ideas  of  Spencer 
have  usually  been  worsted  will  not  blind  the  fair- 
minded  seeker  after  truth  to  the  important  role 
which  Spencer  took  in  the  field  of  social  thought. 

Spencer  early  developed  the  habit  of  causal  think- 
ing, that  is,  he  believed  in  causes,  and  hence 
searched  everywhere  for  causes.  Because  of  the 
acrimonious  discussions  which  took  place  between 
his  father  and  mother,  and  because  of  his  own  inde- 
pendent nature,  he  repudiated  the  orthodox  re- 
ligious explanations  of  the  universe.  He  was 
trained  for  the  profession  of  civil  engineering.  His 
studies  in  mathematics  and  mechanics  accentuated 
his  precise  and  somewhat  materialistic  interpreta- 
tion of  the  universe.  His  social  theories  are  an  out- 
growth in  part  of  his  emphasis  upon  the  laws  of 
co-existence  and  sequences  in  the  physical  world. 

In  order  to  understand  Spencer's  social  laws  it  is 
necessary  first  to  consider  his  general  law  of  evolu- 
tion. He  traced  everything  in  the  world  back 
through  causal  chains  to  two  fundamental  factors, 
namely,  matter  and  motion — two  aspects  of  force. 
As  a  result  of  the  operation  of  some  First  Cause, 
an  integration  of  matter  began  to  take  place,  ac- 
companied by  a  concomitant  dissipation  of  motion. 
As  a  result,  matter  passes  from  an  indefinite,  in- 
coherent homogeneity  to  a  definite,  coherent  hetero- 
geneity. During  this  process  the  unexpended  mo- 
tion undergoes  a  similar  change.2 


262  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

The  best  explanation  of  this  law  of  evolution  can 
be  found  in  its  application  to  societary  phenomena. 
Suppose  that  a  modern  city  neighborhood  under- 
takes to  organize  itself.  It  possesses  physical  re- 
sources and  mental  abilities.  The  "neighbors"  are 
all  more  or  less  untrained  in  community  organiza- 
tion activities.  In  this  sense  they  are  homogeneous. 
At  first  they  are  unable  to  work  together;  in  fact 
they  do  not  know  what  to  do;  thus,  they  form  "an 
indefinite,  incoherent  homogeneity."  But  with  ex- 
perience in  community  organization  activities,  the 
individuals  of  the  neighborhood  learn  to  work  to- 
gether. Each  finds  the  type  of  work  which  he  can 
do  best.  All  work  toward  a  definite  goal.  Thus,  a 
definite,  coherent  heterogeneity  arises.  Further, 
the  unexpended  energies  of  the  people  are  influ- 
enced and  transformed  by  the  pattern  ideas  which 
experience  in  community  organization  measures 
has  taught.3 

This  application  of  Spencer's  law  of  evolution  to 
human  progress  has  weak  as  well  as  strong  points. 
There  is  not  always  an  original  homogeneity.  Upon 
close  examination  this  homogeneity  disappears  be- 
fore a  variegated  conglomeration  of  heterogeneous 
experiences  and  potentialities  of  all  the  individuals 
who  are  concerned.  It  is  not  necessary  to  point  out 
additional  errors.  Spencer  deserves  credit,  how- 
ever, for  developing  the  concept  of  social  evolution 
as  a  phase  of  natural  evolution  and  for  stressing  the 
idea  of  natural  causation  in  societary  matters. 


ORGANIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  263 

Spencer  began  his  Principles  of  Sociology  with  a 
very  elaborate  description  of  primitive  man — the 
original  societary  unit  corresponding  to  the  bio- 
logical cell.  The  physical,  emotional,  and  intellec- 
tual life  of  primitive  man  is  given  prominence.  An 
analysis  is  made  of  the  behavior  of  man,  the 
original  social  unit,  when  he  is  exposed  to  the 
various  environing  conditions — inorganic,  organic, 
and  super-organic.  The  emphasis  upon  "man"  as 
the  primary  unit  neglects  the  importance  of  the 
"group"  in  the  social  evolutionary  process.  More- 
over, Spencer  underrated  the  intellectual  nature  of 
primitive  man ;  he  denied  to  early  man  the  qualities 
involving  excursiveness  of  thought,  imagination, 
and  original  ideas.4 

Spencer's  discussion  of  primitive  ideas  shows 
widespread  reading  of  volumes  of  source  materials. 
The  "inductions"  are  often  influenced  by  precon- 
ceived notions  of  human  life,  despite  Spencer's  sin- 
cere desire  and  effort  to  be  scientific.  While  the 
horde,  the  family,  and  other  groups  are  described, 
the  influences  which  are  the  result  of  the  inter- 
action of  individual  minds  and  the  interactions  be- 
tween the  individual  and  his  group  are  scarcely 
recognized. 

In  regard  to  the  state,  Spencer  carried  forward 
the  theories  which  have  already  been  noted,  namely, 
of  individual  rights.  He  repudiated  the  state  which 
is  the  product  of  the  military  organization  of 
society.  Such  a  regime  is  primordial  and  un- 


264  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

civilized.  It  is  an  organization  of  homogeneous 
units  in  which  the  units,  or  the  individuals,  are 
slaves  to  the  organization. 

Spencer  believed  in  a  new  industrial  development 
whereby  individuals  would  become  differentiated 
and  developed,  and  whereby  individuals  would 
be  shifted  from  an  autocratic  maximum  to  a 
democratic  maximum.  To  Spencer,  man  is  vastly 
superior  to  the  state.  In  the  coming  industrial 
order  Spencer  foresaw  an  era  in  which  the  main 
business  of  society  will  be  to  defend  the  rights  of 
individuals.  Spencer  forecasted  an  epoch  of  indus- 
trial states  which  have  abolished  war.  In  such  a 
day  the  only  conflicts  that  will  take  place  between 
states  will  be  natural.  These  will  be  only  the  com- 
petitions that  arise  naturally  between  states  that 
are  engaged  in  building  up  the  best  individuals,  that 
is,  those  persons  who  develop  their  individuality 
most  freely  and  harmoniously. 

The  rise  of  industrial  states  with  a  minimum 
emphasis  upon  government  and  a  maximum  em- 
phasis upon  individuality  will  produce  a  world 
order  in  which  national  barriers  will  slowly  melt 
away  and  a  planetary  unity  will  develop.  Spencer's 
industrialism,  however,  has  fundamental  weak- 
nesses.  It  implies  that  social  organization  is  more 
important  than  social  process.  It  neglects  to  pro- 
vide for  inherent  psychical  changes.  It  assumes 
that  an  industrial  society,  per  se,  will  be  peaceful. 
It  underestimates  the  importance  of  socializing 


ORGANIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  265 

motives. 

In  the  changes  from  a  military  to  an  industrial 
organization  of  society,  the  six  main  sets  of  social 
institutions  undergo  deep-seated  changes.  Spencer 
describes  at  length  these  six  institutional  struc- 
tures, namely,  the  domestic,  ceremonial,  political, 
ecclesiastical,  professional,  and  industrial.  Two, 
the  political  and  industrial,  have  been  mentioned  on 
the  preceding  page.  Spencer's  treatment  of  the 
other  four  is  accurate  to  a  degree  but  at  funda- 
mental points  is  unreliable — judged  by  current  con- 
ceptions and  data. 

Perhaps  Spencer  is  best  known  for  his  treatment 
of  the  organic  analogy.  He  set  up  the  hypothesis 
that  society  is  like  a  biological  organism  and  then 
proceeded  to  defend  his  thesis  against  all  objections 
with  great  logical  force.  But  logic  was  his  socio- 
logical downfall,  for  it  overcame  his  scientific  in- 
sight. 

Spencer  found  four  main  ways  in  which  society 
resembles  an  organism.5  ( 1 )  In  both  cases  growth 
is  attended  by  augmentation  of  mass.  (2)  In  each 
instance  growth  is  accomplished  by  increasing  com- 
plexity of  structure.  (3)  In  the  organism  and 
in  society  there  is  an  interdependence  of  parts. 
(4)  The  life  of  society,  like  the  life  of  an  organism, 
is  far  longer  than  the  life  of  any  of  the  units  or 
parts. 

But  there  are  ways  in  which  society  and  an  or- 
ganism are  unlike.6  These  were  analyzed  by  Spen- 


266  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

cer  and  determined  to  be  merely  superficial  differ- 
ences. There  are  four  of  these  main  differences. 
( 1 )  Unlike  organisms,  societies  have  no  specific  ex- 
tensive form,  such  as  a  physical  body  with  limbs  or 
a  face.  (2)  The  elements  of  society  do  not  form 
a  continuous  whole  as  in  the  case  of  an  animal. 
The  living  units  composing  society  are  free,  and  not 
in  contact,  being  more  or  less  dispersed.  (3)  The 
parts  of  society  are  not  stationary  and  fixed  in  their 
positions  relative  to, the  whole.  (4)  In  an  organism 
consciousness  is  concentrated  in  a  small  part  of  the 
aggregate,  while  in  society  consciousness  is  dif- 
fused. The  alleged  superficiality  in  this  difference 
between  society  and  an  organism  was  difficult  for 
Spencer  to  maintain. 

In  discussing  the  organic  analogy  further,  Spen- 
cer compared  the  alimentary  system  of  an  organism 
to  the  productive  industries,  or  the  sustaining  sys- 
tem in  the  body  politic.7  Furthermore,  there  is  a 
strong  parallelism  between  the  circulatory  system 
of  an  organism  and  the  distributing  system  in 
society  with  its  transportation  lines ;  but  more  par- 
ticularly, its  commercial  classes  and  media  of  ex- 
change. Then,  in  both  cases  there  has  developed 
regulating  systems.  In  an  organism  there  is  a  dom- 
inant center  and  subordinate  centers,  the  senses, 
and  a  neural  apparatus.  A  similar  structure  ap- 
pears in  society  in  the  form  of  an  adjustive  ap- 
paratus, or  government,  for  the  purpose  of  adjudi- 
cating the  differences  between  the  producers  and  the 


ORGANIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  267 

consumers.  These  parallelisms  throw  only  a  small 
measure  of  light  upon  the  nature  of  society.  They 
appear  ridiculous  when  carried  to  an  extreme,  for 
example,  to  the  extreme  to  which  Spencer  himself 
went  when  he  compared  the  King's  Council  to  the 
medulla  oblongata,  the  House  of  Lords  to  the 
cerebellum,  and  the  House  of  Commons  to  the 
cerebrum. 

Spencer  uses  his  analogies  very  extensively  and 
vigorously,  and  later  refers  to  them  as  merely  a 
scaffolding  for  building  a  structure  of  deductions. 
This  conclusion  contains  contradictory  elements. 
When  the  scaffolding  is  removed,  society  is  left 
standing  as  a  more  or  less  intangible  affair.  If  a 
society  is  like  an  organism,  it  experiences  a  natural 
cycle  of  birth,  maturity,  old  age,  and  death.  But 
according  to  the  telic  concept  of  progress  that  was 
idvanced  by  Lester  F.  Ward  and  developed  by  later 
writers,  the  death  of  society  does  not  come  with 
organic  inevitableness,  but  depends  on  the  vision, 
plans,  courage,  and  activities  of  that  society's  mem- 
bers. A  society  need  never  die. 

For  many  years  it  has  been  popular  to  criticise 
Spencer.  Nearly  all  the  criticisms  are  justified. 
Moreover,  they  have  been  so  numerous  that  little  of 
worth  seems  to  be  left  in  Spencer's  writings.  How- 
ever, Spencer's  contributions  to  social  thought  are 
not  negligible  for  several  reasons.  (1)  Heempha-/ 
sized  the  laws  of  evolution  and  natural  causa- 
tion. (2)  He  described  social  evolution  as  a  phase 


268  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

of  natural  evolution.  (3)  He  pointed  out  the  like- 
nesses between  biological  organisms  and  human 
society.  (4)  He  made  the  role  of  social  structures, 
or  institutions,  to  stand  out  distinctly.  (5)  He 
stressed  the  importance  of  individuality.  (6)  He 
undermined  the  idea  that  the  State  is  a  master 
machine  to  which  all  the  individual  citizens  must 
submit  automatically. 

In  the  United  States,  Spencer  possessed  an  able 
and  loyal  friend  in  John  Fiske  (1842-1901). 
Fiske  built  his  social  thought  upon  the  evolution- 
arily  formulae  of  Darwin  and  Spencer.  In  his 
Cosmic  Philosophy,  or  philosophy  of  the  universe, 
Fiske  contended  that  the  evolution  of  man  produced 
fundamental  changes  in  the  nature  of  cosmic  evo- 
lution. With  the  development  of  man  there  appears 
a  new  force  in  the  universe,  the  human  spirit,  or 
soul.  The  advent  of  this  psychical  entity  has  pro- 
duced a  subordination  of  the  purely  bodily,  physi- 
cal, material  forces  and  established  a  control  by 
spiritual  forces.  Moreover,  in  human  evolution 
there  has  been  a  slowly  increasing  subordination  of 
the  selfish  phases  of  spiritual  life  to  the  altruistic. 
With  the  apparent  cessation  in  important  bodily 
changes  there  have  come  unheralded  and  unantici- 
pated psychical  inventions,  which  have  released  man 
from  the  passive  adaptation  to  environment  which 
animals  manifest,  and  given  to  him  an  increasingly 
positive  control  over  the  processes  of  adaptation. 
Humanity  as  the  highest  product  of  the  evolu- 


ORGANIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  269 

tionary  processes  has  the  power  to  change  the  whole 
course  of  cosmic  development.  Fiske  distinctly 
emphasized  the  psychical  forces  in  evolution  and 
the  part  which  they  are  playing  in  making  mankind 
purposeful  and  in  organizing  groups  on  social  prin- 
ciples. Humanity  is  not  a  mere  incident  in  evolu- 
tion; it  is  the  supreme  factor.9  The  main  purpose 
of  man  is  not  the  perpetuation  of  the  species,  but 
the  development  of  increasingly  higher  and  more 
social  purposes. 

Following  the  ideas  of  Maine,  Tylor,  McLennan, 
and  Lubbock,  Fiske  concluded  that  social  evolution 
originated  when  families,  "temporarily  organized 
among  all  the  higher  gregarious  mammals,  became 
in  the  case  of  the  highest  mammal  permanently 
organized. "3  Gregariousness  developed  into  def- 
inite family  relationships  and  responsibilities.  So- 
cial evolution  produced  an  increased  complexity  and 
specialty  in  intelligence,  which  in  turn  required  a 
lengthening  of  the  period  "during  which  the  ner- 
vous connections  involved  in  ordinary  adjustments 
are  becoming  organized."  Such  a  transformation 
requires  time,  and  hence  the  need  for  a  period  of 
infancy  which  is  not  common  to  the  lower  animals. 
Accompanying  this  period  of  infancy,  there  is  the 
development  of  strong  affection  of  relatively  short 
duration  among  higher  animals.  Among  mankind 
parental  love  takes  on  the  characteristics  not  only 
of  intensity  and  unselfishness  but  of  duration  and 
forgiveness.  In  this  phase  of  evolution  there  is  a 


270  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

correlative  development  of  three  factors,  namely, 
the  prolongation  of  infancy,  the  rise  of  parental 
affection,  and  increasing  intelligence.  The  gradual 
prolongation  of  the  period  of  infancy  is  partly  a 
consequence  of  increasing  intelligence,  and  in  turn 
the  prolongation  of  infancy  affords  the  circum- 
stances for  the  establishment  .of  permanent  rela- 
tionships, of  reciprocal  behavior,  of  sociality. 

Fiske  was  one  of  the  first  social  philosophers  to 
point  out  the  significance  of  foresight  as  a  phase 
of  evolutionary  development.  Perhaps  the  chief 
way  in  which  civilized  man  is  distinguished  from 
the  barbarian  is  in  his  ability  "to  adapt  his  conduct 
to  future  events,  whether  contingent  or  certain  to 
occur."  Civilized  man  has  the  power  to  forego 
present  enjoyment  in  order  to  safeguard  himself 
against  future  disaster.12  This  quality  is  the  es- 
sence of  prudence  and  is  due  in  large  part  to  civil- 
ized man's  superior  power  of  self-restraint,  one  of 
the  chief  elements  in  moral  progress.  It  is  equally 
important  as  "an  indispensable  prerequisite  to  the 
accumulation  of  wealth  in  any  community."  It  is 
the  basic  factor  in  civilized  man's  elaborate  scien- 
tific provisions  and  in  his  numerous  far-reaching 
philosophic  and  religious  systems. 

Paul  von  Lilienfeld  (1829-1903)  made  the  or- 
ganic analogy  a  definite  part  of  his  theory  of  so- 
ciety. He  compared  the  individual  to  the  cells  in 
an  organism;  the  governmental  and  industrial  or- 
ganizations, to  the  neural  system ;  and  the  cultural 


ORGANIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  271 

products  of  society,  to  the  intercellular  parts  of  an 
organism.13 

Lilienfeld  compared  the  stages  of  growth  of  the 
individual  to  the  stages  of  racial  development, 
namely,  savage,  barbarian,  and  civilized.  This 
analogy  was  made  use  of  by  Fiske.  Although  some- 
what true  in  a  very  general  sense,  this  recapitu- 
lation theory  cannot  be  carried  into  minute  details. 

The  concept  of  social  capitalization  was  orig- 
inated by  Lilienfeld.  By  it  he  meant  the  ability  of 
society  to  store  up  useful  ideas  and  methods  and 
transmit  them  from  generation  to  generation.  In 
this  way  each  generation  becomes  the  inheritor  of 
all  the  human  experiences  that  have  gone  before. 

Lilienfeld  was  one  of  the  first  sociological 
writers  to  develop  the  definite  concept  of  social 
pathology.14  His  treatment  of  this  theme,  however, 
was  exceedingly  weak.  He  distinguished  between 
a  normal  and  diseased  organism  and  then,  by  an- 
alogy, between  a  normal  and  diseased  society.  So- 
cial pathology,  according  to  Lilienfeld,  deals  with 
three  sets  of  diseases,  namely,  of  industry,  of  jus- 
tice, and  of  politics.  Lilienfeld  carried  the  organic 
analogy  to  a  ridiculous  and  puerile  extreme  when 
he  compared  the  diseases  of  industry  to  insanity; 
of  justice,  to  delirium ;  of  politics,  to  paralysis.  He 
also  elaborated  a  system  of  social  therapeutics  to 
correspond  to  the  diseases. 

In  Albert  Schaeffie  (1831-1903),  the  organic  an- 
alogy found  another  disciple,  but  a  more  worthy  one 


272  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

than  either  Spencer  or  Lilienf  eld.  In  the  thought  of 
Schaeffle,  society  is  not  primarily  a  large  organism 
but  a  gigantic  mind.  Schaeffle  presented  a  func- 
tional analogy  rather  than  a  biological  analogy. 
Whereas  Spencer  was  especially  interested  in  social 
structures,  Schaeffle  set  his  attention  upon  social 
functions. 

In  his  functional  analogies  Schaeffle  compared  the 
reason  with  the  legislature  in  society ;  the  will,  with 
the  executive  officers;  and  the  esthetic  judgment, 
with  the  judiciary.  Schaeffle's  psychology  is  inaccu- 
rate and  on  the  whole  unscientific ;  his  analogies  add 
tittle  to  an  understanding  of  society.  Nevertheless, 
his  thought  on  these  subjects  represents  an  advance 
over  the  ideas  of  Spencer. 

In  the  Bau  und  Leben  des  Socialen  Korpers, 
Schaeffle  undertook  to  develop  a  complete  sociolog- 
ical system.    His  teachings  follow  the  principle  thai 
"function  leads  structure  and  structure  limits  func- 
tion."    Activities  produce  developments  in  bodil; 
structure,  and  also  cause  the  formation  of 
social  institutions.    Bodily  structures  and  social  in- 
stitutions   alike    limit    activities    and    usefulness. 
These  propositions  are  a  reversal  of  the  emphasii 
which  Spencer  maintained.    They  are  fundament- 
ally correct. 

Although  Schaffle  referred  frequently  to  th< 
"social  body,"  he  did  not  give  the  concept  a  sp< 
cine  meaning.  He  introduced  the  term  "social 
process,"  but  did  not  analyze  its  nature.  He  repu- 


ORGANIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  273 

diated  the  idea  that  the  individual  is  the  social  unit ; 
he  considered  the  group  to  be  the  all-important 
unit  in  society.  Natural  selection  in  social  evolu- 
tion manifests  itself  in  conflicts  between  the  ideals 
of  different  groups.  Rene  Worms,  it  may  be  added, 
has  assumed  the  existence  of  a  social  consciousness 
apart  from  the  consciousness  of  individuals,  and 
argued  that  the  chief  difference  between  biological 
organisms  and  social  organizations  is  one  of  degree. 

Schaeffle  considered  that  government  justifies  it- 
self in  protecting  the  weaker  members  of  society, 
and  in  maintaining  the  highest  welfare  of  all.  He 
pointed  out  the  social  responsibility  which  rests 
upon  the  best  educated  and  most  fortunate  mem- 
bers of  society.  Schaeffle  wisely  emphasized  the 
development  of  purposeful  activity  on  the  part  of 
both  the  individual  and  society. 

The  ideas  of  John  Stuart  Mackenzie  differ  from 
those  of  Spencer,  Lilienfeld,  and  Schaeffle.  Mac- 
kenzie does  not  use  the  figure  of  an  organic  anal- 
ogy; he  speaks  in  terms  of  homologies.  According 
to  Mackenzie,  society  is  not  like  an  organism;  it 
is  organic. 

The  organic  nature  of  society  is  threefold.  ( 1 ) 
There  is  an  intrinsic  relation  between  the  parts  of 
society  and  the  whole.  The  individual  reflects  the 
culture  of  the  group  in  which  he  has  been  trained. 
(2)  The  development  of  a  group  is  by  virtue  of 
intrinsic  processes.  A  group  builds  on  ideas  de- 
rived from  both  the  past  and  from  other  groups, 


274  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

but  it  does  not  genuinely  grow  unless  it  takes  these 
ideas  and  makes  them  over  into  a  part  of  its  own 
nature.  (3)  Society  develops  towards  ends  which 
are  discoverable  in  society  itself.  By  analysis  of 
the  ideals  and  motive  forces  of  a  group,  it  is  pos- 
sible to  determine  in  what  direction  the  group  is 
moving. 

Mackenzie  argues  for  the  inner  principle  of 
things  and  particularly  of  society.  He  believes, 
however,  that  knowledge  concerning  this  inner 
principle  and  the  essential  unity  of  mankind  can- 
not be  reduced  to  a  science,  but  will  constitute  the 
basis  of  a  social  philosophy.  Social  philosophy  does 
not  supply  facts,  but  seeks  to  interpret  the  signifi- 
cance of  the  special  aspects  of  human  life  with 
reference  to  the  social  unity  of  mankind.15 

The  family  and  the  state  are  the  two  forms  of 
association  in  which  the  most  intimate  bonds  of 
union  are  nurtured.  Language,  if  it  can  be  called 
a  social  institution,  is  perhaps  the  most  fundamental 
institution  of  all,  because  it  produces  that  commu- 
nity of  spirit  whereby  intimacy  in  social  intercourse 
can  take  place  and  whereby  the  realization  of  a 
common  good  can  be  achieved.16 

According  to  Mackenzie,  there  are  three  main 
lines  of  social  progress,  and  hence  three  main  types 
of  social  control  to  be  encouraged.17  (1)  The 
control  of  natural  forces  by  human  agencies.  (2) 
The  control  of  individuals  by  the  communal  spirit. 
(3)  Self  control.  |  |  \ 


ORGANIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  275 

The  road  of  social  advance  is  beset  with  obsta- 
cles. The  chief  are  these:  (1)  The  dominance 
of  vegetative  needs.  These  economic  factors  are 
so  universal  and  insistent  that  they  are  likely  at  any 
time  to  override  all  other  human  needs.  (2)  The 
insistence  of  animal  impulses,  chiefly  love  and 
strife.  While  love  promotes  unity,  it  generally 
produced  a  limited  unity.  Moreover,  one  mode  of 
unity  is  apt  to  conflict  with  other  types  of  unity, 
and  thus  lead  to  intense  strife.  (3)  The  mastery 
of  mechanism.  Life  is  easily  crushed  under  the 
weight  of  organization;  thought,  by  scholastic 
pedantry;  industry,  by  economic  systems;  nation- 
ality, by  soulless  bureaucracy.  (4)  Anarchism. 
The  remedy  for  over-organization  is  not  anarchy, 
for  life  and  society  are  composed  of  numbers  of 
conflicting  tendencies,  which  must  be  controlled  by 
the  power  of  thought.  But  the  exercise  of  merely 
individual  thought  will  not  suffice.  Individual 
thought  is  likely  to  be  egocentric,  to  evade  the 
problems  of  group  life,  or  to  solve  them  selfishly. 
(5)  Conservatism.  An  established  and  success- 
ful civilization  is  in  danger  of  relying  too  much  on 
its  past.  It  often  carries  within  itself  the  canker 
of  decay,  and  frequently  lacks  any  clear  vision  of 
higher  development. 

Mackenzie  is  committed  to  internationalism.  It 
is  no  longer  fitting  for  anyone  to  think  of  his  own 
country  as  an  exclusive  object  of  devotion.  "The 
earth  is  our  country,  and  all  its  inhabitants  are  our 


276  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

fellow-citizens;  and  it  is  only  the  recognition  of 
this  that  entitles  us  to  look  for  any  lasting  security." 

Mackenzie  advances  beyond  the  organic  analo- 
/  gists  when  he  describes  the  ways  in  which  society 
is  organic.  As  a  social  philosopher  he  has  con- 
tributed important  pattern-ideas.  He  has  escaped 
from  the  foibles  of  the  organic  analogy  and  at  the 
same  time  indicated  the  values  that  lie  beneath  that 
concept. 

This  chapter  deals  with  a  significant  period  in 
the  history  of  social  thought.  The  biology  of  the 
time  was  very  faulty  and  the  sociological  applica- 
tions of  biological  knowledge  were  consequently  of 
little  merit.  The  early  years  of  the  present  century 
were  characterized  by  noteworthy  improvements 
in  biological  thinking.  The  facts  about  the  laws  of 
heredity  and  variation  increased  in  number;  a  sci- 
ence of  heredity  was  established.  The  first  decade 
of  the  present  century  also  marks  the  rise  of  the 
science  of  eugenics.  In  a  later  chapter  the  contri- 
butions of  recent  scientific  biology,  and  particularly 
of  eugenics,  to  social  thought  will  be  presented. 


'Y 


CHAPTER  XVII 
THE  SOCIOLOGY  OF  LESTER  F.  WARD 


The  name  of  Lester  F.  Ward  (1841-1913)  stands 
forth  between  the  old  and  new  eras  of  social 
thought.  Ward  belongs  to  both  the  old  and  new. 
He  adopted  Comtean  positivism  and  built  in  part 
upon  Spencer's  evolutionary  principles,  but  op- 
posed Spencer's  laissez  faire  ideas  and  his  evolu- 
tionary determinism,  especially  in  regard  to  educa- 
tion. Perhaps  his  most  notable  work  was  the  way 
in  which  he  shocked  a  Spencerian-tinged  world  of 
social  thought  into  a  new  method  of  thinking. 

Ward  became  the  ardent  advocate  of  social 
telesis.  Man  can  modify,  defeat,  or  hasten  the 
processes  of  nature.  Ward  brought  the  concept  of 
dynamic  sociology  to  the  attention  of  the  world. 
Although  he  was  interested  in  social  statics,  his 
primary  concern  was  in  the  fact  that  man  through 
the  use  of  his  intelligence  can  transform  not  only 
the  natural  world  but  the  social  world,  and  that  he 
can  harness  not  only  the  natural  forces  to  social 
ends,  but  even  the  social  forces  to  social  purposes. 
Hence  it  is  that  Ward  holds  rank  today,  despite  his 
monistic  philosophy  and  his  false  psychological  be- 
liefs, as  one  of  the  world's  leading  sociologists. 


278  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

Lester  F.  Ward  was  born  in  Joliet,  Illinois.  He 
received  a  limited  schooling,  and  early  went  to 
work,  first  on  a  farm  and  then  as  a  wheelwright. 
He  manifested  an  unusual  liking  for  books  and  to 
a  great  extent  was  self-educated.  He  entered  the 
employment  of  the  United  States  Government, 
where  he  remained  for  more  than  forty  years,  after 
he  was  honorably  discharged  from  service  in  the 
Civil  War.  In  the  Government  service  he  held  the 
positions  of  geologist  and  paleontologist.  De- 
spite his  strenuous  and  efficient  work  for  the  Gov- 
ernment, he  found  time  to  think  through  and  write 
out  an  elaborate  sociological  system  of  thought. 

Ward's  published  works  in  sociology  began  with 
his  Dynamic  Sociology  (1883)  and  ended  with 
the  Glimpses  of  the  Cosmos  (1913)  in  several  vol- 
umes, which,  with  the  exception  of  volume  one, 
have  been  published  posthumously.  The  inter- 
mediate books  of  importance  in  order  were :  Pure 
Sociology,  Applied  Sociology,  and  Psychic  Factors 
of  Civilisation. 

Ward  was  characterized  by  an  impressive  com- 
mand of  his  subject  and  "a  terrific  mental  drive." 
In  1906,  he  began  the  unique  experiment  of  teach- 
ing sociology  at  the  age  of  65.  As  a  professor  of 
sociology  he  served  Brown  University  until  his 
death — for  a  period  of  seven  years.  He  was  sup- 
ported by  the  indefatigable  assistance  of  his  wife, 
as  shown  by  the  many  files  which  she  kept  of  "Re- 
views and  Press  Notices,"  "Autograph  Letters," 


SOCIOLOGY  OF  LESTER  F.  WARD  279 

and  "Biography." 

Ward  was  led  to  produce  the  Dynamic  Sociology 
because  of  his  observation  that  preceding  1875 
there  was  an  essential  sterility  in  social  science 
thinking.  Ward  observed  that  the  prevalent  teach- 
ings of  Herbert  Spencer  were  statical,  and  that  the 
ideas  of  Spencer's  American  disciples  were  only 
passively  dynamic.  Ward  believed  that  before  the 
science  of  society  could  be  truly  established  the 
active  dynamic  factors  must  be  described.  A  sci- 
ence which  fails  to  benefit  mankind  is  lifeless.  To 
save  sociology  from  the  lifelessness  which  it  was 
manifesting,  Ward  wrote  the  Dynamic  Sociology. 
He  contemplated  social  phenomena  "as  capable  of 
intelligent  control  by  society  itself  in  its  own  in- 
terest."1 His  main  thesis  in  the  Dynamic  Soci- 
ology is  "the  necessity  for  universal  education  as 
the  one  clear,  overshadowing,  and  immediate  social 
duty  to  which  all  others  are  subordinate."  He  ar- 
gued for  a  truly  progressive  system  of  popular  sci- 
entific education.2  He  declared  that  not  one-hun- 
dredth of  the  facts  which  original  research  has  al- 
ready brought  forth  are  today  obtainable  by  a  one- 
hundredth  of  the  members  of  society,  and  hence 
not  one  truth  in  ten  thousand  is  fully  apprehended.3 

The  prevailing  doctrine  in  social  thought,  that  of 
laissez  faire  as  championed  by  Spencer,  drew  forth 
Ward's  best  intellectual  efforts  as  a  challenger. 
Ward  protested  against  the  teaching  that  natural 
forces  arc  operating  only  as  elements  in  the  all- 


280  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

powerful  evolutionary  process.  He  pointed  out 
that  man  is  distinguished  from  animals  by  the  de- 
velopment of  his  psychical  nature,  i.  e.,  of  his  fore- 
sight and  reason.  He  demonstrated  that  by  this 
development  man  is  able  to  master  and  regulate  the 
operation  of  the  blind  evolutionary  forces.  Hence, 
the  doctrine  of  laissez  faire  is  not  only  false  but 
pernicious.  It  defeats  social  progress.  The  truth 
is,  said  Ward,  society  is  able  to  improve  itself,  and 
it  should  set  itself  scientifically  at  once  to  the 
opportunity. 

Passive,  or  negative,  progress  is  represented  by 
the  social  forces  operating  in  their  natural  freedom, 
subject  only  to  general  evolutionary  laws.*    Active, 
or  positive,  progress  is  represented  by  the  social 
forces  guided  by  conscious  human  purposes.     So- 
cial statics  deals  with  the  nature  of  social  order; 
social  dynamics  treats  of  the  laws  of  social  prog- 
ress.    Social   dynamics   concerns   itself   with   two 
types  of  studies.     One  line  analyzes  and  describes 
what  is  going  on  in  society  under  the  influence 
natural  laws — this  is  pure  sociology.     It  is  pun 
diagnosis;  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  what  societ] 
ought  to  be.    It  describes  the  phenomena  and  law: 
of  society  as  they  are.5    The  other  procedure  dis- 
cusses the  application  of  human  purpose  to  the  nat- 
ural social   forces — this   is  applied   sociology.     Il 
studies  the  art  of  applying  the  active,  or  positive, 
forces  to  the  natural  evolution  of  society.     Thi< 
method  is  distinctly  a  human  process  and  "depend* 


SOCIOLOGY  OF  LESTER  F.  WARD  281 

wholly  on  the  action  of  man  himself."  Applied 
sociology  treats  of  social  ends  and  purposes. 

Pure  sociology  describes  the  spontaneous  devel- 
opment of  society ;  applied  sociology  deals  with  the 
artificial  means  of  accelerating  the  spontaneous 
processes  in  society.6  Pure  sociology  treats  of 
achievement;  applied  sociology,  of  improvement. 
But  applied  sociology  is  not  social  reform ;  "it  does 
not  itself  apply  sociological  principles,  it  seeks  only 
to  show  how  they  may  be  applied."  It  lays  down 
principles  as  guides  to  social  action.  The  carrying 
of  these  principles  into  social  and  political  practice 
is  social  reform. 

The  distinction  is  now  clear  between  natural  and 
artificial  progress.7  The  former  is  a  blind  growth; 
the  latter,  a  purposeful  manufacture.  One  is  a 
genetic  process;  the  other,  a  teleological  process. 
One  is  characterized  by  increasing  differentiation; 
the  other,  by  a  process  of  calculation.  Artificial 
progress  is  considered  superior  to  natural  progress. 

Ward  was  a  monist.  He  believed  in  the  absolute 
unity  of  nature,  from  the  revolutions  of  celestial 
orbs  to  the  vicissitudes  of  social  customs  and  laws.8 
He  held  that  "life  is  a  property  of  matter,"  and 
naively  declared  that  "it  is  simply  the  result  of  the 
movements  going  on  among  the  molecules  compos- 
ing a  mass  of  protoplasm."9  Psychic  phenomena  are 
"the  relations  which  subsist  among  the  material 
molecules  of  the  brain  and  nervous  system  and  be- 
tween these  and  the  material  objects  of  the  outside 


282  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

world.  .  .  ."  Since  mind  is  relational,  it  is  immate- 
rial, but  it  has  matter  for  its  basis.  Relations,  how- 
ever, constitute  the  properties  of  matter,  and  hence 
mind,  as  well  as  life,  is  a  property  of  matter.10  The 
logical  length  to  which  Ward  goes  in  supporting  his 
monistic  doctrine  is  in  itself  a  proof  of  his  error. 

Unlike  Comte,  Ward  believed  that  man  origi- 
nally was  anti-social  and  completely  selfish.  In  the 
earliest  stage  of  human  existence,  man  lived  a  life 
almost  solitary,  or  at  least  in  small  groups.11  He 
was  surrounded  by  destructive  forces  both  inor- 
ganic and  organic.  Against  the  wild  and  ferocious 
beasts  he  found  himself  almost  physically  helpless. 
Some  of  his  number  overcame  their  physical  de- 
fenselessness  by  using  their  "wits."  Through 
sagacity  and  cunning  they  were  able  to  withstand 
the  attacks  of  the  wild  beasts,  to  survive,  and  to 
propagate  their  young.  Along  with  increased  cun- 
ning there  went  an  increased  brain  size  in  propor- 
tion to  size  of  body,  and  also  an  improved  brain 
structure  qualitatively. 

This  brain  development  is  the  essential  prerequi- 
site for  perceiving  the  advantages  of  association.12 
Man  early  recognized  the  merits  of  association,  and 
moved  up  from  the  solitary,  or  autarchic,  stage  of 
social  life  to  the  second,  or  constrained  aggregate 
stage.  This  second  stage  does  not  contain  the  ele- 
ments of  permanency  because  of  its  forced  nature. 
The  tendencies  toward  association  are  often  coun- 
teracted and  at  times  destroyed  by  fierce  contests 


SOCIOLOGY  OF  LESTER  F.  WARD  283 

for  the  limited  natural  foods.  In  contending  that 
man's  early  ancestors  were  very  irascible  and  quar- 
relsome beings,  Ward  went  beyond  the  limits  of 
scientific  induction.  In  believing  that  altruism  is 
an  outgrowth  of  egoism,  Ward  again  violates  the 
best  scientific  thought.  The  probabilities  are  that 
both  egoism  and  altruism  have  developed  pari 
passu,  and  in  part  from  different  causes.  During 
the  second  stage  human  speech  became  an  art.  It 
was  a  natural  outgrowth  of  the  associational  life. 

The  rise  of  the  rudiments  of  an  established  gov- 
ernment marks  the  beginning  of  the  third  period 
in  human  society.  For  protection,  tribes  unified 
themselves  under  central  controls.  Through  com- 
pulsion or  interest,  and  for  protective  reasons, 
tribes  united;  the  spheres  of  social  organization 
thus  were  enlarged.  But  government,  which  was 
established  for  the  purpose  of  securing  peace,  be- 
came one  of  the  chief  causes  of  external  wars. 
Governments,  autocratic  control,  and  territory  hun- 
ger led  peoples  into  destructive  war.  The  world 
is  still  in  this  third  stage. 

But  some  day,  according  to  Ward,  wars  between 
nations  will  cease,  national  prejudices  will  soften, 
diversity  of  language  will  be  overcome,  and  all 
governments  probably  will  be  consolidated  into  one. 
This  picture  represents  the  fourth,  or  ideal,  level 
of  societary  life,  and  may  never  be  attained.  Ward 
cherishes  the  strong  belief  that  the  present  national 
stage  will  be  succeeded  by  the  cosmopolitan,  or 


284  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

pantarchic,  age.  Ward  perceives  an  ultimate  tri- 
umph of  humanitarian  sentiments,  which  will  be 
also  "a  triumph  of  practical  interests,  that  shall 
sweep  away  the  present  barriers  of  language,  na- 
tional pride,  and  natural  uncongeniality,  and  unite 
all  nations  in  one  vast  social  aggregate  with  a  single 
political  organization/'13 

Ward's  analysis  of  social  evolution  rests  on  his 
conception  of  the  social  forces.  The  primary  social 
force  is  desire.  Desire  is  the  expression  of  any  of 
the  native  impulses  which,  at  the  given  moment,  has 
not  been  gratified.  This  striving  for  gratification 
constitutes  desire  and  the  moving  force  in  the  socie- 
tary  world.  "Desire  is  the  essential  basis  of  all 
actions." 

The  desires  are  numerous  and  complex,  but  upon 
examination  lend  themselves  to  classification. 
There  are  two  fundamental  and  primary  sets  of 
desires,  the  nutritive  and  the  reproductive.  The 
end  of  the  first  is  to  preserve  the  individual ;  and  of 
the  second,  to  preserve  and  maintain  the  race. 

"The  first  desire  of  all  creatures  is  for  nourish- 
ment." This  desire  remains  dominant  throughout 
life.  The  human  race,  Ward  summarizes,  spent  its 
infancy — thousands  of  years — in  the  single  pursuit 
of  subsistence.14  When  the  natural  food  supply 
failed,  man  was  forced  to  be  inventive  and  to  labor 
or  die.  Too  many  individuals  in  one  place  meant 
either  the  migration  of  some  individuals  or  that 
others  must  compel  nature  through  labor  to  in- 


SOCIOLOGY  OF  LESTER  F.  WARD  285 

crease  her  normal  yield  of  subsistence.15 

The  nutritive  desire  has  led  man  to  labor.  Labor, 
however,  is  not  the  natural  condition  of  man.23 
Work,  according  to  Ward,  is  unnatural  and  irk- 
some. The  constant  spur  of  hunger  transformed 
man  into  a  working  man.  To  be  useful,  however, 
work  must  be  continuous  and  applied  steadily  to  a 
given  object  until  that  object  is  attained.  This 
process  is  the  essence  of  invention,  the  highest  and 
most  useful  form  of  labor.  Without  wings,  valu- 
able weapons  of  offense  and  defense,  claws  for  dig- 
ging, man  has  had  but  one  line  of  advance  open  to 
him,  namely,  invention,  whereby  he  could  overcome 
his  limitations  and  master  nature. 

Ward  overlooked  what  Veblen  has  called  the 
instinct  of  workmanship.  Man  has  a  desire  to  do, 
to  achieve,  to  be  active — only  so  can  he  escape  the 
terrors  of  ennui.  He  secures  illimitable  enjoyment 
from  seeing  the  crude  materials  of  nature  change 
under  the  manipulations  of  his  hand  and  mind  into 
works  of  art. 

Nevertheless,  the  need  of  nutrition  was  probably 
the  chief  factor  in  the  invention  of  tools  and  in  the 
storing  of  food  against  the  hungry  day.  These 
tools  and  stores  constituted  property.  Property  at 
once  represented  power.  The  law  of  acquisition 
soon  exerted  a  great  force.  Intense  rivalries  in 
acquiring  property  developed.  "The  grand  rivalry 
was  for  the  object,  not  the  method;  for  the  end  re- 
gardless of  the  means."16  Through  the  centuries 


286  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

and  until  the  present  hour,  the  morality  of  obtain- 
ing wealth  has  rarely  risen  to  the  morality  of  many 
other  phases  of  life. 

Deception  early  came  into  prominence.  We  de- 
ceive an  animal,  in  order  to  catch  and  domesticate 
or  kill  him.  We  deceive  a  fellow  human  being  and 
take  his  hard  earned  property  away  from  him.  So- 
ciety, blindly,  has  praised  deception  even  when  used 
by  one  individual  against  the  welfare  of  his  fellows. 
Society  has  honored  him  who  could  "drive  a  bar- 
gain." 

Ward  declared  that  the  desire  to  acquire  property 
regardless  of  the  method  is  as  strong  as  ever.17 
The  only  changes  that  have  come  are  a  mitigation 
of  the  harshness  of  the  method  and  the  rise  of  com- 
pulsory laws  and  codes  which  force  individuals  to 
"drive  their  bargains"  and  to  practice  their  decep- 
tions within  prescribed  limits.  The  acquisitive  im- 
pulses have  created  major  social  evils,  as  evidenced 
by  "the  exceeding  indigence  of  the  poor  and  the  ex- 
ceeding opulence  of  the  rich,"  and  by  a  relatively 
large  proportion  of  non-producing  rich  people  to 
the  entire  number  of  wealthy.18  On  the  other  hand, 
those  who  are  poor  because  they  are  indolent  are 
only  a  small  proportion  of  those  who  are  poor  and 
industrious. 

The  evils  of  acquisitiveness  cannot  be  overcome 
by  softening  the  human  heart.  Ward  would 
make  it  impossible  for  individuals  to  take  away  the 
property  of  others  by  making  it  to  the  interest  of 


SOCIOLOGY  OF  LESTER  F.  WARD  287 

all  individuals  not  to  act  in  that  way.  And  then  he 
would  teach  them,  through  the  social  sciences,  that 
such  conduct  is  against  their  own  highest  develop- 
ment. 

Ward  pronounced  the  money-making  tendency 
one  of  the  most  useful  and  at  the  same  time  "one 
of  the  coarsest  and  cheapest  of  all  mental  attri- 
butes/'1 It  is  useful  because  it  is  "the  spur  of  all 
industry  and  commerce;  it  provides  the  leisure 
which  makes  intellectual  pursuits  possible;  it  en- 
courages exploration,  discovery,  and  invention;  it 
is  the  basis  of  all  large  business  undertakings ;  and 
it  has  been  an  essential  force  in  the  development 
of  civilization.  Since  civilization  is  so  exclusively 
artificial,  money  can  buy  a  vast  variety  of  objects 
of  human  desire;  hence,  the  possession  of  money 
is  strenuously  sought. 

On  the  other  hand,  money-making  confers  a 
pleasure  which  after  all  is  sordid.21  It  often  leads 
to  avarice.  It  has  produced  a  pecuniary  inequality 
of  mankind  which  socially  admits  of  little  justifica- 
tion. From  a  moral  viewpoint  the  great  struggle 
for  pecuniary  possession  has  been  man's  greatest 
curse.22  Because  of  it,  many  infants  have  opened 
their  eyes  as  millionaires  in  a  world  of  boundless 
plenty;  others  (equally  worthy)  have  opened  their 
eyes  as  beggars  in  a  world  of  abject  poverty. 

Society  becomes  divided  into  two  main  classes: 
the  industrials  and  the  non-industrials,  or  parasites. 
The  non-industrials  use  their  cunning  in  various 


288  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

ways.24  The  leading  non-industrial  modes  of  acqui- 
sition are  these:  robbery,  theft,  war,  statecraft, 
priestcraft,  and  monopoly.  This  list  represents  the 
chronological  order  and  history  of  non-industrial 
types  of  acquisition. 

Robbery  is  the  coarsest  manner  of  acquisition. 
Theft  represents  the  lowest  order  of  cunning. 
Wars  of  conquest  are  robbery  on  so  large  a  scale 
that  they  arouse  group  patriotism.  Cunning  and 
treachery  in  war  have  given  way  to  strategy.  State- 
craft has  often  been  characterized  by  the  egoistic 
attempts  of  a  few  shrewd  individuals,  who  have  de- 
vised means  for  supplying  the  wants  of  the  many, 
and  appropriated  rich  rewards  for  themselves  from 
"the  befriended  and  grateful  community."  Priest- 
craft as  represented  by  many  of  the  priests  of 
Brahma,  Buddha,  Osiris,  Ormuzd,  Mahomet  and 
even  Jesus  have  developed  successful  modes' of  ac- 
quisition. They  have  often  stood  at  the  gates  of 
death,  and  for  pay  guaranteed  to  the  stricken  and 
fearful  friends  of  a  departed  loved  one  a  safe  jour- 
ney through  the  perils  following  death.  Monopoly 
takes  cunning  advantage  of  a  scarcity  of  the  means 
of  substance,  or  creates  an  artificial  and  false 
scarcity.  Monopoly  has  organized  the  fields  of 
transportation,  exchange,  finance,  labor,  manufac- 
ture. 

The  non-industrials  co-operate  better  than  the  in- 
dustrials and  against  the  welfare  of  the  latter.  The 
industrials,  unfortunately,  do  not  understand  the 


SOCIOLOGY  OF  LESTER  F.  WARD  289 

principles  of  co-operation  very  well  and  do  not  have 
the  intelligence  to  carry  them  into  practical  opera- 
tion. They  receive  less  education  than  the  non-indus- 
trials; the  years  of  their  industrial  apprenticeship 
are  taken  from  their  school  days.  After  their  ap- 
prenticeship begins,  the  fatigue  of  their  labor  gives 
them  little  time  or  energy  for  intellectual  improve- 
ment.25 In  pronouncing  co-operation  the  product  of 
superior  intelligence  Ward  neglects  the  role  played 
by  the  gregarious,  parental,  and  related  social  in- 
stincts. Ward  sees  only  part  of  the  truth  when  he 
calls  competition  a  natural  law,  and  co-operation 
artificial.  He  wisely  observes,  however,  that  those 
who  co-operate  thrive  at  the  expense  of  those  who 
compete.26  In  the  same  way  that  individuals  co- 
operate in  order  to  secure  their  own  gain,  society 
must  organize  to  secure  the  progress  of  all. 

The  second  primary  set  of  fundamental  forces 
is  the  reproductive.  These  operate  for  the  future 
and  for  the  species.  In  animals  they  operate  with- 
out arousing  shame  or  modesty.  Among  human 
beings  they  are  manipulated  through  the  agencies 
of  the  reason  and  the  imagination  and  give  rise  to 
the  sentiments  of  shame  and  modesty.27  They  are 
so  clouded  in  secrecy  that  they  arouse  dangerous 
forms  of  curiosity. 

Among  animals  the  choice  of  mates  is  largely  de- 
termined by  the  females.  In  fact,  among  the  lowest 
types  of  animals  there  are  no  males.  Among  cer- 
tain higher  forms  of  animal  life  the  male  appears 


290  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

as  a  mere  adjunct.  But  among  human  beings,  male 
sexual  selection  developed.  This  change  in  sexual 
selection  is  one  of  the  differences  between  the  brute 
and  the  human  worlds.  This  transition  is  ex- 
plained by  the  fact  that  the  higher  a  being  rises  in 
the  scale  of  development  the  more  sensitive  its  or- 
gans become,  and  by  the  correlated  fact  that  the 
male  human  being  through  his  reason  is  able  to 
arouse  and  satisfy  a  thousand  desires  within  the 
female,  and  thus  cause  her  to  look  to  him  for  "that 
protection  and  those  favors  which  he  alone  can  con- 
fer."28 

In  the  human  world  the  reproductive  forces  have 
first  produced  a  crude  sexual  love,  animal  in  its 
nature,  but  far-reaching  in  its  basic  implications. 
Sexual  love  is  an  unconscious  but  dominant  factor 
in  courtship.  In  its  refined  form,  and  modified  by 
the  addition  of  genuine  but  often  short-lived  affect- 
ive elements,  it  becomes  romantic  love.  Romantic 
love,  according  to  Ward,  unfits  lovers  for  the  nor- 
mal pursuits  of  life.  While  under  its  spell  they 
are  unable  to  enjoy  anything  but  each  other's  pres- 
ence. "The  man  is  unfitted  for  business,  the  woman 
for  social  life,  and  both  for  intellectual  pursuits. 
The  only  spur  that  can  make  either  party  pursue 
other  things,  is  the  sense  of  doing  something  that 
the  other  desires."29 

In  the  sense  that  natural,  or  sexual,  love  becomes 
the  basis  of  romantic  love,  so  romantic  love  in  turn 
represents  the  genesis  of  a  still  higher  form  of  love, 


SOCIOLOGY  OF  LESTER  F.  WARD  291 

namely,  conjugal  love.  The  love  of  a  man  for  his 
wife  or  of  a  woman  for  her  husband  is,  however, 
fundamentally  different  from  romantic  love.  It  is 
more  stable,  less  disturbing  to  the  normal  processes 
of  life,  and  makes  the  home  and  the  family  socially 
productive  institutions.  It  often  reaches  a  high 
state  of  refinement  and  develops  its  beauty  of  con- 
tent from  the  sharing  together  by  husband  and  wife 
of  great  joys  and  sorrows. 

Maternal  love,  an  outgrowth  of  maternity,  mani- 
fests startling  degrees  of  courage  even  among 
animals.  Under  the  spur  of  the  need  for  defending 
her  young,  a  mother  will  often  perform  miraculous 
deeds.  In  its  highest  form  maternal  love  manifests 
a  remarkable  strength  throughout  life  and  an  extra- 
human  power  of  forgiveness. 

Then  there  is  consanguineal  love,  which  accord- 
ing to  Ward  includes  paternal  and  fraternal  affec- 
tions. It  becomes  the  blood  bond  or  feeling  of 
attachment  that  exists  among  the  members  of  a 
primitive  kinship  group,  and  it  leads  to  feelings  of 
race  and  world  solidarity  and  attachment. 

Ward  also  pointed  out  that  for  each  of  these 
forms  of  love  there  is  a  correlative  hate.  This 
force  of  repulsion  is  often  greater  than  the  correla- 
tive love.  Jealousy  often  leads  to  violent  and  de- 
structive actions.  Race  hatred  frequently  becomes 
a  vicious,  brutal,  and  widespread  sentiment  that 
paralyzes  all  tendencies  toward  world  progress. 

Marriage  institutions  have  developed  from  the 


292  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

operation  of  the  reproductive  forces.  Polygamy, 
polyandry,  and  a  score  of  other  types  of  marriage 
have  arisen,  although  monogamy  has  demonstrated 
itself  to  be  the  superior  type  of  marriage  institution. 
The  reproductive  forces  have  led  to  numerous 
sexuo-social  inequalities.  Men  and  women  have 
come  to  occupy  separate  spheres  of  activity,  and  to 
represent  distinct  social  conditions.30  Although  the 
two  sexes  live  together  and  appear  to  be  com- 
panions, they  are  in  fact  dwelling  in  separate  worlds 
and  on  different  planes.  There  are  several  principal 
inequalities.  (1)  There  is  an  inequality  of  dress, 
which  has  loaded  woman  with  ornaments  and 
caused  her  an  enormous  amount  of  disease  and 
suffering.  (2)  There  is  an  inequality  of  duties, 
which  has  kept  woman  confined  to  the  house,  and 
made  a  slave  or  a  pampered  pet  of  her.  (3)  There 
is  an  inequality  of  education.  Society  has  shut 
woman  in  the  past  from  all  opportunities  for  gain- 
ing knowledge  by  experience.  Moreover,  society 
has  seen  fit  to  debar  women  from  the  knowledge 
that  is  acquired  by  instruction.  (4)  An  inequality 
of  rights  has  meant  that  women  have  been  dis- 
criminated against  before  the  law.  Without  direct 
representation  in  legislatures,  women  have  suffered 
in  proprietary  matters.  (5)  A  general  sex  in- 
equality has  at  times  made  woman  the  property  or 
the  slave  of  man.  In  short,  women  have  been 
denied,  until  with  recent  years,  entrance  to  the 
higher  intellectual  forms  of  activity  and  at  the 


SOCIOLOGY  OF  LESTER  F.  WARD  293 

same  time  denied  social  and  political  rights. 

Reverting  to  Ward's  classification  of  desires,  we 
may  now  proceed  to  a  discussion  of  the  third  set 
of  forces,  the  sociogenetic.  In  contradistinction  to 
the  nutritive  and  the  reproductive  desires,  or  to  the 
ontogenetic  and  the  phylogenetic  forces,  respec- 
tively, the  sociogenetic  forces  lead  directly  to  race, 
or  social,  improvement.  The  ontogenetic  forces 
guarantee  individual  preservation;  the  phylogen- 
etic, race  preservation;  and  the  sociogenetic,  race 
and  social  progress.  Ward  classified  the  socio- 
genetic forces  as  moral,  esthetic,  and  intellectual.31 

Morality  is  either  racial  or  individual.  Race 
morality  is  largely  an  outgrowth  of  custom.  Duty, 
according  to  Ward,  is  conduct  favorable  to  race 
safety,  while  virtue  is  "an  attitude  of  life  and  char- 
acter consistent  with  the  preservation  and  con- 
tinuance of  man  on  earth."3  Individual  morality 
on  the  other  hand,  is  based  on  altruism.  Altruism 
is  the  expenditure  of  energy  in  behalf  of  other  in- 
dividuals, and  involves  the  power  of  representing 
the  psychic  states  of  others  to  one's  self.  Morality 
leads  to  humanitarianism,  whose  aim  is  meliorism. 
Meliorism  aims  to  reorganize  society  so  that  the 
minimum  pain  and  the  maximum  enjoyment  may 
be  insured.  Meliorism  is  a  non-sentimental  im- 
provement or  amelioration  of  the  human  or  social 
state.33 

Ward  holds  that  the  esthetic  forces  consist  of  a 
desire  for  open  or  deep-seated  symmetrical  forms. 


294  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

Behind  a  landscape  which  at  first  appears  irregular 
and  jagged,  there  is  a  fundamental  symmetry 
and  balance.  Sculpture,  painting,  and  landscape- 
gardening  are  largely  imitations  of  nature.  Archi- 
tecture, however,  emphasizes  straight  lines,  regular 
curves,  and  other  symmetrical  and  geometrical 
figures.34  Because  of  the  invention  of  popular  mu- 
sical instruments,  music  is  open  to  and  enjoyed  by 
the  common  people.  No  such  invention,  unfor- 
tunately, has  taken  place  in  the  fields  of  painting 
and  sculpture.  These  realms  are  limited  to  the 
highest  geniuses  and  "their  choicest  productions 
appropriated  by  the  few  who  combine  wealth  with 
taste."35 

The  intellectual  forces  are  chiefly  the  desires  to 
know.  These  desires  are  threefold :  ( 1 )  to  acquire 
knowledge,  (2)  to  discover  truth,  and  (3)  to  impart 
information.36  The  desire  to  acquire  knowledge  is 
perhaps  strongest  in  the  young.  Youth  will  often 
learn  anything,  without  exercising  any  powers  of 
discrimination.  The  gratification  of  the  desire  to 
discover  new  truth  yields  almost  divine  thrills  of 
satisfaction.  There  are  four  methods  of  impart- 
ing information  to  others,  viz.,  (1)  by  conversing, 
(2)  by  teaching,  (3)  by  lecturing,  and  (4)  by 
writing. 

In  addition  to  the  dynamic  forces  there  is  the 
directive  agent  in  society,  namely,  the  intellect. 
Ward  makes  a  precarious  distinction  between  the 
feelings  and  thought,  or  between  intellect  as  a 


SOCIOLOGY  OF  LESTER  F.  WARD  295 

seat  of  emotion,  appetite  and  motive  power,  and 
intellect  as  the  organ  or  source  of  thought  and 
ideas.37  Ward's  psychology  is  admittedly  unscien- 
tific. The  thought  or  ideational  phase  of  the  in- 
tellect Ward  divorced  almost  absolutely  from  the 
affective  aspects  of  consciousness.  He  failed  to 
perceive  the  dynamic  character  of  thought  and 
ideas.  He  made  thought  simply  the  directive  agent 
in  society. 

In  thought,  Ward  found  the  hope  of  the  race. 
Thought  can  restrain  and  control  social  energy. 
It  can  produce  telic  methods  of  progress  which 
are  immeasurably  superior  to  the  blind,  ruthless 
methods  of  nature.  The  procedure  of  nature  with 
unlimited  resources  is  "to  produce  an  enormously 
redundant  supply,  and  to  trust  the  environment  to 
select  the  best.38  Nature  secures  success  through 
"the  indefinite  multiplication  of  chances."  Hence 
the  survival  of  the  fittest  results  in  a  sacrifice  of  a 
great  majority — a  highly  wasteful  method.  The 
method  of  mind  is  the  reverse.  Though  prevision, 
mind  utilizes  all  the  dynamic  forces  of  society,  that 
is  the  human  desires,  in  constructive,  orderly  ways. 
Social  waste  may  be  reduced,  by  telic  methods,  to 
a  minimum.  Mind  can  perceive  the  best  social  ends 
and  pursue  them,  whereas  nature  works  blindly. 
Thought  has  in  its  power  the  possibility  of  sub- 
jugating natural  forces  and  turning  them  into  con- 
tributors to  human  needs. 

Ward  developed  essentially   four  leading  prin- 


296  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

ciples  of  social  dynamics  and  hence  of  societal 
progress.  (1)  The  first  law  he  called  "difference 
of  potential."  This  term,  which  he  borrowed  from 
physics,  refers  to  the  difference  in  potential  pos- 
sibilities of  individuals.  This  difference  is  mani- 
fested, for  example,  in  the  crossing  of  cultures. 
It  disturbs  social  stability,  and  creates  social  lia- 
bility. Sex  is  a  device  whereby  a  difference  of 
potential  is  maintained.  While  asexual  reproduc- 
tion is  characterized  chiefly  by  repetition  of  forms, 
sexual  reproduction  creates  changes  in  the  stock 
in  countless  directions.  The  difference  of  poten- 
tial which  is  caused  by  a  crossing  of  strains  is 
highly  dynamic,  resulting  in  unnumbered  varia- 
tions, and  hence  in  providing  endless  opportunities 
for  progress.  In  a  similar  way  a  cross  fertilization 
of  cultures  opens  many  opportunities  for  social  ad- 
vancement. "Progress  results  from  the  fusion  of 
unlike  elements."40  Difference  of  potential,  again, 
is  illustrated  in  the  friction  of  mind  upon  mind. 
Thoughts  conflict,  and  the  result  is  likely  to  be  an 
invention. 

Difference  of  potential  may  lead  to  creative  syn- 
thesis.41 When  two  elements  are  joined,  the  result 
is  usually  more  than  the  sum  of  the  parts.  The 
combining  of  hydrogen  and  oxygen  in  given  pro- 
portions produces  water,  which  manifests  charac- 
teristics that  are  not  possessed  by  either  of  the  con- 
stituents. Likewise,  the  combining  of  two  ideas 
by  the  human  mind  may  result  in  a  new  idea,  and 


SOCIOLOGY  OF  LESTER  F.  WARD  297 

thus  in  progress. 

(2)  A  second  dynamic  principle  is  innovation, 
which  has  its  biological  homologue  in  the  sport,  or 
mutant.    Throughout  nature  and  society,  fortuitous 
variations  occur.     Life  at  times  breaks  over  the 
bounds  of  pure  heredity — the  result  is  innovation. 
Variation,  in  the  sense  of  mutation  or  innovation, 
appears  to  be  due  to  the  exuberance  of  life.     At 
times  nature  appears  to  react  against  being  bound 
by  rigid  laws  of  heredity,  to  defy  her  own  rules, 
and  to  become  rampant. 

Social  innovation  is  invention.  New  ideas  often 
appear  accidentally.  The  mind  in  its  exuberance 
coins  new  phrases,  catches  new  glimpses  of  reality, 
and  creates  ideas  which  are  contrary  to  all  that  is 
established  and  supposedly  true. 

(3)  Ward's  third  law  of  progress  is  called  cona- 
tion.    This  concept  refers  to  social  effort  which  is 
carried  on  naturally  to  satisfy  desire,  to  preserve 
or  continue  life,  to  modify  the  surroundings.     In 
satisfying  normally  the  gregarious  desires,  the  in- 
dividual advances  the  cause  of  social  progress.    In 
preserving  the  life  of  the  child,  the  mother  pre- 
sumably contributes  to  the  welfare  of  the  race. 
The  sacrifices  which  parents  make  in  behalf  of  chil- 
dren  are   efforts   which    further   the   welfare   of 
society.     Every  constructive  modification  of  either 
the  physical  or  spiritual  environment  benefits  man- 
kind.   Conation  is  thus  a  term  which  covers  a  mul- 
titude of  activities  that  are  performed  in  the  or- 


298  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

clinary  course  of  daily  life,  and  which  unconsciously 
to  the  doers  are  adding  to  the  sum  total  of  human 
welfare. 

(4)  The  fourth  dynamic  principle  which  Ward 
described  has  already  been  discussed,  namely,  the 
principle  of  social  telesis.  The  possibilities  in  social 
telesis  are  illimitable.  Social  telesis  can  turn  the 
passions  and  desires  of  men  into  socially  useful 
channels.  These  passions  are  bad  only  when  di- 
rected to  wrong  ends.  They  are  like  fire — they  can 
destroy  or  they  can  refine.  If  individuals  as  mem- 
bers of  society  could  develop  prevision  and  work 
together  for  societary  ends,  they  would  be  able  to 
transform  the  world. 

Ward  believed  that  greatness  does  not  rest  so 
much  in  intellectual  power  as  in  emotional  force. 
He  had  great  faith  in  persons  of  average  intellec- 
tual ability  who  are  ambitious.  It  thus  becomes  the 
part  of  wisdom  for  society  to  educate  wisely  the 
average  intelligence.  Ward  challenged  the  idea 
that  only  a  very  few  persons  are  geniuses  and  that 
these  individuals,  by  virtue  of  their  superior  abili- 
ties, will  uniformly  overcome  their  environments. 
He  held  that  genius  is  largely  a  matter  of  focaliza- 
tion  of  psychic  energy,  and  that  by  this  process  all 
individuals  may  have  the  honor  of  contributing 
something  valuable  to  civilization. 

Ward  pointed  out  that  geniuses  are  as  likely  to 
appear  in  one  social  stratum  as  in  another,  among 
the  poor  as  among  the  healthy,  in  the  hovel  as  in 


SOCIOLOGY  OF  LESTER  F.  WARD  299 

the  palace.  He  also  demonstrated  how  society 
allows  genius  and  talent  to  be  ruthlessly  destroyed 
among  the  lower  classes  through  denial  of  oppor- 
tunity. As  a  solution  for  this  problem,  Ward  ad- 
vocated social  distribution,  that  is,  the  distribution 
of  all  useful  knowledge  to  all  humanity  everywhere. 
A  scientific  system  needs  to  be  perfected  for  the 
more  thorough  and  equal  distribution  of  the  great 
volume  of  valuable  knowledge  which  has  already 
been  discovered.  Ward  was  a  strong  advocate  of 
the  socialization  of  education. 

In  an  article  which  appeared  in  the  month  fol- 
lowing his  death,  Ward  discussed  his  idea  of  social 
progress  under  the  terms,  eugenics,  euthenics,  and 
eudemics.42  He  supplemented  a  theory  of  sound 
birth  with  a  theory  of  sound  environment.  The 
practical  result  in  society  would  be  a  state  of  eu- 
demics, or  a  society  of  sound  people. 

Ward  was  an  advocate  of  sociocracy.  By  soci- 
ocracy  he  did  not  mean  a  democracy  or  a  rulership 
that  is  likely  to  be  conducted  selfishly  by  the  indi- 
viduals who  exercise  sovereign  power.  Sociocracy 
connotes  a  rulership  of  the  people  in  which  each  in- 
dividual is  governed  primarily  not  by  his  own  inter- 
ests but  by  the  interests  of  society. 

Achievement  was  a  large  concept  in  Ward's 
mind.  He  made  "achievement"  one  of  the  chief 
goals  of  human  life.  By  achievement  in  behalf  of 
human  progress  individuals  gain  social  immortality. 
The  masses  of  humanity  are  achieving  little  or 


300 


HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 


nothing  in  behalf  of  society. 

In  this  treatment  of  Ward's  sociological  thought 
it  has  not  been  the  aim  of  the  writer  to  enter  upon 
a  dissertation  regarding  the  abstract  and  philo- 
sophic implications  that  are  involved  in  the  subject 
matter.  Neither  has  he  attempted  a  polemic  against 
the  weaknesses  in  Ward's  thinking,  except  to  note 
the  defective  monistic  philosophy  and  the  erroneous 
"faculty"  psychology.  It  has  been  his  purpose  to 
let  the  strong,  constructive  elements  in  Ward's  sys- 
tem of  sociology  speak  clearly  and  effectively  for 
themselves. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 
ANTHROPOLOGIC  SOCIOLOGY 


Additional  light  upon  the  nature  of  sociological 
thought  may  be  secured  by  consulting  the  anthro- 
pologists, and  particularly,  the  students  of  social 
origins.  The  last  mentioned  group  of  scholars 
have  been  unusually  successful  in  making  valuable 
contributions  to  sociological  thought,  because  they 
have  used  the  psychological  approach. 

For  more  than  a  century  the  anthropologists 
have  been  searching  for  materials  and  advancing 
theories  concerning  the  origin  of  man,  of  conflict 
and  co-operative  tendencies,  and  of  the  early  ideas 
and  institutions  of  the  human  race.  They  have 
been  aided  by  the  investigations  of  the  geologists 
and  especially  of  the  paleontologists.  The  ethnog- 
raphers and  ethnologists  have  also  discovered  im- 
portant data.  The  findings  of  all  these  groups  of 
investigators,  as  far  as  they  relate  to  the  main 
thread  of  this  book,  will  be  here  treated  essentially 
as  a  unitary  contribution.  There  is  not  space  to  deal 
specifically  with  the  work  of  anthropologists,  such 
as  Tylor,  Morgan,  Pitt-Rivers,  Haddon,  Frazer, 
Goldenweiser,  Keane,  and  a  number  -of  other  prom- 
inent authorities. 


302  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

Anthropological  social  thought  will  be  indicated 
here  under  several  headings.  As  far  as  possible  the 
controversial  and  technical  theories  in  anthropology 
will  be  avoided.  Certain  of  the  ideas  that  have  been 
advanced  by  Sumner,  Westermarck,  Hobhouse, 
Wundt,  Boas,  and  Thomas  will  receive  special  at- 
tention, because  they  are  unusually  pertinent  to  the 
main  theme  of  this  volume. 

1.  There  is  common  agreement  among  anthro- 
pologists that  man  is  the  descendant  of  a  branch  of 
higher  animal  life,  and  that  the  creation  of  man  took 
place  by  a  slow,  evolutionary  process.     The  slow- 
ness of  this  developmental  process  does  not  neces- 
sarily lessen  the  mysterious  or  miraculous  charac- 
ter of  it.    It  places  the  origin  of  the  human  race  at 
a  much  earlier  date  than  was  once  supposed — per- 
haps from  200,000  to  500,000  years  ago.    The  ani- 
mal inheritance  of  man  need  not  lead  anyone  to 
deny  the  correlative  fact  that  man  possesses  spiri- 
tual qualities  not  common  to  the  highest  developed 
animals.1 

Even  the  psychic  equipment  of  man  can  be 
traced  in  its  origins  to  the  primates  with  their  indi- 
vidual and  social  instincts.  The  instinctive  bases  of 
human  conduct  are  hundreds  of  thousands  of  years 
old.  They  are  so  intrinsically  a  part  of  human 
nature  that  no  discussion  of  current  social  prob- 
lems will  neglect  the  imperiousness  of  the  ancient 
instinct  heritage  of  the  human  race. 

2.  There   is   extensive   anthropologic   evidence 


ANTHROPOLOGIC  SOCIOLOGY 


303 


lat  mankind  had  a  common  origin.  The  remains 
of  the  earliest  human  beings  are  found  in  a  region 
which  extends  through  India  from  Java  to  Eng- 
land. From  these  geographic  centers  primitive  man 
seems  to  have  migrated  in  various  directions — 
northeast,  southwest,  and  finally  to  the  Western 
Hemisphere.  Different  climatic  and  environmental 
conditions  affected  the  migrating  groups  in  differ- 
ent ways.  Those  who  migrated  into  the  tropical 
regions  were  retarded  because  of  the  enervating 
climatic  factors.  Those  who  reached  the  frigfd 
zone  were  also  retarded,  or  subjected  to  recidivism 
for  a  different  reason — a  harshness  of  living  con- 
ditions and  an  excess  of  environmental  obstacles. 
The  north  temperate  zone  with  its  fertile  lands  and 
its  invigorating  climate  afforded  the  proper  milieu 
for  the  development  of  the  race. 

3.  An  important  question  relates  to  the  alleged 
potential  equality  of  all  races.  The  common  origin 
of  races  is  admitted,  but  the  question  remains  open 
whether,  for  example,  the  African  races  possess  the 
same  innate  mental  abilities  as  the  Caucasian  races. 
The  controversy  here  is  sharply  drawn  between  the 
environmentalists  and  the  eugenists.  Each  side  of 
the  debate  has  collected  a  large  body  of  evidence. 
In  reality,  the  question  apparently  boils  down  to 
this:  Have  the  many  centuries  of  living  under  the 
enervating  torrid  zone  conditions  effected  the  Afri- 
can races  so  deeply  that  under  favorable  cultural 
circumstances  they  have  become  incapable  of  de- 


304  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

veloping  beyond  a  certain  mental  level  which  is 
lower  than  that  attained  by  the  Caucasian  races  ?  In 
the  past  the  answer  to  this  question  has  been  a 
strong  affirmative.  The  bulk  of  the  evidence  that 
has  been  collected  in  recent  years  indicates  that  the 
affirmative  answer  is  incorrect. 

4.  It  is  becoming  clear  that  every  race  is  a  com- 
posite of  several  races.     Ethnological  data  show 
that  the  five  grand  divisions  of  the  human  race  may 
be  sub-divided  into  racial  stocks,  and  into  races  and 
sub-races,  until  more  than  600  races  may  be  de- 
scribed; and  furthermore,  that  each  of  the  600  or 
more  races  represents  an  amalgamation  of  at  least 
three  or  four  races.    It  is  evident  that  no  clear  line 
of  racial  demarcation  can  be  drawn,  and  that  purity 
of  race  may  be  a  fictitious  term. 

5.  Intermarriage  of  the  representatives  of  races 
belonging  to  similar  racial  stocks  seems  advisable- 
according  to  the  ethnologist.     Pure  bloods  appar- 
ently die  out.    The  strongest  races  today  are  those 
in  which  amalgamation  has  taken  place  recently— 
that  is,  within  one  thousand  or  two  thousand  years, 
for  example,  the  English,  or  the  Scotch-Irish. 

A  mooted  question  of  world  importance  relates 
to  the  intermarriage  of  the  representatives  of  races 
widely  different,  such  as  the  white  and  the  yellow 
races,  or  the  white  and  the  black  races.  No  race 
has  yet  developed  out  of  such  combinations.  Race 
prejudices  and  social  distinctions  have  produced 
conflicts  which  thus  far  have  prevented  the  forma- 


ANTHROPOLOGIC  SOCIOLOGY  305 

tion  of  such  a  race.  Very  few  scientific  data  are 
available  regarding  miscegenation. 

Apparently,  the  interbreeding  of  whites  and 
blacks  leads  ultimately  to  the  elimination  of  the 
racial  characteristics  of  the  blacks  and  to  the  com- 
plete dominance  of  the  whites.  There  are  some 
writers  who  assert  that  this  process  takes  place  to 
the  gain  of  the  lower  race  and  to  the  loss  of  the 
higher  race.  The  last-mentioned  point  has  not  yet 
been  proved.  Miscegenation  between  whites  and 
blacks  occurs  under  such  abnormal  and  vicious 
social  conditions  that  the  racial  tendencies  are  defi* 
nitely  obscured. 

6.  Conflict  between  races  is  primordial ;  conflict 
between  races  today  is  illustrated  in  national  wars 
and  race  persecutions.  Weaker  races  have  often 
combined  against  a  stronger  race;  from  these  ex- 
periences there  has  come  a  growing  sense  of  the 
value  of  co-operation.  Nations  with  high  moral 
principles  have  united  against  a  powerful  neighbor 
nation  with  bullying  tendencies.  Out  of  these  tem- 
porary combinations  there  has  arisen  a  sense  of 
need  for  permanent  forms  of  national  co-operation. 
This  common  need  will  ultimately  lead,  undoubt- 
edly, to  a  permanent  association  of  nations. 

The  conflict  between  the  grand  divisions  of  the 
human  race  will  probably  continue  for  a  long  time 
to  come.  Sometimes  it  is  concentrated  in  an  antag- 
onism between  the  white  and  yellow  races;  and 
again,  it  is  expressed  in  the  more  fundamental 


306  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

struggle  between  Occidentalism  and  Orientalism. 

7.  The  origin  and  development  of  primitive 
ways  of  doing  constitute  a  well-cultivated  field  of 
study.  Anthropologists  have  published  an  endless 
amount  of  materials  on  the  origin  of  languages, 
religions,  occupations,  sex  distinctions.  A  portion 
of  this  work  has  been  done  without  an  accurate  un- 
derstanding of  the  psychological  principles  that  are 
involved,  and  hence  has  to  be  viewed  with  caution 
or  neglected  entirely. 

W.  G.  Sumner,  whose  argument  in  favor  of  indi- 
vidualism and  of  a  laissez  faire  governmental  policy 
was  given  in  Chapter  XI,  published  in  his  Folkways 
a  minute  and  extended  account  of  the  nature  of 
primitive  institutions. 

In  the  development  of  his  theories,  Sumner  began 
with  the  needs  of  primitive  peoples  and  with  the  at- 
tempts to  meet  these  needs.  Repetition  of  these  acts 
leads  to  established  ways  of  doing,  that  is,  to  folk- 
ways. Folkways  are  "the  widest,  most  funda- 
mental, and  most  important  operation  by  which  the 
interests  of  men  in  groups  are  served."2  Societal 
life  consists  chiefly  in  making  folkways  and  apply- 
ing them.  Even  the  science  of  society  might  be  de- 
fined as  the  study  of  folkways.  Folkways  are  the 
product  of  the  trial  and  failure  method  of  meet- 
ing needs.  They  tend  to  become  firmly  established 
and  to  be  passed  on  from  generation  to  genera- 
tion. They  become  traditional.  They  acquire  all 
the  authority  which  is  attached  to  the  memory  of 


ANTHROPOLOGIC  SOCIOLOGY  307 

respected  ancestors.  Even  the  ghosts  of  ancestors 
stalk  the  earth  keeping  guard  over  the  folkways. 
The  folkways  carry  with  them  the  conviction  that 
they  are  essential  to  human  welfare.  It  is  this  con- 
viction which  gives  them  the  force  of  mores.  Thus 
the  folkways  are  not  purposeful  methods  of  secur- 
ing progress  but  unconscious  ways  of  meeting  cur- 
rent exigencies;  they  are  blindly  and  rigorously 
forced  upon  successive  generations. 

8.  Races  are  guilty  of  ethnocentrism.3     Each 
race  considers  itself  the  center  of  mankind.     It 
judges  all  other  races  by  its  own  standards,  and  not 
by  a  higher  standard  that  is  determined  by  data 
that  are  representative  of  the  best  interests  of  all 
races.     Ethocentrism  compels  each  race  to  exag- 
gerate the  importance  of  its  own  folkways  and  to 
depreciate  the  folkways  of  other  races.     For  ex- 
ample, the  Romans  and  Greeks  called  all  outsiders 
"barbarians."  The  Jews  considered  themselves  "the 
chosen  people,"  and  the  Romans  and  Greeks  as 
"pagans." 

9.  Sumner  divided  the  chief  motives  of  human 
action  into   four  classes:     Hunger,   sex   passion, 
vanity,  and  fear  (of  ghosts  and  spirits).     Behind 
each  of  these  motives  there  is  a  set  of  interests. 
(1)   Hunger  led  primitive  man  to  invent  simple 
weapons  and  tools,  such  as  arrows  and  hoes,  and 
then  to  produce  and  hoard  more  complex  forms  of 
wealth.     A  strange  peculiarity  of  wealth  is  its  ef- 
fect on  its  creator;  it  seems  to  be  stronger  than 


308  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

its  creator.  It  often  bears  him  down  to  a  slavish, 
materialistic,  and  even  selfish  existence.  Labor  in 
the  struggle  for  existence  is  irksome  and  painful. 
Wealth  and  labor,  however,  are  both  commenda- 
tory when  they  are  used  to  increase  human  wel- 
fare. In  this  statement  Sumner  overlooked  the  fact 
that  wealth  in  order  to  be  commendable  must  also 
be  produced  under  constructively  social  conditions, 
and  that  labor  in  order  to  be  praiseworthy  must  in 
its  exercise  be  individually  helpful.  In  other  words, 
Sumner's  test  of  the  use  to  which  wealth  and  labor 
are  put  is  incomplete. 

Sumner  gave  a  new  meaning  to  the  term,  slavery. 
He  held  that  "men  of  talent  are  constantly  forced 
to  serve  the  rest.  They  make  the  discoveries  and 
inventions,  order  the  battles,  write  the  books,  and 
produce  the  art."4  Sumner  deplored  the  tendency 
to  call  whatever  one  does  not  like  by  the  name  of 
slavery.  He  felt  that  marriage  slavery,  rent 
slavery,  sin  slavery  are  terms  which  are  coined  by 
a  too  easily  disgruntled  people. 

(2)  The  sex  passion  leads  to  sex  mores  which 
cover  the  relations  of  men  and  women  to  each 
other  before  marriage  and  in  marriage,  and  the 
obligations  of  married  persons  to  society.  The  sex 
mores  determine  the  nature  of  marriage  and  of  di- 
vorce. Sumner  derided  sex  equality.  Man  has  a 
more  stable  nervous  system  than  woman,  is  more 
self-absorbed,  more  egoistic,  less  tactful.  Since 
man  has  greater  physical  strength  than  woman, 


ANTHROPOLOGIC  SOCIOLOGY  309 

woman  was  educated  by  circumstances  in  primitive 
days  to  adapt  herself  to  the  stronger  sex,  and  to  win 
by  developing  charms  where  her  lack  of  compara- 
tive strength  rendered  her  helpless.  Resignation 
and  endurance  thus  became  acquired  traits  of 
women. 

Neither  renunciation  nor  license  is  the  proper 
method  of  control  of  the  sex  passions.  Both  pro- 
duce unnecessary  agony.  License,  for  example, 
"stimulates  desire  without  limit,  and  ends  in  impo- 
tent agony."  Sumner  advocated  temperance  and 
regulation — a  regulation  which  comes  from  knowl- 
edge and  judgment. 

Women  by  necessity  must  bear  an  unequal  share 
in  the  responsibilities  of  sex  and  reproduction. 
Likewise,  men  must  bear  an  unequal  share  of  the 
responsibilities  of  property,  war,  and  politics.  For 
the  latter  types  of  duties  women  are  hampered  by 
a  delicately  adjusted  and  cumbersome  generative 
system  which  men  do  not  possess.5 

Formerly  women  yielded  to  the  will  of  men.  To- 
day, the  marital  state  is  one  of  endless  discussion, 
a  defeat  for  one  party  or  the  other,  with  unpleasant 
effects  upon  life  and  character.  In  ancient  times 
women  took  pride  in  the  supervision  which  their 
husbands  exercised  over  them  and  valued  them- 
themselves  as  hidden  treasures.6  This  protected 
position  was  considered  aristocratic.  Under  po- 
lygamy, women  looked  with  pity  and  disgust  upon 
the  man  who  cannot,  or  is  unwilling  to,  support 


310  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

more  than  one  wife. 

At  this  point  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  W.  I. 
Thomas  has  distinguished  between  the  sexes  on  the 
basis  of  differences  in  metabolism — men  being  kata- 
bolic  and  women  anabolic.  Man  consumes  more  en- 
ergy than  woman.7  He  is  better  fitted  for  bursts 
of  energy,  while  woman  possesses  more  endurance. 
Man's  structural  variability  is  toward  motion; 
woman's,  toward  reproduction.  Hence  man  seems 
to  have  been  assigned  in  primitive  society  to  tasks 
requiring  violence  and  exertion,  whereas  to  women 
fell  the  work  requiring  constant  attention. 

Civilization  thus  far  has  largely  profited  by  the 
intelligence  of  man.  If  to  this  situation  it  will  de- 
velop and  add  the  intelligence  of  women,  it  will  be 
supplanted  by  a  higher  type  of  civilization.  Under 
these  conditions  a  large  percentage  of  marriages 
will  represent  "the  true  comradeship  of  like 
minds,"  instead  of  being  frequently,  as  now,  an  ar- 
rangement in  which  woman  is  treated  as  a  pet. 

(3)  The  motive  of  vanity  is  all-powerful.  "One 
likes  to  be  separated  from  the  crowd  by  what  is 
admired,  and  dislikes  to  be  distinguished  for  what 
is  not  admired.'"  To  satisfy  vanity,  barbarian 
mothers  "deform  their  babies  toward  an  adopted 
type  of  bodily  perfection."  Aristocracies  grow  up 
out  of  appeals  to  vanity.  An  aristocracy  is  a  group 
of  persons  closely  united  who  define  the  possession 
of  things  for  which  they  are  admired  and  which 
the  masses  do  not  possess,  Vanity  leads  to  all  types 


ANTHROPOLOGIC  SOCIOLOGY  3 1 1 

of  absurdities  and  indecencies  in  dress.  Teeth  are 
knocked  out  for  the  sake  of  appeasing  vanity.  An 
Indian  woman  puts  a  board  on  the  forehead  of  her 
baby  to  make  the  forehead  recede. 

(4)  Fear  as  a  motive  rules  the  lives  of  primi- 
tives. Fear  of  ghosts  and  spirits  is  peculiarly  en- 
slaving. Pestilence,  defeat  in  war,  bodily  pain  were 
all  considered  the  result  of  the  wrath  of  the  gods. 

The  mass  phenomena  of  fear  are  especially  piti- 
ful. Manias  of  various  types  rule  whole  masses. 
Witchcraft  thrived  for  centuries  on  the  strength  of 
fear.  Pilgrimages  and  crusades  were  partly  due  to 
fear;  demonism  was  a  product  of  fear.  When  fear 
became  firmly  established  in  the  folkways,  it  acted 
as  an  ever-ruling  tyrant.  In  the  mores  it  became 
firmly  entrenched  and  was  a  leading  factor  in 
moulding  character.  Through  religious  practices 
and  dogmas  it  defined  a  "hell"  and  ruled  with  a 
fearful  hand. 

10.  Upon  simplest  analyses,  according  to  Sum- 
ner,  four  societal  values  stand  out  with  clearness: 
intellectual,  moral,  economic,  and  physical.9     Each 
of  these,  however,  is  composite.    The  highest  socie- 
tal value  seems  to  result  from  a  harmonious  combi- 
nation of  the  four  values  enumerated.     The  best 
member  of  society  is  he  in  whom  the  intellectual, 
moral,  economic,  and  physical  values  are  more  or 
less  equally  and  harmoniously  represented. 

11.  Sumner    divided    society    into    five    main 
classes.10     (1)    The  masses  represent  social  medi- 


312  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

ocrity.  They  are  of  average  social  usefulness.  (2) 
Then  there  are  the  dependent  and  defective  classes 
— a  drag  upon  society  but  not  harmful  or  vicious. 
(3)  The  delinquent  classes  are  grossly  harmful. 
They  are  anti-social  and  a  grievous  burden.  (4) 
Above  the  masses  there  are  the  people  of  talent, 
and  (5)  above  the  talented  are  the  geniuses.  "A 
man  of  talent,  practical  sense,  industry,  persever- 
ance, and  moral  principle  is  worth  more  to  society 
than  a  genius  who  is  not  morally  responsible,  or 
not  industrious."11 

It  is  a  mistake  to  think  of  the  masses  as  being 
at  the  base  of  society;  they  are  located  at  the  core. 
They  are  traditional,  conservative,  and  the  bearers 
of  the  mores.  The  lowest  sections  of  the  masses 
are  a  dead  weight  of  ignorance,  disease,  and  crime. 

12.  A  social  institution  is  composed  of  an  idea, 
notion,  or  interest,  and  a  resultant  structure.  Th  > 
primary  institutions  are  property,  marriage,  and 
religion.12  These  began  as  folkways;  they  became 
customs.  Social  institutions  can  be  modified  only 
when  the  mores  are  changed;  they  develop  rituals, 
which  are  ceremonious,  solemn,  and  strongest  when 
perfunctory  and  when  exciting  no  thought.13 

Sumner  boldly  asserted  that  nothing  but  might 
has  ever  made  right,  and  that  nothing  but  might 
makes  right  now.14  The  fact  that  property  began 
in  force  is  not  proof  that  property  is  an  unjust 
institution.  Marriage  and  religion  also  began  in 
force,  but  the  element  of  justice  in  the  existence 


ANTHROPOLOGIC  SOCIOLOGY  313 

of  these  institutions  is  not  seriously  questioned  to-/ 
day.  Sumner,  however,  did  not  discriminate  be- 
tween force  as  an  agent  or  a  tool,  and  force  as  a 
primary  cause.  He  did  not  distinguish  clearly  be- 
tween hate  and  love  as  the  dynamic  factors  behind 
action  that  is  decisive.  He  did  not  set  forth  the 
distinction  between  harsh,  material,  immutable 
force  and  a  kindly,  spiritual,  attracting  love. 

13.  The  persistency  of  folkways  and  mores  is 
illustrated  in  a  thousand  ways  by  Sumner.    He  de- 
scribed  (1)   their  slow  variability  under  changed 
life  conditions,  (2)  their  sudden  variability  under 
revolutionary    conditions,    (3)    the    possibility    of 
changing  them  by  intelligent  action,  (4)  the  prob- 
lems involved  in  adjusting  one's  self  to  the  mores 
of  another  group,    (5)   the  conflicts  between  the 
mores  of  different  groups.15 

The  mores  are  powerful  engines  of  societal  se- 
lection. The  most  important  fact  about  the  mores 
is  the  power  which  they  exert  over  the  individual. 
He  does  not  know  their  source.  He  is  born  into 
them.  He  accepts  them  in  his  early  years  uncritic- 
ally. His  habits  and  character  are  moulded  by  them. 
If  in  adult  life  he  challenges  them,  he  is  ostracized 
by  his  group,  labeled  unpatriotic,  and  even  trodden 
under  foot.16  The  mores  develop  powerful  watch- 
words, slogans,  and  even  epithets  of  contempt  and 
disapproval  which  only  the  most  independent  and 
courageous  individuals  dare  to  face. 

14.  Ideals    are    entirely    unscientific,    declared 


314  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

Sumner.17  They  are  phantasies  little  connected  with 
fact.  They  are  often  formed  to  pacify  the  restless, 
or  to  escape  settling  a  question  justly  in  the  present. 
The  "poor"  are  told  to  look  to  the  next  life  for  their 
rewards.  The  radicals  are  urged  to  accept  the 
Christian  virtues  of  meekness  and  lowliness.  Ideals 
are  useful,  chiefly,  in  homiletics,  in  self -education 
via  auto-suggestion,  in  satisfying  vanity,  in  mar- 
riage. In  these  observations,  Sumner  undoubtedly 
pointed  out  genuine  weaknesses  in  ideals.  He  un- 
derestimated the  psychological  fact  that  they  spring 
from  the  very  real  affective  phases  of  conscious- 
ness, and  that  they  can  be  projected  rationally.  He 
was  right,  however,  in  deploring  the  chasm  which 
exists  between  ideals  and  practices,  and  in  showing 
how  ideals  may  become  encysted  in  literature  al- 
though not  in  the  mores.  "The  Greeks  proved  that 
people  could  sink  very  low  while  talking  very 
nobly." 

Immorality  is  conduct  contrary  to  the  mores  of 
the  time  and  place.18  Chastity  is  conformity  to  the 
current  taboo  on  the  sex  relation.  "Modesty  is  re- 
serve of  behavior  and  sentiment."  Even  "naked- 
ness is  never  shameful  when  it  is  unconscious,"  that 
is,  when  there  is  no  consciousness  of  a  difference 
between  fact  and  the  rule  set  by  the  mores. 

Sumner  deduced  an  important  principle  when  he 
asserted  that  the  "mores  can  make  anything  right." 
The  mores  give  usages  a  certain  order  and  form, 
and  cover  them  with  a  protecting  mantle  of  pro- 


ANTHROPOLOGIC  SOCIOLOGY  3 1 5 

priety.  The  sanction  of  the  mores  is  utilized  by 
the  class  in  power  in  order  to  maintain  the  estab- 
lished regime,  even  though  it  be  one  of  injustice. 

Sumner  decried  the  importance  which  is  ordi- 
narily attached  to  book  learning,19  because  it  is  ad- 
dressed to  the  intellect  rather  than  to  the  feelings 
which  are  the  springs  of  action.  The  real  education 
is  that  which  comes  through  personal  influence  and 
example.  It  is  derived  from  "the  habits  and  atmos- 
phere of  a  school,  not  from  the  school  text-books." 

15.  Despite  Sumner's  failure  to  appreciate  the 
significance  of  a  thoroughgoing  psychological  ap- 
proach to  an  analysis  of  folkways,  his  description 
of  these  societal  phenomena  constitutes  a  unique 
and  valuable  contribution  to  social  thought.  Sum- 
ner's  rigorous  attitude  toward  social  life  did  not 
permit  him  to  enter  into  an  extensive  interpretation 
of  the  folkways  in  the  light  of  folk  ideals.  He  dealt 
with  what  is  to  the  exclusion  of  what  ought  to  be. 
He  saw  the  past  so  clearly,  and  the  present  so  much 
as  a  reflection  of  the  past,  that  no  enheartening 
forward  look  was  possible.  He  rested  his  theories 
on  the  inexorable  work  of  the  laws  of  biological 
evolution,  modified  chiefly  by  his  belief  in  a  strong 
individualism. 

Sumner's  fundamental  theses  have  been  devel- 
oped and  modified  by  A.  G.  Kellor.  Professor 
Kellor  has  projected  the  Darwinian  principles  of 
variation,  selection,  transmission,  and  adaptation 
into  societal  concepts.  In  fact,  he  has  done  this  so 


316  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

well  that  he  has  given  the  Darwinian  principles  full 
sway,  not  allowing  sufficiently  for  the  rise  and 
operation  of  complex  psychic  principles.  He  has 
made  the  folkways  the  connecting  link  between 
organic  and  societal  evolution,  but  has  not  noted 
fully  the  new,  countless,  and  often  intangible  but 
powerful  factors  by  which  societal  evolution  is 
characterized. 

16.  The  role  that  concepts  of  conduct  have 
played  in  the  evolution  of  society,  has  been  analyzed 
by  E.  A.  Westermarck  and  L.  T.  Hobhouse.  The 
former  is  usually  known  as  an  anthropologist,  and 
the  latter  as  a  sociologist.  Professor  Westermarck 
has  shown  that,  strictly  speaking,  a  custom  is  not 
merely  the  habit  of  a  certain  group  of  people;  it 
also  involves  a  rule  of  conduct.21  It  possesses  two 
characteristics — habitualness  and  obligatoriness. 

Not  every  public  habit,  however,  is  a  custom,  in- 
volving an  obligation.22  There  may  be  certain  prac- 
tices which  are  more  or  less  common  in  society,  but 
which  at  the  same  time  are  generally  condemned. 
The  disapproval  of  these  is  as  a  rule  not  very  deep 
or  genuine. 

Dr.  Westermarck  has  indicated  that  there  is  a 
close  similarity  between  the  conscience  of  a  com- 
munity and  of  an  individual.23  If  a  group  commits 
a  sin  twice,  it  is  likely  to  be  considered  allowable. 
In  order  to  get  at  the  real  nature  of  societal  life, 
the  "bad  habits"  as  well  as  the  professed  opinions 
of  groups  must  be  examined. 


ANTHROPOLOGIC  SOCIOLOGY  317 

"Society,"  says  Dr.  Westermarck,  "is  the  birth- 
place of  the  moral  consciousness."24  Emotions 
which  are  felt  by  the  community  at  large  tend  to 
take  the  form  of  conduct  standards.  The  moral 
emotions  lead  to  a  variety  of  moral  concepts. 
These  fall  into  two  main  classes:  concepts  of  dis- 
approval, such  as  the  concepts,  bad,  vice,  wrong; 
and  concepts  of  approval,  such  as  good,  virtue,  and 
merit. 

Professor  Westermarck  is  convinced  of  the 
tremendous  influence  that  religious  beliefs  have 
exerted  upon  the  moral  ideas  of  mankind.25  This 
influence  has  been  exceedingly  varied.  Religion  has 
taught  the  principles  of  love  and  yet  has  indulged 
in  cruel  persecutions.  It  has  condemned  murder 
and  yet  been  a  party  to  child  sacrifice.  "It  has  em- 
phasized the  duty  of  truth-speaking,  and  has  itself 
been  a  cause  of  pious  fraud."  Professor  Wester- 
marck has  contributed  to  social  thought  not  only  in 
his  valuable  descriptions  of  the  rise  and  evolution 
of  moral  ideas,  but  also  in  his  History  of  Human 
Marriage,  to  which  reference  will  be  made  in  Chap- 
ter XXIV. 

The  writings  of  L.  T.  Hobhouse  reveal  a  thor- 
ough, comparative  study  of  the  conduct  rules  of 
mankind.  Professor  Hobhouse  ha  s  described  the 
evolution  of  ethical  consciousness  as  displayed  in 
the  habits,  customs,  and  principles  hat  have  arisen 
in  human  history  for  the  regulaticr  of  human  con- 
duct. He  has  shown  how,  in  the  owest  forms  of 


318  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

the  organic  world,  behavior  is  regulated,  and  di- 
rected to  some  purpose.27  This  behavior  is  some- 
what definitely  determined  by  the  structure  of  the 
organism  itself.28 

There  are  three  forces  which  may  be  called 
social,  or  which  tend  to  keep  society  together. 
These  social  bonds  are:  (1)  the  principle  of  kin- 
ship, (2)  the  principle  of  authority,  and  (3)  the 
principle  of  citizenship.29  Kinship  is  the  moving 
force  in  primitive  society.  The  principle  of  author- 
ity becomes  prominent  when  one  tribe  captures  and 
enslaves  a  weaker  group.  This  principle  is  also  in- 
voked in  order  to  secure  an  integration  of  openly 
diverse  attitudes  within  the  group,  even  of  modern 
national  groups.  It  is  exemplified  in  the  various 
forms  of  absolutism  in  government.  The  principle 
of  citizenship  finds  expression  when  certain  in- 
dividuals within  the  group  are  delegated  to  perform 
as  servants  and  ministers  of  the  public  as  a  whole.30 
Personal  rights  and  the  common  good  are  the  two 
reigning  ideals.  Every  individual  is  recognized  as 
having  a  right  to  the  conditions  requisite  for  the 
full  development  of  his  social  personality.  The 
good  in  life  consists  "in  the  bringing  out  into  full 
bloom  of  those  capacities  of  each  individual  which 
help  to  maintain  the  common  life/'31  The  third 
principle,  that  of  citizenship,  when  carried  to  its 
conclusion  reveals  the  possibility  of  a  world  state.32 

It  is  the  contention  of  Professor  Hobhouse  that 
there  is  a  close  connection  between  the  growth  of 


ANTHROPOLOGIC  SOCIOLOGY  319 

law  and  justice  and  the  prevalent  forms  of  social 
organization.  Organized  law  has  developed  out  of 
a  sense  of  community  responsibility,  which,  how- 
ever, has  expressed  itself  as  a  rule  in  crude  ways, 
and  without  distinguishing  between  accident  and 
design.  This  sense  of  community  responsibility  in 
primitive  groups  tends  to  hold  in  check  the  spirit 
of  anarchy  and  of  self-redress.  Sooner  or  later, 
the  method  of  community  self-redress  yields  to  the 
authority  of  a  chief  or  of  a  council  representing 
the  whole  community.33  Ultimately  the  community 
develops  a  special  social  organ  for  adjusting  dis- 
putes and  preventing  crime.  It  is  then  that  the 
ethical  idea  becomes  separated  from  the  conflicting 
passions  of  the  collectivity.  Thus,  the  foundations 
are  laid  for  true  judicial  inquiry  by  evidence  and 
genuine  proof,  and  for  a  system  of  scientific  public 
justice. 

17.  In  applying  the  principles  of  folk  psy- 
chology to  the  anthropologic  field,  William  Wundt 
has  developed  a  new  method  and  new  theories. 
Folk  psychology  is  the  study  of  "the  relations 
which  the  intellectual,  moral,  and  other  mental 
characteristics  of  peoples  sustain  to  one  another."3 
The  term  was  originated  by  Lazarus  and  Steinthal, 
whose  works  will  be  referred  to  again  in  Chapter 
XXII.  In  the  masterpiece  on  the  Elements  of 
Folk  Psychology,  Wundt  has  given  a  psychological 
description  of  the  main  processes  and  institutions 
in  society,  tracing  them  from  their  beginnings  in 


320  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

the  processes  of  nature;  he  has  made  a  survey  of 
human  progress.  His  study  opens  with  a  discussion 
of  the  processes  which  produced  the  digging  stick, 
the  club,  and  the  hammer;  it  ends  with  an  analysis 
of  world  empire,  world  culture,  world  religions,  and 
world  history.  The  intervening  ages  are  the  totemic 
and  the  age  of  heroes  and  gods. 

World  empire  affected  primarily  the  material 
aspects  of  the  life  of  peoples.  It  led  to  world  inter- 
course, which  in  turn  multiplied  the  needs  of  peo- 
ples. These  multiplied  needs  were  followed  by  ex- 
changes of  the  means  of  satisfying  the  needs.  The 
external  and  material  phases  of  culture  are  sur- 
vived by  the  spiritual  phases — thus  world  culture 
is  a  sequence  of  world  empire.  It  may  be  said  that 
the  vicissitudes  of  peoples  under  the  rule  of  the 
world  empire  idea  brings  forth  a  unified  history. 
World  culture  in  turn  creates  a  common  mental 
heritage  for  mankind.38 

In  the  establishment  of  a  world  culture,  world 
religions  are  the  leading  forces.  They  have  been 
foremost  in  creating  the  idea  of  a  universal  human 
community.  In  particular,  Christianity  is  based  on 
a  belief  in  a  God  who  makes  no  distinction  between 
race  or  class  or  occupation.  Consequently,  "it  has 
regarded  missionary  activity  among  heathen  peo- 
ples as  a  task  whose  purpose  it  is  finally  to  unite 
the  whole  of  mankind  beneath  the  cross  of  Christ/'3 

For  a  long  time  in  human  history,  religious 
development  was  considered  to  be  the  main  con- 


ANTHROPOLOGIC  SOCIOLOGY  321 

necting  link — such  was  the  contention  of  St.  Augus- 
tine. In  1725,  Vico  argued  that  the  development 
of  language  and  jurisprudence  is  of  universal  im- 
port.38 Finally,  world  history  has  become  an  ac- 
count of  the  mental  life  of  peoples — "a  psycho- 
logical account  of  the  development  of  mankind." 

18.  The  work  of  Professor  Wundt  is  similar  in 
many  ways,  although  characterized  by  a  distinctive 
starting  point  and  by  many  differences,  to  the  con- 
tributions of  Franz  Boas  and  W.  I.  Thomas.  Pro- 
fessor Boas  has  declared  his  belief  in  man's  ability 
to  dominate  the  laws  of  organic  evolution  as  ex- 
pressed in  human  life.  He  has  brought  forward 
a  large  amount  of  evidence  in  support  of  the  theory 
that  environment  has  caused  differences  between 
races.  He  has  pointed  out  that  race  prejudice  is 
largely  a  product  of  social  environment,  and  that 
under  changed  conditions  of  life  it  has  little  place 
in  the  world.  Boas  is  a  strong  advocate  of  the 
theory,  already  advanced  in  this  chapter,  that  all 
races  are  potentially  equal  in  ability,  and  that  they 
would  demonstrate  the  truth  of  this  statement,  if 
given  a  common  cultural  background  and  social 
opportunities.  He  has  advanced  the  idea  that  "the 
organization  of  mind  is  practically  identical  among 
all  races  of  men."39 

Professor  Boas  has  amassed  considerable  evi- 
dence to  show  that  in  the  matter  of  inhibition  of 
impulses,  of  power  of  attention,  of  ability  to  do 
original  thinking,  primitive  man  compares  favor- 


322  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

ably  with  civilized  man.  Inasmuch  as  the  social 
environment  is  powerful  and  education  is  effective 
in  making  over  social  environments,  education  can 
raise  all  races  to  the  same  high  level,  and  at  the 
same  time  unify  them  upon  the  same  knowledge 
bases.  This  contention  is  similar  to  the  position 
that  Professor  Hobhouse  has  made  clear,  namely: 
"While  race  has  been  relatively  stagnant,  society 
has  rapidly  developed. "  Moreover,  social  progress 
is  determined  not  by  alterations  or  racial  type,  but 
by  modifications  of  social  cultures.40  These  modifi- 
cations are  caused  primarily  by  the  interactions  of 
social  causes. 

19.  Noteworthy  pioneering  in  the  field  of  social 
anthropology  and  social  origins  has  been  done  by 
W.  I.  Thomas.  He  has  developed  the  theory  that 
progress  results  from  "crises."4  As  long  as  life 
runs  along  smoothly,  a  lack  of  interest  is  likely  to 
ensue.  The  result  is  ennui.  But  a  crisis  in  any  of 
the  life  processes  arouses  the  attention,  that  is,  pro- 
duces a  concentration  of  psychic  energy.  A  dis- 
turbance of  any  habit  is  a  crisis.  When  the  exi- 
gences of  the  crisis  are  solved  through  a  focaliza- 
tion  of  consciousness,  the  situation  is  said  to  be 
controlled  by  the  individual,  who  again  lapses  into 
a  state  of  disinterestedness  until  another  disturb- 
ance of  habit  occurs.  The  new  method  of  control 
will  be  imitated.  If  imitated  widely,  it  will  mark  a 
rise  in  the  level  of  civilization. 

It  will  be  observed  at  once  that  the  power  of  at- 


ANTHROPOLOGIC  SOCIOLOGY  323 

tention  to  meet  crises  is  largely  an  individual  mat- 
ter and  that  the  role  of  the  individual  is  very 
important.  The  group  level  of  culture  limits  the 
power  of  the  mind  to  meet  crises  and  to  make 
adjustments.42  The  mind  is  limited  by  the  psychic 
fund  which  the  group  already  possesses.  If  there 
is  no  knowledge  of  mathematics  in  the  group,  then 
a  large  banking  system  is  impossible.  Crises,  at- 
tention, control — these  are  the  three  leading  con- 
cepts in  Thomas'  theory  of  social  origins. 

Control  is  the  object  of  all  purposeful  activity.43 
It  is  the  end,  and  attention  is  the  means.  An  animal 
differs  from  a  plant  in  that  it  has  a  superior  con- 
trol over  a  larger  environment  than  does  the  plant. 
"It  does  not  wait  for  food,  but  goes  after  it."  Man 
differs  from  an  animal  partly  in  the  fact  that  his 
fore  limbs  are  free  to  secure  new  and  varied  forms 
of  control.  Moreover,  man  through  his  mind  has  a 
superior  instrument  of  control.  By  the  use  of 
knowledge,  mind  is  effective  in  controlling  factors 
that  are  present  in  neither  time  nor  space.  Through 
its  inventions,  such  as  language,  religious  creeds, 
mechanical  appliances,  forms  of  government,  man 
has  risen  to  a  high  level  of  civilization. 

Thomas  has  analyzed  the  social  process  in  terms 
of  social  attitude  and  social  values.  An  attitude  is 
a  process  of  individual  consciousness  that  deter- 
mines "the  real  or  possible  activity  of  the  individual 
in  the  social  world."45  A  social  value,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  any  datum  that  has  an  empirical  content 


324  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

accessible  to  the  members  of  a  social  group  and  a 
meaning  which  may  make  it  an  object  of  activity. 
Activity  is  thus  the  bond  between  a  social  attitude 
and  a  social  value.  The  value  is  the  meaning  which 
a  material  or  spiritual  datum  may  have.  An  atti- 
tude is  a  real  or  implied  going  out  after  value. 
Social  psychology  is  the  science  of  social  attitudes. 
At  this  point  anthropologic  social  thought  has 
merged  into  social  psychology. 

Until  twenty-five  years  ago,  anthropology  inter- 
preted societary  origins  pretty  largely  in  terms  of 
the  individual.  With  the  use  of  a  social  psychology 
such  as  Cooley  represents,  "anthropology  has  given 
more  accurate  explanations  and  become  essentially 
a  social  anthropology." 

Before  we  discuss  the  different  phases  of  psycho- 
sociologic  thought,  it  will  be  well  to  make  clear  the 
recent  advances  that  have  been  made  in  the  biologic 
phases  of  social  thought.  The  center  of  attention 
in  this  field  is  the  relation  of  the  laws  of  heredity 
to  human  progress,  which  constitutes  the  problem 
in  eugenics.  A  discussion  of  eugenic  social  thought 
will  bring  forward  in  a  scientific  way  the  chief  ele- 
ments of  an  intellectual  situation  that  was  left,  in 
Chapter  XVI,  in  the  unsatisfactory  Spencerian 
formulae.  A  presentation  of  eugenic  social  thought 
will  give  a  valuable  background  to  the  discus- 
sion which  follows  concerning  psycho-sociologic 
thought. 

> 


CHAPTER  XIX 
EUGENIC  SOCIOLOGY 


Eugenic  social  thought  is  the  child  of  biological 
discoveries.  Eugenics,  the  science  of  good  breed- 
ing, which  did  not  achieve  scientific  standing  until 
the  closing  years  of  the  last  century,  may  be  traced 
back  in  its  incipient  forms  to  Plato,  who  advocated 
that  strength  should  mate  only  with  strength,  and 
that  imperfect  children  should  be  eliminated  from 
society.  In  its  scientific  origins  eugenics  dates  from 
1859,  when  Darwin's  Origin  of  Species  was  first 
published.  Its  beginning  as  a  distinct  field  of  hu- 
man thinking  is  found  in  the  articles  by  Francis 
Galton  on  "Hereditary  Talent  and  Genius/',  which 
appeared  in  1865 ;  and  in  1869,  in  book  form  under 
the  title,  Hereditary  Genius.1 

Eugenic  social  thought  deals  with  the  operation 
of  the  laws  of  heredity  in  society.  It  was  a  part  of 
this  field  which  Francis  Galton  made  world-known 
by  his  treatises  on  Hereditary  Genius  and  Inquiries 
into  the  Human  Faculty.2  In  1904,  Galton  wrote  a 
paper  entitled :  "Eugenics ;  Its  Definition,  Scope  and 
Aims."  In  this  dissertation  the  new  science  of 
eugenics  was  formally  introduced  to  the  world. 
Galton's  analysis  of  eugenics  became  its  leading 


326  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

interpretation.3 

The  mantle  of  the  founder  fell  upon  Professor 
Karl  Pearson,  whose  work  at  times  has  assumed  a 
distinctly  statistical  nature.  Professor  Pearson's 
leaning  toward  biometry  has  brought  severe  criti- 
cism upon  him.  The  statistical  approach,  while 
exact  and  thought-provoking,  is  subject  to  various 
errors  in  interpretation  of  data.  The  viewpoint 
from  which  Professor  Pearson  writes,  however,  is 
not  one-sided.  For  example,  he  states  that  "it  may 
require  years  to  replace  a  great  leader  of  man,  but 
a  stable  and  efficient  society  can  only  be  the  out- 
come of  centuries  of  development."4  He  holds  that 
group  conscience  ought  for  the  sake  of  social  wel- 
fare to  be  stronger  than  private  interest,  and  that 
the  ideal  citizen  should  be  able  to  form  s,  judgment 
free  from  personal  bias.5 

C.  W.  Saleeby,  another  English  writer,  has  de- 
veloped an  independent  reputation  as  a  eugenist.6 
In  the  United  States,  such  men  as  C.  B.  Davenport7 
and  Paul  Popenoe  have  made  important  eugenic 
contributions.  The  recent  tendency  has  been  to  be 
wary  of  purely  statistical  studies  of  heredity  and 
to  rely  more  definitely  upon  case  studies.  However, 
since  eugenics  is  directly  indebted  to  the  studies  of 
heredity  and  since  heredity  must  be  investigated  for 
several  generations,  eugenic  social  thought  has  not 
yet  developed  far. 

Galton  defined  eugenics  as  the  science  of  good 
breeding.  Its  aim  as  a  pure  science  is  to  study  the 


EUGENIC  SOCIOLOGY  327 

agencies  under  social  control  "that  may  improve  or 
impair  the  racial  qualities  of  future  generations, 
either  physically  or  mentally."  Galton's  program, 
as  outlined  by  the  founder  shortly  before  his  death, 
insisted  upon  (1)  a  study  of  the  laws  of  heredity, 

(2)  a  dissemination  of  knowledge  about  heredity, 

(3)  a  study  of  the  factors  underlying  marriage, 

(4)  a  study  of  birth  rates,  and  (5)  a  case  study  of 
individual  families. 

Eugenic  social  thought  holds  that  heredity  among 
human  beings  operates  according  to  the  same  laws 
that  govern  heredity  among  animals.  The  theory 
of  Mendelian  units  becomes  in  practice  the  theory 
of  multiple  factors.  The  unit  characters,  upon 
analysis,  appear  to  be  complex  and  to  be  inherited 
in  complex  ways.  Multiple  factors  are  inherited 
from  generation  to  generation  directly  when  pure 
factors  are  united  with  pure  factors.  But  when  the 
pure  is  united  with  the  hybrid,  then  the  laws  of 
dominance  and  recessiveness  operate.  In  such  com- 
binations certain  factors  tend  to  express  themselves 
in  greater  proportion  than  do  other  elements.  This 
failure  to  secure  expression  in  a  given  generation, 
however,  means  that  the  specific  factor  is  recessive 
for  the  time  being.  Later,  it  will  likely  appear. 

Galton  stated  another  important  eugenic  law,  the 
law  of  regression.  Each  peculiarity  is  inherited  by 
the  offspring  on  the  average  in  a  slightly  less  de- 
gree than  it  is  found  in  the  parent.  Hence,  accord- 
ing to  Galton,  good  traits  and  poor  traits  alike  are 


328  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

inherited  in  a  degree  nearer  mediocrity  by  the  off- 
spring than  by  the  parents.  This  law  partially  ex- 
plains why  gifted  men  rarely  have  sons  who  are 
equally  gifted.  The  law  seems  to  hold  good  for 
large  numbers,  but  not  when  considered  in  relation 
to  single  families.  It  serves  as  a  check  upon  varia- 
tion and  mutation. 

Galton  and  Pearson  advanced  another  statistical 
law,  the  law  of  ancestral  inheritance.  Galton  sup- 
posed that  the  parents  contribute  to  the  child  one- 
half  of  his  inherited  factors,  the  grandparents  one- 
fourth,  and  so  on.  Pearson  has  secured  statistical 
evidence  which  shows  that  Galton's  geometric  series 
is  incorrect,  and  that  on  the  average  in  a  large 
number  of  cases  the  parents  together  contribute 
to  the  child  .624  of  his  traits;  the  four  grandpar- 
ents, .198;  the  eight  great  grandparents,  .063;  and 
so  on. 

The  law  of  mutation,  described  by  de  Vries  and 
other  geneticists,  refers  to  the  appearance  of  mu- 
tants, or  individuals  who  do  not  reproduce  to  form 
but  represent  a  new  line  of  heredity.  In  this  way 
the  appearance  of  genius  may  often  be  accounted 
for.  However,  the  factors  which  explain  the  ap- 
pearance of  mutants  have  not  yet  been  analyzed. 

Another  fundamental  genetic  consideration  is  the 
law  of  selection.  If  individuals  with  worthy  traits 
mate  only  with  individuals  who  possess  worthy 
traits,  a  superior  stock  will  be  produced.  This  tend- 
ency is  very  important,  since  it  points  the  way  to 


EUGENIC  SOCIOLOGY  329 

a  potent  method  of  securing  social  progress. 

Eugenic  social  thought  has  been  developed  in  part 
on  the  basis  of  the  Weismann  theory  of  no  or  slight 
transmission  of  acquired  traits.  The  germ-plasm 
is  transmitted  from  individual  to  offspring  in  a  di- 
rect line  of  descent.  Injuries  to  the  parent  rarely 
change  the  nature  of  the  germ-plasm.  Only  ex- 
treme malnutrition  or  excessive  use  of  alcohol  ap- 
parently exerts  a  definite  influence  on  the  germ 
cells.  Nature  has  thus  made  provision  for  the 
protection  of  germ-plasm,  whether  strong  or  de- 
fective. Society,  then,  may  encourage  the  mating 
of  individuals  who  possess  strong  physical  and  men- 
tal traits,  and  discourages  the  mating  of  individuals 
who  are  defective — thus  securing  its  own  positive 
improvement. 

Eugenic  social  thought  follows  two  courses.  Re- 
strictive eugenics  advocates  the  segregation  of  the 
so-called  dysgenic  classes,  such  as  the  feeble- 
minded, the  insane,  and  the  grossly  defective  crimi- 
nal. Public  opinion  reacts  against  sterilization; 
injustice  that  cannot  be  remedied  may  be  done 
through  the  use  of  sterilization.  Segregation  by 
sexes,  while  involving  expense,  is  a  satisfactory 
eugenic  method  of  safeguarding  society  against  the 
reproduction  of  dysgenic  persons. 

The  other  trend  of  eugenic  thought  supports  the 
raising  of  the  standards  of  choice  in  mating.  Con- 
structive eugenics,  as  distinguished  from  restrictive 
eugenics,  urges  a  program  of  education  whereby 


330  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

young  people  will  habitually  rate  one  another  by 
physical  and  mental  standards  rather  than  by 
wealth  and  class  standards. 

Eugenics  disapproves  of  random  mating.  It 
favors  assortative  mating,  because,  for  example, 
the  "marriage  of  representatives  of  two  long-lived 
strains  ensures  that  the  offspring  will  inherit  more 
longevity  than  does  the  ordinary  man.m  Eugenics 
thus  stresses  the  importance  of  teaching  young 
people  eugenic  ideas,  and  of  training  them  to  be 
guided  by  these  ideals  rather  than  by  caprice  and 
passion.10  Eugenic  ideals  include  health,  paternity 
and  maternity,  and  pleasing  disposition.  Education 
and  character  are  secondary  eugenic  ideals  of  im- 
portance. 

A  study  of  the  birth  rate  shows  that  the  inferior 
stocks  and  classes  of  individuals  produce  many 
more  children  than  do  the  superior  groups.  Many 
cultured  people  do  not  marry,  or  if  they  marry  they 
keep  the  birth  rate  very  low.  As  a  result,  the  racial 
character  of  a  whole  people  may  change  within  a 
few  generations.  The  superior  strains  may  be  lost 
and  the  inferior  furnish  the  entire  population. 

The  low  birth  rate  of  the  superior  stocks  is  due 
to  several  f atcors :  ( 1 )  The  lengthening  period  of 
education  and  of  professional  training  calls  for  the 
postponement  of  marriage.  (2)  The  desire  to  give 
children  the  best  advantages  limits  the  birth  rate. 
(3)  The  increasing  spirit  of  independence  on  the 
part  of  women  causes  a  postponement  of  marriage 


EUGENIC  SOCIOLOGY  331 

and  a  limitation  of  the  number  of  children.  These 
and  other  causes  have  produced  a  differential  birth 
rate  in  favor  of  the  inferior  strains.  Eugenic 
thought  urges  that  the  differential  be  reversed  in 
favor  of  the  superior  strains.  This  conclusion  im- 
plies that  the  dysgenic  classes  must  be  prevented 
from  producing  children,  that  the  poor  must  be 
raised  to  higher  educational  and  economic  levels  and 
taught  to  limit  the  birth  rate,  and  that  the  eugenic- 
ally  superior  be  taught  to  increase  the  birth  rate. 

Eugenics  pronounces  war  to  be  both  dysgenic  and 
eugenic.11  (1)  It  is  dysgenic  in  that  the  bravest 
and  the  physically  best  are  killed  first.  In  the  case 
of  a  long  war  only  the  weakest  men  physically  and 
mentally  are  left  alive  to  propagate  the  race.  (2) 
War  is  dysgenic  in  that  it  produces  a  large  number 
of  hurried  marriages.  Rational  choices  of  mates 
are  supplanted  by  sudden  emotional  reactions.  (3) 
War  is  dysgenic  in  that  sex  immorality  greatly  in- 
creases. Prostitution  flourishes  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  military  encampments,  unless  rigid  means 
of  control  are  established.  (4)  Again,  the  dys- 
genic effect  of  war  is  seen  in  the  period  of  socio- 
mental  unrest  which  always  follows  war,  and  which 
among  other  things  undermines  rational  sexual  se- 
lection. 

The  chief  eugenic  effect  of  war  is  manifested 
during  the  period  of  training.  This  preparation 
period  accents  the  importance  of  a  strong  physique 
and  health  measures.  An  insipid,  stoop-shouldered 


332  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

population  of  city  young  men  may  be  transformed 
into  an  army  of  fit  soldiers.  However,  the  conclu- 
sions are  obvious  that  the  dysgenic  effects  of  war 
are  far  more  potent  than  the  eugenic  gains,  and  that 
the  eugenic  advantages  may  be  acquired  in  other 
ways  than  by  promulgating  war. 

Eugenics  looks  askance  at  the  feminism  move- 
ment. Feminism  once  meant  the  development  of 
the  womanly  traits  of  the  sex.  It  now  refers  to  the 
elimination  as  far  as  possible  of  sex  differences. 
It  would  make  women  as  nearly  as  possible  like 
men.  Eugenics  objects  to  this  trend,  since  it  under- 
estimates the  importance  of  the  fact  that  women 
physically  are  built  to  be  mothers.  To  the  extent 
that  women  enter  into  all  the  occupations,  they  will 
become  men-like ;  and  their  efficiency  as  mothers  of 
the  race  will  decrease,  and  the  race  will  suffer. 

The  economic  equality  of  the  sexes  is  a  satisfac- 
tory doctrine  to  the  eugenist  if  the  doctrine  is  ex- 
tended to  make  motherhood  a  salaried  occupation, 
like  mill  work  or  stenography.12  "Child-bearing 
should  be  recognized  as  being  as  worthy  of  remu- 
neration as  any  occupation  which  men  enter,  and 
should  be  paid  for  (by  the  state)  on  the  same 
basis."18  ! 

Eugenics  would  throw  every  possible  safeguard 
around  motherhood,  especially  in  the  period  imme- 
diately before  and  after  the  birth  of  the  child.  The 
mother,  even  the  expectant  mother,  "is  doing  our 
business,  indispensable  and  exacting  business,  and 


EUGENIC  SOCIOLOGY  333 

we  must  take  care  of  her  accordingly.  She  is  not 
only  a  worker  but  the  foremost  of  all  workers."14 

Eugenic  thought  as  represented  in  the  writings 
of  C.  W.  Saleeby  has  denominated  alcohol,  venereal 
disease,  and  tuberculosis  as  "racial  poisons/'  While 
there  is  some  doubt  regarding  the  eugenic  effects 
of  taking  small  amounts  of  alcohol  into  the  human 
body,  eugenists  are  agreed  that  alcohol,  when  taken 
in  excess  quantities,  affects  the  germ-plasm  and  pro- 
duces a  neurotic  taint.  It  appears  that  alcoholism 
may  be  a  cause  in  producing  defective  children. 
The  verdicts  of  hygiene  and  economics  that  alcohol- 
ism is  injurious  to  the  race  is  supported  by  eugenics. 

Venereal  disease,  another  so-called  racial  poison, 
produces  toxins  which  apparently  affect  the  germ- 
plasm  indirectly  if  not  directly.  It  lowers  the 
physical  and  moral  tone  and  causes  unfavorable 
racial  tendencies.  Venereal  disease  tends  to  destroy 
the  generative  organs  and  to  cut  off  the  birth  rate 
entirely.  It  is  a  result  of  sex  immorality  which  in 
itself  tends  to  produce  children  under  such  abnor- 
mal conditions  of  vice  that  it  becomes  an  anti-social, 
if  not  a  dysgenic  factor,  in  society.  To  the  extent 
of  course,  that  venereal  disease  kills  off  the  racially 
useless,  it  may  be  considered  eugenic.15  Such  a 
point  of  view,  however,  fails  to  rate  properly  the 
invasions  which  venereal  disease  is  continually 
making  upon  normal  and  superior  types  of  germ- 
plasm. 

Tuberculosis  weakens  the  membranous   tissues 


534  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

and  probably  leads  in  a  few  generations  to  an  un- 
usual degree  of  susceptibility  to  the  invasion  of 
tubercle  bacilli.  It  is  still  a  question,  however,  to 
what  extent  tuberculosis  may  be  counted  a  racial 
poison.  Professor  Hobhouse  has  argued  that,  by  the 
development  of  scientific  hygiene,  it  will  be  possible 
to  center  attention  not  upon  eliminating  a  tubercu- 
lar stock  but  upon  eliminating  the  tubercle  bacilli.16 

In  regard  to  race  questions  the  social  anthro- 
pologist and  the  eugenist  represent  different  poles 
of  thought.  As  was  indicated  in  the  preceding 
chapter,  the  social  anthropologists,  such  as  Boas 
and  Thomas,  support  the  theory  of  potential  race 
equality.  The  eugenist,  on  the  other  hand,  con- 
tends that  there  are  inherently  superior  and  inferior 
racial  stocks,  and  that  the  marriages  of  representa- 
tives of  inferior  stocks  with  representatives  of 
superior  stocks  will  produce  children  of  a  stock  dis- 
tinctly lower  than  that  of  the  superior  stocks.  The 
eugenists  in  the  United  States  hold  that  the  immi- 
gration of  the  southern  and  eastern  peoples  of  Eu- 
rope will  not  only  supplant  through  a  higher  birth 
rate  the  native  stock  of  Nordic  origin  but,  where 
marriages  between  natives  and  southern  and  eastern 
European  immigrants  occur,  it  will  lower  the  racial 
quality  of  the  population.  While  eugenic  thought 
in  this  matter  deserves  a  complete  and  respectful 
hearing,  it  must  be  considered  along  with  the  find- 
ings of  social  anthropology. 

Eugenic  thought  opposes  the  miscegenation  of 


EUGENIC  SOCIOLOGY  335 

the  Caucasian  and  African.  The  Negro,  it  is  con- 
tended, is  not  only  different  from  the  Caucasian 
but  as  a  rule  is  eugenically  inferior,  judged  by 
the  achievements  of  the  Negro.  Moreover,  the 
eugenist  interprets  the  anthropological  tests  to 
show  that  the  innate  ability  of  a  colored  man  "is 
proportionate  to  the  amount  of  white  blood  he  has." 
The  conclusion  of  eugenics  is  that  "in  general  the 
white  race  loses  and  the  Negro  gains  from  mis- 
cegenation/'17— as  far  as  the  germinal  natures  of 
the  two  races  are  concerned.  The  eugenist  would 
forbid  all  intermarriage  between  the  races,  and  urge 
that  the  taboo  against  sexual  intercourse  between 
the  races  be  extended. 

In  the  light  of  eugenic  thought  genealogy  may 
become  scientific,  in  fact,  it  may  become  a  valuable 
source  of  scientific  materials  for  eugenics.  Here- 
tofore genealogy  has  been  the  concern  of  a  few 
leisure-class  people,  who  have  taken  pleasure  and 
pride  in  recounting  the  fact  that  some  one  of  a 
possible  thousand  or  more  ancestors  several  gener- 
ations back  was  distinguished  in  some  way  or  other, 
and  who  would  have  friends  or  the  public  believe 
that  they  inherited  from  this  ancestor  of  note  the 
characteristics  which  made  him  great.  Eugenics 
points  out  a  nobler  purpose  to  which  genealogy  may 
be  put.  It  urges  that  mental  and  physical  traits  of 
every  individual  in  all  families  be  carefully  analyzed 
and  accurately  and  systematically  recorded.  In  this 
way  it  will  be  possible  in  a  generation  to  have  avail- 


336  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

able  a  large  amount  of  eugenic  materials,  and  in  a 
few  generations  a  reliable  body  of  data  for  study- 
ing racial  heredity. 

The  debate  regarding  the  comparative  influences 
of  nature  and  nurture  has  been  long  and  bitter. 
It  may  be  said  here  that  both  heredity  and  environ- 
ment are  more  or  less  equally  essential  in  the  de- 
velopment of  human  personality.  Without  inher- 
ited factors  in  the  individual  the  environment  has 
nothing  upon  which  to  work.  Without  a  stimu- 
lating environment  the  inherited  traits  will  remain 
dormant.  Each  human  being  has  inherited  factors 
which,  if  played  upon  by  certain  environmental  fac- 
tors, may  lead  the  individual  to  try  to  wreck  society 
or  himself  or  both.  Every  person,  also,  has  traits 
which,  if  stimulated  by  the  proper  environmental 
elements  may  cause  him  to  develop  into  a  useful 
member  of  society.  While  the  environment  cannot 
change  the  inherited  potentialities  very  much,  if 
any,  it  is  a  prime  factor  of  vast  importance  in  deter- 
mining which  inherited  tendencies  will  never  find 
expression,  which  will  be  expressed  in  modified 
ways,  and  which  will  reach  full  fruition.  Eugenics 
insists  with  increasing  force  that  educational  pro- 
grams shall  provide  that  every  child  be  not  only  well 
reared  but  also  well  born.  A  weakness  in  eugenic 
thought  is  that  it  implies  that  sound  racial  stock  is 
sufficient  to  guarantee  progress;  it  tends  at  times 
to  overstress  an  aristocracy  of  racial  stock.  It 
sometimes  detracts  from  the  importance  of  char- 


EUGENIC  SOCIOLOGY  337 

acter  and  moral  discipline  as  essential  elements  in 
social  progress. 


CHAPTER  XX 
CONFLICT  THEORIES  IN  SOCIOLOGY 


The  concept  of  social  conflict  has  already  been 
introduced  to  the  reader.  In  the  chapter  on  In- 
dividualistic Social  Thought  the  prolonged  struggle 
between  individual  rights  and  genuine  social  con- 
trol was  analyzed.  Malthus  described  the  conflict 
between  population  and  the  means  of  subsistence, 
Comte  insisted  that  man  is  not  naturally  a  social 
being.  Hence  this  unsocial  nature  of  mankind  is 
a  fruitful  source  of  human  conflict.  Marx  pictured 
the  class  struggle;  and  Darwin  elaborated  the  doc- 
trine of  the  survival  of  the  fittest. 

The  slightest  grasp  of  social  thought  reveals  the 
fact  that  human  association  is  characterized  at 
times  by  deep-seated  and  subtle  conflicts;  and  at 
other  times  by  a  fundamental  co-operative  spirit. 
Some  sociological  writers  have  seen  only  or  chiefly 
the  conflicts  of  life;  others  have  sought  out  the  co- 
operative activities;  still  others  have  tried  to  dis- 
cover the  relationships  between  conflict  and  co- 
operation in  societal  development.  This  chapter 
will  deal  with  the  concept  of  social  conflict,  while 
the  next  chapter  will  be  centered  on  the  ideal  of 
social  co-operation  and  upon  the  relationship  of  con- 


CONFLICT  THEORIES  339 

flict  to  co-operation  in  group  processes. 

One  of  the  outstanding  believers  in  the  theory 
that  conflict  dominates  societal  life  was  Ludwig 
Gumplowicz  (1838-1910).  His  system  of  thought 
begins  with  the  assertion  that  primitive  hordes  were 
the  original  units  of  society.  Gumplowicz  dissented 
from  Herbert  Spencer's  belief  in  the  individual  as 
the  original  societary  unit,  although  he  accepted  the 
determinism  that  is  inherent  in  Spencer's  theory  of 
evolution.  Gumplowicz  also  repudiated  Comte's 
belief  in  social  amelioration  through  prevision,  but 
subscribed  to  Comte's  positivism. 

According  to  Gumplowicz,  society  began  with  a 
large  number  of  primitive  groups,  which  were  self- 
sustaining  and  self-conscious  units.  Each  one  of 
these  hordes  was  a  warring  group,  possessing  an 
instinctive  hatred  of  all  other  hordes.1  As  these 
hordes  increased  in  size,  the  general  food  supply 
failed  to  meet  the  needs.  Consequently,  inter-group 
struggle  resulted  and  the  members  of  the  weaker 
hordes  were  either  destroyed  or  enslaved.  The 
existence  of  slaves  led  to  situations  of  intra-group 
inequality,  which  in  turn  created  problems  involv- 
ing justice  and  injustice. 

As  a  result  of  continual  conflicts  between  groups, 
there  are  frequent  changes  taking  place  in  their 
personnel.  The  vanquished  are  continually  being 
absorbed  by  victorious  groups.  In  a  given  success- 
ful group  two  classes  are  at  once  established, 
namely,  the  victors  and  the  vanquished.  Classes 


340  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

are  thus  continually  arising  out  of  new  juxtaposi- 
tions of  heterogeneous  racial  elements.2 

It  was  in  an  intense  form  of  group  self-interest 
that  Gumplowicz  found  the  mainspring  of  social 
progress.  This  self-interest  leads  to  an  exag- 
gerated group  appraisement,  a  strong  degree  of 
group  unity,  a  state  of  warfare  between  groups — 
and  perhaps  progress.  Basic  to  this  group  self- 
interest,  there  are  the  material  needs  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  group;  the  economic  desires  and  the 
occupational  interests;  and  the  moral  and  spiritual 
tendencies.  The  group  is  bound  together  by  various 
factors,  such  as  a  common  social  life,  a  common 
language,  religion,  and  culture. 

Gumplowicz  advocated  a  theory  of  potential  race 
equality.  He  argued  against  innate  racial  superior- 
ity and  racial  inferiority.  He  doubted  the  exist- 
ence of  any  pure  races.  Each  race  is  a  compound 
of  other  races,  and  hence  races  are  potentially 
similar  in  fundamental  respects.  National  progress, 
therefore,  holds  no  connection  with  race  purity. 

Gumplowicz  minimized  the  importance  of  the 
individual.  Society  rules.  Centuries  of  traditions 
dominate.  The  thoughts  of  the  individual  are 
almost,  if  not  entirely,  a  mere  reflection  of  the  social 
environment.  The  group  develops  group  pride  or 
group  disloyalty  in  the  minds  of  its  members.  The 
distinguished  leader  is  largely  the  man  who  ex- 
presses the  will  of  the  group  during  the  group 
crisis.  Gumplowicz  makes  only  a  brief  reference 


CONFLICT  THEORIES  341 

to  the  process  of  interaction  between  the  individual 
and  the  group.3  An  underlying  theory  of  natural 
determinism  vitiates  much  of  Gumplowicz's  ideas 
concerning  the  individual. 

Inasmuch  as  society,  like  individuals,  passes 
through  a  cycle  of  growth  and  decay,  subject  to 
unchangeable  natural  and  societary  laws,  there  is 
no  justification  for  individual  interference  with  ^ 
social  processes.  In  fact,  this  theory  led  Gum- 
plowicz  into  pessimistic  conclusions  concerning  life. 
He  failed  to  see  that  societal  life  is  not  necessarily 
a  series  of  hopeless  cyclical  conflicts,  and  that  social 
processes  are  becoming  increasingly  subject  to 
human  control — for  good  or  ill.  He  did  not  appre-  .  • 
ciate  the  fact  that  groups  are  not  subject  to  laws 
of  cyclical  growth  and  decay  after  the  manner  of 
individuals.  Hence,  his  conflict  theory  of  societal 
life  ended  in  confusion  and  pessimism. 

A  reference  was  made  in  Chapter  XI  to  the 
theories  of  Friedrich  Nietzsche  (1844-1900).  This 
German  philosopher  developed  the  idea  of  social 
conflict,  basing  it  on  the  concept  of  the  "will  to 
power."  Leaders  desire  power.  They  enjoy  to 
exercise  power  and  they  thrive  under  that  exercise. 
Jealousy  of  the  leaders  arises.  The  weaker  mem- 
bers of  society  join  together  against  the  possessors 
of  power.  They  develop  a  will  to  power,  but  of  a 
weaker  type  than  that  of  the  leaders.  Conflicts 
ensue  between  the  will  to  power  of  the  superior  and 
the  will  to  power  of  the  inferior. 


/  342    I       HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

^he  superior  and  the  inferior  types  each  possess 
-•"a  distinctive  code  of  morality.4  The  supermen 
develop  a  harsh  and  rigorous  attitude  toward  them- 
selves and  others.  They  gird  and  prepare  them- 
selves for  the  crises  of  life.  They  strive  to  aug- 
ment their  power.  They  become  self-contained. 
They  take  pride  in  crushing  weakness  and  in  deify- 
ing strength.  Their  morality  stresses  those  factors 
in  life  which  create  power.  They  feel  a  condescend- 
ing pity  for  the  weak.  They  experience  no  sense 
of  responsibility  for  the  inferior  classes.  Since 
supermen  are  the  supreme  goal  of  nature,  super- 
men feel  that  all  persons  and  things  should  con- 
tribute to  increasing  the  power  of  supermen.5  It  is 
a  waste  of  energy  for  supermen  to  give  their  lives 
in  behalf  of  inferior  persons.  They  are  interested 
only  in  the  welfare  of  other  supermen. 

The  morality  of  the  inferior  is  of  a  type  which 
furthers  weakness.  It  accents  sympathy.  It  em- 
phasizes gregariousness.  The  inferior  create  a 
slavish,  cringing,  meek  morality.  They  sacrifice 
themselves  readily  and  humbly  in  behalf  of  others 
who  may  be  inferior  to  themselves. 

Nietzsche  believed  in  a  eugenics  program.  He 
declared  that  marriages  should  be  arranged  with  a 
view  to  producing  supermen.  Nietzsche's  deter- 
ministic view  of  natural  evolution  led  him  to  be- 
lieve, however,  that  equality  of  privileges  is  un- 
attainable. He  opposed  democracy  because  its 
theory  of  equal  opportunities  contradicts  the  ten- 


CONFLICT  THEORIES  343 

dencies  of  nature.  He  was  no  socialist.  He  as- 
serted that  an  aristocracy  of  power  is  the  only  true 
goal  for  society.  He  carried  forward  the  ruthless 
biological  laws  of  tooth  and  fang  into  his  concep- 
tion of  the  highest  types  of  civilization. 

Moreover,  the  superman  is  a  biological  mutant. 
He  appears  sporadically.  At  this  point  Nietzsche's 
inconsistency  becomes  obvious.  For  example,  if 
geniuses  appear  sporadically  and  without  reference 
to  biological  laws,  why  attempt  to  arrange  mar- 
riages so  as  to  produce  supermen?  To  get  himself 
out  of  the  dilemma,  Nietzsche  postulated  cyclical 
returns  of  supermen  and  lost  his  bearings  in  trying 
to  interpret  an  endless  circular  movement  in  social 
evolution,  endlessly  repeating  itself.  In  an  applied 
form  Nietzsche's  philosophy  has  appeared  in  Ger- 
man political  life,  but  to  the  defeat  of  Germany. 

In  starting  points,  Nietzsche  and  Gumplowicz 
were  widely  different.  Nietzsche  began  with  an 
apotheosis  of  the  man  of  power  and  extolled  the 
achievements  of  supermen.  Gumplowicz  had  little 
place  for  the  individual,  even  for  the  most  power- 
ful. Both  sets  of  theories  ended  in  a  deterministic 
philosophy  of  individual  and  social  despair. 

An  unusually  fundamental  delineation  of  social 
conflict  has  been  advanced  by  Simon  N.  Patten  in 
his  Theory  of  Social  Forces.6  Human  society  is  the 
product  largely  of  a  pain  economy  in  which  the 
requisites  for  survival  are  determined  "by  the  ene- 
mies and  pains  to  be  avoided."  In  a  like  manner  a 


344  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

pain  morality  and  a  pain  religion  develop.  The  pur- 
pose of  the  pain  morality  is  "to  keep  persons  from 
committing  acts  and  putting  themselves  in  situa- 
tions which  lead  to  destruction."  The  pain  religion, 
likewise,  aims  to  invoke  the  aid  of  higher  powers 
in  the  human  conflict  with  enemies  and  death.  The 
social  forces  in  a  pain  economy  have  been  builded 
up  in  the  form  of  sets  of  ideals,  instincts,  and 
habits. 

Society,  however,  is  now  in  a  transition  stage — 
entering  a  pleasure  economy.  A  large  number  of 
the  sources  of  pain  have  been  eliminated  through 
the  inventive  and  administrative  phases  of  civiliza- 
tion. Dangerous  beasts  and  reptiles,  barbarous  in- 
vasions, and  superstitious  interpretations  are  un- 
common among  the  advanced  human  groups. 

No  nation,  unfortunately,  has  been  able  to  live 
under  a  pleasure  economy.  Its  members  have  not 
built  up  sets  of  instincts,  habits,  and  ideals  that 
withstand  the  effects  of  a  pleasure  economy.  Con- 
sequently, individuals  and  nations  have  fallen  into 
lethargy,  vice,  and  decay.  The  enemies  in  a  pleas- 
ure economy  are  found  within  the  individual ;  these 
are  as  yet  unconquered  under  the  allurements  of  a 
pleasure  environment.  In  discussing  the  conflicts 
between  these  habits  and  ideals,  Dr.  Patten  may 
err  in  implying  that  the  race  once  was  not  in  a  pain 
economy  and  hence  did  not  originally  develop  out 
of  such  an  environment,  but  he  nevertheless  has 
analyzed  an  important  societal  fact  in  his  pain- 


CONFLICT  THEORIES  345 

pleasure  transition  concept. 

Another  type  of  conflict  theory  of  society  is  ad- 
vanced by  Thomas  Nixon  Carver.  Professor  Car- 
ver begins  his  analysis  with  a  discussion  of  the  con- 
flict of  human  interests.  Originally  all  conflicts 
were  settled  on  the  basis  of  might.  But  conflicts 
between  persons  who  are  beginning  to  think,  some- 
times lead  one  or  each  of  the  contending  parties  to 
a  consideration  of  adjusting  the  conflict  by  other 
than  physical  strife.  At  this  point  the  concept  of 
justice  begins  to  take  form. 

Justice,  according  to  Dr.  Carver,  is  "that  system 
of  adjusting  conflicting  interests  which  makes  the 
group  strong  and  progressive."7  Virtue  and 
strength  are  pronounced  identical,  and  strength  is 
denned  "according  to  its  ability  to  make  itself  uni- 
versal/' 

Conflict  arises  out  of  scarcity.  Where  two  men 
want  the  same  thing,  conflict  ensues.  It  is  this  an- 
tagonism of  interests  which  produces  moral  prob- 
lems and  furnishes  a  basis  of  determining  justice 
and  injustice.  One  reason  for  the  lack  of  supply 
of  things  which  people  seek  is  that  in  society  human 
wants  are  unduly  expended.  If  wants  could  be  kept 
low  and  production  high,  an  adaptation  of  people 
to  things  would  take  place  which  would  greatly 
lessen  conflict. 

Conflicts  take  place  in  three  different  fields:  (1) 
between  man  and  nature,  (2)  between  man  and 
man,  and  (3)  between  the  different  interests  of  the 


346  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

same  man.8  If  there  were  no  such  conflicts,  there 
would  be  no  moral  problems.  The  result  would  be 
paradise. 

The  institutions  of  property,  the  family,  and  the 
state  have  developed  out  of  antagonism  of  interests, 
which  in  turn,  as  has  been  said,  is  the  result  of 
scarcity.  If  things  were  not  scarce,  no  one  would 
think  of  claiming  property  in  anything.  In  a  simi- 
lar way  the  kinship  group  becomes  desirous  of  pos- 
sessing property  and  hence  acquires  unity.  In  as- 
serting that  the  unifying  principle  in  the  family  is 
an  economic  one,  Dr.  Carver  espouses  a  theory  of 
economic  determinism.  In  fact,  he  holds  that  "the 
economic  problem  is  the  fundamental  one,  out  of 
which  all  other  social  and  moral  problems  have 
grown/'9 

Dr.  Carver  somewhat  softens  his  rigorous  social 
theories  when  he  admits  that  there  may  be  a  few 
people  in  the  world  whose  feeling  of  Humanity  is 
strong  enough  to  overbalance  an  antagonism  of  in- 
terests and  to  lead  them  to  treat  the  world  as  a  nor- 
mal individual  treats  his  family.10  A  world  of  such 
people  would  make  a  world  of  communism.  But 
such  a  world  is  unthinkable,  because  world-loving 
people  are  social  aberrations.  The  individual  whose 
altruism  is  such  that  he  gladly  gives  his  body  to  a 
tiger,  is  not  helping  to  transform  the  world  into  a 
world  of  saints  but  into  a  world  of  tigers.11  Ex- 
treme forms  of  benevolence  and  meekness  constitute 
the  very  food  upon  which  selfishness  fattens,12 


CONFLICT  THEORIES  347 

Professor  Carver,  therefore,  points  out  two 
sources  of  conflict,  namely,  scarcity  of  desirable 
things  and  self-centered  appreciation.  These  two 
bases  of  conflict  are  fundamentally  natural  and  nor- 
mal. Conflicts  appear,  however,  in  a  great  variety 
of  forms.  This  classification  of  the  methods  of 
struggling  for  existence  is  fourfold.13 

(1)  There  is  a  group  of  conflicts  which  are  pri- 
marily destructive,  such  as  war,  robbery,  dueling, 
sabotage,  brawling.     These  conflicts  are  all  crude, 
primitive,  brutal.    They  represent  man  at  his  lowest 
ebb.    They   are   militant   in   character,   depending 
upon  the  individual's  power  to  destroy,  to  harm,  or 
to  inflict  pain  and  injury.14 

(2)  Deceptive  conflicts  are  of  an  order  slightly 
higher  than  the  militant.     They  include  thieving, 
swindling,  adulteration  of  goods,  false  advertising. 
They  imply  a  greater  degree  of  intelligence  than  the 
purely  destructive  types  of  conflict. 

(3)  Another  form  of  conflict  is  persuasive  in 
character,  for  example,  political,  erotic,  commercial, 
and  legal  conflicts.     Political  competition  includes 
seeking  governmental  appointments,   running  for 
office,  campaigning  for  a  political  party.     Erotic 
conflicts  are  in  the  main  different  forms  of  court- 
ship.    Commercial  persuasion  utilizes  the  agencies 
of  advertising  and  salesmanship.     Legal  conflicts 
include  litigations  in  the  courts.     In  all  these  illus- 
trations the  individual  strives  to  further  his  own 
interests    by    his    persuative    ability.     Oftentimes 


348  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

resort  is  made  to  cheap  persuasive  methods,  such 
as  demagogy  or  political  claptrap.  Sometimes  the 
persuasion  falls  to  the  level  of  deception  and,  occa- 
sionally, to  destructive  depths. 

(4)  The  highest  form  of  conflicts  are  the  pro- 
ductive types.  Some  productive  conflicts  refer  to 
rivalries  in  producing  economic  goods;  others  to 
rivalries  in  rendering  service.  In  his  Essays  in 
Social  Justice,  Professor  Carver  discusses  three 
forms  of  economic  competition  at  length.  Here  he 
includes  competitive  production,  competitive  bar- 
gaining, and  competitive  consumption  of  economic 
goods.  The  second  class  has  already  been  referred 
to  as  commercial  persuasion.  Competitive  produc- 
tion increases  the  supply  of  economic  goods  and 
"always  works  well."  Competitive  consumption, 
however,  "always  works  badly."  It  means  "rivalry 
in  display,  in  ostentation,  in  the  effort  to  outshine 
or  to  outdress  all  one's  neighbors,  or  at  least  not  to 
be  outshone  or  outdressed  by  them."  It  is  usually 
deceptive;  it  has  no  productive  features  about  it. 
It  may  even  assume  a  form  of  waste  and  destruc- 
tion. The  highest  type  of  conflict  is  friendly  rivalry 
in  rendering  service  to  other  people. 

Professor  Carver  would  have  self-interest  direct 
its  efforts  toward  the  welfare  of  the  nation.  Since 
neither  law  nor  government  can  eliminate  self- 
interest,  the  next  best  thing  is  to  connect  it  with 
national  well-being.  Nearly  all  useful  things  that 
are  done  in  a  community  are  undertaken  through 


CONFLICT  THEORIES  349 

self-interest.15  Even  co-operation  is  a  form  of  com- 
petition.16 The  purpose  of  co-operation  is  to  enable 
groups  of  individuals  to  compete  more  effectively 
against  opposing  groups. 

Competition  is  not  an  evil  in  itself.  The  spirit 
which  dominates  competition  is  the  important  thing. 
Some  people  are  motivated  by  the  pig-trough  phil- 
osophy, which  emphasizes  struggle  for  the  sake  of 
possession  and  consumption  of  goods.  The  work- 
bench philosophy  accents  "action  and  not  posses- 
sion, production  and  not  consumption/' 

These  theories,  excellent  in  many  particulars, 
apparently  do  not  rate  at  full  value  the  fact  that 
education  and  love  can  and  do  modify  the  self- 
interest  of  the  individual,  and  at  the  same  time  di- 
rect the  attention  of  the  individual  toward  unselfish 
service.  In  stressing  service  through  achievement 
and  production,  they  neglect  to  emphasize  achieve- 
ment through  service.  Competition  in  rendering 
unselfish  service  is  underrated. 

It  was  Novicow,  the  Russian  sociologist,  who 
laid  bare  the  alleged  benefits  of  war,  showing 
that  the  gains  which  come  from  war  may  be  ob- 
tained through  other  methods  of  social  interac- 
tion.17 Novicow  argued  forcefully  that  the  real 
enemies  of  a  group  of  people  are  disease  germs  and 
death,  not  the  best  people  of  other  nationality 
groups.  Novicow's  vision  enabled  him  to  perceive 
the  foolishnes  of  men  who  lock  themselves  together 
in  destructive  conflict,  when  the  real  enemies  are 


350  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

microscopic  disease  bacteria  and  the  gaunt  black 
specter  of  death. 

Conflict  bulks  large  in  the  sociology  of  Edward 
A.  Ross.  Any  interference  with  the  carrying  out 
of  the  individual's  plans  and  with  the  satisfying  of 
his  interests  creates  opposition.  The  best  charac- 
teristic of  the  phenomenon  of  opposition  is  that  it 
awakens  and  stimulates.18  Competition  operates 
according  to  psychologic  laws ;  for  example,  the  in- 
tensity of  competition  varies  according  (1)  to  the 
degree  of  personal  liberty,  (2)  to  the  rate  of  social 
change,  and  (3)  inversely  as  the  efficiency  of  the 
selective  agents.19 

One  of  the  most  important  forms  of  competition 
is  found  in  industrialism.  The  invention  and  adop- 
tion of  the  power-driven  machine  has  created  an 
industrialism  which  is  moulding  and  transforming 
society  in  startling  ways,  and  which  is  causing  "its 
members  more  and  more  to  cluster  at  opposite  poles 
of  the  social  spindle. "'  Professor  Ross  expresses 
slight  hope  that  the  ownership  of  industrial  capital 
will  be  disseminated  through  the  working  class  ac- 
cording to  the  conflict  rules  of  the  present  economic 
system. 

Other  conflict  theories  will  be  presented  in  the 
following  chapters;  for  example,  the  conflict  the- 
ories of  Gustav  Ratzenhofer  and  Albion  W.  Small 
will  be  noted  in  the  chapter  on  co-operation  con- 
cepts, and  Gabriel  Tarde's  analysis  of  conflict  will 
be  taken  up  in  the  discussion  of  psycho-sociological 


CONFLICT  THEORIES  351 

thought. 

In  general,  the  social  conflict  doctrines,  when 
carried  to  the  extreme,  fail  to  recognize  that  conflict 
and  co-operation  are  correlative  social  processes. 
Humanly  speaking,  one  is  as  old  as  the  other.  Both 
spring  from  the  deepest  types  of  human  needs.  /( 
While  the  earliest  types  of  associative  life  may 
have  been  characterized  by  a  predominance  of  con- 
flict, the  highest  stages  are  ruled  by  the  co-opera- 
tive spirit.  This  transition  together  with  the  lead- 
ing co-operation  theories  of  social  progress  will  be  s 
taken  up  in  the  chapter  which  follows. 

Suffice  it  to  say  here  that  conflict  and  competition 
are  essential  to  social  advance.  They  are  both 
highly  useful  when  operating  in  the  fields  of  pro- 
duction and  service. 


CHAPTER  XXI 
CO-OPERATION  THEORIES  IN  SOCIOLOGY 


One  of  the  first  persons  to  work  out  a  systematic 
interpretation  of  co-operation  was  Giovanni  Vico 
(1668-1744),  an  Italian  philosopher.1  Vico  rejected 
the  social  contract  idea  because  he  believed  that  it 
was  a  false  interpretation  of  the  true  principle  of 
co-operation.  The  concept  of  a  social  contract  em- 
bodied an  artificial  and  metaphysical  notion  of 
social  life. 

In  his  chief  work,  Principles  of  a  New  Science 
Concerning  the  Common  Nature  of  Nations,  Vico 
inaugurated  a  study  of  actual  social  phenomena. 
He  sought  to  discover  possible  social  laws.  He  at- 
tempted to  cast  aside  the  accidental  social  ele- 
ments and  to  organize  the  regularities  of  social 
phenomena  into  laws.  He  searched  for  the  laws 
governing  the  growth  and  decay  of  societies.  He 
undertook  to  analyze  the  history  of  human  society. 

Although  Vico's  important  treatise  was  not 
known  outside  of  Italy  until  a  century  and  a  half 
after  it  was  originally  published,  it  contained  a 
statement  of  the  factor  which  is  basic  to  any  sound 
co-operation  theory  of  social  progress.  Vico  was 
one  of  the  first  writers  to  describe  the  principle 


CO-OPERATION  THEORIES  353 

that  all  human  groups  have  a  common  nature.  His 
comparative  studies  of  human  institutions  every- 
where, led  him  always  to  the  belief  in  the  common 
mind  of  mankind,  a  concept  which  in  recent  years 
has  been  ably  elaborated  by  D.  G.  Brinton.  For 
this  contribution  Vico  has  been  called  "the  father 
of  sociology." 

According  to  Vico,  the  fundamental  social  move- 
ment is  a  gradual  unfolding  or  evolution  of  social 
institutions  in  response  to  the  common  needs  of 
people.  Society  owes  its  development  in  part  to 
the  reflections  of  the  wise,  as  the  social  contract 
theorists  have  said,  but  also  to  the  human  feelings 
even  of  the  brutish.  This  natural  sociability  of 
man  has  furnished  the  chief  basis  for  the  rise  and 
development  of  the  spirit  of  co-operation. 

The  natural  sociability  of  human  beings  has  led, 
more  or  less  unconsciously  on  the  part  of  man,  to 
the  establishment  of  necessary  social  relations  and 
institutions.  The  purpose  of  social  organization  is 
to  produce  perfect  human  personalities.  Vico  out- 
lined the  evolutionary  character  of  society  accord- 
ing to  the  spiral  theory,  namely,  that  society  does  re- 
turn upon  itself  but  that,  when  it  completes  a  cycle, 
it  is  upon  a  higher  plane  of  co-operation  than  when 
the  given  cycle  began.  Vico  also  made  religion  a 
necessary  principle  of  progress.  Although  in  ad- 
justing himself  to  the  prevailing  theological  dogmas 
of  his  time,  Vico  committed  serious  scientific  errors, 
he  nevertheless  is  deserving  of  special  credit  for  his 


354  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

emphasis  upon  the  common  nature  and  natural 
sociability  of  mankind. 

Hugo  Grotius  (1583-1645),  the  celebrated  Dutch 
scholar,  gave  to  social  thought  the  international 
concept.  He  advanced  the  idea  of  the  coming  co- 
operation among  the  nations — nations  which  in  his 
time  were  moved  primarily  by  jealousy  and  hatred 
in  their  relations  with  one  another.  Grotius  was 
the  originator  of  a  definite  set  of  principles  and 
laws  for  international  co-operation.  His  work  in 
this  regard  accentuated  the  importance  of  like- 
mindedness  in  matters  of  international  polity. 

Spinoza,  whose  contributions  regarding  the  con- 
cept of  sovereignty  have  already  been  stated, 
declared  that  the  instinct  to  acquire  is  naturally 
stronger  than  the  tendency  to  share.  Hence,  man 
must  be  educated  to  perceive  the  advantages  of  co- 
operative living.  When  this  appreciation  occurs, 
when  the  advantages  of  co-operation  become  clear, 
then  man  will  sublimate  his  egoistic  and  self-seek- 
ing desires  to  altruistic  communal  living.  As  man 
comes  to  understand,  step  by  step,  the  values  of 
co-operative  conduct,  he  will  overcome,  degree  by 
degree,  his  selfish  impulses. 

The  references  which  were  made  in  Chapter  XIV 
to  the  work  and  writings  of  certain  socialists,  such 
as  Robert  Owen,  form  another  link  in  this  discus- 
sion of  the  development  of  the  co-operation  concept. 
While  the  experiments  in  consumers'  co-operation, 
such  as  the  activities  of  the  Rochdale  Pioneers, 


CO-OPERATION  THEORIES  355 

have  had  splendid  success  in  many  countries,  they 
have  demonstrated  that  they  can  flourish  only  in  an 
environment  where  the  co-operative  spirit  rules. 
While  the  experiments  in  producers'  co-operation 
have  often  failed  and  have  not  yet  as  a  class  been 
successful,  they  have  testified  to  the  absence  of  a 
developed  co-operative  spirit  rather  than  to  the 
failure  of  the  principle  upon  which  they  are  based. 

Peter  Kropotkin,  whose  opposition  to  socialism 
was  indicated  in  Chapter  XIV,  rendered  a  useful 
service  in  writing  his  Mutual  Aid;  a  Factor  in 
Evolution.  Kropotkin,  a  loyal  Darwinian,  pro- 
tested against  the  falsely  labeled  "social  Darwinian- 
ism/'3  Kropotkin  made  plain  that  Darwin's  inter- 
pretation of  evolution,  while  stressing  the  struggle 
for  existence,  also  pointed  out  that  there  is  in  evo- 
lution a  powerful  tide  of  co-operation.  The  logical 
conclusion  of  this  treatment  of  evolution,  accord- 
ing to  Kropotkin,  is  not  a  phase  of  "social  Darwin- 
ianism"  with  its  emphasis  upon  a  biological  struggle 
in  the  highest  human  realms,  but  a  world  of  human 
association  in  which  the  co-operative  spirit  has  risen 
to  a  position  of  control  over  physical  force  and 
selfish  desire. 

Kropotkin  studied  animal  life  extensively  and 
concluded  that,  although  there  was  among  animals 
a  severe  struggle  against  a  heartless  Nature,  there 
was  essentially  no  bitter  struggle  for  existence 
"among  animals  belonging  to  the  same  species/" 
There  is  no  pitiless  inner  war  for  life  within  this 


356  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

species,  and  moreover,  this  alleged  war  is  not  a  con- 
dition of  progress.  War,  declared  Kropotkin,  is 
not  a  condition  of  social  progress. 

Kropotkin  considered  the  clan  and  the  tribe 
rather  than  the  individual  or  even  the  family  the 
starting  point  of  society.  The  tribe  itself  developed 
a  morale  on  the  basis  of  beliefs  in  its  common  origin 
and  in  the  worship  of  common  ancestors.  Then 
the  possession  in  common  of  certain  lands  served 
to  arouse  new  tribal  loyalties.  These  loyalties  ex- 
pressed themselves  in  the  form  of  "con-jurations," 
sworn  agreements,  and  ultimately  in  fraternities 
and  guilds  for  mutual  support.  Kropotkin  believed 
that  primitive  man  was  naturally  peaceful,  and  that 
he  fought  from  necessity  rather  than  from  ferocity. 

In  primitive  communal  organization  the  judge 
and  military  chief  united  for  "mutual  insurance  of 
domination,"  drawing  to  their  support  the  slavish 
loyalty  of  the  witch-doctor  or  priest.  In  the  twelfth 
century,  however,  the  old  communal  spirit  broke 
forth  with  "striking  spontaneity  all  over  Europe;" 
it  stopped  for  a  time  the  growth  of  the  despotic 
monarchies  of  Europe;  it  produced  endless  numbers 
of  communes. 

The  free  cities  developed  under  the  shelter  of 
communal  liberties,  and  in  them  art  and  invention 
flourished,  producing  the  beauty  of  Raphael,  the 
vigor  of  Michaelangelo,  the  poetry  of  Dante,  and 
"the  discoveries  which  have  been  made  by  modern 
science, — the  compass,  the  clock,  the  watch,  print- 


CO-OPERATION  THEORIES  357 

ing,  gunpowder,  the  maritime  discoveries,  the  law 
of  gravitation/'* 

Then,  there  came  the  modern  State  formed  by  a 
triple  alliance  of  the  military  chief,  the  Roman 
judge,  and  the  priest.  The  industrial  revolution 
and  the  rise  of  capitalism  furthered  the  interests 
of  the  military-legal-priestly  triumvirate.  When 
the  State  and  Church  were  separated,  the  money 
baron  took  the  place  of  the  priest  in  the  triumvirate. 
With  the  overthrow  of  militarism  the  power  of  the 
triumvirate  is  broken,  and  the  old  communal  co- 
operative feelings  of  man  again  begin  to  express 
themselves.  Kropotkin  led  the  way  in  defining  the 
law  of  co-operative  individualism.  He  urged  de- 
centralization in  social  control,  and  attacked  mon- 
opolies of  all  types,  public  as  well  as  private.  Al- 
though he  exaggerated  the  role  of  mutual  aid  in 
primitive  society,  considering  it  the  main  social 
factor,  he  nevertheless  rendered  a  valuable  service 
in  giving  the  world  a  vigorous  presentation  of  a 
significant  concept. 

The  social  process  was  analyzed  in  terms  of  both 
conflict  and  co-operation  by  Gustav  Ratzenhofer 
(1842-1904).  It  is  characterized  by  a  continuous 
reappearance  of  the  phenomena  of  individualization 
of  structures  already  extant.5  Both  differentiation 
and  socialization  arise  out  of  the  operation  of  hu- 
man interests.  Both  are  implicit  in  the  nature  of 
man.  Certain  human  interests  lead  to  individuali- 
zation and  some  to  communitization. 


358  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

At  this  point  we  encounter  Ratzenhof  er's  theory 
of  force.  Force  and  interest  are  made  the  two 
primordial  principles.  These  two  factors  work  to- 
gether in  order  to  secure  for  the  individual  the 
largest  possible  degree  of  self  development. 

The  struggle  of  pre-primitive  men  against  the 
harsh  phases  of  nature  established  a  pre-primitive 
sociality.  Struggle  has  always  led  to  co-operation 
in  the  interests  of  preservation.  Similarly,  war 
leads  to  co-operation.  In  primitive  society  insti- 
tutions arose  in  response  to  community  needs. 
Among  barbarians  the  increase  in  numbers  pro- 
duced an  increasing  emphasis  upon  conflict,  which 
was  expressed  in  robberies,  wars,  and  enslavements. 
Warfare  led  to  the  formation  of  classes  and  class 
conflicts.  Class  interests,  as  distinguished  from  in- 
dividual interests,  then  began  to  secure  definition. 
With  the  rise  of  capitalism,  the  interests  of  capital 
were  asserted ;  and  at  once  the  interests  of  labor,  in 
apposition,  assumed  tangible  expression.  A  stage, 
however,  of  stable  social  conditions  is  coming,  in 
which  the  whole  world  will  be  organized  on  the 
basis  of  a  single  system  of  economic  and  non- 
competing  production  and  of  free  international  ex- 
change.6 

Throughout  this  analysis  Ratzenhof er  gives  force 
a  leading  place.7  He  also  develops  a  theory  of  a 
ruling  aristocracy  of  supermen.  Despite  these  un- 
fortunate emphases,  Ratzenhofer's  contribution  to 
social  thought  in  his  theory  of  interests  as  dom- 


CO-OPERATION  THEORIES  359 

inating  human  factors,  and  his  accent  upon  the  rise 
of  an  increasing  degree  of  co-operation,  is  note- 
worthy. 

Professor  Albion  Small,  whose  methodology  will 
be  indicated  in  Chapter  XXVII,  has  modified,  cor- 
rected, and  refined  Ratzenhofer's  theory  of  in- 
terests. "In  the  beginning  were  interests,"  says 
Professor  Small.8  An  "interest"  is  defined  as  an 
unsatisfied  capacity,  an  unrealized  condition  of  the 
organism,  a  tendency  securing  satisfaction  of  an 
unsatisfied  capacity.9  In  its  subjective  phase  an  in- 
terest is  a  desire,  and  in  its  objective  phase,  a  want. 
An  interest  is  developed  when  the  individual  knows 
something,  feels  something,  or  wills  something. 
Consequently,  the  whole  individual  or  social  process 
consists  in  developing,  adjusting,  and  satisfying 
interests. 

The  six  groups  into  which  Professor  Small  di- 
vides all  interests  are  as  follows :  ( 1 )  The  health 
interest  arises  from  the  sheer  interest  in  keeping 
alive.  It  is  expressed  in  the  food  interest,  the  sex 
interest,  the  work  interest  and  includes  all  the 
desires  which  find  satisfaction  in  the  exercise  of  the 
powers  of  the  body.  (2)  The  wealth  interest  is 
encompassed  in  the  desire  for  mastery  over  things. 
(3)  The  sociability  interest  is  represented  at  its 
best  by  the  appetite  for  personal  interchanges  of 
stimulus  of  a  purely  spiritual  nature.  (4)  The 
knowledge  interest  arises  from  the  curiosity  im- 
pulses. The  limits  of  its  possibilities  are  expressed 


360  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

in  the  terms,  nescience  and  omniscience.  (5)  The 
beauty  interest  secures  satisfaction  through  an  ap- 
preciation of  the  symmetrical  phases  of  material 
and  spiritual  phenomena.  (6)  The  Tightness  in- 
terest traverses  the  gamut  of  all  other  interests.  It 
results  in  enjoyment  when  it  secures  the  sanction 
of  the  individual's  ideal  self  or  of  his  whole  self. 

Each  of  these  interests  tends  to  be  absolute.10 
Each  seeks  satisfaction  regardless  of  the  others.  In 
consequence,  there  is  a  universal  conflict  of  in- 
terests. Moreover,  there  is  a  universal  conjunction 
of  interests.  The  conflict,  however,  is  more  spec- 
tacular than  the  conjunction.  In  the  history  of 
mankind  this  conflict  has  been  the  predominating 
relationship.  The  social  process  has  resolved  itself 
into  a  series  of  reactions  between  persons  some  of 
whose  interests  comport,  but  others  of  which  con- 
flict. Furthermore,  the  social  process  is  a  continual 
formation  of  groups  and  institutions  around  in- 
terests. It  is  a  perpetual  equating  and  adjusting  of 
interests;11  it  is  a  rhythm  of  differentiations  and 
integrations. 

Professor  Small  points  out  that  struggle  and 
co-operation  are  always  to  a  certain  extent  func- 
tions of  each  other.12  Moreover,  in  the  social 
process  viewed  historically,  there  is  a  movement 
"from  a  maximum  toward  a  minimum  of  conflict, 
from  a  minimum  toward  a  maximum  of  helpful 
reciprocity/'  The  social  process,  thus,  is  a  per- 
petual readjustment  between  the  forces  which  "tend 


CO-OPERATION  THEORIES  361 

backward  toward  more  struggle,  and  those  that 
tend  forward  toward  more  socialization."  By  a 
minimum  of  conflict,  Professor  Small  does  not 
mean  absence  of  conflict,  for  he  recognizes  that 
stagnation  would  result  in  a  society  in  which  con- 
flict was  eliminated.  By  a  maximum  of  co-opera- 
tion he  does  not  refer  to  a  state  of  complete  social 
solidification,  which  in  turn  would  mean  stagnation 
and  death. 

The  fundamental  social  problem  is  to  give  free 
scope  to  those  interests  which  require  the  fullest 
rational  development  of  all  other  interests.  The 
social  problem  is  to  intellectualize  all  the  interests, 
and  moreover,  to  intellectualize  the  conflict  of  in- 
terests. Hence  the  fundamental  conflict  today  is 
between  the  knowledge  interest  and  all  other  in- 
terests.13 Socialization,  then,  becomes  the  process 
of  transforming  conflict  into  co-operation. 

Sociology  may  be  said  to  be  the  study  of  human 
interests,  together  with  their  conflicts  and  reciproc- 
ities. It  is  an  interpretation  of  human  association 
in  terms  of  the  effective  interests  of  man.  It  focal- 
izes within  one  field  of  vision  all  human  activities 
so  that  the  persons  who  have  the  benefit  of  this 
outlook  may  rate  their  own  activities  in  relation  to 
the  whole. 

In  a  concrete,  specific  way  Professor  Small  has 
presented  his  theory  of  the  social  process  in 
the  book,  Between  Eras,  From  Capitalism  to  De- 
mocracy. Here  is  a  vivid  picture  of  the  conflict 


362  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

between  labor  and  capital,  with  the  resultant  mis- 
understandings and  injustices.  A  young  lady, 
Hector,  observes  the  essential  activities  of  labor 
and  capital,  and  as  a  representative  of  capital  per- 
ceives the  relationship  which  actually  exists  between 
herself  and  one  of  the  working  girls.  She  receives 
large  dividends,  for  which  she  puts  nothing  into  the 
productive  activities  of  the  corporation.  The  work- 
ing girl  is  paid  low  wages,  but  is  giving  her  life  to 
the  industrial  concern  from  which  Hector's  liberal 
dividends  are  pouring  forth.  The  main  end  of  the 
discussion  is  an  argument  for  the  establishment  of 
the  principle  of  industrial  democracy.  Professor 
Small  urges  that  the  employees,  per  se,  be  given 
representation  on  boards  of  directors.  While  this 
representation  at  first  will  necessarily  be  a  minority 
one,  it  will  serve  the  useful  purpose  of  providing 
for  regular  meetings  of  the  representatives  of  the 
employees  around  the  same  council  table.  These 
council  meetings  will  enable  the  representatives  of 
either  party  in  the  bitter  labor-capital  conflict  to 
become  acquainted  with  the  problems  which  the 
opposing  group  faces.  In  this  interchange  Profes- 
sor Small  sees  the  rise  of  a  spirit  of  co-operation 
which  will  melt  many  of  the  difficulties  that  have 
sprung  up  in  the  controversy  between  capital  and 
labor.14  Although  Dr.  Small's  Between  Eras  was 
published  in  1913,  the  idea  of  industrial  representa- 
tion was  not  considered  seriously  in  the  United 
States  until  about  1918.  The  initial  steps  which 


CO-OPERATION  THEORIES  363 

have  thus  far  been  taken  toward  industrial  repre- 
sentation in  the  management  of  business  and  in  the 
determination  of  wages,  hours,  and  conditions  of 
labor,  have  produced  noteworthy  co-operative  re- 
sults and  have  fully  justified  Professor  Small's 
prophetic  recommendation  for  the  solution  of  a 
world-disturbing  social  situation. 

The  primordial  social  group,  according  to  Pro- 
fessor E.  A.  Ross,  is  a  band  of  mothers  and  their 
children.  In  such  groupings  preliminary  socializa- 
tion took  place.  In  earliest  societies  definite  prin- 
ciples of  human  action  made  themselves  evident.15 
Domination  was  one  of  the  ruling  principles.  Note 
for  example  the  domination  (1)  by  parents  over 
offspring,  (2)  by  old  over  young,  (3)  by  husband 
over  wife,  (4)  by  men  over  women,  (5)  by  the 
military  over  the  industrial  classes,  (6)  by  the 
wealthy  over  the  poor.  The  chief  purpose  in 
dominating  is  to  exploit,  that  is,  to  use  other  in- 
dividuals as  means  to  one's  own  ends.16 

Socialization,  or  social  adaptation,  runs  the 
gamut  of  toleration,  compromise,  accommodation, 
and  amalgamation.  The  simplest  form  of  co-opera- 
tion is  mutual  aid,  which,  however,  is  more  popular 
among  the  lower  classes  than  among  the  higher. 
Socialization,  it  may  be  noted  here,  has  been  shown 
by  E.  W.  Burgess  to  be  the  fundamental  process  in 
the  determination  of  social  progress.17 

Organization  of  effort  is  a  specific  societal 
method,  which  has  developed  in  society,  for  getting 


364  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

things  done.  Organization  results  (1)  in  the  ac- 
complishment of  ends  which  are  unattainable  other- 
wise, (2)  in  arousing  a  common  interest  intermit- 
tently in  all,  (3)  in  dividing  a  task  into  its  natural 
parts,  (4)  in  securing  a  degree  of  expertness,  (5) 
in  producing  a  co-ordinated,  intelligent  plan,  (6)  in 
eliminating  needless  duplication  of  effort.18  On  the 
other  hand,  organization  leads  to  wastes  and 
abuses,  which  are:  (1)  overhead  expenses;  (2) 
undue  time  devoted  to  making  out  reports  and  simi- 
lar routine  work;  (3)  a  loss  in  personal  contacts; 
(4)  a  tendency  to  formalism  and  red  tape;  (5)  an 
inflexibility  of  machinery;  (6)  a  misapplication  of 
power  to  personal  ends;  (7)  too  much  specializa- 
tion; (8)  the  organization  becomes  an  end  in  itself. 

Socialization,  in  content,  is  the  development  of  a 
we-feeling  in  a  number  of  persons,  and  "their 
growth  in  capacity  and  will  to  act  together."19  A 
very  simple  causal  factor  of  this  process  is  the  age- 
long custom  of  giving  a  banquet,  that  is,  in  eating 
and  drinking  together.  A  consciousness  of  kind 
arises  which,  as  Professor  Ross  believes,  is  not  the 
perception  of  a  general  resemblance  but  "an  aware- 
ness of  likeness  or  agreement  in  specific  matters."2 
Nationalism,  or  the  process  of  creating  a  spirit  of 
national  patriotism,  illustrates  the  meaning  of  the 
socialization  concept. 

The  sociology  of  L.  T.  Hobhouse,  discussed  in 
part  in  Chapter  XVIII,  is  largely  an  interpretation 
of  society  in  terms  of  increasing  co-operation.  Pro- 


CO-OPERATION  THEORIES  365 

fessor  Hobhouse  has  defined  social  progress  as  the 
development  of  the  principle  of  union,  order,  co- 
operation, and  harmony  among  individuals.  He  has 
described  a  certain  mutual  interest,  similar  to  Gid- 
dings'  consciousness  of  kind,  which  has  served  to 
keep  individuals  together,  from  the  lowest  groups 
of  savages  to  the  highest  civilized  groups.21 

The  social  process,  as  Professor  Cooley  analyzes 
it,  is  not  a  series  of  futile  repetitions  or  brutal  and 
wasteful  conflicts,  but  an  eternal,  onward  growth 
which  produces  increasingly  humane,  rational,  and 
co-operative  beings.  While  the  element  of  conflict 
is  useful  in  that  it  awakens  and  directs  human  at- 
tention and  thus  leads  to  activity,  it  is  limited  by 
a  superintending  factor  of  co-operation  and  organi- 
zation to  which  the  contestants  must  adjust  them- 
selves if  they  would  succeed.22 

The  discussions  in  this  and  the  preceding  chapter 
have  shown  that  the  natural  trend  of  evolution  is 
away  from  a  pitiless  competitive  and  destructive 
social  process,  and  toward  a  tempered,  productive, 
and  co-operative  process.  Of  course,  there  are  re- 
actionary movements  from  time  to  time  which  halt 
the  co-operative  trend.  On  the  other  hand,  the  de- 
velopment of  reason  gradually  eliminates  the  more 
brutal  effects  of  conflict.  Conflict,  however,  will 
always  remain,  as  far  as  can  now  be  seen,  an  essen- 
tial factor  in  the  processes  of  individual  and  societal 
growth.  Through  rational  controls,  it  will  operate 
in  the  direction  and  interest  of  the  co-operative 


366  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

spirit.  In  the  old  social  order,  hate  and  the  spirit 
of  conflict  have  ruled.  The  spirit  of  co-operation 
has  often  been  utilized  only  for  selfish  purposes.  In 
the  coming  social  order  love  and  the  co-operative 
spirit  will  direct,  while  the  spirit  of  conflict  will  play 
a  vital  but  secondary  role. 


CHAPTER  XXII 

PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT 


A  large  number  of  references  have  already  been 
made  to  psycho-sociologic  thought.  In  origin  It 
may  be  traced  to  the  primitive  days  of  the  race. 
The  folkways  reveal  keen  psycho-sociologic  obser- 
vations. Undoubtedly,  many  phases  of  the  psychic 
nature  of  group  activities  were  known  to  the  leaders 
of  ancient  civilizations.  Plato  wrote  on  the  im- 
portance of  custom  and  custom  imitation  as  a  socie- 
tal force.  Aristotle  understood  the  socio-psychic 
nature  of  man  when  he  observed  that  property 
which  is  owned  in  common  is  least  taken  care  of, 
and  when  he  declared  that  a  fundamental  test  of 
good  government  may  be  found  in  the  attitude  of 
a  people  toward  public  service.  In  his  theory  of 
social  attitudes  Aristotle  made  a  distinct  contribu- 
tion to  psycho-sociologic  thought. 

Thomas  More  analyzed  the  causes  of  human  ac- 
tions. He  was  a  worthy  social  psychologist  when 
he  protested  against  heaping  punishment  upon 
human  beings,  without  attempting  to  understand 
the  causes  of  criminal  conduct  and  without  seeking 
to  remove  the  societal  causes  of  such  conduct. 
Bodin  postulated  a  theory  of  interests  in  his  ex- 


368  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

planation  of  social  evolution.  He  made  the  com- 
mon economic,  religious,  and  other  interests  of  man 
the  basis  of  social  organization.  These  interests, 
according  to  Bodin,  led  primitive  families  to  form 
a  commonality  of  organization  or  government. 

It  was  Hobbes  who  believed  that  man  originally 
was  a  being  of  entirely  selfish  interests.  Man's 
interest  in  others  was  based  on  their  ability  to  cater 
to  his  own  good.  This  theory  still  has  strong  sup- 
port; there  are  large  numbers  of  individuals  who 
today  apparently  are  living  according  to  this  rule. 
Nations  oftentimes  still  seem  to  be  motivated  by  no 
higher  principle.  On  the  basis  of  an  introspective 
psychology,  Hobbes  made  the  scientific  observation 
that  "he  that  is  going  to  be  a  whole  man  must  read 
in  himself — mankind."  Such  a  person  must  not 
simply  find  in  himself  this  or  that  man's  interests, 
but  the  interests  of  all  mankind. 

George  Berkeley  (1685-1753),  ff$hop  of  Cloyne 
and  eminent  philosopher,  in  his  Principles  of  Moral 
Attraction  attempted  to  point  out  the  analogies  be- 
tween the  physical  and  social  universe.  His  work 
was  stimulated  by  the  discoveries  of  Isaac  Newton. 
He  tried  to  apply  the  Newtonian  formulas  to  so- 
ciety. While  his  "physical  analogies"  are  of  little 
value,  they  represent  a  stage  in  the  rise  of  psycho- 
sociologic  thought.  He  made  the  social  instinct,  or 
the  gregarious  instinct,  in  society  the  analogue  of 
the  force  of  gravitation.  The  centrifugal  force  in 
society  is  selfishness;  and  the  centripetal,  sociabil- 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT  369 

ity.  As  the  attractive  force  of  one  mass  for  another 
varies  directly  in  relation  to  the  distance  between 
them,  so  the  attraction  of  individuals  for  one  an- 
other varies  directly  in  proportion  to  their  resem- 
blances. The  physical  analogies,  however,  could 
not  be  carried  far  without  being  lost  in  the  realm 
of  absurdity. 

The  Scotch  philosopher,  David  Hume,  has  been 
called  the  father  of  social  psychology  because  of  his 
splendid  analysis  of  sympathy  as  a  social  force. 
"Let  all  the  powers  and  elements  of  nature  conspire 
to  serve  and  obey  one  man,  ...  he  will  still  be  miser- 
able, till  you  give  him  some  one  person  at  least  with 
whom  he  may  share  his  happiness,  and  whose  es- 
teem and  friendship  he  may  enjoy."1  "Whatever 
other  passions  we  may  be  actuated  by,  pride,  ambi- 
tion, avarice,  curiosity,  revenge  or  lust, — the  soul  or 
animating  principle  of  them  is  sympathy."2 

But  sympathy, is  not  always  limited  in  its  opera- 
tion to  the  present  moment.  Through  sympathy  we 
may  put  ourselves  in  the  future  situation  of  any 
person  whose  present  condition  arouses  our  interest 
in  him.  Moreover,  if  we  see  a  stranger  in  danger, 
we  will  run  to  his  assistance. 

Vice  was  defined  by  Hume  as  everything  which 
gives  uneasiness  in  human  actions.  By  sympathy, 
we  become  uneasy  when  we  become  aware  of  in- 
justice anywhere.  "Self-interest  is  the  original 
motive  to  the  establishment  of  justice;  but  a  sym- 
pathy with  public  interest  is  the  source  of  the  moral 


370  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

approbation  which  attends  that  virtue."*  There  is 
a  continual  conflict  between  self-interest  and  sym- 
pathy, both  in  the  individual  and  between  indi- 
viduals in  society.  Although  at  times  this  self-in- 
terest seems  to  predominate,  "it  does  not  entirely 
abolish  the  more  generous  and  noble  intercourse  of 
friendship  and  good  offices."4 

Sympathy  causes  people  to  be  interested  in  the 
good  of  mankind.5  But  whatever  human  factor  is 
contiguous  either  in  space  or  time  has  a  propor- 
tional effect  on  the  will,  passions,  and  imagination.6 
It  commonly  operates  with  greater  force  than  any 
human  factor  that  lies  in  a  distant  and  more  obscure 
light.  This  principle  explains  why  people  often  act 
in  contradiction  to  their  interests,  and  "why  they 
prefer  any  trivial  advantage  that  is  present  to  the 
maintenance  of  order  in  society." 

In  accordance  with  the  analysis  of  sympathy  by 
Hume,  Adam  Smith  made  sympathy  a  leading  con- 
cept in  his  theory  of  political  economy.  Smith  also 
carried  the  concept  of  self-interest,  with  the  result- 
ant conflict  between  self-interest  and  social  interest, 
into  nearly  all  his  economic  theories. 

According  to  Adam  Smith  there  are  four  classes 
of  people  in  modern  life.  ( 1 )  There  are  those  who 
live  by  taking  rent.  They  have  social  interests  but 
are  not  socially  productive;  they  grow  listless  and 
careless.  (2)  There  is  the  class  which  takes  wages. 
This  group  is  large,  productive,  and  socially  inter- 
ested, but  their  widespread  lack  of  education  makes 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT  371 

them  subject  to  the  passions  of  the  day,  and  hence 
socially  useless  or  even  harmful.  (3)  Those  who 
take  profit  have  interests  at  direct  variance  with  the 
welfare  of  society.  Their  selfish  interests  become 
unduly  developed;  their  public  attitudes  are  usually 
dangerous  to  all  except  themselves.  (4)  The 
fourth  group  is  composed  of  all  who  derive  a  liv- 
ing from  serving  one  or  more  of  the  three  afore- 
mentioned classes.  The  interests  of  the  three  first- 
mentioned  groups  often  clash,  leading  to  destructive 
social  conflicts.  Despite  this  conclusion,  Adam 
Smith  was  an  advocate  of  laissez  faire.  He  urged 
that  natural  laws  be  allowed  to  express  themselves 
normally. 

In  1859,  Moritz  Lazarus  and  Heymann  Steinthal 
began  to  contribute  to  social  thought  in  the  Zeit- 
schrift  fur  Volker-Psychologie  und  Sprachwissen- 
schaft.  They  applied  psychological  methods  to  the 
study  of  primitive  society.  In  this  journal  they  made 
notable  contributions  concerning  the  social  customs 
and  mental  traits  of  early  mankind.  It  is  in  this 
field,  which  was  discussed  in  Chapter  XVIII,  that 
the  original  work  of  such  men  as  Franz  Boas,  W. 
G.  Sumner,  W.  I.  Thomas,  and  L.  T.  Hobhouse  be- 
longs. Fundamental  pioneering  in  psycho-socio- 
logic  thought  was  done  by  Lester  F.  Ward  (see 
Chapter  XVII).  Ward  opposed  the  prevailing  be- 
lief of  his  time,  and  particularly  of  Herbert  Spen- 
cer, that  society  must  continue  as  it  now  is  going 
on,  namely,  an  exhibition  of  a  blind  struggle  of 


372  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

competitive  forces.  He  not  only  perceived  the  rise 
of  mind  out  of  the  obscure  processes  of  social  evo- 
lution, but  more  important  still,  he  noted  the  part 
that  mind  may  play  in  modifying  the  course  of 
social  forces.  Although  he  considered  the  human 
desires  to  be  the  dynamic  social  elements,  he  gave 
to  mind,  through  its  power  of  prevision,  the  pre- 
rogative of  directing  the  desires  of  mankind. 
Moreover,  he  pointed  out  the  direction  in  which 
mind  could  best  guide  the  desires.  He  urged  a 
sociocracy  in  which  the  desires  of  the  individual 
are  so  controlled  that  they  operate  only  when  in 
harmony  with  the  welfare  of  other  individuals. 
For  establishing  these  fundamental  considerations, 
Ward  ranks  high  in  the  history  of  psycho-sociologic 
thought. 

The  chief  founder  of  social  psychology  was 
Gabriel  Tarde  ( 1843-1904) .  He  wrote  the  first  im- 
portant treatise  in  the  field  of  the  psychology  of  so- 
ciety. The  Lois  de  I' imitation  established  Tarde's 
reputation  as  a  social  psychologist,  and  at  the  same 
time  aroused  the  world  of  thought  to  the  existence 
of  a  new  phase  of  social  science.  Tarde  was  a  jurist 
who  inquired  into  the  causes  of  anti-social  conduct. 
He  was  greatly  impressed  by  the  observation  that 
criminal  acts  are  committed  in  waves.  Upon  ex- 
amination of  this  fact  he  found  imitation  to  be  a 
potent  factor,  and  began  to  analyze  the  laws  of  imi- 
tation. This  study  soon  showed  that  not  all  is 
imitation  but  that  much  human  conduct  arises  out 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT      f     373 

of  opposition.  His  analysis  of  the  laws  of  opposi- 
tion led  him  to  the  conclusion  that  imitation  and 
opposition  are  the  bases  of  a  third  social  factor,  in- 
vention. The  social  process,  as  he  observed  it,  is 
characterized  ( 1 )  by  an  ever-widening  imitation  of 
inventions,  (2)  by  the  opposition  of  conflicting  cir- 
cles of  imitation,  and  (3)  by  the  rise  of  new  inven- 
tions (out  of  these  oppositions),  which  in  turn  be- 
come the  centers  of  new  imitations.  Thus,  the 
social  process  goes  on,  endlessly  and  unconsciously 
or  consciously.  To  understand  society,  Tarde  be- 
lieved that  one  must  understand  how  minds  act  and 
interact. 

Tarde's  work,  first  presented  is  Les  Lois  de  limi- 
tation, was  formally  developed  in  his  Logique 
sociale,  and  summarized  in  his  Lois  sociale  (English 
translation,  Social  Lazvs).  Together,  these  books 
constitute  a  unique  social  theory.  Although  Tarde's 
approach  to  the  psychology  of  society  was  objective 
and  sociological,  and  although  he  did  not  give  seri- 
ous attention  to  the  purely  psychological  nature  of 
the  mind  nor  to  the  instinctive  bases  of  conduct, 
he  nevertheless  made  a  contribution  to  social 
thought  which  is  valid  and  enlightening. 

Society,  according  to  Tarde,  is  a  group  of  people 
"who  display  many  resemblances,  produced  either 
by  imitation  or  by  counter-imitation."7  Again,  he 
says  that  society  is  "a  group  of  distinct  individuals 
who  render  one  another  mutual  services."8  Socie- 
ties are  groups  of  people  who  are  organized  because 


374  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

of  agreement  or  disagreement  of  beliefs.9  "Society 
is  imitation."1  The  outstanding  element  in  social 
life  is  a  psychological  process  in  which  inventions 
are  followed  by  imitations,  which  when  coming  into 
inevitable  oppositions  produce  new  inventions. 

To  the  degree  that  a  person  is  social  he  is  imi- 
tative. In  the  way  that  vital,  or  biological,  resem- 
blances are  due  to  heredity,  so  human  resemblances 
are  caused  by  imitation.  The  closer  the  human  re- 
semblances between  individuals,  even  though  they 
be  occupational  competitors,  the  larger  will  be  the 
proportion  of  imitations  and  the  closer  the  social 
relationships.  The  father  will  always  be  the  son's 
first  model.11  A  beloved  ruler  will  so  fascinate  his 
people  that  they  will  imitate  blindly,  yea,  even  be 
thrown  into  a  state  of  catalepsy  by  him.  In  such 
a  case  imitation  becomes  a  kind  of  somnambulism.12 

Imitations  are  characterized  by  inclines,  plateaus, 
and  declines.13  The  incline  refers  to  the  period  of 
time  which  an  imitation  requires  for  adoption  The 
plateau  is  the  length  of  time  during  which  an  imita- 
tion is  in  force.  The  decline,  of  course,  has  to  do 
with  the  passing  away  of  an  imitation.  Each  of 
these  phases  are  of  varying  lengths — dependent 
upon  the  operation  of  almost  countless  socio-psy- 
chical  factors.  It  is  this  career  through  which  all 
imitations  must  pass  that  is  the  important  phase  of 
history.14 

There  are  two  causal  factors  determining  the  na- 
ture of  imitation :  logical,  and  non-logical.15  Logical 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT  375 

causes  operate  when  the  imitator  adopts  an  innova- 
tion that  is  in  line  with  the  principles  that  have 
already  found  a  place  in  his  own  mind.  Extra- 
logical,  or  non-logical,  imitations  are  those  which 
are  determined  by  the  adventitious  factors  of  place, 
date,  or  birth  of  the  individual. 

The  fundamental  law  of  imitation,  stated  in  sim- 
plest terms,  is  that  the  superior  are  imitated  by  the 
inferior,  for  example :  the  patrician  by  the  plebeian ; 
the  nobleman  by  the  commoner;  the  beloved  by  the 
lover.16  A  more  accurate  statement  of  the  law  of 
imitation  is  that  "the  thing  that  is  most  imitated  is 
the  most  superior  one  of  those  that  are  nearest." 
The  term  "superior"  in  all  these  cases  must  be  used 
in  the  subjective  sense,  that  is  to  say,  that  which 
seems  to  the  specific  individual  to  be  superior,  not 
necessarily  that  which  actually  is  the  superior,  is 
imitated. 

A  country  or  period  of  time  is  democratic  if  the 
distance  between  the  highest  and  lowest  classes  is 
lessened  enough  so  that  the  highest  may  be  imitated 
freely  by  the  lowest.17  Democracy  will  keep  the 
distance  between  classes  reduced  to  that  minimum 
where  imitation  may  operate. 

An  important  phase  of  sociology  involves  the 
knowledge  and  control  of  imitations.18  Sociological 
statistics  should  determine  (1)  "the  imitative 
power  which  inheres  in  every  invention  at  any  given 
time  and  place;"  and  (2)  "the  beneficial  or  harmful 
effects  which  result  from  the  imitation  of  given  in- 


376  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

ventions." 

Imitation  is  divided  into  sets  of  complementary 
tendencies ;  custom  imitation  and  fashion  imitation ; 
sympathy  imitation  and  obedience  imitation;  na'ive 
imitation  and  deliberate  imitation.19  Everywhere 
custom  imitation  and  fashion  imitation  are  embod- 
ied in  two  parties,  divisions,  or  organizations — the 
conservative  and  the  liberal.20 

Through  custom  imitation,  usages  acquire  auto- 
cratic power.  They  control  habit,  regulate  private 
conduct,  and  define  morals  and  manners  with  im- 
perial authority.  Usages  are  frequently  extra-log- 
ical imitations.  Usages  are  commonly  accepted  first 
by  the  upper  classes.  They  usually  are  related  pri- 
marily to  objects  of  luxury;  they  stick  tenaciously 
to  the  leisure-time  phases  of  life.  Their  most  favor- 
able milieu  is  a  social  and  individual  status  of  ignor- 
ance. 

Fashion  imitation  rules  by  epochs,  for  example: 
Athens  under  Solon,  Rome  under  the  Stipios,  Flor- 
ence in  the  fifteenth  century.21  These  epochs  of 
fashion  produce  great  individualities — illustrious 
legislators,  and  founders  of  empire.  Whenever  the 
currents  of  fashions  are  set  free,  the  inventive 
imagination  is  excited  and  ambitions  are  stimulated. 

Fashion  imitation  has  a  democratizing  influence. 
A  prolonged  process  of  fashion  imitation  ends  "by 
putting  pupil-peoples  upon  the  same  level,  both  in 
their  armaments  and  in  their  arts  and  sciences,  with 
their  master  people."22  In  fact,  the  very  desire  to 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT  377 

be  like  the  superior  is  a  latent  democratizing  force. 

The  counterpart  of  imitation  is  opposition.  Op- 
position, however,  may  be  a  very  special  kind  of 
repetition.  There  are  two  types  of  opposition: 
interference-combinations  and  interference-con- 
flicts.23 The  first  type  refers  to  the  coming  together 
of  two  psychological  quantities  of  desire  and  belief 
with  the  result  that  combination  takes  place  and  a 
total  gain  is  made.  The  second  type  refers  to  the 
opposition  resulting  from  incompatible  forces.  In 
this  case  an  individual  or  social  loss  is  registered. 

From  another  standpoint,  opposition  appears  in 
one  of  three  forms,  namely,  war,  competition,  and 
discussion.24  Conflicts  often  pass  through  these 
three  forms,  which  are  obedient  to  the  same  law  of 
development,  but  in  order  are  characterized  by  ever- 
widening  areas  of  pacification,  alternating  however 
with  renewals  of  discord.  As  war  is  the  lowest, 
most  brutal  form  of  conflict,  discussion  is  the  high- 
est, most  rational  form. 

Opposition  in  human  life  is  society's  logical 
duel.25  This  duel  sometimes  ends  abruptly  when 
one  of  the  adversaries  is  summarily  suppressed  by 
force.  Sometimes  a  resort  to  arms  brings  a  mili- 
tary victory.  Sometimes  a  new  invention  or  dis- 
covery expels  one  of  the  adversaries  from  the  social 
scene. 

The  logical  result  of  opposition  is  invention  or 
adaptation.  "Invention  is  a  question  followed  by 
an  answer."26  Invention,  or  adaptation,  at  its  best 


378  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

is  "the  felicitous  interference  of  two  imitations, 
occurring  first  in  one  single  mind/'27  Inventions 
grow  in  two  ways :  ( 1 )  in  extension — by  imitative 
diffusion;  and  (2)  in  comprehension — by  a  series 
of  logical  combinations,  such  as  the  combination  of 
the  wheel  and  the  horse  in  the  inventions  of  the 
horse-cart.28. 

Inventions  partially  determine  the  nature  of  new 
inventions  and  new  discoveries.  A  new  invention 
makes  possible  other  inventions,  and  so  on.  Each 
invention  is  the  possible  parent  of  a  thousand  off- 
spring inventions. 

To  be  inventive,  one  must  be  wide-awake,  inquir- 
ing, incredulous,  not  docile  and  dreamy,  or  living  in 
a  social  sleep.  The  inventor  is  one  who  escapes,  for 
the  time  being,  from  his  social  surroundings.29  In- 
venting develops  from  wanting.  A  man  experiences 
some  want,  and  in  order  to  satisfy  this  want  he  in- 
vents. Inventiveness  is  contrary  in  nature  to  sheep- 
ishness. 

Since  an  invention  is  the  answer  to  a  problem, 
inventions  are  the  real  objective  factors  which  mark 
the  stage  of  progress.  But  invention,  according  to 
Tarde,  becomes  increasingly  difficult.  Problems 
naturally  grow  increasingly  complex  as  the  simpler 
ones  are  mastered.  Unfortunately,  the  mind  of 
man  is  not  capable  of  indefinite  development,  and 
therefore  will  reach  a  limit  in  solving  problems.30 
At  this  point,  Tarde  is  on  doubtful  ground.  His 
argument  can  neither  be  proved  nor  disproved.  Ap- 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT  379 

parently,  man's  ability  to  solve  problems  increases 
with  his  training  and  experience  in  that  connection. 
Moreover,  man  appears  to  be  at  the  very  dawn  of 
his  possibilities  in  the  field  of  invention.  He  is  only 
beginning  to  gather  together  systematically  the  ma- 
terials for  inventing,  and  to  understand  slightly  the 
principles  of  inventing. 

Inventors  are  imitative.31  This  statement  is  but 
another  way  of  saying  that  inventions  are  cumu- 
lative, that  they  come  in  droves,  that  they  are  gre- 
garious. A  new  discovery  will  arouse  the  ambition 
of  many  wide-awake  persons  to  make  similar  dis- 
coveries. "There  is  in  every  period  a  current  of  in- 
ventions which  is  in  a  certain  general  sense  re- 
ligious or  architectural  or  sculptural  or  musical  or 
philosophical."32 

Invention  and  imitation  represent  the  chief 
forces  in  society.33  Invention  is  "intermittent,  rare, 
and  eruptive  only  at  certain  infrequent  intervals." 
It  explains  "the  source  of  privileges,  monopolies, 
and  aristocratic  inequalities."  Imitation,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  democratic,  leveling,  and  "incessant 
like  the  stream  deposition  of  the  Nile  or  Euphra- 
tes." At  times  the  eruptions  of  invention  take  place 
faster  than  they  can  be  imitated.  At  other  times 
imitations  flow  in  a  monotonous  circular  current. 

The  contributions  of  Tarde  to  social  thought 
have  stimulated  numerous  investigators  to  enter  the 
field  of  social  psychology.  While  Tarde's  thinking 
has  been  severely  criticised  by  the  psychologists  and 


380  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

modified  by  the  sociologists,  it  has  opened  mines 
of  valuable  social  ores.  Not  the  least  important 
consideration  was  the  impetus  which  the  Tardian 
thought  gave  to  American  writers,  such  as  E.  A. 
Ross.34  Tarde's  name,  however,  will  be  long  revered 
for  the  penetrating  way  in  which  he  developed  the 
concept  of  imitation.  Although  Walter  Bagehot, 
an  English  publicist,  in  an  epoch-stirring  book, 
Physics  and  Politics,  published  an  important  chap- 
ter on  "Imitation"  as  early  as  1872,  it  was  Tarde's 
Lois  de  limitation  in  1890  which  at  once  became 
the  authority  on  the  subject.  In  the  United  States, 
Michael  M.  Davis,  Jr.,  has  written  an  excellent 
summary  of  Tarde's  socio-psychologic  thought.35 
As  a  critical  digest  of  Tardian  thought,  Dr.  Davis' 
Psychological  Interpretations  of  Society  is  unsur- 
passed. 

In  1892,  Profesor  H.  Schmidkunz  published  an 
elaborate  work  on  the  Psychologic  der  Suggestion. 
This  book  is  an  important  pioneer  work.  In  the 
English  language,  the  writings  of  Boris  Sidis  on 
the  psychology  of  suggestion  are  well-known.  Pro- 
fessor E.  A.  Ross  has  given  an  intensive  treatment 
of  the  theme  in  his  Social  Psychology.  In  these 
various  discussions,  however,  the  fact  is  not  made 
clear  that  suggestion  and  imitation  are  correlative 
phases  of  the  same  phenomenon.  The  point,  also, 
is  not  developed  that  suggestion-imitation  phe- 
nomena are  natural  products  of  social  situations  in 
which  like  stimuli  normally  produce  like  responses. 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT  381 

In  1895,  the  first  book  by  Gustave  Le  Bon  on 
crowd  psychology  was  published.  Le  Bon  has  also 
written  on  the  psychology  of  revolutions,  of  war, 
and  of  peoples.  He  gave  a  limited  definition  to  the 
term,  crowds,  and  then  applied  the  term  to  nearly 
all  types  of  group  life.  He  conceived  of  crowds  as 
"feeling  phenomena."  They  are  more  or  less  patho- 
logical. Since  the  proletariat  are  subject  to  crowd 
psychology,  they  are  untrustworthy  and  to  be  re- 
warded perpetually  with  suspicion.  A  sounder, 
more  synthetic,  and  historical  position  concerning 
the  psychology  of  groups  and  of  society  is  taken 
by  G.  L.  Duprat  in  La  Psychologic  sociale. 

Italian  contributions  in  the  field  of  crowd  and 
group  psychology  are  represented  by  Paolo  Orano's 
Psicologia  sociale,  which  includes  only  a  partial 
treatment  of  the  subject  that  is  indicated  by  the 
title;  and  by  Scipio  Sighele's  La  foule  criminelle 
and  Psychologic  des  sectes.  Permanent  groups,  ac- 
cording to  Sighele  (following  Tarde),  are  either 
sects,  castes,  classes,  or  states.36  The  sect  is  a  group 
of  individuals  which  possesses  a  common  ideal  and 
faith,  such  as  a  religious  denomination  or  a  political 
party.  The  caste  arises  from  identity  of  profession. 
The  class  is  characterized  by  a  strong  unity  of  in- 
terests. States  possess  common  bonds  of  language, 
national  values,  and  national  prestige. 

The  concept  of  "consciousness  of  kind"  was  de- 
veloped by  Franklin  H.  Giddtngs  in  his  Principles 
of  Sociology  (1896).  Consciousness  of  kind  is  the 


382  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

original  and  elementary  subjective  fact  in  society.37 
Professor  Giddings  defines  this  term  to  mean  "a 
state  of  consciousness  in  which  any  being,  whether 
low  or  high  in  the  scale  of  life,  recognizes  another 
conscious  being  as  of  like  kind  with  itself."  In  its 
widest  meaning,  consciousness  of  kind  marks  the 
difference  between  the  animate  and  the  inanimate. 
Among  human  beings  it  distinguishes  "social  con- 
duct" from  purely  economic  or  purely  religious 
activity.  Around  consciousness  of  kind,  as  a  de- 
termining principle,  all  other  human  motives  or- 
ganize themselves. 

People  group  together  according  to  the  develop- 
ment of  the  consciousness  of  kind  in  them.  Roughly 
speaking,  there  are  four  such  groupings.38  (1) 
The  non-social  are  persons  in  whom  the  conscious- 
ness of  kind  has  not  yet  developed  —  in  whom  it 
finds  imperfect  but  not  degenerate  expression,  and 
from  whom  the  other  classes  arise.  (2)  The  anti-_ 
social,  or  criminal,  classes  include  those  persons  in 
whom  the  consciousness  of  kind  is  approaching  ex- 
tinction. They  detest  society.  (3)  The  pseudo^ 
social,  or  pauper,  classes  are  characterized  by  a  de- 
generation of  the  genuine  consciousness  of  kind. 
(4)  The  social  classes  are  noted  for  a  high  develop- 
ment of  the  consciousness  of  kind;  they  constitute 
the  positive  and  constructive  elements  in  society. 
At  the  head  of  the  list  are  the  pre-eminently  social. 
These  people  devote  their  lives  and  means  to  the 
amelioration  of  society;  they  are  called  the  natural 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT  383 

aristocracy  of  the  race,  the  true  social  elite. 

Consciousness  of  kind  is  made  possible  in  part  by 
the  operation  of  physical  factors.  Fertility  of  soil 
is  one  of  the  sources  of  human  aggregation.  Favor- 
able climate  makes  aggregation  possible.  Aggrega- 
tion of  population  is  either  genetic  (due  to  the 
birth  rate)  or  congregate  (due  to  immigration). 
Aggregation  leads  to  association — the  proper  milieu 
for  the  growth  of  consciousness  of  kind. 

Aggregation  guarantees  social  intercourse,  which 
is  a  mode  of  conflict.  Conflict,  according  to  Profes- 
sor Giddings,  becomes  the  basis  of  social  growth.89 
Primary  conflicts  are  those  in  which  one  adversary 
is  completely  outdone,  and  hence  likely  to  be 
crushed,  by  the  other.  Secondary  conflict  refers  to 
the  contests  between  more  or  less  evenly  balanced 
forces.  Primary  conflict  is  conquest;  secondary 
conflict  is  growth.  Among  people  secondary  con- 
flict leads  to  the  development  of  consciousness  of 
kind  through  the  successive  steps  of  communica- 
tion, imitation,  toleration,  co-operation,  alliance. 
The  supreme  result  is  the  production  of  pre-emi- 
nently social  classes.  Of  these  various  factors, 
Professor  Giddings  particularly  stresses  imitation. 
"It  is  the  factor  of  imitation  in  the  conflict  that 
gradually  assimilates  and  harmonizes."4 

Association  reacts  upon  individuals  and  produces 
self-consciousness,  which  in  turn  creates  social  self- 
consciousness,  or  group  awareness  of  itself.  Social 
self-consciousness  is  characterized  by  rationa 


384  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

cussion.  With  the  rise  of  discussion,  social  memory, 
or  traditions,  becomes  possible.  Moreover,  a  sense 
of  social  values  arises.  Public  opinion  springs  from 
the  passing  of  judgment  by  the  members  of  the 
group  upon  any  matters  of  general  interest.41 

Social  memory,  or  traditions,  becomes  highly 
differentiated.42  It  consists  of  impressions  concern- 
ing the  tangible  world,  the  intangible  world,  and  the 
conceptional  world.  The  traditions  in  any  field,  plus 
current  opinion  in  that  field,  form  the  standards, 
ideals,  faiths,  "isms"  of  the  time.  For  example, 
the  integration  of  economic  traditions  with  current 
economic  opinions  is  the  general  standard  of  living 
of  the  time  and  place.  The  integration  of  the 
aesthetic  tradition  with  current  criticism  is  taste, 
and  the  modification  of  a  traditional  religious  belief 
by  current  religious  ideas  is  a  faith. 

Inasmuch  as  consciousness  of  kind  is  the  psy- 
chological basis  of  social  phenomena,  it  is  natural 
that  the  chief  social  value  is  the  kind  itself,  or  the 
type  of  conscious  life  that  is  characteristic  of  the 
society.43  The  social  cohesion  is  another  important 
social  value.  Social  cohesion  is  vital  to  the  unity  of 
any  group;  therefore  the  group  is  usually  willing 
to  make  many  sacrifices  in  its  own  behalf.  The 
distinctive  possessions  and  properties  of  the  com- 
munity, such  as  territory,  sacred  or  historic  places, 
heroes,  ceremonies,  constitute  the  third  class  of 
social  values.  A  fourth  group  is  found  in  the  gen- 
eral principles  which  promote  the  growth  of  the 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT  385 

group ;  for  example,  the  principles  of  liberty,  equal- 
ity, and  fraternity.  The  social  values  largely  deter- 
mine the  social  choices  of  groups  and  the  nature  of 
social  organizations. 

Professor  Giddings  develops  an  interesting  the- 
ory of  the  dualism  in  social  structures.  Civilization 
is  marked  by  the  contemporaneous  existence  of 
public  and  private  associations.  Civilized  society 
affords  four  main  sets  of  dualistic  associations: 
political,  juristic,  economic,  and  cultural.  In  the 
political  field  there  are  private  political  parties  and 
the  public  association,  namely,  the  government,  or 
the  political  party  in  power.  Among  juristic  asso- 
ciations there  are  the  privately-organized  vigilance 
committees  and  the  public  associations,  such  as  the 
police,  the  courts,  the  prisons.  In  the  realm  of 
economics  there  are  private  individual  entrepre- 
neurs, partnerships,  corporations ;  and  on  the  other 
hand,  there  are  the  governmentally-owned  rail- 
roads, postal  service,  the  water  systems,  the  coinage 
systems.  In  regard  to  cultural  associations  we  may 
note  the  privately  endowed  universities  and  state 
universities,  privately  organized  churches  and  state 
churches,  private  charities  and  public  charities. 
This  dualism  in  social  structure  is  supported  by 
Professor  Giddings  on  the  grounds  that  private 
associations  are  needed  for  purposes  of  initiation, 
experimentation,  and  stimulation;  and  the  public 
associations  serve  the  useful  purposes  of  regulation 
and  maintenance  of  balance  among  various  contend- 


386  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

ing  factors. 

The  highest  test  of  social  organization  is  the 
development  of  social  personality.  An  efficient 
social  organization  is  one  which  makes  its  mem- 
bers "more  rational,  more  sympathetic,  with  an 
ever-broadening  consciousness  of  kind."  4* 

In  recent  works  Professor  Giddings  has  devel- 
oped the  concept  of  pluralistic  behavior.  "Any  one 
or  any  combination  of  behavior  inciting  stimuli  may 
on  occasion  be  reacted  to  by  more  than  one  indi- 
vidual." *5  The  character  of  pluralistic  reactions, 
whether  similar  or  dissimilar,  simultaneous  or  not, 
equal  or  unequal,  is  determined  by  two  variables: 
(1)  the  strength  of  the  stimulation;  (2)  the  simi- 
larity or  dissimilarity  of  the  reacting  mechanisms.46 
Thus  Professor  Giddings  considers  pluralistic  be- 
havior the  subject  matter  of  the  psychology  of 
society,  or  sociology. 

In  1897,  Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations,  by 
J.  Mark  Baldwin,  was  printed;  it  bears  the  sub- 
title of  "A  Study  in  Social  Psychology."  This  was 
the  first  time  that  the  term,  social  psychology,  had 
appeared  in  the  title  of  a  book  in  America,  though 
three  years  earlier,  in  1894,  one  of  the  leading  parts 
of  Small  and  Vincent's  Introduction  to  the  Study 
of  Society  was  designated  "social  psychology"  and 
included  a  discussion  of  social  consciousness,  social 
intelligence,  and  social  volition.  Baldwin's  Social 
and  Ethical  Interpretations  and  Giddings'  Prin- 
ciples of  Sociology  appeared  almost  simultaneously, 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT  387 

one  by  a  psychologist  and  the  other  by  a  sociologist. 
One  was  written  from  the  genetic  viewpoint,  and 
the  other  from  the  objective  viewpoint;  one  dealt 
primarily  with  social  psychology,  and  the  other  with 
a  psychology  of  society;  one  was  built  around  the 
concept  of  the  social  self,  and  the  other  around  the 
concept  of  a  consciousness  of  kind.  They  both 
hastened  the  development  of  an  organic  social  psy- 
chology. 

Professor  Baldwin  demonstrated  that  the  self  is 
largely  a  product  of  the  give-and-take  of  social  life. 
A  child  becomes  aware  of  his  self  by  setting  him- 
self off  from  other  selves.  It  is  in  group  life,  that 
is,  in  contact  with  other  selves,  that  the  child  de- 
velops a  self  consciousness. 

Moreover,  the  self  is  bi-polar.  One  end  of  the 
self-pole  is  characterized  by  what  one  thinks  of 
himself,  and  the  other  end  by  what  he  thinks  of 
other  persons. 47  "The  ego  and  the  alter  are  to  our 
thought  one  and  the  same  thing."4 

People  are  so  much  alike  because  they  are  imita- 
tive. It  is  imitation  which  keeps  people  alike.  Imi- 
tation integrates  individuals.  Imitation  is  either 
(1)  a  process  whereby  one  individual  consciously 
or  unconsciously  copies  another  individual,  or  (2) 
the  copying  of  a  model,  that  is,  adopting  a  model 
which  arises  in  one's  own  mind.49 

Baldwin  found  the  law  of  social  growth  in  the 
particularization  by  the  individual  of  society's  store 
of  material,  and  by  the  generalization  on  the  part 


388  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

of  society  of  the  individual's  particularizations. 
The  essence  of  the  first  phase  of  this  process  is 
invention  and  of  the  second,  imitation.  Baldwin 
considered  invention  and  imitation  the  two  funda- 
mental processes  of  social  growth. 

In  this  chapter  the  strength  of  the  psychological 
approach  to  an  understanding  of  societary  processes 
has  been  demonstrated.  In  the  chapter  which  fol- 
lows the  reader  will  find  further  materials,  show- 
ing the  tremendous  vitality  of  psycho-sociologic 
thought. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT 
(CONTINUED) 

In  1902,  Human  Nature  and  the  Social  Order 
by  Professor  Charles  H.  Cooley  was  published. 
This  book  was  at  once  accepted  as  an  authority  on 
the  integral  relationship  of  the  individual  self  and 
the  social  process.  It  was  followed  in  1909  by 
Social  Organisation,  and  in  1918  by  Social  Process. 
The  three  books  constitute  a  chronological  develop- 
ment of  a  logical  system  of  psycho-sociologic 
thought.  ; 

The  first  volume  treats  of  the  self  in  its  reac- 
tions to  group  life;  the  second  explains  the  nature 
of  primary  groups,  such  as  the  family,  playground, 
and  neighborhood,  of  the  democratic  mind,  and  of 
social  classes ;  the  third  analyzes  the  many  elements 
in  the  processes  by  which  society  is  characterized. 
The  chief  thesis  of  the  three  volumes  is  that  the  in- 
dividual and  society  are  aspects  of  the  same  phe- 
nomenon, and  that  the  individual  and  society  are 
twin-born  and  twin-developed. * 

An  individual  has  no  separate  existence. 
Through  the  hereditary  and  social  elements  in  his 
life  he  is  inseparately  bound  up  with  society.2  He 


390  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

cannot  be  considered  apart  from  individuals.  Even 
the  phenomena  which  are  called  individualistic  "are 
always  socialistic  in  the  sense  that  they  are  ex- 
pressive of  tendencies  growing  out  of  the  general 
life."3  It  is  not  only  true  that  individuals  make 
society,  but  equally  true  that  society  makes  indi- 
viduals. 

Professor  Cooley  has  given  an  excellent  presen- 
tation of  what  he  calls  the  looking-glass  self. 
There  are  three  distinct  psychic  elements  in  this 
phenomenon :  ( 1 )  the  imagination  of  one's  appear- 
ance to  another  person;  (2)  the  imagined  esti- 
mation of  that  appearance  by  the  other  person ;  and 
(3)  a  sense  of  pride  or  chagrin  that  is  felt  by  the 
first  person.  The  looking-glass  self  affects  the  daily 
life  of  all  individuals.  "We  are  ashamed  to  seem 
evasive  in  the  presence  of  a  straightforward  man, 
cowardly  in  the  presence  of  a  brave  one,  gross  in 
the  eyes  of  a  refined  one,  and  so  on."4  Even  a  per- 
son's consciousness  of  himself  is  largely  a  direct  re- 
flection of  the  opinions  and  estimates  which  he  be- 
lieves that  others  hold  of  him.5 

Professor  Cooley  makes  a  lucid  distinction  be- 
tween self  consciousness,  social  consciousness,  and 
public  consciousness.  The  first  is  what  I  think  of 
myself;  the  second,  what  I  think  of  other  people; 
and  the  third,  a  collective  view  of  the  self  and  the 
social  consciousness  of  all  the  members  of  a  group 
organized  and  integrated  into  a  communicating 
group.6  Moreover,  all  three  types  of  consciousness 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT  391 

are  parts  of  an  organic  whole.  Even  the  moral  life 
of  individuals  is  a  part  of  the  organic  unity  of 
society.  Social  knowledge  is  the  basis  of  morality. 
An  upward  endeavor  is  the  essence  of  moral 
progress. 

The  three  groups  which  Professor  Cooley  has 
called  primary  are  so  labeled  because  through 
them  the  individual  gets  "his  earliest  and  com- 
pletest  experience  of  social  unity."7  The  family, 
play  groups,  and  neighborhoods  remain  through- 
out life  as  the  experience  bases  from  which  the 
more  complex  phases  of  life  receive  their  inter- 
pretation. 

An  unbounded  faith  in  human  nature  is  enjoyed 
by  Professor  Cooley.  Human  nature  comprises 
those  sentiments  and  impulses  which  are  distinctly 
superior  to  those  of  the  higher  animals,  such  as 
sympathy,  love,  resentment,  ambition,  the  feeling  of 
right  and  wrong.8  The  improvement  of  society, 
according  to  Professor  Cooley,  does  not  involve  any 
essential  change  in  human  nature  but  rather  "a 
larger  and  higher  application  of  its  familiar  im- 
pulses."9 

Communication  is  a  fundamental  concept  in  Pro- 
fessor Cooley's  system  of  social  thought.  Commu- 
nication is  "the  mechanism  through  which  human 
relations  exist  and  develop."10  Professor  Cooley 
has  pointed  out  that  not  only  does  language  consti- 
tute the  symbols  of  the  mind,  but  that  in  a  sense  all 
objects  and  actions  are  mental  symbols.  Communi- 


392  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

cation  is  the  means  whereby  the  mind  develops  a 
true  human  nature.  The  symbols  of  our  social 
environment  "supply  the  stimulus  and  framework 
for  all  our  growth."  Thus  the  communication  con- 
cept furnishes  a  substantial  basis  for  understanding 
the  psycho-sociologic  phenomena  which  are  ordi- 
narily called  suggestion  and  imitation. 

Personality  has  its  origin  partly  in  heredity  and 
partly  "in  the  stream  of  communication,  both  of 
which  flow  from  the  corporate  life  of  the  race." 
A  study  of  communication  shows  that  the  individ- 
ual mind  is  not  a  separate  growth,  but  an  integral 
development  of  the  general  mind. 

The  means  of  communication  developed  remark- 
ably in  the  nineteenth  century,  chiefly  in  the  follow- 
ing ways:  (1)  in  expressiveness,  that  is,  in  the 
range  of  ideas  and  feelings  they  are  competent  to 
carry;  (2)  in  the  permanence  in  recording;  (3)  in 
swiftness  of  communication;  and  (4)  in  diffusion 
to  all  classes  of  people.12  Thus  society  can  be  or- 
ganized on  the  bases  of  intelligence  and  of  ration- 
alized and  systematized  feelings  rather  than  on  au- 
thority, autocracy,  and  caste. 

A  free  intercourse  of  ideas,  that  is,  free  and  un- 
impeded communication,  will  not  produce  uniform- 
ity. Self  feeling  will  find  enlarged  opportunities 
for  expression.  An  increased  degree  of  communi- 
cation furnishes  the  bases  for  making  the  individual 
conscious  of  the  unique  part  he  can  and  should  play 
in  improving  the  quality  of  the  social  whole.  On 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT  393 

the  other  hand,  freedom  of  communication  is  tend- 
ing to  produce  "the  disease  of  the  century/'  namely, 
the  disease  of  excess,  of  overwork,  of  prolonged 
worry,  of  a  competitive  race  for  which  men  are  not 
fully  equipped.13 

Public  opinion,  according  to  Professor  Cooley,  is 
not  merely  an  aggregate  of  opinions  of  individuals, 
but  "a  co-operative  product  of  communication  and 
reciprocal  influence/"  It  is  a  crystalization  of 
diverse  opinion,  resulting  in  a  certain  stability  of 
thought.  It  is  produced  by  discussion.  Public 
opinion  is  usually  superior,  in  the  sense  of  being 
more  effective,  than  the  average  opinion  of  the 
members  of  the  public. 

The  masses  make  fundamental  contributions  to 
public  opinion,  not  through  formulated  ideas  but 
through  their  sentiments.  The  masses  in  their 
daily  experiences  are  close  to  the  salient  facts  of 
human  nature.  They  are  not  troubled  with  that 
preoccupation  with  ideas  which  hinders  them  from 
immediate  fellowship.  Neither  are  they  limited  by 
that  attention  to  the  hoarding  of  private  property 
which  prevents  the  wealthy  from  keeping  in  touch 
with  the  common  things  of  life. 

The  striking  result  of  the  social  process  is  the 
development  of  personalities.  The  social  process 
affords  opportunities  which  individuals,  ambitious 
and  properly  stimulated,  may  accept.  Education 
may  perform  a  useful  function  in  adjusting  indi- 
viduals to  opportunities.  But  education  often  fails 


394  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

because  it  requires  too  much  and  inspires  too  little ; 
it  accents  formal  knowledge  at  the  expense  of 
kindling  the  spirit.15 

Social  stratification  hinders.16  It  cuts  off  com- 
munication. It  throws  social  ascendancy  into  the 
hands  of  a  stable,  communicating  minority.  The 
majority  are  submerged  in  the  morass  of  ignorance. 
Degrading  neighborhood  associations,  vicious  par- 
ents, despised  racial  connections — these  all  serve  to 
produce  stratification  and  to  hinder  progress. 

Professor  Cooley  holds  that  in  the  social  process 
the  institutional  element  is  as  essential  as  the  per- 
sonal.17 Institutions  bequeath  the  standard  gifts  of 
the  past  to  the  individual;  they  give  stability.  At 
the  same  time,  if  rationally  controlled  they  leave 
energy  free  for  new  conquests.  Vigor  in  the  indi- 
vidual commonly  leads  to  dissatisfaction  on  his 
part  with  institutions.  Disorganization  thus  arises 
from  the  reaction  against  institutional  formalism 
manifested  by  energetic  individuals.  It  may  be 
regarded  as  a  lack  of  communication  between  the 
individual  and  the  institution.  Formalism  indicates 
that  in  certain  particulars  there  has  been  an  excess 
of  communication. 

The  economic  concept  of  value  has  long  been 
analyzed  in  individualistic  terms — the  economic 
desires  arise  out  of  "the  inscrutable  depths  of  the 
private  mind."  To  this  explanation  Professor 
Cooley  replies  that  economic  wants,  interests,  and 
values  are  primarily  of  institutional  origin;  they 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT  395 

are  socially  created.  Pecuniary  valuations  are 
largely  the  products  of  group  conditions  and  activi- 
ties. 

It  is  in  a  rational  public  will  that  Professor 
Cooley  sees  the  salvation  of  the  social  process. 
While  he  repeatedly  expresses  a  large  degree  of 
faith  in  human  nature  as  it  is,  he  looks  forward 
to  a  day,  rather  remote,  when  communication  and 
education  will  enable  all  individuals  to  take  a  large 
grasp  of  human  situations  and  on  the  basis  of  this 
grasp  to  express  effectual  social  purposes.  Uncon- 
scious adaptation  will  be  superseded  by  the  delib- 
erate self-direction  of  every  group  along  lines  of 
broadening  sympathy  and  widening  intellectual 
reaches. 

Professor  Cooley  has  earned  the  title  of  a  sound, 
sane,  and  deep  sociological  thinker.  His  contribu- 
tions to  social  thought  are  found  in  his  lucid  de- 
scriptions of  the  social  process  from  which  person- 
alities and  social  organizations  arise,  in  his  keen 
analysis  of  communication  as  the  fundamental  ele- 
ment in  progress,  and  in  his  emphasis  upon  rational 
control  through  standards. 

The  year  1908  is  a  red  letter  year  in  the  history 
of  socio-psychologic  thought.  In  that  year  two 
important  treatises  appeared,  one  written  by 
William  McDougall  and  the  other  by  Edward  Als- 
worth  Ross.  The  former  was  developed  from  the 
psychological  standpoint ;  the  latter,  from  the  socio- 
logical point  of  view. 


396  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

Mr.  McDougall  considers  social  psychology 
largely  as  a  study  of  the  social  instincts  of  in- 
dividuals; Professor  Ross  concentrates  attention 
upon  the  suggestion  and  imitation  phases  of  societal 
life.  In  a  sense  Professor  Ross  begins  his  analysis 
where  Mr.  McDougall  concludes. 

Mr.  McDougall  treats  the  instincts  as  the  bases 
of  social  life.  He  makes  them  the  foundation  of 
nearly  all  individual  and  social  activities.18  Instincts 
are  biologically  inherited ;  they  cannot  be  eradicated 
by  the  individual.  Instincts  constitute  the  materials 
out  of  which  habits  are  made.  Consciousness  arises 
only  when  an  instinct  or  a  habit  (that  is,  a  modified 
instinct)  fails  to  meet  human  needs. 

The  primary  instincts  are  the  sex  and  parental, 
the  gregarious,  curiosity,  flight,  repulsion.  Each  is 
accompanied  by  its  peculiar  emotion,  for  example, 
the  instinct  of  flight  by  the  emotion  of  fear,  the  in- 
stinct of  curiosity  by  the  emotion  of  wonder.  This 
instinct-emotion  theory  is,  however,  drawn  out 
until  it  seems  to  become  academic  rather  than  actual 
in  its  details. 

Professor  McDougall  points  out  that  the  instincts 
are  the  basic  elements  upon  which  all  social  institu- 
tions are  built.19  For  example,  the  sex  and  parental 
instincts  are  the  foundations  of  the  family;  the 
acquisitive  instinct  is  an  essential  condition  of  the 
accumulation  of  material  wealth  and  of  the  rise  of 
private  property  as  an  institution.  Pugnaciousness 
leads  to  war. 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT  397 

This  emphasis  upon  the  instincts  reaches  an  ex- 
treme form  in  W.  Trotter's  Instincts  of  the  Herd 
in  Peace  and  War,  where  the  herd  instinct  is  made 
all-dominant.  According  to  Mr.  Trotter  the  herd 
instinct  arouses  fear  in  the  individual  and  rules  him 
through  rigorous  conventional  means — in  a  large 
percentages  of  cases  to  his  detriment. 

In  conjunction  with  his  theory  of  instincts,  Pro- 
fessor McDougall  has  advanced  a  noteworthy  con- 
ception of  the  sentiments.  The  three  leading  ex- 
pressions of  sentiment  are  love,  hate,  and  respect. 
Sympathy  is  regarded  as  an  elemental  sentiment,  in 
fact,  as  an  emotion  in  its  simplest  form.  A  senti- 
ment is  "an  organized  system  of  emotional  tenden- 
cies centered  about  some  object."  The  sentiments 
comprise  an  important  phase  of  the  self,  and  func- 
tion powerfully  in  determining  social  conduct. 

It  was  in  1901  that  Professor  E.  A.  Ross  made 
his  initial  contribution  to  psycho-sociologic  thought 
—seven  years  before  his  Social  Psychology  was 
published.  His  first  great  work  was  Social  Control 
In  this  excursus  he  defined  social  psychology  as  the 
study  of  "the  psychic  interplay  petween  man  and 
his  environing  society."2  This  interplay  is  two- 
fold :  the  domination  of  society  over  the  individual 
(social  ascendancy) ;  and  the  domination  of  the  in- 
dividual over  society  (individual  ascendancy).  So- 
cial ascendancy  may  be  either  purposeless  (social 
influence)  or  purposeful  (social  control).  Social 
psychology,  according  to  Professor  Ross,  deals  with 


398  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

psychic  planes  and  currents;  it  does  not  treat  of 
groups,  which  is  a  part  of  the  preserve  of  psycho- 
logical sociology. 

The  psycho-sociologic  grounds  of  control  are 
found  in  such  factors  as  sympathy,  sociability,  an 
elemental  sense  of  justice,  and  particularly  in  group 
needs.  There  are  individuals  whose  conduct  exas- 
perates the  group.  "In  this  common  wrath  and 
common  vengeance  lies  the  germ  of  a  social  control 
of  the  person."21 

Perhaps  the  best  part  of  Professor  Ross*  discus- 
sion of  social  control  is  his  analysis  of  the  agents 
of  control.22  Public  opinion  and  law  are  the  two 
most  important  means  of  controlling  individuals. 
The  weakness  of  one,  in  this  connection,  is  its  fitful- 
ness;  of  the  other,  its  rigidity.  Personal  beliefs 
and  ideals  function  widely  and  effectively  because 
of  their  subjective  character.  An  individual  may 
escape  the  operation  of  law ;  he  can  hide  away  from 
the  winds  of  public  opinion ;  but  he  cannot  get  away 
from  his  own  ideas  and  conscience.  It  is  for  this 
reason  that  religious  convictions  are  powerful.  Art 
as  a  means  of  social  control  is  commonly  under- 
rated. It  arouses  the  passions,  kindles  sympathies, 
creates  a  sense  of  the  beautiful  and  perfects  social 
symbols,  such  as  Columbia,  La  Belle  France, 
Britannia.23 

Systems  of  social  control  are  political  or  moral.24 
The  political  form  is  more  or  less  objective,  is  likely 
to  be  in  the  hands  of  a  few,  is  apt  to  be  used  for 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT  399 

class  benefit.  The  ethical  arises  from  sentiment 
rather  than  from  utility;  it  is  more  or  less  subject- 
ive; it  permeates  the  hidden  recesses  of  life.  The 
ethical  system  is  usually  mild,  enlightening  and 
suasive  "rather  than  bold  and  fear-engendering." 
Individuals  are  ordinarily  aware  of  political  con- 
trol, but  the  far-reaching  influences  of  ethical  con- 
trol they  little  suspect. 

The  two  most  difficult  problems  for  society  to 
solve  in  connection  with  social  control  are  these: 
( 1 )  what  measures  of  control  may  be  best  imposed ; 
and  (2)  how  these  measures  should  be  imposed.25 
The  variety  of  disciplines  which  society  may  use 
varies  from  epithets  to  capital  punishment.  The 
methods  vary  from  the  democratic  one  of  social 
self-infliction  to  the  direct  autocratic  procedure. 
Too  much  control  produces  either  stagnation  or 
revolution,  depending  on  the  amount  of  energy  the 
rank  and  file  may  possess.  Too  little  control  leads 
to  anarchy,  or  at  least  to  a  reign  of  selfishness.  A 
paternal  social  control  may  cause  resentment  or  a 
crushing  of  self-respect. 

Suggestion  and  imitation  are  social  elements  that 
Professor  Ross  has  described  in  detail.26  He  has 
demonstrated  that  the  more  gregarious  species  are 
more  suggestible  than  the  species  whose  members 
are  more  or  less  solitary;  that  southern  races  are 
more  suggestible  than  northern  races,  because  of 
the  different  climatic  effects  upon  temperament; 
that  children  are  more  suggestible  than  adults,  be- 


400  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

cause  children  possess  a  small  store  of  facts  and  an 
undeveloped  ability  to  criticize;  that  people  of  a 
nervous  temperament  are  more  suggestible  than 
persons  who  are  phlegmatic,  because  of  difference 
in  sensibility ;  that  women  are  more  suggestible  than 
men,  because  they  have  not  had  the  broadening  in- 
fluences which  men  have  enjoyed,  such  as  "higher 
education,  travel,  self-direction,  professional  pur- 
suits, participation  in  intellectual  and  public  life."2 

The  laws  of  imitation,  particularly  of  fashion 
imitation  and  rational  imitation,  which  M.  Tarde 
wras  the  first  to  outline,  have  been  elucidated  and 
illustrated  by  Professor  Ross.  He  has  cut  boldly 
into  the  shams  of  fashion,  convention,  and  custom, 
and  made  a  strong  plea  for  rationality  in  these 
fields.  He  has  shown  how  mob  mind,  the  craze,  and 
the  fad  sweep  not  simply  the  foolish  and  light- 
headed individuals  off  their  feet,  but  also  the  per- 
sons who  are  counted  as  sane  and  acquainted  with 
common  sense.  In  fact,  he  has  made  clear  that  even 
the  most  level-headed  are  blindly  or  slavishly  gov- 
erned by  custom  or  fashion  or  both.  He  does  not 
develop,  however,  the  fact  that  imitation  is  largely 
a  result  of  like-mindedness  and  common  social 
stimuli.  He  implies  an  individual  rather  than  a 
group  origin  of  suggestion-imitation  phenomena. 

It  is  in  discussion  that  Professor  Ross  sees  one 
of  the  main  hopes  of  progress.28  Discussion  brings 
conflicts  to  a  head,  and  leads  to  group  progress. 
Discussion  changes  a  person's  opinions.  Adequate 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT  401 

discussion  leads  to  the  settlement  of  a  conflict  and 
the  creation  of  an  established  public  opinion,  which 
remains  in  force  until  a  new  invention  occurs,  a  re- 
sultant conflict  ensues,  and  a  new  public  opinion 
comes  into  power. 

In  1920,  Professor  Ross  made  his  largest  and 
most  important  contribution  to  social  thought  in  his 
Principles  of  Sociology.  This  work,  however,  is 
essentially  a  treatise  in  social  psychology.  The  orig- 
inal social  forces  are  the  human  instincts,  notably 
the  fighting  instinct,  the  gregarious  instinct,  the 
parental  instinct,  the  curiosity  instinct.  The  deriva- 
tive social  forces  are  societal  complexes  which  tend 
to  satisfy  instinctive  cravings.  Professor  Ross* 
classification  of  the  derivative  social  forces,  or  in- 
terests, is  primarily  fourfold.  These  fundamental 
interests  are  wealth,  government,  religion,  and 
knowledge.  This  classification  contains  only  two, 
or  at  best  three,  of  the  six  groups  of  interests  which 
are  found  in  Professor  Small's  exhibit.29 

Professor  Ross'  analysis  of  the  process  of  social- 
ization has  been  indicated  in  Chapter  XXI.  This 
phenomena  is  to  be  sharply  distinguished  from  ossi- 
fication, which  is  the  hardening  of  social  life  into 
rigid  forms.30  Groups  often  become  unduly  solidi- 
fied. The  salvation  of  such  a  situation  lies  in  indi- 
viduation,  which  is  a  process  of  pulverizing  social 
lumps  and  releasing  the  action  of  their  members.31 
Any  movement  that  develops  that  spirit  of  personal 
liberty  leads  to  individuation. 


402  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

"Commercialization  is  the  increasing  subjection 
of  any  calling  or  function  to  the  profits  motive."1 
The  various  factors  which  hold  the  profits  motive  in 
check  are:  (1)  pleasure  in  creative  activity;  (2) 
pride  in  the  perfection  of  one's  product;  (3)  the  de- 
sire to  live  up  to  accepted  standards  of  excellence ; 
(4)  abhorrence  of  sham  in  one's  work;  (5)  interest 
in  the  welfare  of  the  customer;  (6)  the  social  serv- 
ice motive.  The  profits  motive,  however,  receives 
support  from  many  social  tendencies,  notably:  (1) 
the  increasing  distance  between  producer  and  con- 
sumer; (2)  the  growing  differentiation  between 
principals  and  subordinates;  (3)  the  increasing  im- 
portance of  capital  in  the  practice  of  an  art  or  occu- 
pation. 

Professor  Ross  has  set  forth  a  valuable  exhibit  of 
the  canons  of  social  reconstruction.33  ( 1 )  Reforms 
must  not  do  violence  to  human  nature.  (2)  They 
must  square  with  essential  realities.  (3)  They 
should  be  preceded  by  a  close  sociological  study  of 
the  situation  which  it  is  planned  to  change.  (4) 
Reforms  should  be  tried  out  on  a  small  scale  before 
being  adopted  on  a  large  scale.  (5)  A  reform 
should  be  the  outcome  of  a  social  movement.  (6) 
Under  a  popular  government,  reforms  should  move 
according  to  legal  and  constitutional  methods. 

In  regard  to  the  improvement  of  social  institu- 
tions, Professor  Ross  rests  his  argument  on  the  im- 
portance of  standards.  "Standards  are,  perhaps, 
the  most  important  things  in  society."34  Although 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT  403 

invisible  and  intangible  they  reveal,  better  than  any- 
thing else,  the  quality  of  a  society. 

The  current  standards  of  the  family  may  be  im- 
proved through  imparting  sound  ideals  of  marriage, 
through  fixing  these  ideals  everywhere  in  social  tra- 
dition, and  through  making  "the  social  atmosphere 
frosty  toward  foolish  and  frivolous  ideals  of  mar- 
riage."'' Young  people  may  well  be  taught  to  look 
upon  divorce  as  a  moral  shipwreck.  Loyalty  to  the 
state  or  society  has  its  origin  in  the  obedience  of 
children  to  parents  in  the  family.  A  sound  family 
life,  thus,  is  rated  by  our  author  as  the  bulwark  of 
society. 

In  regard  to  industry,  it  is  pointed  out  that  the 
principle  of  the  sovyet  is  associated  in  an  entirely 
accidental  way  with  Bolshevism.36  The  sovyet  may 
well  be  judged  on  its  own  merits.  The  principle 
upon  which  citizens  may  be  grouped  for  purposes  of 
securing  representation  in  government  is  not  yet 
settled.  Is  a  given  geographical  area  a  better  unit 
for  securing  representation  than  occupational 
areas? 

State  socialism  is  objected  to  by  Professor  Ross 
on  the  grounds  that  it  leaves  the  citizens  so  remote 
"from  that  which  most  vitally  concerns  him,  viz., 
the  regulation  of  the  industry  in  which  he  works, 
that  his  yearly  vote  may  be  a  mere  fribble  and  he 
little  better  than  a  state  serf."38  Guild  socialism,  on 
the  other  hand,  urges  that  each  branch  of  industry 
shall  organize  itself  democratically,  and  that  the 


404  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

state  shall  be  organized  not  with  provinces  and  lo- 
calities as  semi-autonomies  but  with  industries  ex- 
ercising a  degree  of  autonomy.  Our  author  en- 
dorses the.  general  shift  which  is  occurring  at  the 
present  time  from  the  coercive  side  to  the  service 
side  of  industrial  life. 

Professor  Ross  has  deduced  several  important 
sociological  principles  of  general  import.  These  he 
calls  the  principle  of  anticipation,  the  principle  of 
simulation,  the  principle  of  individualization,  and 
the  principle  of  balance. 

By  the  principle  of  anticipation,  he  means  that  a 
known  policy  of  an  institution  will  come  to  be  an- 
ticipated by  the  members  of  the  institution  and  will 
result  in  modifying  behavior.38  Unfair  advantage 
is  often  taken  of  people  on  the  basis  of  this  prin- 
ciple. For  example,  children  frequently  count  on 
favor  and  leniency.  The  false  beggar's  whine  is 
often  effective.  It  is  in  this  connection  that  genuine 
social  reform  differs  from  a  common  conception  of 
charity,  for  the  former  method  fits  people  to  run, 
clears  their  course,  and  incites  them  to  make  the 
race,39  while  the  latter  fails  to  render  assistance  of 
permanent  value. 

The  principle  of  simulation  refers  to  the  common 
tendency  of  "the  unworthy  to  simulate  every  type 
or  trait  which  has  won  social  approval,  in  order  to 
steal  prestige  from  it."40  Commercial  competition 
has  produced  adulterations,  mi sbrandings,  counter- 
feiting. There  is  the  professional  athlete,  who 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT  405 

sometimes  poses  as  a  sincere  enthusiast  for  physical 
development.  Politicians  are  often  expert  dissem- 
blers. 

The  principle  of  individualization  refers  to  giv- 
ing individuality  a  reasonable  chance  for  growth. 
As  society  grows  more  complex,  institutions  more 
ossified,  and  life  more  standardized,  the  average  in- 
dividual is  increasingly  in  danger  of  being  crushed ; 
at  least,  his  opportunities  for  self-expression  grow 
more  slim.  There  is  need  of  constant  vigilance  in 
education  in  allowing  for  individual  differences,  in 
industry  for  safeguarding  the  laborer  in  expressing 
his  personality  in  his  work,  in  government  in  per- 
mitting free  discussion. 

The  principle  of  balance  is  stated  by  Professor 
Ross  as  follows:  In  the  guidance  of  society  each 
social  element  should  share  according  to  the  intelli- 
gence and  public  spirit  of  its  members  and  none 
should  predominate."41  There  has  been  in  the  past, 
and  even  now  there  is  in  all  countries,  a  bitter  strug- 
gle taking  place  between  classes  apparently  on  the 
basis  that  some  one  class  should  rule  all  the  other 
classes.  Society  has  suffered  immeasurably  in  this 
way.  Sometimes  society  has  been  the  victim  of  the 
rulership  of  the  dead,  of  the  rulership  of  masculin- 
ism,  of  clericalism,  of  militarism,  of  commercialism, 
of  legalism,  of  leisure  class  ascendancy,  of  intellec- 
tualism,  of  proletarianism,  but  always  by  one  class 
lording  it  over  the  weaker  classes  until  some  one  of 
the  weaker  classes  acquires  strength  enough  to  over- 


406  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

throw  the  class  in  power. 

The  socio-psychological  thought  of  Professor 
Ross  has  penetrated  the  farthermost  reaches  of 
human  life.  It  has  been  stated  in  lucid,  stimulating 
language.  It  has  commanded  the  attention  of  so- 
cially-thinking persons  in  many  lands.  It  has  de- 
fined the  field  of  sociology,  giving  the  psychological 
approach. 

Special  attention  may  be  given  to  the  concept  of 
"the  great  society"  as  used  by  Graham  Wallas.  The 
Great  Society  is  a  name  for  current  human  society, 
the  product  of  mechanical  inventions,  industrial 
production,  commercial  expansion,  democratic  evo- 
lution— highly  organized  and  intricately  complex. 
It  is  ruled,  in  the  main,  by  men  "who  direct  enor- 
mous social  power  without  attempting  to  form  a 
social  purpose,"  and  it  is  composed  to  a  surpassing 
degree  of  individuals  who  recognize  the  power  of 
society  but  dimly  and  who  often  treat  society  with 
distrust  and  dislike.42 

Mr.  Wallas  substitutes  organization  for  organ- 
ism as  a  fundamental  social  concept.  He  makes  a 
distinction  between  thought  organizations,  will  or- 
ganizations, and  happiness  organizations.  Thought 
organizations  are  those  institutions  in  society  whose 
main  function  is  the  organization  of  thought,  such 
as  discussion  groups,  ranging  from  a  philosophical 
club  to  an  ordinary  committee  that  is  called  together 
to  plan  new  legislation.  At  this  point  Mr.  Wallas 
asserts  that  he  has  attended  perhaps  3000  meetings 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT  407 

of  municipal  committees,  of  different  sizes  and  for 
different  purposes,  and  that  he  is  sure  that  at  least 
half  of  the  men  and  women  with  whom  he  has  sat 
"were  entirely  unaware  that  any  conscious  mental 
effort  on  their  part  was  called  for."43  They  at- 
tended in  the  same  spirit  that  many  persons  attend 
church,  namely,  in  the  spirit  that  if  they  merely 
attend  they  are  doing  their  duty,  and  that  some  good 
must  come  of  it. 

Will  organization  comes  into  existence  because 
of  imperfect  social  machinery.  In  industry  three 
types  of  will  organizations  are  striving  for  mastery 
— the  institution  of  private  property,  represented 
by  the  individualists;  the  state,  represented  by  col- 
lectivists;  labor  organizations,  represented  perhaps 
by  syndicalists.  There  is  urgent  need  for  "the  in- 
vention of  means  of  organizing  the  conflicting  wills 
of  individuals  and  classes  within  each  nation  more 
effective  than  reliance  upon  any  single  'principle,' 
whether  representation,  property,  or  professional- 


ism."44 


The  organization  of  happiness  has  not  proceeded 
far.  Efficiency  has  supplanted  happiness  as  a  mod- 
ern god.  The  ideal  of  making  money  has  shadowed 
the  ideal  of  making  people  happy.  A  social  system 
organized  on  the  basis  of  happiness  avoids  both  des- 
titution and  superfluity,  employs  the  Mean  as  the 
standard  for  the  representation  of  all  social  inter- 
ests as  well  as  for  all  faculties  of  individuals,  avoids 
the  Extreme  in  all  things.45 


408  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

The  writings  of  Charles  A.  Ellwood  deal  particu- 
larly with  that  part  of  sociological  thought  which 
rests  upon  psychological  theory.  Professor  Ellwood 
defines  a  society  as  "a  group  of  individuals  carrying 
on  a  collective  life  by  means  of  mental  interac- 
tions."46 As  a  result  of  mental  interactions,  co-or- 
dination or  co-adaptation  of  the  activities  of  the 
members  is  effected. 

The  psychological  basis  of  social  interactions  is 
found  in  such  characteristics  of  the  individual  as 
spontaneity,  instincts,  emotions,  consciousness, 
mind.  Organisms  possess  spontaneity,  that  is, 
movements  are  set  up  in  them  without  the  apparent 
aid  of  external  causes.47  The  organism,  however, 
is  dependent  largely  upon  the  environment  for  the 
development  of  its  potentialities,  "but  the  essential 
ground  for  the  beginning  of  its  activities  lies 
within — in  its  own  organic  needs."  Instincts,  the 
product  of  natural  selection,  represent  preformed 
neurological  pathways  that  developed  "in  response 
to  the  demands  of  previous  life  conditions."  The 
emotions,  also  hereditary,  are  complexes  of  feelings 
and  sensations.  The  desires  are  complex  combina- 
tions of  feelings  and  impulses  which  are  accom- 
panied by  an  awareness  of  the  objects  that  will 
satisfy  the  impulse.48  Consciousness  develops  to 
solve  problems  which  the  instincts  cannot  meet.  At 
first,  consciousness  is  largely  a  selective  activity.  It 
develops,  however,  into  a  highly  complex  agency  for 
mastering  the  problems  of  life  and  the  universe. 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT  409 

Mind  is  a  product  of  the  social  life-process.  It  has 
arisen  under  conditions  of  association. 

One  of  the  most  fundamental  phases  of  the  asso- 
ciational  process  is  communication.  The  need  of 
acting  together  has  given  rise  to  intercommuni- 
cative  symbols. 

Professor  George  H.  Mead  has  given  a  thorough- 
going discussion  of  communication,  language,  and 
the  consciousness  of  meaning.49  He  begins  with  a 
social  situation,  where  the  actions  of  one  person 
serve  as  stimulations  to  other  persons,  whose  re- 
sponses in  turn  act  as  stimulations  to  the  first  per- 
son. Thus  life  is  a  series  of  actions,  stimulations, 
responses,  resultant  stimulations  —  these  activities 
constitute  gestures  or  symbols  with  meanings. 
Symbols  and  the  consciousness  of  meaning  of  these 
symbols  are  the  main  elements  in  communication. 

Communication,  says  Professor  Ellwood,  is  "a 
device  to  carry  on  a  common  life-process  among 
several  distinct,  though  psychically  interacting,  in- 
dividual units. "e  This  definition  probably  empha- 
sizes unduly  the  "individual  units/'  which  are 
doubtless  a  product,  in  part,  of  the  stream  of  social 
life.  Suggestion  is  an  elemental,  but  quick  form  of 
communication,  related  in  its  simpler  phases  to  sym- 
pathetic emotion.  Imitation  is  a  common  mechan- 
ism whereby  actions  and  ideas  spread.  Communi- 
cation in  the  form  of  oral  and  written  language  is 
the  chief  mechanistic  factor  in  securing  social 
change. 


410  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

The  contention  of  Ward  that  primitive  man  was 
anti-social  is  refuted  by  Professor  Ellwood,  who 
points  out  that  according  to  social  anthropology  the 
so-called  anti-social  traits  of  earliest  man  are  not 
found  fully  developed  among  "savages"  but  among 
people  of  later  ages.  Primitives  were  characterized 
by  a  narrow  sociality,  confined  largely  to  the  family 
and  small  groups.51 

Professor  Ellwood's  theory  of  social  change  is  of 
a  two-fold  character :  unconscious  and  conscious, — 
the  former  being  characteristic  of  the  lower  stages 
of  social  evolution,  and  the  latter,  increasingly  char- 
acteristic of  the  higher  stages.52  The  forms  of  un- 
conscious social  change  are  manifold. 

Natural  selection  tends  to  crush  and  destroy  the 
weaker  individuals  and  the  weaker  groups.  An- 
other type  of  unconscious  social  change  is  that 
which  comes  through  a  gradual  disuse  of  certain 
cultural  elements.  One  generation  fails  to  copy  the 
preceding  in  all  particulars.  Another  set  of  sources 
of  unconscious  social  change  is  found  in  the  shift- 
ing relationships  between  individuals  that  is  pro- 
duced by  "the  increase  of  population,  a  new  physical 
environment,  a  new  cultural  contact,  a  new  discov- 
ery or  a  new  invention."  In  fact,  Professor  Ell- 
wood  states  that  all  social  changes  start  in  an  un- 
conscious way.53 

Conscious  change  begins  with  the  awareness  on 
the  part  of  one  or  more  individuals  that  some  social 
habit  is  not  functioning  well.  Through  communi- 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT  411 

cation,  this  awareness  spreads  from  individual  to 
individual.  Discussion  ensues.  At  first,  discussion 
is  largely  critical  of  the  unsatisfactory  social  situa- 
tion. The  useless  or  harmful  elements  in  the  situ- 
ation receive  first  attention.  As  discussion  pro- 
ceeds, it  takes  on  a  more  constructive  nature,  that 
is,  it  becomes  projective,  planful,  positive.  It  sug- 
gests a  change  to  be  made.  It  becomes  transformed 
into  a  more  or  less  stable  public  opinion,  demand- 
ing a  substitution  of  a  proposed  way  of  doing  for 
the  old.  The  chief  elements  in  guaranteeing  con- 
scious readjustments  are  free  communication,  "free 
public  criticism,  free  discussion,  untrammeled  for- 
mation of  public  opinion,  free  selection  of  social 
policies  and  social  leaders."54  The  selective  process 
in  conscious  social  change  is  public  opinion,  whose 
social  function  it  is  to  mediate  in  the  transition 
from  one  social  habit  to  another. 

Conscious  social  change  in  Western  Civilization 
is  endangered  on  one  hand  by  an  excessive  indi- 
vidualism, and  on  the  other  by  a  socialism  which 
threatens  to  suppress  individual  initiative  and  to 
underemphasize  the  role  of  mental  and  moral  char- 
acter. Professor  Ellwood  urges  the  importance  of 
an  education  which  will  socialize  the  individual  and 
at  the  same  time  develop  a  high  type  of  personal 
character. 

Social  change,  also,  takes  place  under  socially 
abnormal  conditions,  so  long  as  societies  fail  to  keep 
"a  high  degree  of  flexibility  in  their  habits  and  in- 


412  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

stitutions."2  Autocratic  rulers,  propertied  classes, 
ecclesiastical  classes,  special  groups  in  power,  a 
general  intellectual  stagnation,  are  factors  which 
tend  to  resist  institutional  flexibility.  If  this  adapt- 
ability does  not  exist,  then  social  conditions  will 
produce  revolutions.  If  the  ruling  autocracy  is  so 
powerful  that  the  lives  of  all  objectors  are  snuffed 
out,  then  revolution  is  indefinitely  postponed.  If 
the  energetic  forces  within  a  society  are  hampered 
greatly  in  securing  constructive  opportunities  for 
expression,  they  become  forces  of  discontent  and 
agents  of  revolt.  If  a  revolution  comes,  then  much 
that  is  worthy  in  social  organization  will  be  oblit- 
erated along  with  the  unworthy,  confusion  will 
reign  and  a  reversion  to  the  brutal  stages  of  societal 
life  is  easily  possible. 

In  his  discussion  of  "the  social  problem,"  Profes- 
sor Ellwood  points  out  that  the  good  fruits  of  the 
World  War  are  in  danger  of  being  destroyed  by 
"the  blindness  and  selfishness  of  some  in  our 
socially  privileged  classes,  the  fanatic  radicalism 
and  class  hatred  of  some  of  the  leaders  of  the  non- 
privileged."56  The  forces  which  are  combining 
against  making  the  world  safe  for  democracy  today 
are  national  imperialism,  commercialism,  material- 
istic standards  of  life,  class  conflicts,  religious 
agnosticism,  and  a  reckless  attitude  toward  mar- 
riage and  the  family.57  The  social  problem,  from 
one  angle,  becomes  the  problem  of  training  people 
to  live  together  justly,  constructively,  and  co- 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT  413 

operatingly. 

As  Turgot  indicated,  the  only  way  to  avert  social 
revolution  is  through  suitable  and  well-timed  re- 
forms. Today,  the  reforms  most  urgently  needed 
are  three- fold:  the  substitution  of  an  unselfish 
internationalism  for  a  selfish  nationalism,  of  a 
spiritual  civilization  for  a  rampant  materialism, 
and  of  a  socialized  human  race  for  individualized 
peoples.  To  bring  about  these  changes  is  a  gigantic 
task,  namely  the  social  problem. 

Civilization  is  a  complex  of  social  values.  Pro- 
fessor Ellwood's  classification  of  values  is  widely 
different  from  the  analysis  that  Professor  Gid- 
dings  has  made  (given  in  the  preceding  chapter). 
According  to  Professor  Ellwood,  western  civiliza- 
tion is  represented  by  the  following  groups  of 
social  values  historically  derived:  (1)  a  set  of 
spiritual  and  ethical  values,  described  by  the 
ancient  Hebrews;  (2)  a  set  of  esthetic  and  philo- 
sophic concepts  from  the  Greeks;  (3)  a  set  of  ad- 
ministrative and  legal  forms  of  Roman  origin; 
(4)  a  set  of  personal  liberty  beliefs  of  early  Teu- 
tonic derivation;  (5)  a  scientific  spirit  and  tech- 
nique, originating  during  the  Renaissance;  (6) 
economic  efficiency,  born  of  the  industrial  revolu- 
tion; and  (7)  an  extensive  group  of  humanitarian 
values,  the  product  of  the  nineteenth  century.  This 
vast  and  complicated  Western  Civilization  needs, 
however,  to  remove  from  its  structure  the  three 
"rotten  pillars"  of  hyper-individualism,  material- 


414  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

ism,  and  selfish  nationalism,  substituting  for  each 

its  spiritualized  and  socialized  counterpart. 

The  nature  of  social  control,  according  to  the 
analysis  by  Professor  E.  C.  Hayes,  is  "to  secure 
the  completed  and  most  harmonious  realization  of 
good  human  experience,  regarded  as  an  end  in 
itself."58  Social  control  should  prevent  activities 
which  do  not  bear  the  test  of  reason,  and  should 
elicit  those  which  stand  that  test,  when  judged  by 
their  own  intrinsic  value  and  by  their  effect  upon 
other  values.  This  statement  of  the  purpose  of 
social  control  is  similar  to  that  of  other  standard 
interpretations  of  the  matter. 

There  are  two  types  of  social  control.59  The  first 
is  control  by  sanctions,  and  the  second  by  social 
suggestion,  sympathetic  radiation,  and  imitation. 
Social  sanctions  refer  to  proffered  rewards  and 
threatened  punishments.  Professor  Hayes,  how- 
ever, makes  not  law  but  personality  the  ultimate 
basis  of  social  order.  Repression  of  crime  is  a 
correct  social  procedure  but  of  a  distinctly  lower 
grade  than  the  movement  to  raise  the  moral  char- 
acter of  those  who  never  go  to  prison.  The  prob- 
lem of  social  control  is  to  take  the  instinctive  ten- 
dencies of  each  individual  when  he  is  young  and 
make  them  over  into  a  disposition  that  is  character- 
ized by  the  four  following  traits:  (1)  reliability, 
or  honesty;  (2)  controlled  animalism,  or  temper- 
ance regarding  eating,  drinking,  and  other  animal 
propensities;  (3)  steadiness  in  endeavor;  (4)  the 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT  415 

social  spirit,  or  justice.60 

Professor  Hayes'  statement  on  the  agencies  of 
social  control  is  similar  in  purport  to  the  list  that 
Professor  Ross  has  given.  Education  is  considered 
the  chief  agency  of  social  control.  Education  can 
determine  the  direction  of  ambition ;  education  can 
shift  the  emphasis  in  social  valuations.  Professor 
Hayes  recognizes  the  import  of  heredity  and  how 
the  degree  of  individual  achievement  is  "more  de- 
pendent upon  heredity  than  upon  the  directions  of 
effort."  Society,  however,  has  the  power  to  decide 
which  of  its  members  shall  develop  as  far  as  their 
potential  abilities  will  permit,  and  also  the  power 
to  determine  the  direction  the  activities  of  its  mem- 
bers shall  take.61 

Among  educational  agencies  of  control  the  family 
ranks  first.62  The  power  of  the  family  at  its  best 
in  building  personality  is  comparable  to  the  influ- 
ence in  this  connection  of  all  other  agencies  com- 
bined. The  profession  of  mother-work  is  more 
important  to  society  than  any  other  profession. 

The  social  psychology  of  business  enterprise,  of 
the  leisure  classes,  of  the  machine  process,  of  in- 
dustry and  workmanship  have  been  indicated  by 
Thorstein  Veblen.  The  unique,  incisive  work  of 
Mr.  Veblen  is  presented  in  several  books,  chief  of 
which  are  his  Theory  of  the  Leisure  Class  f  Theory 
of  Business  Enterprise,  and  Instinct  of  Workman- 
ship. Mr.  Veblen's  ideas  can  best  be  illustrated  by 
referring  to  his  "canons." 


416  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

The  Canon  of  Pecuniary  Emulation  describes  the 
restless  straining  of  certain  individuals  in  society 
to  outdo  one  another  in  the  possession  of  wealth.63 
Such  possession  is  interpreted  as  conferring  honor 
on  its  possessor.  Wealth  becomes  intrinsically 
honorable.  The  Canon  of  Pecuniary  Beauty  refers 
to  the  impression  that  things  are  beautiful  in  pro- 
portion as  they  are  costly.64  The  marks  of  expen- 
siveness  come  to  be  regarded  as  beautiful  features. 

The  Canon  of  Conspicuous  Consumption  is  a 
term  which  describes  a  method  of  showing  off  one's 
wealth  by  an  elaborate  consumption  of  goods.65 
Conspicuous  consumption  is  seen  more  in  matters 
of  dress  than  in  any  other  line  of  consumption. 
The  Canon  of  Conspicuous  Leisure  is  the  rule 
which  some  people  are  following  when  they  live  a 
life  of  leisure  as  the  readiest  and  most  conclusive 
evidence  of  pecuniary  strength.66  Sometimes  a  man 
keeps  his  wife  frittering  her  time  away  in  a -doll's 
house  in  order  to  show  his  wealth  status. 

The  Canon  of  Leisure  Class  Conservatism  is 
Veblen's  label  for  the  conservative  tendencies  of  the 
wealthy.  Those  whom  fortune  has  greatly  favored 
are  likely  to  be  content  with  things  as  they  are. 
Such  people  are  averse  to  social  change,  for  social 
innovation  might  upset  their  comfortable  existence. 
They  have  a  dominant  material  interest  in  letting 
things  alone. 

Mr.  Veblen's  Canon  of  Pecuniary  Efficiency 
means  that  many  persons  conceive  of  efficiency 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT  417 

largely  in  terms  of  price.  The  person  who  can  in- 
duce his  fellows  to  pay  him  well  is  accounted  effi- 
cient and  serviceable.67  The  man  who  gains  much 
wealth  at  little  cost  is  rated  high  in  his  neighbor's 
esteem.  The  investor  who  at  the  turn  of  his  hand 
reaps  $100,000  in  a  stock  or  bond  deal  is  praised 
widely.  In  other  words,  there  is  a  common  ten- 
dency to  rate  people  high  in  direct  proportion  to 
the  amount  of  money  that  they  are  able  to  extract 
from  the  aggregate  product. 

The  Canon  of  Bellicoseness  refers  to  the  enthu- 
siasm for  war  which  the  hereditary  leisure  class 
displays.  The  very  wealthy,  not  being  obliged  to 
work  for  a  living,  find  that  time  drags.  Therefore, 
they  seek  excitement  and  relief  from  ennui,  and 
find  these  conditions  in  various  things,  especially 
in  war. 

The  Canon  of  Pecuniary  Education  covers  the 
tendency  to  demand  "practical"  education,  which, 
upon  examination,  is  education  that  will  guarantee 
individual  success.  "Success,"  for  which  education 
is  to  fit  young  people,  turns  out  to  be,  in  the  eyes  of 
the  practical  man,  a  pecuniary  success.  "Practical" 
means  useful  for  private  gain.  The  test  that  many 
persons  would  give  to  a  course  in  education  is 
this :  Will  it  help  one  to  get  an  income  ?  The  Canon 
of  Pecuniary  Thinking  denotes  that  many  occupa- 
tions lead  to  habits  of  pecuniary  thought.  For 
numbers  of  people  the  beginning  and  end  of  their 
more  serious  thought  is  of  a  pecuniary  nature. 


418  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

The  Canon  of  Machine  Process  Thinking  is  that 
mechanical  employments  produce  a  type  of  think- 
ing that  is  based  more  or  less  on  material  cause  and 
effect.  The  Machine  knows  neither  morality  nor 
dignity  nor  prescriptive  right.  The  machine  process 
laborers,  working  in  a  world  of  impersonal  cause 
and  effect,  "are  in  danger  of  losing  the  point  of 
view  of  sin." 

Professor  Veblen  has  developed  the  concept  of 
the  instinct  of  workmanship  at  considerable  length. 
According  to  this  contention,  it  is  natural  for  in- 
dividuals to  do,  to  construct,  to  achieve,  to  work. 
Through  activity  the  individual  expresses  himself 
and,  in  so  doing,  develops,  and  attains  happiness. 
Every  individual  is  a  center  of  unfolding  impulsive 
activity;  he  is  possessed  of  a  taste  for  effective 
work.68  Labor  acquires  a  character  of  irksomeness 
by  virtue  of  the  indignity  that  is  falsely  imputed  to 
it  by  a  hereditary  leisure  class.69  It  was  the  instinct 
of  workmanship  which  brought  the  life  of  man- 
kind from  the  brute  to  the  human  plan. 

The  contributions  of  Mr.  Veblen  to  social  thought 
are  always  of  a  thought-provoking  nature.  Some- 
times they  give  rise  to  invidious  comparisons,  often 
they  antagonize,  but  as  a  rule,  they  are  unique. 
No  brief  reference  such  as  is  given  in  the  foregoing 
paragraphs  can  do  justice  to  Mr.  Veblen's  pungent 
criticisms  of  societal  foibles. 

It  would  be  a  decidedly  incomplete  treatment  of 
the  nature  of  psycho-sociologic  thought  that  did 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT  419 

not  make  reference  to  the  work  of  George  Elliott 
Howard,  political  scientist,  historian,  sociologist, 
but  above  all,  social  psychologist.  In  each  of  the 
fields  in  which  Dr.  Howard  has  achieved  fame,  his 
method  of  approach  is  psychological.  He  has  pre- 
pared an  excellent  outline  of  the  field  of  social 
psychology,  together  with  a  scholarly  bibliography 
of  the  same.  Perhaps  the  best  way  to  treat  Profes- 
sor Howard's  socio-psychologic  thought,  is  to  give  a 
sample  of  it,  as  found  in  his  address  before  the 
American  Sociological  Society  when  he  was  presi- 
dent of  that  body.  The  theme  was,  "Ideals  as  a 
Factor  in  the  Future  Control  of  International  So- 
ciety." This  magnum  opus  served  as  an  excellent 
introduction  to  the  series  of  papers  on  the  subject 
of  social  control  which  were  read  at  the  annual 
meeting  of  the  Sociological  Society  in  1918,  and 
which  have  been  published  together  with  the  presi- 
dential address  as  Volume  XII  of  the  Publications 
of  the  Society. 

By  social  control,  Professor  Howard  means  the 
standard  conception  of  the  "ascendency  of  the  social 
consciousness."70  In  the  same  volume,  however, 
Professor  Carl  Kelsey  interprets  social  control  as 
"the  organization  and  utilization  of  our  wealth  and 
citizens  for  private  purposes."71  Professor  Hutton 
Webster  is  inclined  to  believe  that  the  main  feature 
of  primitive  social  control  is  "the  superstitious  fear 
of  the  new."72  Professor  F.  Stuart  Chapin  sees  the 
essential  element  of  primitive  social  ascendency  in 


420  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

the  pressure  upon  the  individual  of  social  condi- 
tions, customs,  and  conventions.73  Without  giving 
additional  interpretations  of  social  control,  the 
reader  will  be  referred  directly  to  Volume  XII  of 
the  Publications  as  the  best  symposium  that  is  avail- 
able on  the  subject. 

In  discussing  ideals  as  a  phase  of  international 
control,  Professor  Howard  makes  clear  that  certa 
ideals  exert  a  baneful  influence.  The  ideal  of  the 
nation-state  appears  to  be  unmoral  if  not  immoral.74 
Of  four  prevailing  standards  of  ethics,  namely,  per- 
sonal morality,  business  morality,  national  morality 
for  home  consumption,  and  "standards  of  inter- 
national morality  for  use  with  outlanders,"  the 
scale  is  descending,  and  the  fourth  type  is  the  low- 
est. Nationalisms  have  been  overdeveloped — at  the 
expense  of  a  needed  internationalism. 

Another  false  ideal  of  which  society  needs  to  rid 
itself  is  its  conception  of  the  function  of  war  and 
militarism.  War  is  not  a  good  in  itself.  War  as 
war  is  not  heroic.  Race  values  constitute  a  third 
false  ideal.  "Every  race  deems  itself  superior  to 
every  other  race  and  every  race  is  mistaken/" 
Race  conceit  is  contrary  to  the  Christian  ideal  and 
has  steadily  been  supplanted  by  the  new  doctrine  of 
the  potential  equality  of  all  races. 

The  ideal  of  democracy,  on  the  other  hand,  rings 
true  to  the  needs  of  progress.  It  makes  for  peace. 
Democracy,  however,  must  rid  itself  of  blemishes. 
Hereditary  and  class  privilege  must  be  abolished; 


PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC  THOUGHT  421 

political  corruption  and  race  riots  must  be  defeated ; 
woman,  "the  original  social  builder,  the  mother  of 
industry,  the  first  inventor  of  the  arts  of  peace/' 
must  be  granted  a  full  voice  in  social  control. 

The  ideal  of  education  is  exceedingly  delicate, 
for  it  involves  the  process  of  the  changing  of  ideals. 
Education  may  prepare  a  people  to  admire  au- 
tocracy or  to  build  a  self-governing  democracy. 

Dr.  Howard  enters  a  strong  plea  for  social 
idealism — the  most  effective  that  has  yet  been 
written.76  "The  idealist  is  the  inspired  social  archi- 
tect, who  dreams  a  plan  for  the  sanitary  or  moral 
cleansing  of  a  great  city ;  the  campaign  for  purging 
politics  of  graft;  a  law  for  saving  little  children 
from  the  tigerish  man  of  the  factory  or  the  sweat- 
shop; a  referendum  for  banishing  from  the  com- 
monwealth the  saloon,  that  chief  breeder  of  pauper- 
ism, sin,  and  crime;  a  conference  for  the  rescuing 
from  the  hands  of  predacious  greed,  for  the  use  of 
the  whole  people,  of  the  remnant  of  our  country's 
natural  wealth.  The  idealist  is  the  statesman — the 
head  of  a  nation — who  dreams  a  scheme  for 
safeguarding  democracy  and  guaranteeing  peace 
throughout  the  world." 

It  is  evident  from  the  introduction  to  the  history 
of  psycho-sociologic  thought  that  has  been  given  in 
this  and  the  preceding  chapter,  supported  by  the 
materials  in  the  chapters  on  social  conflict  and 
social  co-operation  concepts,  that  psycho-sociologic 
thought  holds  a  place  of  first  rank  in  the  field  of 


422  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

sociology.  It  bids  fair  to  become  the  central  force 
in  social  thinking  and  to  lead  the  social  sciences. 
It  deals  with  the  most  vital  social  concepts,  namely, 
groups,  personality,  behavior,  conflict,  co-operation, 
and  process.  Of  all  the  main  approaches  to  an 
understanding  of  societary  problems,  it  promises 
most. 


V 


CHAPTER  XXIV 
THE  TREND  OF  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 


In  the  preceding  chapters  the  discussions  have 
dealt  primarily  with  the  philosophic  and  psychologic 
phases  of  social  thought.  Another  important  phase 
of  our  field  is  applied  sociology.  The  hosts  of 
individuals  who  have  been  engaged  in  dealing  di- 
rectly with  societal  problems  have  learned  valuable 
lessons  from  their  personal  experiences.  Some- 
times they  have  labored  according  to  false  theories ; 
often  they  have  scorned  theories  entirely.  At  the 
other  extreme,  the  world  has  often  accepted  fine 
theories,  but  made  a  pitiable  spectacle  of  itself  in 
falling  away  from  its  idealistic  professions. 

As  the  term  implies,  applied  sociology  treats  of 
techniques  for  improving  the  quality  of  human  liv- 
ing. The  best  techniques  have  been  developed  ex- 
perimentally, but  by  persons  who  have  combined  a 
high  estimate  of  social  theory  with  practical  pro- 
grams of  activity.  The  useful  concept  of  social 
technology,  a  more  accurate  term  perhaps  than 
applied  sociology,  was  given  to  society  by  Charles 
R.  Henderson,  whose  balanced  thinking,  sane  judg- 
ment, and  important  ameliorative  activities  made 
him  the  founder  of  this  branch  of  sociological 


424  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

science.  Dr.  Henderson's  name  is  synonymous 
with  a  practical  interpretation  of  both  democracy 
and  Christianity,  with  the  spirit  of  vigorous  yet 
kindly  reformation  in  penology,  with  the  concept  of 
prevention  in  philanthropic  endeavors,  and  with 
justice  and  love  in  all  the  fields  of  human  achieve- 
ment. There  are  many  other  important  names  in 
the  list  of  those  persons  who  helped  to  found  ap- 
plied sociology;  for  example,  such  individuals  as 
Canon  Barnett,  Arnold  Toynbee,  Jacob  Riis,  Jane 
Addams,  and  many  other  social  welfare  saints. 

Poverty  and  crime  have  been  the  two  chief  phe- 
nomena with  which  welfare  work  has  been  con- 
cerned. Until  the  present  century  the  attempts  to 
meet  the  problems  of  poverty  have  been  largely 
remedial.  Jesus  said  that  the  poor  are  always 
present  in  any  age  of  society.  St.  Francis  of  As- 
sisi,  tiring  of  monastery  life,  sought  out  the  poor 
in  the  natural  walks  of  life,  and  dedicated  himself 
in  their  behalf. 

For  centuries  England  has  experimented  with 
solutions  for  the  problems  of  poverty  and  pauper- 
ism. She  has  learned  that  when  she  cares  too  as- 
siduously for  the  poor  she  encourages  the  spirit  of 
pauperism  and  increases  the  numbers  of  depend- 
ents. When  she  provided  liberal  aid  for  illegitimate 
children,  she  found  that  illegitimacy  was  furthered. 

England  has  had  a  series  of  important  literary 
leaders  who  have  interested  themselves  in  behalf  of 
the  poor  and  outcast.  Dickens  drew  minute  word 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  425 

pictures  of  poverty.  Carlyle,  the  iconoclast  and  in- 
dividualist, pierced  repeatedly  the  shams  of  society 
which  are  partly  responsible  for  the  perpetual  exist- 
ence of  social  misery.  In  beautiful  diction  Ruskin 
spoke  in  behalf  of  social  justice.  In  similar  fields, 
France  has  her  Hugo  and  Balzac;  Germany,  her 
Hauptmann ;  Russia,  her  Tolstoi  and  Gorky ;  Scan- 
dinavia, her  Bjornson,  Ibsen,  and  Strindberg.  In- 
dividuals of  this  type,  however,  cannot  be  consid- 
ered social  technologists.  They  have  directed  pub- 
lic opinion  to  specific  social  problems,  but  rarely 
offered  technological  programs  of  practical  value. 

Since  1900,  the  leaders  in  social  technology,  such 
as  C.  R.  Henderson,1  Sidney  and  Beatrice  Webb,2 
and  E.  T.  Devine,3  have  made  clear  the  specific  con- 
ditions under  which  the  poor  may  be  permanently 
aided.4  Remedial  care  will  always  be  necessary, 
but  it  must  be  offered  in  ways  that  will  not  en- 
courage anyone  to  make  a  living  by  begging.  The 
prevailing  thought  today  regarding  poverty  is  in 
preventive  terms.  The  individual  should  be  shown 
how  to  help  himself  up  the  economic  pathway.  Edu- 
cation will  make  the  individual  efficient  and  safe- 
guard him  against  falling  into  a  chronic  state  of 
pauperism. 

Above  all  else,  social  technology  urges  the  estab- 
lishment of  justice  in  economic  conditions.  As 
shown  in  Chapter  XIV,  Henry  George,  in  his 
Progress  and  Poverty,  made  a  fundamental  analysis 
of  one  set  of  causes  of  poverty,  which  he  found  in 


426  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

the  unjust  factors  in  the  economic  system.  He 
showed  how  ownership  in  land  may  be  traced  back 
to  force.  Shall  the  first  person  who  acquires  a  sec- 
tion of  land  be  allowed  to  fence  it  in  and  to  keep  out 
all  other  persons  unless  they  pay  him  a  price  that 
rises  rapidly  as  the  number  of  other  persons  in- 
creases ?5  Why  is  there  increasing  misery  amid  ad- 
vancing wealth?  The  larger  the  city  the  greater 
the  degree  of  squalor — this  was  George's  perplexing 
observation.  Material  progress  does  not  improve 
the  condition  of  the  lowest  classes.  Prosperity 
under  the  present  economic  system  appears  to  be  a 
heavy  wedge  driven  into  society.  The  individuals 
who  are  below  the  line  of  cleavage  are  crushed 
down;  those  who  are  above  this  line  are  hoisted 
upward  into  positions  of  luxury  and  affluence. 

Henry  George,  despite  the  large  number  of  fol- 
lowers which  his  ideas  have  today,  was  probably  in 
error  in  believing  that  to  take  the  ownership  of 
land  out  of  the  hands  of  individuals,  through  the 
method  of  the  single  tax,  would  prevent  poverty. 
However,  no  one  should  be  blind  to  the  fact  that 
increasing  land  values  result  from  mere  increase 
in  population.  Either  the  birth  rate  or  immigra- 
tion increases  population  and  sends  up  land  values, 
which  in  turn  is  accompanied  by  a  rising  scale  of 
rents  with  an  elevated  cost  of  living  and  increased 
poverty. 

The  history  of  human  thought  concerning  crime 
has  run  a  vicissitudinous  career.  It  was  not  until 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  427 

the  days  of  John  Howard  and  Beccaria  that  a  truly 
scientific  approach  was  made  to  the  problem.  John 
Howard  (1726-1790),  sheriff  of  Bedford,  became 
interested  in  criminals.  He  visited  jails  through- 
out England.  He  traveled  widely  in  Europe, 
usually  at  his  own  expense,  studying  the  causes  of 
typhus  fever  and  endeavoring  to  effect  a  more 
humane  treatment  of  offenders. 

Beccaria  (1735-1794),  an  Italian  criminologist, 
published  in  1764  a  remarkable  book,  Crimes  and 
Punishment.  Beccaria  protested  against  attempt- 
ing to  repress  crime  by  the  use  of  fear.  Retaliation 
is  an  entirely  inadequate  motive  for  administering 
punishment.  Torture  is  inhuman.  Neither  retalia- 
tion nor  repression  meets  the  problem.  Reforma- 
tion was  the  concept  with  which  Beccaria  startled 
Europe.  Punishment  should  be  administered  so  as 
to  reform. 

In  modern  days  the  names  of  Cesare  Lombroso 
(1836-1909)  stands  out  prominently  in  the  field  of 
criminology.6  Lombroso  was  a  determinist,  finding 
in  heredity  and  environment  all  the  causes  of  crime, 
and  relieving  the  individual  of  moral  responsibility. 
The  mental  defective,  the  alcoholic,  the  frantically 
angry  are  irresponsible  for  the  crimes  they  commit. 
By  defining  one  irresponsible  group  after  another 
the  Lombrosan  school  has  practically  included  all 
individuals  in  this  classification,  leaving  no  one 
responsible  for  his  conduct. 

The  remedy  for  crime,  according  to  Lombroso 


428  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

and  his  followers,  is  found  in  society.  Society  is 
responsible  for  the  criminal  acts  of  its  members.  If 
society  should  surround  all  individuals  from  in- 
fancy with  a  favorable  environment,  then  crime 
would  end.  In  the  writings  of  Garofalo,  Ferri,  de 
Quiros,  Gross  and  other  Continental  criminologists, 
a  broader  point  of  view  is  usually  taken,  making 
the  responsibility  for  crime  to  rest  on  three  factors, 
heredity,  environment,  and  individual  morality. 
The  margin  of  choice,  and  therefore  of  individual 
responsibility,  is  usually  made  very  slender.  Euro- 
pean criminological  experts,  and  even  American 
writers,  such  as  Parmelee,  have  commonly  mini- 
mized the  importance  of  moral  character  and  the 
accountability  of  the  individual. 

In  the  United  States  the  trend  of  interest  has 
been  penological.  Since  the  days  of  William  Penn, 
who  had  been  a  prisoner  in  England,  American 
thought  has  centered  on  the  problem  of  prison  re- 
form. Barrows  and  Brockway  devoted  their  lives 
to  the  reorganization  of  prison  procedure.  Wines 
and  Lane  show  lucidly  the  trend  in  penological 
thought,  paying  splendid  tribute  to  the  achieve- 
ments of  Z.  R.  Brockway  in  establishing  the  Elmira 
Reformatory  (New  York).7 

The  fundamental  principles  of  the  Elmira  pro- 
cedure are  as  follows:  (1)  The  average  prisoner 
can  be  reformed.  (2)  Reformation  of  the  prisoner 
is  the  duty  of  the  state.  (3)  Prisoners  must  be 
Considered  as  individuals  and  accorded  the  treat-, 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  429 

merit  which  each  needs  in  order  to  bring  him  to  a 
normal  attitude  of  life.  (4)  The  prisoner's  refor- 
mation requires  his  own  co-operation  in  the  process. 
(5)  The  prison  must  have  the  power  to  lengthen 
or  shorten  the  sentence  according  to  the  offender's 
stage  of  reformation.  (6)  The  entire  process  of 
reformation  is  educational,  giving  the  offender  op- 
portunity for  psychical,  mental,  and  moral  growth. 
(7)  Punishment  for  crime  is  administered  in  the 
discipline  and  labor,  which  are  unremitting  and 
exacting. 

In  recent  years  Thomas  M.  Osborne  has  been 
developing  the  honor  system  and  self-government 
among  prisoners.8  The  idea  is  dramatised  by  Bur- 
leigh  and  Bierstadt  in  Punishment.9  The  concep- 
tion is  that  kindly  administration  and  the  personal 
touch  of  love  will  win  the  offender's  heart  and 
mind,  and  effect  a  reformation. 

The  last  twenty  years  have  seen  a  remarkable 
development  of  the  concept  of  prevention  of  crime. 
This  theory,  however,  takes  the  problem  back  to 
pre-adult  years,  to  the  adolescent,  to  childhood, 
and  even  to  the  pre-natal  years  of  the  specific  in- 
dividual. The  establishment  of  the  juvenile  court, 
with  the  success  of  Judge  Ben  B.  Lindsey,  has 
served  to  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  criminals  are 
made  as  a  rule  before  they  reach  the  age  of  twenty- 
one. 

The  contributors  to  recent  thought  about  delin- 
quency, such  as  Jane  Addams,  Breckinridge  and 


430  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

Abbott,  W.  R.  George,  Ben  B.  Lindsey,  Mrs.  Louise 
de  Koven  Bowen,  Flexner  and  Baldwin,  are  pretty 
largely  agreed  that  the  causes  of  delinquency,  and 
hence  of  criminality,  are  as  follows :  ( 1 )  The  de- 
fective home — made  defective  by  illness,  poverty, 
shiftlessness,  ignorance,  immorality,  desertion,  di- 
vorce, death — is  the  leading  single  causal  element. 
Nearly  all  criminals  begin  their  careers  as  dis- 
obedient sons.  The  law  of  obedience  and  self- 
discipline,  if  not  observed  in  the  home,  is  learned 
later  only  at  the  expense  of  anti-social  and  criminal 
acts.  (2)  Mental  defectiveness  often  causes  de- 
linquency. The  mentally  defective  child,  if  ener- 
getic, has  great  difficulty  in  withstanding  the  evil 
temptations  of  life.  He  or  she  has  bodily  passions 
that  are  further  developed  than  his  mental  inhibi- 
tions. In  this  connection  the  public  school  has  an 
important  function  to  perform  in  detecting  mental 
defectives  and  in  segregating  them  under  special 
educational  care.  They  should  be  segregated  also 
by  sexes,  so  that  they  may  not  reproduce  their  kind, 
and  they  should  be  kept  under  educational  and  in- 
stitutional direction  throughout  their  lives.  They 
can  be  made  useful  and  happy  under  a  guarded 
environment.  (3)  Civic  neglect  is  a  third  cause  of 
delinquency  and  crime.  Young  people  are  released 
from  the  public  schools,  often  without  proper  home 
training  and  supervision,  and  drift  about  in  a  highly 
complex  urban  environment,  full  of  commercialized 
and  vicious  devices  for  preying  upon  the  curious 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  431 

and  the  unsuspecting.  (4)  Social  injustice,  for 
example  in  industry,  arouses  feelings  of  hatred  of 
class  against  class,  and  leads  to  criminal  acts. 
(5)  Moral  thoughtlessness  and  religious  indiffer- 
ence are  common  causes.  A  moral  and  religious 
attitude  gives  a  balanced  expression  to  personality, 
wholesomeness  and  obedience  in  the  home;  and  a 
deep,  constant,  and  abiding  interest  in  public  wel- 
fare is  an  invaluable  preventive  of  sin,  vice,  and 
crime. 

A  growing  conception  relative  to  juvenile  courts 
is  that  a  considerable  portion  of  the  work  that  such 
courts  are  now  called  on  to  perform  belongs  to  the 
public  schools.  The  compulsory  attendance,  child 
welfare,  and  continuation  school  departments  may 
well  assume  responsibility  for  and  direction  of 
many  youth  who  now  become  court  charges.  It  is 
urged  that  a  fully  organized  procedure  of  construc- 
tive work  and  play  activity  under  the  supervision 
of  the  schools  will  greatly  reduce  juvenile  delin- 
quency. \ 

Another  cause  of  juvenile  delinquency  is  parental 
negligence.  It  is  believed  by  many  authorities  that 
problems  of  this  character  should  be  taken  care  of 
through  the  domestic  relations  court  rather  than  in 
the  juvenile  court.  Another  causal  factor  is  the 
growing  disrespect  for  parents  on  the  part  of  chil- 
dren, that  is,  the  increasing  degree  of  failure  of 
children  to  appreciate  the  significance  of  the  con- 
cept of  obedience. 


432  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

In  regard  to  labor  problems,  social  technology 
has  made  notable  contributions.  Child  labor  is  a 
term  which  refers  to  the  employment  of  adolescent 
children  for  wages,  when  such  children  are  thereby 
deprived  from  normal  opportunities  of  mental  and 
physical  growth.  Children  should  learn  to  work, 
even  at  unpleasant  tasks,  but  when  at  an  early  age 
they  are  taken  out  of  or  quit  school  and  become 
gainfully  employed,  they  are  deprived  of  a  normal 
adolescence;  they  and  society  both  lose.10 

The  problem  of  women  in  industry  is  due  to  the 
migration  of  millions  of  women  from  the  home  into 
industry.  While  women  are  entitled  to  equality  of 
opportunity  with  men,  they  are  often  unmindful 
that  constitutionally  they  are  not  fitted  to  perform 
all  the  tasks  that  men  are  doing;  that  if  they  fail 
in  the  bearing  and  rearing  of  children  rationally, 
the  race  dies ;  and  that,  if  they  neglect  to  make  the 
home  attractive,  the  family  as  an  essential  social 
institution  is  undermined. 

The  labor  problem,  when  applied  to  men,  brings 
forth  a  multiplicity  of  contradictory  opinions.  The 
idea  of  industrial  democracy  is  the  storm  center. 
While  praising  modern  capitalism  for  its  stimulus 
to  initiative  and  for  its  large-scale  enterprises  that 
have  been  highly  beneficial  in  many  ways,  the 
social  technologist  pronounces  modern  capitalism 
undemocratic.  He  declares  that  it  must  purge  itself 
or  be  supplanted  by  another  industrial  order;  it 
must  take  cognizance  of  social  changes  and  adjust 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  433 

itself  accordingly  or  be  routed. 

The  injustice  in  modern  capitalism  is  often 
stressed  in  social  technologic  thought.  Only  one 
factor,  wealth,  is  represented  in  the  management  of 
business.  The  skilled  or  unskilled  laborers,  often 
"the  hardest  working  partners"  in  the  business,  are 
not  represented.  Applied  sociology,  unlike  social- 
ism, would  keep  industry  in  the  hands  of  indi- 
viduals. The  idea  has  been  best  developed,  perhaps, 
by  a  social  theorist,  Professor  A.  W.  Small.  Labor 
and  capital  must  both  have  representation  on 
boards  of  directors,  if  capitalism  is  to  prove  that 
it  is  not  undemocratic.11 

Tripartite  management  of  industry  is  a  current 
phase  of  industrial  thought.  Where  employers  and 
employees  have  reached  a  common  ground  of  co- 
operation, they  have  often  joined  forces  in  collusion 
against  the  public  and  the  consumer.  The  employer 
agrees  to  a  rise  in  wages  for  the  employee,  and  the 
employee  to  an  increase  in  dividends,  providing  he 
receives  a  portion  of  the  added  returns — meanwhile 
the  public  is  apathetic  or  rages  impotently.  The 
best  thought  today  is  urging  that  on  boards  of  di- 
rectors and  managers  all  three  interested  parties 
shall  have  representation,  namely,  labor,  capital, 
and  the  public. 

It  is  a  current  opinion  that  the  failure  of  capital- 
ism to  democratize  itself  will  result  in  the  rise  of 
socialism  by  revolutionary  means.  If  capital  with  its 
one-sided  control  of  industry  is  supplanted  by  labor 


434  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

with  another  type  of  control,  it  is  doubtful  how 
much  will  be  gained.  The  labor  standard  is  mani- 
festing itself  as  a  class  standard,  and  at  times 
arbitrarily.  To  have  society  controlled  by  labor 
standards,  no  matter  under  what  form  of  socialism 
they  may  appear,  will  not  guarantee  progress.  The 
labor  classes,  the  capitalist  classes,  the  professional 
classes — all  must  rule,  and  unselfishly  for  the  wel- 
fare of  society. 

The  current  socialist  thought  ranges  from  a 
radical  bolshevist  theme  of  a  dictatorship  of  the 
proletariat  to  a  conservative  state  socialism,  like 
that  advocated  by  John  Spargo.  Bolshevism  has 
the  earmarks  of  class  autocracy.  Progress  cannot 
be  secured  by  a  social  order  in  which  the  least  edu- 
cated and  trained  are  in  control.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  is  not  clear  that  state  socialism,  with  its 
governmental  control  of  interest-producing  capi- 
tal and  rent-producing  land,  will  best  guarantee 
progress.  The  socialization  of  individuals  will 
probably  be  more  effective  than  the  socialization  of 
industries. 

The  tendency  is  toward  the  elimination  of  profit- 
ism.  This  negative  thought,  it  is  claimed,  will  re- 
lieve capitalism  of  its  worst  evils,  and  allow  the 
educational  process  of  socializing  individuals  to  go 
forward. 

The  concept  of  social  insurance  has  been  given  a 
remarkable  reception  since  1882.  Social  insurance 
was  introduced  as  a  means  of  pacifying  labor  and 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  435 

of  making  it  contented  under  the  rule  of  capitalism. 
It  was  admitted  into  governmental  economy  by  Bis- 
marck as  an  agency  of  forestalling  socialism.  It 
spread  rapidly.  It  has  met  with  two  setbacks. 
(1)  In  the  first  place  it  has  acquired  such  mo- 
mentum that  capitalism  sees  it  as  the  entering 
wedge  of  a  genuine  socialism.  (2)  In  the  second 
place  social  insurance  is  guaranteeing  so  much  se- 
curity to  the  workingman  that  he  is  constrained  at 
times  to  sacrifice  his  initiative  and  even  to  become 
shiftless,  saying  in  effect  to  himself,  "I'll  be  taken 
care  of  anyway/'  It  is  this  second  type  of  an- 
tagonistic thought  that  indicates  the  real  weakness 
in  social  insurance.  It  would  be  better  to  have  a 
society  in  which  the  workingmen  as  a  class  would 
have  an  ample  opportunity  of  caring  for,  and  be 
stimulated  to  care  for,  their  old  age  and  for  periods 
of  disability.  For  the  individual  exceptions,  special 
provisions  could  be  made. 

The  unemployment  problem  has  produced  many 
reform  theories.  Unemployment  insurance,  now  be- 
ing made  the  subject  of  experiment,  is  probably  not 
reaching  the  main  causes.  The  causal  factors  are 
many  and  deep-seated;  they  range  from  individual 
shiftlessness  and  mental  defectiveness  on  one  hand, 
to  economic  injustice  and  social  callousness  on  the 
other.12  The  prevailing  thought  urges  a  more  effi- 
cient training  of  the  individual;  the  increasing  of 
the  workman's  opportunity  to  enlarge  his  person- 
ality through  each  day's  work;  the  development  of 


436  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

industrial  democracy  and  justice;  and  a  complete 
socialization  program. 

Another  set  of  problems  concerning  which  applied 
sociology  is  endeavoring  to  find  solutions  relates  to 
the  family,  feminism,  marriage,  divorce,  and  hous- 
ing. Professor  George  Elliott  Howard13  and  Dr. 
Edward  Westermarck14  have  traced  the  development 
of  the  family  and  marriage  throughout  human  his- 
tory. The  primitive  relationships  between  sexes  have 
been  described  by  many  anthropological  writers.  A 
history  of  the  American  family  has  been  written 
by  A.  W.  Calhoun.15  Single  volume  treatments  of 
the  family  as  a  social  institution  have  been  made  by 
Bosanquet16  and  Goodsell.17  These  works  essentially 
agree  that  the  family  is  an  evolutionary  product, 
that  the  primitive  family  centered  about  the  mother 
and  child,  that  patriarchalism  introduced  a  high  de- 
gree of  masculine  arbitrariness,  and  that  the  family 
is  at  present  undergoing  marked  changes  whereby 
the  spirit  of  democracy  is  gaining  ground. 

In  the  new  found  spirit  of  freedom,  woman  has 
sometimes  been  captivated  by  the  desire  to  follow 
man  into  all  the  man-made  occupations.  Sex  nature 
predestines  woman  to  the  chief  occupation  or  pro- 
fession of  all,  that  of  motherhood.  For  woman  to 
rush  headlong  after  men  into  industry  may  turn 
out  to  be  not  liberty,  but  license  and  deterioration. 
Current  social  thought  protests  vigorously  against 
the  idea  of  women  being  household  drudges,  and 
also  against  women  wasting  their  time  in  pluming 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  437 

themselves  or  in  idling  away  their  days  in  dolls' 
houses,  supported  dependents  of  men.  Women  are 
entitled  to  learn  vocations  and  to  live  constructive 
lives,  in  an  atmosphere  of  the  largest  possible  free-  / 
dom  consistent  with  the  development  of  themselves 
and  the  race.     On  the  other  hand,  any  movement 
which  weakens  the  home  as  a  societary  training  in- 
stitution apparently  defies  the  laws  of  social  ad-  / 
vance. 

The  housing  problem  is  provoking  urgent 
thought.  With  the  rise  of  large  cities  the  economic 
order  favors  exorbitant  land  values  and  extraordi- 
narily high  rents.  The  social  increment  goes  into 
the  hands  of  the  few.  The  flat  and  apartment  house 
life  often  favors  pet  bulldogs  rather  than  children, 
and  decreases  the  efficiency  of  the  home  as  a  social 
institution.  These  untoward  tendencies,  further- 
more, are  being  supplemented  by  an  attitude  of 
more  or  less  helpless  apathy  on  the  part  of  the 
public. 

Another  field  of  applied  sociologic  thought  is 
represented  by  the  terms,  race  problems,  immigra- 
tion, and  naturalization.  These  concepts  are  all 
outgrowths  of  the  population  concept  which  has 
been  treated  in  an  earlier  chapter.  The  human  race 
with  its  common  origin  has  subdivided  and  wan- 
dered into  all  the  inhabitable  parts  of  the  globe. 
Climate,  geography,  and  social  environment  have 
operated  to  make  the  race  subdivisions  distinct  and 
discriminatory.  Race  pride  and  prejudice  have 


438  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

raised  impassable  race  barriers. 

In  the  United  States  the  leading  race  problem  in- 
volves the  Negroes.  Booker  T.  Washington18  urged 
that  if  the  Negro  shows  himself  industrially  effi- 
cient and  morally  worthy,  the  prejudice  against  him 
will  disappear.  W.  E.  B.  DuBois19  asks  that  the 
prejudice  against  the  colored  race  by  the  white  race 
be  removed  in  order  that  the  Negro  may  have  a  fair 
chance  to  show  himself  capable.  The  Southern 
white  people  declare  that  the  colored  people  must  be 
segregated  on  a  lower  plane  than  that  occupied  by 
the  white  race.  Northern  people  assert  that  the 
trouble  lies  chiefly  in  an  undemocratic  attitude  of 
Southern  white  people  toward  the  colored  race. 
Thus  the  currents  of  thought  concerning  the  Negro 
come  into  conflict,  but  without  forming  a  common 
current  of  action. 

Another  phase  of  the  race  problem  is  conveyed 
by  the  concept  of  hyphenated  interests.  The  Ameri- 
canization movement  has  assumed  momentum  be- 
cause of  the  need  for  a  more  unified  spirit  within 
the  nation.  Although  some  of  the  promoters  of 
Americanization  have  used  autocratic  means,  the 
opinion  is  gaining  ground  that  the  transference  of 
the  loyalty  of  the  immigrant  from  his  home  coun- 
try to  his  adopted  country  can  best  be  effected  by 
treating  the  immigrant  sympathetically  and  demo- 
cratically in  all  his  contacts — industrial,  social,  po- 
litical— with  the  people  of  our  land.20 

The  public  health  movement  has  acquired  force 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  439 

because  of  the  belief  that  only  public  and  wide- 
spread action  can  remove  many  of  the  causes  of 
disease.  Tuberculosis,  for  example,  is  a  disease  that 
is  caused  by  a  microscopic  germ  which  thrives  and 
multiplies  in  the  tissues  of  susceptible  and  weakened 
organisms.  Tuberculosis  and  unsanitary  housing 
conditions  flourish  together.  The  individual  is 
often  helpless,  but  the  thought  is  now  well  grounded 
that  public  action  can  stamp  out  the  breeding  places 
of  the  tubercle  bacilli  and  relieve  the  country  of  the 
white  plague.  An  improved  economic  and  educa- 
tional status  for  the  unskilled  laborer  and  his  family 
would  also  help  to  improve  the  health  level  of  the 
country.  Current  social  thought  supports  the  con- 
tention that  the  real  work  of  a  physician  is  to  keep 
people  well  rather  than  to  cure  them  after  they  have 
fallen  seriously  ill.  Preventive  medicine  and  the 
public  health  movement  are  strongly  urged  by  social 
technology. 

Another  phase  of  applied  sociology  of  current 
significance  is  indicated  by  the  term,  community 
organization.21  The  idea  of  this  movement  origi- 
nated in  the  failure  of  people  to  develop  a  demo- 
cratic consciousness.  Community  organization  re- 
fers to  attempts  of  communities  to  organize  them- 
selves for  neighborhood  efficiency.  When  a  com- 
munity organizes  its  own  recreations  and  amuse- 
ments, it  functions  in  two  important  directions.  ( 1 ) 
It  supplants  commercialized  amusements,  operated 
for  profit  and  often  on  a  socially  destructive  basis, 


440  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

by  community  recreation,  maintained  by  the  people 
themselves  in  socially  constructive  ways  and  at  a 
minimum  of  expense.  (2)  In  participating  in  and 
building  up  community  enterprises  such  as  com- 
munity recreation,  the  people  of  the  community  de- 
velop a  co-operative  democratic  consciousness.  The 
problem  of  the  use  of  leisure  time  is  growing  in 
proportion  to  the  extent  that  the  laboring  classes 
are  winning  a  shorter  work  day.  In  addition  to 
community  recreation,  community  health  move- 
ments, community  newspapers,  community  co-oper- 
ative stores,  community  committees  for  securing 
needed  legislation  and  for  breaking  the  force  of 
economic  monopoly,  are  attracting  widespread  at- 
tention. The  social  unit  and  the  block  system  of 
community  service,  are  terms  which  indicate  varia- 
tions of  the  community  organization  concept,  orig- 
inally a  product  of  the  need  of  meeting  the  leisure 
time  problem  constructively  with  the  very  important 
result  of  re-creating  democracy. 

Social  technology  has  produced  the  survey.22  The 
social  survey,  being  related  in  its  origin  to  the  cen- 
sus, is  an  accurate  method  of  gathering  social  facts, 
not  merely  facts  about  the  numbers  of  people,  the 
acreage,  and  the  amount  of  wealth,  but  the  facts 
about  the  societary  assets  and  liabilities  of  a  city 
or  community,  and  concerning  the  constructive  and 
the  destructive  forces.  By  making  surveys  at  regu- 
lar intervals  of  five  or  ten  year  periods,  a  commun- 
ity can  determine  the  amount  and  direction  of  its 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  441 

own  progress.  The  idea  of  a  survey  is  similar  to 
that  of  an  inventory  of  a  business  house — to  find 
out  the  gains  and  losses,  and  to  plan  for  the  future 
according  to  the  verdict  of  the  inventory. 

In  recent  years  social  case  work  has  acquired  an 
important  rank  in  the  field  of  applied  sociology. 
Social  reform  deals  with  methods  for  improving  the 
whole  mass  of  individuals  and  for  raising  the  level 
of  the  entire  group;  social  case  work  on  the  other 
hand  stimulates  individuals  to  improve  the  quality 
of  their  lives,  to  adjust  themselves  more  adequately 
to  their  environment,  and  to  transform  their  en- 
vironments. Social  case  work  insists  that  sound 
social  reforms  can  be  effected  only  on  the  basis  of 
first-hand  experiences  with  the  needs  of  individuals 
who  are  the  victims  of  social  imperfections  or  their 
own  shortcomings.  Social  work  with  individuals 
has  provided  a  body  of  specific  facts  of  first  magni- 
tude as  a  foundation  for  measures  of  social  amelio- 
ration and  progress;  it  has  mirrored  life  which  is 
under  the  harrow  of  circumstances;  it  has  por- 
trayed life  where  living  conditions  are  harshest. 

Applied  sociology  represents  methods  of  social 
attack.  It  furthers  progress  by  planning  for  society 
on  the  basis  of  past  societal  experiences  and  current 
facts  and  tendencies.  It  fulfils  the  demands  of  so- 
cial telesis. 


CHAPTER  XXV 
THE  RISE  OF  EDUCATIONAL  SOCIOLOGY 


In  recent  decades  educational  leaders  have  been 
thinking  in  sociological  terms.  In  its  experimental 
phases  educational  sociology  constitutes  a  phase  of 
applied  sociology.  The  principles  of  modern  educa- 
tional sociology  have  a  thousand  sources. 

Pestalozzi  (1746-1827)  may  be  considered  a 
forerunner  of  current  social  theories  of  education. 
He  was  interested  in  humanity  for  humanity's  sake. 
Like  St.  Francis  of  Assisi,  he  lived  with  the  poor 
in  order  that  he  might  teach  them  to  be  thrifty  and 
worthy  citizens.  In  his  Leonard  and  Gertrude,  he 
described  the  life  of  the  poor,  and  formulated  an 
educational  procedure  for  educating  the  poor.  He 
was  a  lover  of  little  children,  of  poor  people,  of 
anyone  in  trouble,  of  all  humanity.  He  spoke  in 
dignified  terms  of  the  function  of  a  good  woman, 
no  matter  how  humble  her  station  in  life.  Her  first 
duty  is  to  educate  her  children  and  to  meet  the  needs 
of  her  family.  She  has,  also,  obligations  to  her 
neighbors  and  community.  Others,  seeing  her  con- 
structive work,  will  be  inspired  and  motivated  to  do 
likewise. 


EDUCATIONAL  SOCIOLOGY  443 

In  opening  an  industrial  school  for  the  poor,  Pes- 
talozzi  recognized  that  the  poor  have  the  least  op- 
portunities for  development  and  the  largest  num- 
bers of  problems  to  solve, — therefore  they  are  in 
the  greatest  need  of  educational  advantages.  He 
held  that  all  the  phases  of  human  personality  should 
be  trained,  and  that  there  should  be  "a  harmonious 
development  of  all  human  powers."  Hence,  educa- 
tion is  the  greatest  gift  that  anyone,  rich  or  poor, 
can  receive.  In  urging  that  the  child  should  be  edu- 
cated in  company  with  other  children,  that  is,  in 
groups,  he  took  an  attitude  superior  to  that  of  Rous- 
seau, but  presaging  that  of  Froebel. 

Froebel  (1782-1852),  the  founder  of  the  kinder- 
garten, considered  little  children  "as  plants  in  a  gar- 
den." He  recognized  the  educative  importance  of 
the  early  years  of  life.  He  perceived  the  possibili- 
ties of  teaching  through  the  use  of  plays  and  games. 
He  understood  the  "interests"  of  little  children. 
His  most  important  conception,  perhaps,  was  his 
recognition  of  the  gregarious  impulses  as  an  effect- 
ive setting  for  the  educative  processes.  While  neo- 
Froebelians  have  sometimes  turned  all  work  into 
play  and  have  neglected  to  train  the  child  in  doing 
some  things  in  which  he  is  not  interested  at  the  par- 
ticular time,  the  utilization  of  the  gregarious  and 
play  impulses  as  vital  backgrounds  for  education  is 
not  unworthy.  The  evils  in  this  connection  are  no 
greater  than  when  the  Montessori  method  is  fol- 
lowed, with  its  emphasis  upon  a  maximum  of  indi- 


444  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

vidual  choice. 

In  Horace  Mann  (1796-1859),  American  educa- 
tion found  a  new  social  emphasis.  Education  in  a 
democracy,  according  to  Mann,  should  be  public  and 
open  equally  to  all  classes  of  people.  Moreover,  in 
a  democracy,  education  is  not  a  mere  acquisition  of 
knowledge ;  it  is  not  concealed  in  college  degrees  as 
such;  it  is  not  aristocratic.  It  was  Mann's  conten- 
tion that  education  should  be  an  actual  training  for 
rearing  worthy  families,  for  living  an  unsefish  so- 
cial life,  for  being  a  public  spirited  citizen  in  one's 
daily  I  activities. 

Mann  asserted  that  the  common  school  is  the  bul- 
wark of  the  nation.  He  believed  that  education 
should  encourage  true  religion.  He  inaugurated  the 
normal  training  school, — in  support  of  his  theory 
of  specially  trained  teachers.  His  social  philosophy 
is  contained  in  a  statement  from  his  last  public  ad- 
dress: "Be  ashamed  to  die  until  you  have  won 
a  victory  for  humanity." 

During  the  intervening  decades  since  the  days  of 
Horace  Mann,  the  social  conception  of  education 
has  been  assuming  new  practical  phases.  Professor 
John  Dewey  has  pointed  out  that  all  communication 
is  education;  that  the  terms,  common,  community, 
and  communication,  possess  more  than  a  verbal  re- 
lationship.1 Anything  is  educative  which  produces 
similar  emotional  and  intellectual  dispositions,  that 
is,  like  ways  of  responding  to  stimuli.  Societal  life, 
hence,  is  unusually  educative.  Education  consists 


EDUCATIONAL  SOCIOLOGY  445 

of  processes  of  self-development,  of  self-continua- 
tion, of  social  continuation.  These  processes  are 
possible  only  on  bases  of  common  means  of  com- 
munication. It  is  these  means,  as  Professor  C.  H. 
Cooley  has  indicated,  which  make  even  the  power- 
ful factors  of  suggestion  and  imitation  so  universal. 
( It  is  not  the  environment  which  directly  implants 
certain  desires  in  individuals.2  The  environment 
sets  up  conditions  which  stimulate  certain  ways  of 
acting.  The  child  gets  a  real  idea  of  a  hat,  not  by 
seeing  a  hat,  or  by  being  told  of  its  uses,  but  by 
actually  using  a  hat.  The  social  environment,  in 
other  words,  forms  "the  mental  and  emotional  dis- 
position of  behavior  in  individuals  by  engaging 
them  in  activities"  that  arouse  various  impulses, 
purposes,  and  produces  certain  consequences.3 

As  society  becomes  exceedingly  complex,  it  is 
essential  that  society  provide  a  simplified  social 
environment  through  which  the  child  may  pass,  in 
order  that  he  may  adjust  himself  the  more  quickly 
and  easily  to  the  complex  societal  environment.  To 
this  end  the  school  serves  a  valuable  purpose.  How- 
ever, in  order  to  function  best,  the  school  must  be  a 
replica  in  as  many  ways  as  possible  of  real  society.4 
The  special  social  environment,  namely,  the 
school,  must  simplify  and  arrange  in  an  orderly 
way  the  dispositional  factors  it  wishes  to  develop  in 
children.  It  must  present  the  existing  social  cus- 
toms in  purified  and  idealized  forms.  It  must  create 
a  wider  and  better  balanced  environment  for  the 


446  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

young  than  they  would  have  if  they  were  not  in 
school. 

Imitation,  to  Dr.  Dewey,  is  a  less  useful  term 
than  many  social  psychologists  believe.  What  et> 
jectively  is  a  process  of  imitation  is  subjectively  a 
process  of  like  response  to  like  stimuli.  The  term 
imitation  does  not  explain;  it  simply  describes— 
objectively.  The  fundamental  fact  that  the  socio- 
logical student  needs  to  keep  in  mind  is  that  "per- 
sons being  alike  in  structure  respond  in  the  same 
way  to  like  stimuli."5  This  conception  is  similar  to 
ideas  that  Professors  Giddings  and  Cooley  have 
elaborated.  The  societal  significance  of  this  inter- 
pretation can  be  stated  best  in  terms  of  social  con- 
trol. The  highest  type  of  social  control  is  that  which 
plans  for  a  common  mental  disposition,  a  common 
way  of  understanding  objects,  events,  and  acts, 
common  sets  of  socially  constructive  stimuli. 

Professor  Dewey  argues  for  a  school  life  which 
fully  connects  theory  and  practice.  While  prag- 
matic, he  emphasizes  the  necessity  for  a  correct 
theory,  but  more  particularly  the  combining  of 
theory  and  practice — in  the  school  life  itself.  In 
other  words,  anything  which  sets  school  life  apart 
from  actual  life  is  a  disutility;  it  is  educationally 
harmful.  Hence  school  life  must  include  the  actual 
occupations,  nature  study,  and  the  like.  It  must 
relegate  formal  education  to  a  secondary  position. 
The  moral  atmosphere  of  the  schoolroom  must 
change  from  one  primarily  of  discipline,  even  for- 


EDUCATIONAL  SOCIOLOGY  447 

mal  discipline,  to  one  of  co-operation. 

School  life,  in  other  terms,  is  properly  an  embry 
onic  community  life.  It  is  the  business  of  the  school 
to  train  each  child  into  membership  of  a  little  com- 
munity that  is  a  counterpart  of  society  at  large, 
"saturating  him  with  the  spirit  of  service,  and  pro- 
viding him  with  the  instruments  of  effective  self- 
direction."6  Professor  Dewey  would  make  the 
school  a  miniature  society,  fitting  its  members  by 
their  daily  activities  in  the  schools  for  normal  mem- 
bership in  "a  larger  society  which  is  worthy,  lovely, 
and  harmonious." 

The  literature  on  educational  sociology  is  grow- 
ing rapidly.  Within  recent  years  several  books  on 
educational  sociology  have  appeared.  In  the  list  of 
the  authors  of/  these  works  are  the  names  of 
O'Shea,  Snedden,  Smith,  King,  Clow,  Betts,  Dut- 
ton,  and  others  of  equal  importance.7  Professor 
Walter  R.  Smith,  for  example,  in  applying  socio- 
logical principles  to  educational  work,  contends  that 
normal  school  graduates  have  been  taught  to  look 
to  psychology  alone  for  the  key  to  sound  pedagogy, 
whereas  sociology  is  perhaps  an  equally  important 
key  to  effective  teaching.  Education  is  not  entirely 
a  matter  of  training  the  mind  of  the  individual;  it 
is  also  a  process  of  acquainting  the  individual  with 
the  needs  of  society  and  of  helping  him  to  partici- 
pate in  improving  the  quality  of  societary  life.  Dr. 
Smith  urges  training  not  for  citizenship,  but  train- 
ing into  citizenship.8 


448  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

Inasmuch  as  men  and  women  live  and  develop 
and  work  as  members  of  groups,  it  is  vital,  accord- 
ing to  Dr.  Snedden,  that  children  be  taught  as  in- 
tegral units  of  group  life.  It  is  sociology  that  must 
determine  the  aims  of  education.9  By  sociological 
standards  it  has  been  proved  that  existing  curricula 
in  the  United  States  are  excessively  individualistic 
in  aim  as  well  as  in  method.  Their  purpose  has 
been  to  encourage  the  individual  to  win  against, 
rather  than  with,  his  fellows.  Our  curricula  pro- 
vide self-culture  studies  and  self-development  stud- 
ies, but  few  social  culture  and  social  development 
studies.  The  former  are  indispensable,  but  if  not 
properly  balanced  by  the  latter  they  are  positively 
dangerous.  J 

The  responsibilities  of  individuals  for  collective 
thinking  and  acting  have  never  been  taught  to  any 
degree  in  the  schools,  and  yet  these  responsibilities, 
not  only  in  time  of  war,  but  increasingly  so  in  time 
of  peace,  must  be  assumed  widely,  else  democracy 
itself  will  collapse.  By  training  pupils  in  the  prin- 
ciples of  individual  success  primarily,  the  schools 
have  turned  out  a  generation  of  persons  who  are 
unready  to  meet  the  new  world  problems  that  are 
at  hand,  and  who  are  unable  to  promote  "construct- 
ive programs  making  for  international  co-opera- 
tion and  friendliness."10 

Custom,  not  social  needs,  has  too  often  controlled 
school  curricula.  The  Anabasis  and  Caesar's  Com- 
mentaries, although  splendid  bits  of  literary  com- 


EDUCATIONAL  SOCIOLOGY  449 

position,  "are  about  as  significant  to  the  realities  of 
a  nineteenth  or  twentieth  century  as  bows  and 
arrows  would  be  in  modern  warfare,  or  Roman  gal- 
l^ys  in  the  naval  contests  of  tomorrow.11  The  study 
of  forgotten  tongues  and  antiquated  fragments  of 
literature  falls  far  short  of  training  twentieth  cen- 
tury youths  for  the  conscious  co-operative  direction 
of  the  social  forces  of  the  future. 

Vocational  education  is  not  all-sufficient.  Youth 
must  be  taught  to  be  socially  and  morally  efficient — 
no  less  than  physically  and  vocationally.12  In  addi- 
tion to  the  current  emphasis  upon  vocational  edu- 
cation, attention  must  be  given  to  a  moral  education 
in  the  schools  that  can  produce  in  individuals  the 
moral  character  required  to  meet  .the  needs  of  a 
highly  developed  democracy. 

Educational  sociology  has  viewed  with  alarm  cer- 
tain recent  tendencies  in  vocational  guidance.  It 
has  supported  heartily  the  plans  for  giving  every 
child  an  occupational  training  and  of  enabling  him 
to  earn  his  own  living.  On  the  other  hand,  it  has 
deplored  the  idea  that  a  vocation  or  earning  a  living 
is  an  end  in  itself.  It  has  insisted  that  the  main 
reason  for  teaching  a  boy  a  trade  is  that  the  boy 
may  have  a  larger  opportunity  for  developing  his 
personality  and  for  serving  society. 

Likewise,  educational  sociology  has  often  looked 
askance  at  scientific  management,  or  the  movement 
for  educating  all  workingmen  to  the  point  of  high- 
est productive  efficiency.  Such  a  training  has  fre- 


450  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

quently  produced  a  maximum  increase  in  profits  for 
those  who  have  promoted  it  and  a  minimum  of  in- 
crease in  wages  for  the  workers,  besides  tending  to 
turn  the  latter  into  mere  machines,  instead  of  into 
human  leaders  with  increased  capacities  for  enjoy- 
ment and  spiritual  service. 

The  studies  in  all  school  curricula  must  be  evalu- 
ated in  terms  of  social  worth.  For  example,  what 
is  the  purpose  of  teaching  history?  Is  it. to  give 
the  pupil  a  chronology  of  dates  and  a  catalogue  of 
ignoble  kings  and  bloody  battles,  or  is  it  to  give 
the  pupil  the  meaning  of  social  evolution,  social 
progress,  social  inheritances,  the  rise  of  social 
needs?14 

Educational  sociology  holds  the  theory  that  train- 
ing for  unselfish  social  living  is  as  important  as 
training  for  individual  pecuniary  success.  It  is 
engaged  at  the  present  time  in  working  out  tech- 
niques for  introducing  every  member  of  the  public 
schools  to  the  sociological  viewpoint.  The  names 
under  which  such  techniques  appear  is  immaterial, 
whether  as  community  civics,  American  history 
studies,  elementary  social  science,  or  elementary 
sociology.  The  next  few  decades  will  undoubtedly 
be  marked  by  the  rapid  spread  of  educational  so- 
ciology. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 
THE  SOCIOLOGY  OF  MODERN  CHRISTIANITY 


In  a  foregoing  chapter  the  invaluable  contribu- 
tion of  the  Hebrews  to  social  thought  was  pre- 
sented; the  attack  of  the  prophets  on  social  injustice 
was  the  outstanding  feature.  In  another  chapter 
the  emphasis  by  Jesus  upon  love  as  a  dynamic  socie- 
tal principle  was  described.  In  the  centuries  which 
followed  the  beginning  of  the  Christian  era,  the 
Church  apotheosized  beliefs,  creeds,  dogmas.  Near 
the  close  of  the  nineteenth  century  a  renaissance  of 
the  social  teachings  of  Jesus  occurred. 

The  trio  of  writers  who  brought  forward  the 
social  ideals  of  Christianity  in  a  new,  positive,  an3 
stimulating  way  in  the  closing  decades  of  the  last 
century  were  Washington  Gladden,  Josiah  Strong, 
and  Richard  T.  Ely.  All  three  of  these  men  began 
about  1885  to  discuss  in  print  the  social  content  of 
Christianity.  These  men  had  been  aroused  by  the 
apparent  impotence  of  the  Christian  Church  in  face 
of  the  increasing  power  of  capitalism.  While  many 
church  leaders  allowed  themselves  to  be  carried 
along  in  the  powerful  arms  of  capitalism,  there 
were  a  few  who  perceived  the  wreck  of  human  lives 


452  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

that  was  often  left  in  the  wake  of  the  capitalistic 
movement.  These  individuals,  while  not  blind  to 
the  social  values  of  capitalism,  were  in  touch  with 
the  laboring  man,  and  by  these  contacts  caught  the 
social  need  of  the  hour.  In  this  social  crisis  they 
heard  the  still,  small  voice  coming  down  through 
the  centuries,  even  the  voice  of  Jesus  as  he  spoke 
in  behalf  of  the  poor  and  outcast. 

It  was  Washington  Gladden  who  startled  and 
even  angered  the  world  of  religious  and  economic 
thought  by  protesting  against  the  acceptance  of 
"tainted  money."  By  this  term  he  referred  to 
money  which  had  been  made  under  a  capitalistic 
system  at  the  expense  of  the  lives  of  men,  women, 
and  little  children  in  the  industrial  processes.  Dr. 
Gladden  weathered  the  storm  of  protest  and  gave 
the  capitalistic  world  a  new  concept  which,  while 
it  aroused  anger,  also  brought  introspection  and  a 
new  type  of  social  conscience  into  the  lives  of  many 
Christians. 

It  was  Dr.  Gladden's  contention  that  employer 
and  employee  ought  to  be  friends,  because  they  are 
so  closely  associated.  It  is  a  very  large  part  of  the 
business  of  the  employer  to  maintain  sympathetic 
relations  between  himself  and  his  employees.1  If 
the  business  man  will  not  let  his  f ellowmen  share  in 
his  prosperity,  he  will  become  in  spite  of  himself  a 
sharer  in  their  adversity. 

The  attitude  of  Dr.  Gladden  toward  the  accept- 
ance of  railway  passes  by  the  clergy  attracted  wide- 


MODERN  CHRISTIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT      453 

spread  attention.  He  came  to  the  conclusion  that 
a  railroad  company  is  bound  to  render  an  equal 
service  to  all  the  people;  its  business  is  not  to  show 
special  favors  to  the  representatives  of  either  re- 
ligion or  charity.2  "What  it  has  no  right  to  give 
me,  I  have  no  right  to  take,  and  for  several  years 
I  have  not  taken  it;  I  pay  the  regular  fare  as  all 
my  neighbors  do  or  ought." 

Dr.  Gladden  urged  the  abolition  of  city  slums  by 
governmental  action.  Inasmuch  as  slums  are  rife 
with  moral  miasmas  and  are  breeding-places  of 
pauperism  and  crime,  the  city  has  the  same  right  to 
abate  such  curses  as  to  drain  a  morass.  Moreover, 
individuals  ought  to  have  no  property  rights  "in 
premises  which  breed  death  and  engender  vice. 
When  they  have  proved  that  they  lack  the  power 
to  keep  their  property  from  falling  into  such  con- 
ditions, their  property  must  be  summarily  taken 
away  from  them."8 

Without  minimizing  the  importance  of  conflict  as 
a  principle  of  social  progress,  Dr.  Gladden  stressed 
the  concept  of  co-operation.  For  example,  in  in- 
dustrial matters  he  advocated  the  idea  of  a  true 
trades  union — "the  union  of  employers  and  em- 
ployed— of  guiding  brains  and  willing  hands — all 
watchful  of  each  other's  interests,  seeking  each 
other's  welfare,  working  for  the  common  good."4 

In  his  well-known  treatise  on  Social  Salvation, 
Dr.  Gladden  asserts  that,  in  order  to  be  soundly  con- 
verted, an  individual  must  comprehend  his  social  re- 


\ 


454  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

lationships  and  strive  to  fulfil  them,  as  well  as  set 
up  right  relationships  with  God.5  Sanctification 
consists  in  fulfilling  one's  social  as  well  as  one's  di- 
vine privileges,  and  in  living  according  to  the  needs 
of  human  society  as  well  as  according  to  the  needs 
of  the  human  soul.  An  individual  can  no  more  be 
a  Christian  by  himself  than  he  can  sing  an  oratorio 
alone.6 

It  is  no  purely  social  gospel  that  Dr.  Gladden 
taught.  He  was  correct  in  protesting  against  the 
attitude  of  certain  reformers  who  hold  that  chang- 
ing the  environment  is  all-sufficient.  It  is  possible 
to  go  too  far  in  removing  temptations  from  the 
pathway  of  men;  it  would  be  unwise  to  neglect  the 
problem  of  equipping  men  to  resist  temptation,  and 
hence  to  weaken  the  sense  of  moral  responsibility.7 

In  the  field  of  practical  social  reform  Dr.  Josiah 
Strong  did  effective  work.  He  also  re-interpreted 
the  social  principles  of  Jesus,  and  boldly  proclaimed 
the  spirit  of  love  as  the  cardinal  principle  for  the 
organization  of  human  society.8  He  indicated  that 
people  have  stressed  properly  the  importance  of  be- 
lieving the  truth,  but  underestimated  the  import- 
ance of  living  the  truth.9  He  protested  against  the 
tendency  to  separate  the  sacred  and  the  secular,  and 
to  divorce  doctrine  from  conduct.  He  believed  that 
the  prevailing  religious  tendency  to  neglect  the 
sacred  commandment,  of  loving  one's  neighbor  as 
one's  self,  has  led  to  a  selfish  individualism  on  the 
part  of  many  religious  people. 


MODERN  CHRISTIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT      455 

The  contributions  to  social  thought  by  Gladden 
and  Strong  were  ably  supported  by  the  social  ideas 
of  Richard  T.  Ely.  Professor  Ely  remonstrated 
against  the  tendency  of  many  church  people  to  think 
that  they  can  serve  God  without  devoting  their  lives 
to  their  fellowmen.10  He  made  vivid  the  complaint 
of  American  workingmen  that  church  membership 
on  the  part  of  employers  and  landlords  does  not 
necessarily  insure  just  and  considerate  treatment  of 
employees  and  tenants.11  Professor  Ely  insisted 
that  it  is  as  holy  a  work  "to  lead  a  crusade  against 
filth,  vice,  and  disease  in  slums  of  cities,  and  to  seek 
the  abolition  of  the  disgraceful  tenement  houses  of 
American  cities,  as  it  is  to  send  missionaries  to  the 
heathen."12 

The  pioneer  work  of  Gladden,  Strong,  Ely,  and 
others  in  rejuvenating  the  social  meaning  of  Chris- 
tianity in  the  closing  years  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury has  been  carried  forward  in  the  present  cen- 
tury by  a  host  of  able  writers.  The  list  includes 
the  names  of  well  known  socio-religious  thinkers 
such  as  Peabody,13  Mathews,14  Rauschenbusch,15 
Batten,16  Ward,17  Atkinson,18  Ryan,19  Stelzle,20  and 
Taylor.21  Special  attention  will  be  given  to  the  con- 
tributions of  Rauschenbusch  and  Ward,  because 
each  has  been  a  storm-center  in  socio-religious 
matters. 

In  his  Christianity  and  the  Social  Crisis,  Profes- 
sor Rauschenbusch  gave  a  brief  history  of  Chris- 
tianity and  its  Hebrew  antecedents,  showing  first 


456  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

that  "the  essential  purpose  of  Christianity  was  to 
transform  human  society  into  the  Kingdom  of  God 
by  regenerating  all  human  relations  and  reconstitut- 
ing them  in  accordance  with  the  will  of  God."22  He 
then  raised  the  question,  why  has  Christianity  not 
undertaken  the  work  of  social  reconstruction?  He 
believed  that  if  the  Church  were  to  direct  its  full 
available  force  against  any  social  wrong,  probably 
nothing  could  withstand  it.23  Despite  the  fact  that 
Christianity  has  played  a  leading  part  in  lifting 
woman  to  equality  and  companionship  with  men,  in 
changing  parental  despotism  to  parental  service,  in 
eliminating  unnatural  vice,  in  abolishing  slavery,  in 
covering  all  lands  with  a  network  of  charities,  in 
fostering  institutions  of  learning,  in  aiding  the 
progress  of  civil  liberty  and  social  justice,  in  dif- 
fusing a  softening  tenderness  throughout  human 
life,  in  taming  selfishness,  and  in  creating  a  resolute 
sense  of  duty,  it  has  not  yet  undertaken  a  recon- 
struction of  society  on  a  Christian  basis.24  It  has 
been  engaged  in  suppressing  some  of  the  most  glar- 
ing evils  in  the  social  system  of  the  time.25 

Dr.  Rauschenbusch  pointed  out  several  historical 
factors  which  have  prevented  Christianity  from 
entering  upon  a  pregram  of  reconstructing  society, 
many  of  which  no  longer  obtain.26  These  hindering 
factors  have  been :  ( 1 )  the  moral  resentment  of  the 
classes  whose  interests  are  endangered  by  a  moral 
campaign;  (2)  the  belief  in  the  immediate  return 
of  Christ,  which  precluded  a  long  outlook;  (3)  the 


MODERN  CHRISTIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT      457 

primitive  attitude  of  fear  and  distrust  toward  the 
state;  (4)  the  other-worldliness  of  Christian  de- 
sire; (5)  the  ascetic  and  monastic  ideals;  (6)  cere- 
monialism; (7)  dogmatism;  (8)  the  monarchial  or- 
ganization of  the  church;  (9)  an  absence  of  the  in- 
tellectual prerequisites  for  social  reconstruction. 
To  the  extent  that  Christianity  is  no  longer  ham- 
pered by  these  characteristics  it  is  ready  to  under- 
take the  task  of  making  over  society. 

The  main  danger  in  the  present  crisis  which  de- 
mands the  attention  of  social  Christianity  was 
found  by  Professor  Rauschenbusch  in  the  auto- 
cratic, unjust  phases  of  capitalism,  with  its  some- 
what undemocratic  wage  system.  To  this  expres- 
sion of  autocracy  there  is  a  three-fold  class  reac- 
tion.27 First,  there  are  those  classes  which  are  in 
practical  control  of  wealth ;  they  have  no  reforma- 
tory program;  they  are  anxious  to  maintain  the 
present  social  order  intact.  Second,  there  are  the 
middle  social  classes,  which,  sharing  partially  in  the 
advantages  of  the  present  social  adjustment,  are 
also  chafing  under  social  grievances  which  their 
ideals  do  not  allow  them  to  attack  vigorously;  they 
want  reform  work  by  peaceful  and  gradual  meth- 
ods. Third,  there  are  the  disinherited  classes,  which 
see  a  widening  chasm  between  themselves  and  the 
wealthy,  a  chasm  that  "only  a  revolutionary  lift  can 
carry  them  across."  It  is  around  the  condition  and 
attitudes  of  the  masses  that  the  social  crisis  re- 
volves. This  social  attitude  is  like  a  tank  of  gaso- 


458  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

line,  which  by  a  single  explosion  will  blow  a  car 
sky-high,  or  which,  by  a  series  of  little  explosions 
will  push  a  car  to  the  top  of  a  mountain.28  Which 
process  does  Christianity  wish  to  further?  If  the 
latter,  then  Christianity  must  socialize  first  the  atti- 
tude of  the  classes  of  wealth  and  social  power.  Un- 
fortunately, wealth  often  grows  stronger  than  the 
man  who  owns  it;  it  may  own  him  and  rob  him  of 
his  moral  and  spiritual  freedom.29  Can  Christian- 
ity dissolve  this  dilemma? 

The  principle  that  a  Christian  should  seek  an 
ascetic  departure  from  the  world  of  life  and  work 
is  no  longer  acceptable.  He  has  two  other  possibili- 
ties. He  can  either  condemn  the  world  and  try  to 
improve  it,  or  tolerate  it  and  gradually  be  con- 
formed to  it.30  By  these  sharply  drawn  alternatives, 
Professor  Rauschenbusch  awoke  the  Christian 
world.  While  many  Christians  did  not  believe  that 
the  situation  was  as  crucial  as  thus  depicted,  they 
nevertheless  were  jarred  from  a  state  of  moral 
lethargy. 

As  a  pastor  for  eleven  years  among  the  working 
people  of  New  York  City,  Dr.  Rauschenbusch 
learned  to  understand  the  heart  throbs  and  yearn- 
ings of  the  masses,  and  dedicated  his  life  through 
Christian  service  to  easing  the  pressure  upon  the 
working  classes  and  to  increasing  the  forces  that 
bear  them  up.  He  saw  the  solution  of  the  social 
problem  in  a  Christian  socialism  that  would  destroy 
the  autocracy  of  wealth  and  establish  a  democratic 


MODERN  CHRISTIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT      459 

form  of  industrial  relationships.  He  believed  in 
the  social  or  public  ownership  of  the  natural  re- 
sources of  the  earth.  "It  is  preposterous  to  think 
that  an  individual  or  a  corporation  can  have  abso- 
lute ownership  in  a  vein  of  coal  or  copper.  A  min- 
ing company  owns  the  holes  in  the  ground,  for  it 
made  the  holes;  it  does  not  own  the  coal;  for  it  did 
not  make  the  coal.  The  coal  is  the  gift  of  God  and 
belongs  to  the  people."31 

Another  difficulty  is  found  in  the  fact  that  busi- 
ness methods  and  the  principles  of  Christianity  have 
always  been  at  strife.32  Individuals  are  struggling 
to  get  the  better  of  their  fellows.  This  tendency 
has  been  institutionalized  in  the  form  of  business 
enterprise.  Private  persons  have  been  permitted 
"to  put  their  thumbs  where  they  can  constrict  the 
life  blood  of  the  nation  at  will."33  Christianity,  on 
the  other  hand,  lauds  the  principle  of  unselfish  serv- 
ice, and  of  ranking  the  individual  as  the  greatest 
who  gives  most.  Christianity  is  awakening  to  its 
gigantic  task  of  stopping  the  nation  on  "its  head- 
long ride  on  the  road  of  covetousness." 

It  is  in  this  connection  that  Professor  Rauschen- 
busch  has  made  famous  the  phrase,  "Christianizing 
the  social  order."  This  term  means  "bringing  the 
social  order  into  harmony  with  the  ethical  convic- 
tions which  are  identified  with  Christ."35  Such  a 
program  involves  attacking  "the  last  intrenchment 
of  autocracy,"  namely,  in  business, — and  Christian- 
izing business.  The  struggle  is  already  on.  In 


460  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

many  of  the  phases  of  the  conflict,  capitalism  is 
swallowing  up  Christianity.  The  church  becomes 
traditional,  narrowly  ecclesiastical,  dogmatic,  op- 
posing science  and  democracy.  Where  capitalism 
is  strongest,  the  churches  as  virile  social  forces  are 
weakest.34 

In  reply  to  the  often  repeated  charge  that  social- 
ized Christianity  is  no  Christianity  at  all,  Professor 
Rauschenbusch  shows  that  personal  religion,  instead 
of  being  defeated  by  a  socialized  religion,  will  gain 
strength  and  be  able  to  present  a  much  stronger 
appeal  than  it  now  does.  The  advocate  of  the  social 
teachings  of  Jesus  is  not  attacking  personal  religion, 
but  rather  endeavoring  to  give  personal  religion  a 
new  dynamic,  especially  in  those  phases  of  modern 
life  where  personal  religion  has  lost  most  of  its 
appeal.  The  opponents  of  social  Christianity  can- 
not afford  to  neglect  the  fact  that  the  often  one- 
sided, mechanical,  and  superficial  gospel  and  meth- 
ods of  evangelism  have  created  a  religious  apathy, 
if  not  a  definite  reaction  against  religion.37  It  is 
blind  foolishness  to  try  to  fence  out  the  new  social 
spirit  from  Christianity  instead  of  letting  it  fuse 
with  the  older  religious  faith  and  "create  a  new  total 
that  will  be  completer  and  more  Christian  than  the 
old  religious  individualism  at  its  best."37 

Dr.  Rauschenbusch  insisted  that  there  must  be  a 
Christianizing  of  international  relations,  that  indi- 
viduals must  be  taught  to  see  the  sinfulness  of  the 
present  social  order,  and  that  the  popular  concep- 


MODERN  CHRISTIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT      461 

tion  of  God  must  be  democratized.39  He  reinter- 
preted the  organic  unity  of  human  society, — assert- 
ing that  when  one  man  sins,  other  men  suffer ;  and 
that  when  one  class  sins,  other  classes  bear  a  part 
of  the  suffering. 

In  1908,  the  Federal  Council  of  the  Churches  of 
Christ  in  America  was  organized  at  Philadelphia. 
The  Council  adopted  with  slight  modifications  the 
resolutions  which  some  months  earlier  had  been 
accepted  by  the  General  Conference  of  the  Metho- 
dist Episcopal  Church  (North),  and  which  Rev. 
Harry  F.  Ward  and  others  had  drawn  up. 

This  Bill  of  Rights,  as  the  Resolutions  have  been 
called,  imposed  upon  the  members  of  the  more  than 
thirty  Protestant  denominations  the  duty  of  obtain- 
ing industrial  justice  for  the  cause  of  labor.  It 
spoke  for  ( 1 )  the  principle  of  arbitration  in  indus- 
trial dissensions,  (2)  the  adequate  protection  of 
workers  in  hazardous  trades,  (3)  the  abolition  of 
child  labor,  (4)  the  safeguarding  of  physical  and 
moral  health  of  women  in  industry,  (5)  the  sup- 
pression of  the  "sweating  system,"  (6)  the  reduc 
tion  of  the  hours  of  labor  to  the  lowest  practicable 
point,  (7)  a  living  wage  in  all  industries,  (8)  one 
day  of  rest  in  seven  for  all  workers,  (9)  the  most 
equitable  division  of  the  products  of  industry  that 
can  ultimately  be  devised,  (10)  suitable  provisions 
for  old  age  or  disability  of  workers,  and  (11)  the 
abatement  of  poverty. 

At  the  meeting  of  the  Federal  Council  of  the 


462  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

Churches  of  Christ  in  America  at  a  special  meeting 
held  at  Cleveland,  Ohio,  May  6-8,  1919,  the  fore- 
going platform  was  re-affirmed ;  and  in  addition,  as 
a  means  of  meeting  the  needs  of  the  reconstruction 
days  following  the  World  War,  the  following  not- 
able resolutions  were  adopted.  The  Council  de- 
clared not  only  that  labor  is  entitled  to  an  equitable 
share  in  the  profits  of  industry,  but  took  the  new 
step  of  expressing  the  belief  that  labor  is  entitled 
also  to  an  equitable  share  in  the  management  of  in- 
dustry. "The  sharing  of  shop  control  and  manage- 
ment is  an  inevitable  step"  in  the  attainment  of  an 
ordered  and  constructive  democracy  in  industry. 
The  Council  asserted  that  the  first  charge  upon  in- 
dustry should  be  wages  sufficient  to  support  an 
American  standard  of  living. 

In  1919,  the  Committee  on  Special  War  Activi- 
ties of  the  National  Catholic  War  Council  published 
a  brief  but  important  document  on  social  recon- 
struction. In  this  pamphlet  the  defects  of  the  capi- 
talistic system  of  industry  are  declared  to  be: 
"Enormous  inefficiency  and  waste  in  the  production 
and  distribution  of  commodities;  insufficient  in- 
comes for  the  great  majority  of  wage-earners ;  and 
unnecessarily  large  incomes  for  a  small  minority 
of  privileged  capitalists."50  The  Committee  urged 
that  employees  shall  exercise  a  reasonable  share  in 
the  management  of  industrial  enterprises,  and  that 
the  State  should  inaugurate  comprehensive  pro- 
visions for  health  insurance  and  old  age  insurance. 


MODERN  CHRISTIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT      463 

It  recognized  that  the  true  line  of  progress  is  in  the 
direction  of  co-operative  production  and  of  co-part- 
nership arrangements.  "In  the  former,  the  work- 
ers own  and  manage  the  industries  themselves;  in 
the  latter,  they  own  a  substantial  part  of  the  cor- 
porate stock  and  exercise  a  reasonable  share  in  the 
management."4  The  Catholic  pronunciamento  de- 
mands that  the  spirit  of  both  labor  and  capital  be 
reformed.  The  laborer  must  give  up  the  desire  of 
a  maximum  of  return  for  a  minimum  of  service; 
he  must  remember  that  he  owes  society  an  honest 
day's  work  for  a  fair  wage.  On  the  other  hand  the 
capitalist  must  learn  that  wealth  is  not  possession 
but  stewardship,  and  that  "profit-making  is  not  the 
basic  justification  of  business  enterprise."42 

Inasmuch  as  the  Rev.  Harry  F.  Ward  has  writ- 
ten more  extensively  on  social  Christianity  than 
any  other  person,  save  Rauschenbusch,  and  has 
created  widespread  and  heart-searching  discus- 
sions, his  contributions  to  socio-religious  thought 
will  be  considered  next.  Dr.  Ward  does  not  believe 
in  social  service  as  a  bait  for  drawing  people  into 
the  church.  He  objects  to  bribing  people  in  order 
to  get  them  into  an  evangelistic  meeting.  To  him 
social  service  is  a  natural  phase  of  religion,  express- 
ing itself  freely  and  without  sinuous  designs.  In 
his  estimation,  soup  kitchens  are  not  to  be  estab- 
lished as  a  means  of  enticing  the  laboring  man  in- 
side the  church  walls,  but  as  an  unselfish  expression 
of  the  Christian's  desire  to  be  true  to  the  Christ 


464  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

spirit.  Social  service  is  not  a  selfish  program,  on 
the  part  of  the  church,  for  increasing  its  member- 
ship. It  is  as  natural  to  Christianity  as  personal 
evangelism,  and  equally  intrinsic  and  vital.  It  has 
won  more  than  national  recognition.  While  it  is 
radical  in  the  eyes  of  the  conservative,  it  contains 
an  analysis  of  social  conditions  that  many  of  its 
critics  have  not  appreciated.  It  breathes  a  sincerity 
and  a  straightforwardness  that  compels  the  fair- 
minded  reader  to  give  heed. 

Slavery  was  rejected  as  the  economic  basis  of 
civilization,  and  monarchy  has  recently  been  re- 
jected as  the  political  basis.  In  each  instance  the 
world  came  to  a  junction  where  idealistic  impulse 
overthrew  entrenched  power.  It  is  Dr.  Ward's 
contention  that  the  world  is  now  reaching  a  similar 
junction  point,  a  point  where  idealistic  impulse  will 
dethrone  the  autocracy  in  capitalism.  The  idealistic 
impulse,  to  which  reference  has  been  made  in  the 
foregoing  lines,  is  germinal  in  the  teachings  of 
Jesus. 

With  prophetic  vision,  more  organized  than  the 
vision  of  Amos,  Hosea,  Isaiah,  but  equally  sincere, 
and  fearless,  Dr.  Ward  points  out  the  principles  of 
the  new  social  order  which  he  believes  are  almost 
upon  the  world.  He  then  describes  the  various 
factors  which  are  struggling  each  in  its  own  way 
to  inaugurate  the  new  order. 

The  five  principles  of  the  new  social  order  are 
equality,  universal  service,  efficiency,  the  supremacy 


MODERN  CHRISTIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT      465 

of  personality,  and  solidarity.  (1)  Equality  is  the 
old  word  which  won  attention  in  the  American  and 
French  Revolutions.  It  grew  out  of  the  theory  of 
natural  rights  which  was  discussed  in  Chapter  XL 
The  American  emphasis  on  the  principle  of  equality 
is  shown  in  the  admiration  that  is  accorded  the 
achievements  of  energy  and  toil,  in  the  common 
struggle  for  more  wealth  and  luxury,  in  foreign 
missionary  activities,  in  the  rise  of  the  democratic 
conscience  and  the  idealistic  impulses  of  the  people. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  principle  of  equality  is 
being  violated  when,  instead  of  trying  to  remove 
the  natural  inequalities  among  folks,  "we  increase 
them  by  giving  special  privileges  to  the  strong  as 
the  reward  of  their  strength."  The  United  States 
is  at  the  crossroads.  One  highway  is  characterized 
by  luxury  and  extravagance  on  one  side,  and  by 
poverty  and  slavery  on  the  other ;  it  leads  to  revolu- 
tionary attempts  on  the  part  of  the  masses  to  over- 
throw the  privileged  classes.  It  ends  in  national 
decadence.  The  second  highway  is  characterized 
by  justice.  Those  in  economic  authority  are  willing 
to  grant  representation  to  labor  in  the  management 
of  industry  and  to  further  the  rise  of  the  co-oper- 
ative spirit.  They  are  willing  to  sacrifice  their  own 
special  privileges  for  the  sake  of  the  welfare  of  the 
disinherited. 

The  intellectuals  of  the  middle  class  hold  vast 
power.  In  crises,  they  usually  join  the  privileged 
classes  rather  than  the  masses ;  and  hence,  their  in- 


466  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

fluence  often  swings  to  the  side  of  injustice.43 

(2)  Universal  service  is  the  principle  of  equal 
obligation.    Equal  rights,  by  itself,  may  mean  equal 
rights  to  cheat,  to  exploit.    It  needs  to  be  checked 
by  its  complement  of  equal  obligation.    During  the 
World  War  there  was  a  frequent  demonstration  of 
the  principle  of  universal  service.     "We  are  en- 
gaged in  helping  the  boys  at  the  front"  became  the 
slogan.    At  the  front  as  well  as  in  the  home  towns 
and  cities,   wealthy   and  poor,   capital   and  labor 
served  together.    The  end  of  the  War  gave  prom- 
inence to  this  question:   Will  the  universal  service 
idea  spread  or  will  it  be  discarded  ?    Will  industry 
go  back  to  the  unashamed  pursuit  of  private  gain  ?43 

Dr.  Ward  makes  a  careful  distinction  between 
the  service  of  democratic  mutual  helpfulness  and 
the  service  of  a  governing  class,  no  matter  how 
excellent.45  It  is  a  low  type  of  service  which  grants 
Christmas  dinners  to  the  poor  with  the  result  that 
the  poor  are  thereby  made  contented  with  their  lot 
in  life. 

(3)  Efficiency  is  a  term  which  is  the  product  of 
the  mechanical  era,  which  originated  in  the  business 
world,  and  which  is  now  being  applied  to  all  phases 
of  social  organization.46     Its  aim  is  perfection  in 
social  mechanics.    Social  efficiency  includes  not  only 
social  engineering  but  social  knowledge,  social  phil- 
osophy, social  ethics,  and  social  religion.    Evidences 
of  social  inefficiency  are  common;  for  example,  the 
failure  to  use  and  apply  the  social  knowledge  that 


MODERN  CHRISTIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT      467 

we  have,  and  the  loss  of  energy  through  an  over- 
emphasis on  competition.  Democracy  will  never 
be  able  to  succeed  merely  because  of  its  splendid 
ethical  ideals.47  The  need  is  for  an  efficiency  in 
government  that  is  scientific  and  not  simply  a  busi- 
ness efficiency.48  Scientific  efficiency  includes  "the 
spirit  of  service  to  the  common  interest  by  which 
alone  democracy  can  live."49 

(4)  The  supremacy  of  personality  is  a  principle 
of  life  that  conflicts  today  with  the  current  em- 
phasis on  economic  efficiency.  It  is  because  the 
latter  is  so  often  reckless  of  human  values  that  the 
new  social  order  will  stress  the  development  of 
things  of  the  spirit  rather  than  material  goods; 
even  business  must  practice  this  ideal.  The  World 
War  raised  the  estimate  which  the  common  people 
put  on  their  own  lives;  but  the  ultimate  result  will 
depend  on  whether  or  not  people  took  part  in  the 
war  voluntarily  and  conscious  of  high  moral  pur- 
poses, and  whether  or  not  the  peace  which  follows 
shall  bring  a  new  world  organization  that  conserves 
all  the  advances  in  human  living  that  have  thus  far 
been  made. 

Institutions  possess  an  inherent  fallibility.  They 
tend  to  become  mechanical  and  repressive,  even 
those  dedicated  to  high  purposes,  such  as  institu- 
tions of  democracy,  of  education,  and  of  religion. 
The  supreme  object  of  any  social  institution  and 
organization,  no  matter  in  what  field  it  may  exist, 
should  be  the  increase  of  personality.50 


468  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

(5)  The  new  social  order  will  be  governed  by  a 
sense  of  solidarity,  that  is,  by  a  community  of  feel- 
ing and  thought  which  arises  when  individuals 
associate  together  in  working  for  a  common  end. 
World  solidarity  will  come  when  all  peoples  learn 
to  work  together  for  public  welfare,  and  sub- 
ordinate all  selfish  desires  to  this  end.  Christianity 
is  moving  in  this  direction  when  it  advances  the 
concept  of  "comradeship  of  all  men  with  each  other 
and  with  the  Great  Companion/'  when  it  gradually 
unfolds  the  idea  of  a  unified  world  life,  when  it 
applies  its  doctrines  of  brotherhood  of  man  to  the 
relations  of  the  employer  and  employee  or  to  the 
relations  of  white  and  black  races,  when  it  seeks 
the  democratic  solidarity  of  the  human  race  rather 
than  the  imperialistic  solidarity  of  an  overhead 
religious  control,  when  it  endeavors  to  spread  love 
and  faith,  rather  than  to  spread  dogmas  and  pro- 
mote organizations.51  Class  cleavage,  nationalism 
as  distinct  from  nationality,  race  prejudice,  ignor- 
ance, and  selfishness  are  the  main  opponents  of  the 
world  brotherhood  principle. 

Dr.  Ward,  having  defined  what  he  considers  the 
chief  principles  that  will  govern  the  new  social 
order,  proceeds  to  measure  current  movements  by 
certain  standards.  He  reviews  the  declarations  of 
the  British  Labor  Party,  the  Russian  Soviet  Re- 
public, the  League  of  Nations,  and  the  labor  move- 
ments in  the  United  States.  These  tendencies  are 
all  expressions  of  a  more  or  less  blind  desire  for 


MODERN  CHRISTIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT      469 

justice.  In  all  countries  of  the  world  the  masses 
are  restless,  stirring,  and  experiencing  a  keen  sense 
of  injustice.  Their  leaders  are  struggling,  un- 
scientifically as  a  rule,  toward  the  light  of  a  new 
day  of  democracy.  The  trend  which  this  struggle 
takes  depends  on  the  given  social  environment  and 
the  attitude  of  the  persons  in  authority.  If  undue 
repression  and  autocracy  are  exercised  for  a  long 
period  of  time,  as  in  Russia  under  the  Czars,  revo- 
lution is  the  only  means  of  escape  open  to  the 
masses.  Schooled  for  a  long  time  under  the  lash 
of  autocracy,  when  they  themselves  come  into  con- 
trol, they  will  use  the  only  means  of  control  that 
they  know,  the  lash  of  autocracy. 

The  British  Labor  Party  is  moving  in  the  direc- 
tion of  guild  socialism,  which  includes  the  organi- 
zation of  industry  into  large  units,  in  charge  of  the 
workers  and  relatively  free  from  the  rule  of  the 
politicians.  The  national  government  is  to  have  a 
general  oversight  over  the  large  industrial  units. 
As  immediate  steps  in  this  direction,  the  Labor 
Party  demands  the  nationalization  of  the  railroads, 
mines,  and  of  the  production  of  electric  power. 
Municipalities  participate  in  the  common  owner- 
ship program.  The  method  of  transformation  is  to 
be  gradual,  largely  based  on  political  action. 

In  regard  to  the  League  of  Nations  Covenant, 
which  was  agreed  upon  in  Paris  in  1919,  Dr.  Ward 
takes  a  negative  attitude.  Although  he  believes 
firmly  in  an  organization  of  good  will,  in  inter- 


470  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

national  friendship  and  in  world  solidarity  upon 
democratic  bases,  he  asserts  stoutly  that  the  Paris 
Covenant  is  "a  symbol  of  the  sacred  right  of  private 
property,"52  that  it  provided  for  an  international 
organization  of  capitalism  with  all  the  force  of 
powerful  national  governments  behind  it,  that  it 
represented  a  series  of  compromises  between  na- 
tionally selfish  units,  that  it  was  an  expression  of 
the  wishes  of  the  rulers  of  the  democratic  states 
who  are  essentially  of  "the  same  moral  caliber  as 
the  ruling  class  of  imperialistic  militarism,  and 
bear  a  similar  sinister  relationship  to  the  future 
welfare  of  the  common  folk."53 

The  weakness  of  Dr.  Ward's  treatment  of  the 
programs  for  the  new  social  order  is  that  it  dis- 
cusses almost  entirely  programs,  platforms,  ideals, 
without  considerating  the  relations  between  the  pro- 
gams  and  the  actual  practices  of  the  various  organi- 
zations. In  contrasting  the  best  phases,  for  ex- 
ample, of  the  British  Labor  Party  with  the  worst 
phases  of  capitalism,  an  incomplete  picture  is  given. 
However,  this  weakness  in  method  need  not  obscure 
the  strength  of  thought  which  Dr.  Ward  dis- 
plays. Some  of  the  most  thought-provoking  deduc- 
tions are : 

1.  That   individualistic    Christianity   is   losing 
ground. 

2.  That  the  middle  class  is  becoming  a  class  of 
privilege. 

3.  That  the  intellectuals  of  the  middle  class, 


MODERN  CHRISTIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT      471 

while  keenly  aware  of  the  evils  in  the  capitalistic 
system,  are  so  much  indebted  to  that  system  that 
they  would  consider  themselves  ingrates  if  they 
spoke  out  against  it,  or  they  are  simply  afraid  to 
speak  out. 

4.  That  jails  and  machine  guns  will  not  stop  the 
laboring  classes  in  appealing  for  a  democratic  re- 
organization of  industry,  but  will  rather  hasten 
revolutions,  with  resultant  dictatorships  of  the  pro- 
letariat. 

5.  That  capitalism  is  passing,  as  it  is  bound  to 
do,  because  it  is  organized  selfishness — its  funda- 
mental principle  is  wrong. 

6.  That  political  democracy  is  fighting  for  its 
life  today,  being  attacked  on  the  one  flank  by  eco- 
nomic imperialism  and  on  the  other  by  the  dictator- 
ship of  the  proletariat.54 

7 ' .  That  unless  the  struggle  can  be  ended  by  a 
process  of  reason  and  orderly  progress,  the  world 
is  doomed  to  devastation  by  universal  conflict. 

8.  That  the  goal  of  social  development  is,  in 
broad  terms,  "a  fraternal  world  community,  the 
great  loving  family  of  mankind,  knit  together  by 
common  needs  but  most  of  all  by  loyalty  to  common 
ideals,  and  by  the  power  of  its  common  love  effi- 
ciently directing  and  controlling  its  common  life."55 

An  important  question  arises:  How  shall  the 
social  teachings  of  Jesus  become  widely  taught? 
Evangelistic  Christianity,  with  its  personal  em- 
phasis, cannot  be  expected  adequately  to  carry  the 


472  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

social  message.  Preachers,  theologically  trained, 
are  bound  to  give  the  social  phases  of  Christianity 
a  secondary  place.  In  recent  years,  however,  a 
movement  known  as  religious  education  has  been 
acquiring  momentum.  Moreover,  a  social  theory 
of  religious  education  has  been  formulated.  In  this 
connection,  Dr.  George  Albert  Coe  has  perhaps 
done  the  most  significant  work.  Our  life,  Dr.  Coe 
believes,  gets  its  largest  meaning  not  from  the  fact 
of  individual  self-consciousness  alone,  but  from  the 
equally  important  fact  that  life  is  social.56  Without 
a  belief  in  social  consciousness,  an  endless  existence 
after  death,  in  terms  of  self-consciousness  pri- 
marily, would  be  meaningless  and  probably  value- 
less. Religion  must  solve  the  problem  of  establish- 
ing a  Kingdom  of  Heaven  on  earth,  and  also  train 
its  votaries  for  a  societal  life  in  Heaven.  The 
latter  problem  will  be  met  easily  when  the  former 
is  solved.  It  is  well  illustrated  by  the  young  Chris- 
tian lady  from  Virginia  who  asked:  Won't  there 
have  to  be  a  separate  Heaven  for  Negroes,  since 
we  hate  them  so  here?  In  other  words,  will  there 
not  have  to  be  a  thousand  or  a  million  Heavens  in 
order  to  accommodate  happily  all  the  antagonistic 
Christian  groups  now  on  earth?  How  can  the 
Protestant  Ulstermen  and  Catholic  Irishmen  live 
together  lovingly  in  Heaven?  The  problem  goes 
back  to  solving  the  social  implications  of  Christian- 
ity in  earthly  relationships. 

The  social  aims  of  Christian  education,  according 


MODERN  CHRISTIAN  SOCIAL  THOUGHT      473 

to  Dr.  Coe,  are  as  follows:  (1)  Social  welfare,  or 
the  control  of  the  non-human  environment  in  the 
interest  of  human  life.  (2)  Social  justice,  or  the 
inauguration  of  fair  play  in  all  the  dealings  of 
every  individual,  no  matter  how  strong  and  shrewd, 
with  every  other  individual,  no  matter  how  weak 
and  ignorant.  (3)  A  world  society  or  the  promo- 
tion of  a  code  of  conduct  that  leads  to  "the  integra- 
tion of  all  peoples  into  a  single,  democratically  gov- 
erned mankind."  Nationalism  must  melt  into  a 
larger  regard  for  human  beings ;  and  that  which  is 
"a  climactic  expression  of  the  selfishness,  that  is  to 
say  the  injustice  that  is  organized  in  our  legal  sys- 
tems and  our  national  sovereignties/'  must  be  re- 
vealed to  all,  even  in  the  Sunday  schools.57 

The  implications  of  a  sound  social  theory  of  re- 
ligious education  are  met  by  the  religious  doctrine 
of  personal  fellowship  between  God  and  man,  and 
between  man  and  man;  by  a  reorganization  of  the 
church  as  a  religious  institution  in  a  way  which 
shall  put  religious  education  on  as  scientific  a  basis 
as  the  ordinary  day  school  education ;  and  by  train- 
ing the  church  school  pupils  in  the  principles  of 
social  justice,  co-operation,  and  love,  as  well  as  in 
matters  pertaining  to  personal  salvation. 

Another  current  development  is  the  religious  so- 
cial service  director.  For  some  time  the  religious 
education  director  has  been  a  recognized  force  in 
church  work.  The  social  service  director  in  church 
life  is  coming  into  the  foreground,  bearing  the  re- 


474  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

sponsibility  of  working  out  social  welfare  programs 
for  the  church  services,  directing  the  training  of 
the  membership  in  volunteer  social  work,  inaugu- 
rating religious  social  surveys,  in  fact,  carrying  the 
social  message  of  the  church  into  all  the  church 
activities. 

The  social  service  activities  of  the  church  have 
often  been  used  as  a  net  for  catching  the  church- 
less.  Social  service  as  a  bribe,  however,  will 
fail.  Genuine  religious  social  service  is  that  which 
emanates  naturally  and  easily  from  the  lives  of  the 
church  members  and  of  the  church  itself,  asking  no 
pay  and  possessing  no  sinuous  ends.  The  church 
that  inaugurates  a  social  program  for  building  up 
the  family  life,  the  play  life,  the  moral  life,  the  eco- 
nomic life,  as  well  as  the  religious  life,  in  the  com- 
munity in  which  it  is  located,  most  truly  represents 
a  socialized  church.  The  church,  however,  that  uses 
its  social  welfare  program  merely  in  order  to  build 
itself  up,  fails  to  understand  the  social  calling  as  a 
religious  institution. 

The  social  thought  of  the  Hebrews  revolved 
about  the  idea  of  social  justice;  of  Jesus,  about 
the  concept  of  active  love;  and  of  modern  Chris- 
tianity, at  its  best,  about  an  unselfish  social  program 
for  bringing  about  a  just,  co-operative,  and  harmo- 
nious life,  ranging  in  its  operation  from  the  indi- 
vidual in  his  family  and  local  community  life  to 
the  individual  as  a  functioning  unit  in  a  new  world 
society. 


CHAPTER  XXVII 
METHODS  OF  SOCIOLOGICAL  INVESTIGATION 


In  any  line  of  thought  or  endeavor  a  correct 
method  of  procedure  is  all-important.  Inaccurate 
theories  of  procedure  have  wrecked  nations,  hin- 
dered civilization  for  centuries  at  a  time,  and 
flooded  the  world  with  negative  and  harmful  ideas. 
It  will  be  worth  while,  therefore,  to  consider  the 
methods  by  which  sociology  has  advanced. 

The  ancient  makers  of  social  proverbs  crystal- 
lized what  they  had  individually  observed  many 
times  to  be  true,  or  what  they  had  heard  repeated 
on  many  occasions  as  being  true.  Such  methods  / 
were  based  on  observation  and  generalization,  care- 
lessly used.  Moreover,  the  data  at  the  command 
of  the  makers  of  social  proverbs  were  very  limited. 

The  Hebrew  prophets,  fired  by  exalted  ideas  con- 
cerning the  nature  of  Jehovah,  insisted  upon  a  prac- 
tical application  of  these  ideas  to  the  daily  life  of 
the  people  of  their  time.  When  they  perceived  that 
the  actions  and  living  conditions  of  the  people  fell 
far  below  the  implications  of  the  pattern-ideas  for 
which  the  name  of  Jehovah  stood,  they  vehemently 
proclaimed  definite  social  ideals,  and  condemned  all 


476  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

who  hindered  the  realization  of  these  ideals.  This 
method  of  creating  social  thought  is  noteworthy  be- 
cause of  the  religious  dynamic  behind  it,  and  be- 
cause of  the  social  pattern-ideas  which  it  produced. 

Plato  and  Aristotle  were  pioneer  social  philoso- 
phers who  took  cosmic  views  of  life.  One  followed 
the  method  of  abstract  reasoning  and  centered  his 
thought  in  a  world  of  Ideas ;  the  other  viewed  life 
pragmatically,  employing  a  method  of  empirical 
tests.  While  sociology  will  always  have  a  place  for 
methods  which  interpret  the  daily  facts  of  indi- 
vidual and  social  experience  in  their  relationships 
to  the  whole  human  society  and  to  the  universe,  it 
will  insist  that  as  large  a  body  of  societary  data  as 
possible  be  gathered  together  before  philosophic 
sociology  speaks  positively. 

In  the  teachings  of  Jesus  a  rare  insight  to  human 
nature  is  manifested.  Jesus  studied  individuals  as 
individuals  and,  perceiving  their  selfish  natures, 
proclaimed  a  remedy  in  an  inner  transformation 
through  consecration  to  objective  factors,  such  as 
persons  and  ideals.  Jesus  was  peculiarly  happy  in 
his  method  of  moving  among  all  classes  of  people, 
of  studying  their  needs,  and  of  testing  in  practice 
his  social  principles.  While  his  acquaintance  with 
human  life  was  limited  to  small  groups  of  one  race, 
he  sought  universal  as  well  as  particular  human 
tendencies.  His  method  included  an  absolutely  un- 
selfish spirit,  a  search  for  the  truth,  a  broad  view- 
point— all  of  which  are  thoroughly  scientific. 


SOCIOLOGICAL  INVESTIGATION         477 

The  Utopia  of  Sir  Thomas  More,  preceded  to  be 
sure  by  Plato's  Republic,  introduced  another  social 
thought  method.  The  Utopian  formula  consists  in 
setting  forth  a  set  of  ideals  which  presumably  are 
distinctly  in  advance  of  current  standards.  The 
method  of  arriving  at  Utopian  ideas  is  largely 
through  the  use  of  the  imagination.  Standards  are 
postulated  so  far  in  advance  of  current  conditions 
as  to  make  them  of  little  value.  Utopian  social 
thought,  however,  does  have  some  scientific  merit. 
The  imagination  may  be  used  in  revealing  reality, 
to  otherwise  blind  individuals.  A  Utopian  thought 
may  startle  a  selfish  individual  out  of  a  part  of  his 
selfishness.  A  Utopian  idea  possesses  the  power 
which  is  inherent  in  indirect  suggestion;  it  ma; 
arouse  without  antagonizing. 

In  the  approach  to  the  social  question  through 
an  analysis  of  the  natural  rights  of  the  individual, 
the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  social  writers  fell 
into  a  deductive  and  a  priori  procedure  which  led 
them  far  astray.  Like  the  theory  of  individual 
rights,  the  correlative  doctrine  of  the  social  contract 
contained  more  error  than  truth. 

The  method  of  positivism,  ordinarily  connected 
with  the  writings  of  Comte,  essayed  a  scientific  ap- 
proach to  the  social  question.  It  insisted  upon  accu- 
racy, induction,  and  a  right  emphasis  upon  sequence 
and  co-existence.  But  positivism,  even  in  the 
hands  of  its  exponents,  became  deductive  and  philo- 
sophic. It  promised  well  scientifically,  but  fell  into 


478  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

nearly  all  the  errors  which  it  condemned.  It  was, 
however,  a  factor  in  producing  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury humanitarianism. 

The  organic  analogy  method  of  studying  human 
society  attracted  widespread  attention,  appealed 
strongly  to  the  imagination  even  of  scholars,  but 
resulted  in  findings  of  negligible  value.  The  paral- 
lelisms between  an  organism  and  society  proved  to 
be  scientifically  valueless,  except  as  they  revealed 
some  of  the  connections  between  organic  volution 
and  social  evolution.  They  created  a  considerable 
vocabulary  of  bio-social  terminology  which  has  been 
more  of  a  hindrance  than  a  help  in  social  thinking. 

The  psychical  approach  to  the  study  of  societary 
life,  introduced  by  Lester  F.  Ward,  and  made  scien- 
tific by  the  findings  of  inductive  and  behavioristic 
psychology,  has  proved  thus  far  to  be  the  best 
method  of  understanding  the  social  process  and  of 
arriving  at  a  statement  of  sociological  laws.  This 
method  has  revealed  human  life  as  a  series  of  social 
conflicts  and  co-operations,  and  of  forms  of  social 
control  designed  to  regulate  individuals  for  selfish 
and  unselfish  group  purposes.  An  explanation  of 
the  more  important  phases  of  the  psychical  method- 
ology has  been  presented  in  several  chapters  of  this 
volume. 

The  individual  rights  doctrine,  the  social  con- 
tract theories,  the  concept  of  positivism,  and  the 
organic  analogies  belong  to  the  unscientific  age  in 
sociological  methodology.  In  the  main  these  sets  of 


SOCIOLOGICAL  INVESTIGATION         479 

social  theories  were  philosophic,  deductive,  a  priori, 
and  argumentative.  They  were  based  chiefly  on 
opinions,  positivism  alone  leaning  to  observation 
and  induction  but  failing  to  live  up  to  its  promises. 
On  the  other  hand,  recent  decades  have  been 
marked  by  the  rise  of  scientific  methods  in  sociol- 
ogy, attention  has  been  centered  on  the  social 
process,  and  particularly  on  the  psychical  processes" 
of  which  the  social  process  is  an  elaboration.  Al- 
though he  possessed  an  entirely  inadequate  knowl- 
edge of  psychology,  Lester  F.  Ward  laid  the  foun- 
dations of  modern  sociology  when  he  insisted  that 
society  is  a  psychical  affair,  capable  of  mastering 
itself.  As  a  result  of  this  contribution  to  method, 
not  by  a  psychologist  but  by  a  paleontologist,  social 
thought  moved  forward  into  the  field  of  scientific 
sociology. 

There  are  many  writers  who  would  class  Ward 
with  the  pre-scientific  contributors  to  sociological 
thought.  His  methods,  it  is  true,  were  largely  de- 
ductive; his  psychology  was  seriously  faulty;  his 
philosophy  was  inefficient.  Nevertheless,  he  pointed 
the  way  for  sociologists  so  clearly  that  in  this 
treatise  his  work  has  been  considered  as  giving  the 
trend  to  recent  sociology,  rather  than  as  being  the 
last  word  of  discredited  types  of  social  thought. 

Then  there  are  other  types  of  sociological  meth- 
odology of  which  mention  should  be  made,  notably, 
the  statistical,  and  the  classificatory  procedures. 
The  statistical  approach  had  its  origin  in  the  early 


480  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

census.  There  are  evidences  that  rulers  and  kings, 
at  least  two  or  three  millenniums  before  Christ,  had 
enumerations  of  their  subjects  made.  In  connec- 
tion with  poor-law  administration,  people  as  early 
as  the  Roman  Era  were  counted.  But  it  was  not 
until  the  eighteenth  century  that  statistics  became 
scientific,  with  statistical  laws  drawn  from  a  study 
of  tabulated  facts.  Quetelet  gives  1820  as  the  birth 
year  of  statistical  science.  It  was  Frederick  Wil- 
liam I  of  Prussia  who  is  reported  to  have  had 
an  enumeration  made  of  occupational  facts;  and 
Frederick  the  Great,  with  having  established  a  sys- 
tem for  making  regular  statistical  studies  of  popu- 
lation. It  is  said  that  early  in  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury the  University  of  Jena  began  to  offer  courses 
in  statistics. 

In  England,  in  the  latter  part  of  the  seventeenth 
century,  Captain  John  Graunt  is  credited  with  ap- 
plying methods  of  counting,  measurement,  and  in- 
duction to  the  births  and  deaths  in  London.  His 
studies  were  referred  to  as  political  arithmetic,  and 
were  a  forerunner  of  the  current  investigations  in 
vital  statistics.  Malthus  made  use  of  statistical 
methods  in  his  work  (1798)  on  population  changes. 

Quetelet  (1796-1874)  is  usually  considered  the 
founder  of  statistical  science.  He  not  only  applied 
the  method  of  counting  to  the  study  of  the  mem- 
bers of  human  society  (the  census  method  in  its 
common  form),  but  he  tried  to  get  at  the  problem 
of  causation,  and  to  indicate  rules  of  procedure  for 


SOCIOLOGICAL  INVESTIGATION         481 

making  causal  studies  in  statistics.  Although  this 
celebrated  Belgian  statistician  tabulated  and  ana- 
lyzed facts  ranging  from  the  astronomical  to  the 
societary  fields,  his  ideas  can  be  mentioned  here  only 
so  far  as  they  contribute  to  the  subject  of  social 
thought.  Quetelet  pointed  out  certain  of  the  pit- 
falls in  the  way  of  gathering  accurate  data.  He  im- 
proved the  methods  of  census  taking,  and  undertook 
the  difficult  tasks  that  are  involved  in  qualitative 
human  studies. 

Among  the  results  of  Quetelet's  work,  the  con- 
cept of  "the  average  man"  is  well  known.  Quetelet 
defined  the  law  of  averages  and  described  types,  es- 
pecially the  average  individual.  Although  it  is  very 
important  and  useful  to  know  about  the  "average 
man,"  the  term  is  practically  fictitious,  since  no  one 
even  in  a  large  group  exactly  fits  the  description. 
All  individuals  are  either  "above"  or  "below"  the 
average. 

The  contributions  of  Quetelet  in  the  field  of  social 
statistics  were  admirably  supplemented  by  the 
achievements  of  Le  Play  (1806-1882).  This  French 
sociologist  and  mining  engineer  applied  the  methods 
of  physical  science  to  social  science.  He  insisted 
upon  observation  of  data  and  the  use  of  induction 
in  making  generalizations.  His  method  is  illus- 
trated by  his  studies  in  family  budgets.  In  order 
to  secure  accurate  data  he  lived  with  individual 
families,  studying  at  first-hand  the  conditions  by 
which  they  made  a  livelihood.  Le  Play  opposed 


482  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

laissez-faire  theories  and  urged  programs  of  reform 
through  the  journal  which  he  founded,  namely,  La 
Reforme  Sociale.  He  rejected  socialism,  and  advo- 
cated the  method  of  conciliation  and  sympathy  for 
effecting  agreements  among  employers  and  em- 
ployees. 

Similar  methods  were  evolved  by  Engels  and 
Bucher,  German  investigators.  Engels'  studies  of 
family  budgets  led  him  to  draw  certain  average  ob- 
servations. These  "averages"  are  known  as  Engels' 
laws,  for  example:  (1)  The  smaller  the  income, 
the  larger  the  percentage  of  expenditure  for  food. 
(2)  The  percentage  of  expenditure  for  clothing, 
and  for  lodging  or  rent,  varies  directly  with  the  in- 
come. (3)  The  larger  the  income,  the  larger  the 
percentage  of  expenditures  for  sundries  (including 
luxuries). 

The  statistical  method  has  been  carried  forward 
by  a  large  number  of  social  investigators.  With 
averages,  modes,  and  medians,  it  is  now  possible  to 
make  accurate  quantitative  studies.  Current  statis- 
tical methods  include  the  use  of  index  numbers,  fre- 
quency tables,  discrete  series,  deviations,  skewness, 
correlations.  Statistics  has  thrown  a  flood  of  light 
upon  important  phases  of  societary  life,  such  as  the 
economic,  where  wage  scales  and  price  levels  are 
significant  concepts.  Statistics  has  been  widely  uti- 
lized in  the  study  of  crime  and  poverty.  The  vari- 
ous methods  of  graphic  presentations  are  valuable 
in  interpreting  tables  of  statistical  data  to  the  lay 


SOCIOLOGICAL  INVESTIGATION         483 

mind. 

Statistical  methods  can  be  used,  however,  to 
prove  almost  anything.  The  ordinary  individual  is 
helpless  when  statistical  methods  are  treated  un- 
scrupulously. On  the  other  hand,  it  is  probably 
true  that  social  thought  will  become  increasingly  / 
accurate  by  the  judicious  use  of  statistical  studies.S 

A  recent  development,  closely  related  to  statis-X 
tical  science,  is  the  social  survey.  Beginning  with 
the  Pittsburg  Survey  in  1907-1908,  the  social  sur- 
vey method  has  been  widely  adopted  in  the  United 
States.  Its  use  has  been  applied  to  inventories  of 
a  specific  community,  such  as  a  rural  district  or  a 
small  number  of  city  blocks.  There  is  the  specific 
survey  of  a  given  social  problem,  such  as  housing 
or  poverty.  Then  there  is  the  survey  of  an  entire 
industry  or  a  school  system. 

The  social  survey  is  one  of  the  most  important 
sources  today  of  sound  social  thinking.  By  it,  large 
quantities  of  social  facts  are  being  collected.  Urban 
and  rural  surveys,  specific  and  general  surveys 
alike,  are  affording  the  best  bases  at  the  present 
time  for  inductive  social  thinking.  Some  of  these 
results  have  been  indicated  in  a  preceding  chapter 
upon  the  contributions  of  applied  sociology. 

The  nature  of  the  classificatory  method  has  al- 
ready been  indicated  in. this  treatise.  The  Greeks 
classified  the  various  fields  of  knowledge  under 
three  heads :  physics,  ethics,  and  politics.  Francis 
Bacon  classified  knowledge  according  to  his  under- 


484  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

standing  of  mental  operations.  He  divided  mental 
processes  into  three,  namely,  feeling,  memory,  rea- 
soning; and  made  a  corresponding  division  of 
knowledge  into  art,  history,  and  science.  Auguste 
Comte  classified  the  social  elements  into  four 
groups:  the  industrial,  the  esthetic,  the  scientific, 
and  the  philosophical  (previsional).  His  hierarchal 
classification  of  the  sciences  into  mathematics,  as- 
tronomy, physics,  chemistry,  biology,  and  sociology 
has  been  discussed  in  an  earlier  chapter. 

Guillaume  de  Greef  may  be  considered  the  best 
exponent  of  the  classificatory  method.  De  Greef 
accepted  Comte's  hierarchy  of  the  sciences  with  its 
basic  principles  of  decreasing  generality  and  in- 
creasing dependence  of  parts,  assented  to  Spencer's 
evolutionary  dictum  of  increasing  coherence  and 
heterogeneity,  and  added  his  own  concept  of  voli- 
tional contractualism. 

De  Greef  argued  that  social  progress  is  charac- 
terized by  an  increasing  degree  of  volitional  activ- 
ity and  freedom.  This  volitionalism  is  the  basis  of 
rational  social  control.  The  telic  factors,  however, 
are  not  well  developed  by  de  Greef.  His  social 
thought  rests  upon  a  certain  logical  but  inaccurate 
classification  of  the  social  elements. 

The  basis  of  this  classification  is  increasing  voli- 
tionalism and  particularism.  De  Greef  gives  the 
following  classification:  economic,  industrial,  ge- 
netic, artistic,  scientific,  moral,  juridical,  and  po- 
litical. In  holding  that  the  economic  elements  in 


SOCIOLOGICAL  INVESTIGATION         485 

society  represent  the  least  volitionalism,  and  the  po- 
litical the  most  volitional  activity,  with  graded  de- 
grees of  volitional  activities  represented  by  the 
intermediate  factors,  the  weakness  of  de  Greef's 
analysis  becomes  evident.  While  an  improvement 
over  Comte's  classification  and  superior  to  Spencer's 
mechanistic  order,  de  Greef's  contribution  possesses 
only  a  relative  degree  of  logical  merit.  It  is  far 
from  being  objectively  correct,  and  is  indicative  of 
the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  classifying  social  ele- 
ments in  an  evolutionary  or  filial  order.  There  is 
no  doubt  but  that  any  classification  of  merit  would 
have  to  be  arranged  according  to  some  correlative 
plan,  which  would  serve  the  purposes  of  an  exhibit 
but  would  not  be  of  much  scientific  value.  More- 
over, the  classifications  that  are  most  useful  are 
those  classifications  of  societary  forces;  these  are 
psychical  in  nature  and  have  been  treated  in  fore- 
going chapters. 

De  Greef  perceived  the  importance  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  socialization.  He  emphasized  the  import- 
ance of  a  "we"  feeling  in  societary  life.  His  social 
unit  is  the  primitive  family.  In  the  evolution  from 
the  primitive  family  and  state,  the  evidence  of  prog- 
ress is  the  degree  of  "togetherness"  that  has  been 
developed.  De  Greef  advanced  the  idea  that  there 
is  an  increasing  degree  of  contractualism  and  hence 
of  freedom  in  society.  De  Greef's  work  may  be 
taken  as  the  best  attempt  to  carry  Comte's  classifi- 
cation of  the  sciences  to  a  logical  conclusion  by 


486  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

furnishing  a  classification  of  the  elements  which 
function  in  the  field  of  the  "highest"  science  of  all, 
namely,  sociology. 

At  this  point  and  in  concluding,  the  methodology 
of  Albion  W.  Small  will  be  considered.  Professor 
Small's  other  contributions  to  sociological  thought 
have  been  indicated  at  the  proper  places  in  earlier 
chapters.  The  correct  method  for  pursuing  socio- 
logical analyses  is  to  treat  human  society  in  terms 
of  process.  The  main  current  in  all  sound  socio- 
.logical  study  is  the  social  process.  The  significant 
test  of  progress  in  this  social  process  is  achieve- 
ment.2 According  to  Professor  Small's  classifica- 
tion, there  are  six  main  phases  of  social  progress, 
namely : 

1.  Achievement  in  promoting  health, 

2.  Achievement  in  harmonizing  human  rela- 

tions, 

3.  Achievement  in  producing  wealth, 

4.  Achievement  in  discovery  and  spread  of 

knowledge, 

5.  Achievement  in  the  fine  arts, 

6.  Achievement  in  religion. 

These  grand  divisions  are  the  expressions  of  cer- 
tain interests3  that  human  beings  possess:  (1) 
health  interests,  (2)  wealth  interests,  (3)  sociabil- 
ity interests,  (4)  knowledge  interests,  (5)  esthetic 
interests,  and  (6)  rightness  interests.  As  a  result 
of  the  operation  of  these  interests,  social  problems 
are  produced.  Sociology  is  "the  science  of  human 


SOCIOLOGICAL  INVESTIGATION         487 

interests  and  their  workings  under  all  conditions." 
In  this  classification  human  interests  serve  as  the 
main  key  forces  to  an  understanding  of  the  social 
process.  Upon  psychological  examination,  however, 
the  interests  are  found  to  be  bafflingly  complex.  The 
psychologist  has  not  given  a  satisfactory  descrip- 
tion of  interests.  And  yet  it  is  clear  that  what  peo- 
ple are  interested  in  is  a  fair  criterion  of  the  direc- 
tion which  their  evolution  will  take.  Furthermore, 
the  changes  in  the  interests  of  people  are  fundamen- 
tal in  telic  social  progress.  With  a  correlation  of 
interests  as  a  subjective  criterion,  and  of  achieve- 
ment as  an  objetcive  test,  Professor  Small  has 
shown  the  dualistic  nature  of  the  social  process. 
Those  methodologists  who  would  measure  all  things 
human  in  purely  objective  terms  are  scientifically 
negligent  of  important  human  elements.  Mind  is 
not  simply  matter ;  the  social  process  is  not  entirely 
behavior. 

Professor  Small  has  sharpened  three  important 
tools  for  the  use  of  the  sociological  investigator. 
These  are:  the  social  process,  personal  interests, 
and  the  group.  His  analyses  are  sound,  except  as  he 
does  not  show  how  "interests"  usually  possess  social 
origins.  Otherwise  he  speaks  consistently  and 
helpfully  in  terms  of  groups  and  group  processes. 
With  concepts  such  as  have  been  favorably  pre- 
sented in  the  foregoing  paragraphs — and  chapters 
— the  sociologist  of  the  future  will  be  able  to  make 
contributions  to  thought  that  will  help  to  determine 


488  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

educational,  religious,  economic,  political,  and  other 
important  human  aims. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 
THE  DISSEMINATION  OF  SOCIOLOGICAL  THOUGHT 


Despite  its  youth,  inchoateness,  and  naivete,  so- 
ciological thought  is  exerting  a  vital  influence  in  the 
world.  It  is  giving  a  new  rating  to  all  the  estab- 
lished values  of  life,  undermining  some,  strengthen- 
ing others,  and  creating  still  others. 

The  chief  values  in  sociological  thought  are  that 
it  constitutes  the  center  of  all  worth  while  thought ; 
it  gives  balance  and  proportion  to  thinking  in  any 
field ;  it  defies  race  prejudice  and  social  intolerance ; 
it  smites  selfish  living;  it  rivets  attention  to  the 
essentially  human  values ;  it  stimulates  personal  de- 
velopment in  harmony  with  group  and  societary 
welfare.  At  the  same  time,  it  postulates  group  ad- 
vancement, not  upon  paternalistic  or  autocratic 
grounds,  but  upon  a  constructive  projection  of  per- 
sonalities that  harmonizes  with  unselfish  group 
service. 

For  centuries  genuine  social  thinking  was  con- 
fined largely  to  a  few  of  the  intellectually  elite. 
These  few  lived,  and  did  even  their  social  thinking, 
in  a  more  or  less  isolated  way.  It  was  not  until 
the  first  decades  of  the  last  centuries  that  social 


490  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

thought  began  to  be  scientific  in  character,  that  is, 
became  sociological.  Sociological  thinking,  how- 
ever, was  isolated  and  uncorrelated  for  many  years. 
In  the  last  decade  of  the  nineteenth  century,  so- 
ciology began  to  develop  a  considerable  body  of 
thinkers  and  to  create  a  new  morale.  There  were 
many  disagreements  that  tended  to  break  the  new 
science  asunder.  The  opening  decades,  however,  of 
the  twentieth  century  witnessed  a  development  of 
sociological  thought  that  was  followed  by  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  teaching  of  sociology  as  a  profes- 
sion. 

With  the  rise  of  professional  sociologists,  the 
dissemination  of  socialized  thought  became  note- 
worthy. For  a  long  time  sociology  was  considered 
only  as  a  post-graduate  study.  In  the  last  few  years, 
however,  sociology  has  been  making  its  way  down- 
ward in  college  and  university  curricula,  until  it  is 
being  widely  taught  to  college  freshmen  and  sopho- 
mores. In  this  connection  there  is  a  variety  of  text- 
books that  have  been  written  to  meet  the  needs  of 
beginning  students.  There  are  some  teachers  who 
would  introduce  sociology  through  anthropological 
studies,  beginning  with  the  origin  of  man.  Others 
would  give  a  survey  or  prospectus  of  social  institu- 
tions, processes,  and  problems.1  Still  others  would 
deal  only  with  social  problems.  Then  there  are 
those  persons  who  would  build  a  text-book  around 
a  central  theme,  tracing  it  through  social  rela- 
tionships. For  advanced  work  in  sociological 


SOCIOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  491 

thought  there  is  a  variety  of  treatises  dealing  with 
systems  at  once  profound,  complex,  and  funda- 
mental. 

For  high  schools,  the  technique  of  sociological 
teaching  is  in  the  beginning  stages.  The  import- 
ance in  high  schools  of  social  science  teaching  is 
generally  recognized,  but  there  has  been  great  diffi- 
culty in  effecting  an  agreement  among  the  various 
social  science  branches.  Some  high  school  teachers 
prefer  a  "social  problems"  course,  although  the  de- 
mand is  growing  for  a  "social  science"  course,  ex- 
tending throughout  the  year,  dividing  the  time  more 
or  less  evenly  between  economics,  sociology,  and 
civics.  There  are  other  high  school  teachers  who 
contend  that  sociology  can  be  taught  best  in  a  gen- 
eral "citizenship"  course.  One  of  the  specific  diffi- 
culties is  that  the  high  school  curriculum  is  full,  and 
that  the  representatives  of  none  of  the  established 
courses  are  willing  to  see  the  subjects  in  which  they 
are  interested  crowded  out.  Another  difficulty  is 
the  power  which  the  self-culture  and  self-develop- 
ment concepts  possess.  The  equal  importance  of 
the  social  culture  and  social  development  concepts 
is  being  recognized,  but  with  amazing  slowness. 

In  the  grades  the  teaching  of  sociology  is  gaining 
ground.  In  the  sense  that  there  is  an  advanced 
group  of  mathematical  studies  for  university  men 
and  women  and  an  elemental  mathematics  for  the 
grades,  so  there  is  advanced  sociology,  and  also  an 
elemental  sociology  centering  around  the  activities 


492  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

of  the  primary  groups,  such  as  the  family,  play, 
neighborhood,  and  school  groups.  A  child  who  is 
old  enough  to  learn  to  obey  is  old  enough  to  begin 
elemental  sociology,  in  fact,  when  he  learns  to  obey, 
he  is  already  beginning  to  experience  the  meaning 
of  a  social,  if  not  a  sociological  concept.  Simple 
social  studies  are  being  prepared  for  the  grades, 
even  beginning  with  the  first  grade. 

The  dissemination  of  sociological  thought  is  r 
practical  question  to  which  in  the  last  score  of  years 
special  attention  has  been  given.  The  universities 
and  colleges  began  to  establish  chairs  of  sociology 
in  the  closing  decade  of  the  last  century.  The  move- 
ment has  acquired  a  remarkable  momentum  in  the 
United  States.  Normal  schools  and  high  schools 
have  adopted  the  movement.  Many  churches  are 
promulgating  a  socialized  gospel.  Literature  is 
gradually  assuming  an  appreciation  of  the  socio- 
logical viewpoint. 

From  the  social  proverbs  of  primitive  man  to  a 
treatise  such  as  Ross'  Principles  of  Sociology,  with 
its  admirable  analysis  of  significant  societal  proc- 
esses, such  as  equalization,  domination,  individua- 
tion,  socialization — this  is  the  main  span  of  social 
thought.  Social  thought  began  in  the  simplest  form 
of  observations  about  social  relationships  between 
individual  and  individual,  between  chieftain  and 
tribal  member,  between  master  and  servant.  It  ex- 
perienced various  stages  of  denunciation  of  social 
wrongs.  It  produced  perspectives  of  perfect  socie- 


SOCIOLOGICAL  THOUGHT  493 

ties.  It  moved  profoundly  forward  in  the  form  of 
social  philosophies.  Now  it  is  proceeding  either 
as  the  investigator  of  new  social  facts,  or  the  psy- 
chological interpreter  of  these  facts  in  terms  of 
social  processes.  It  is  assuming  a  scientific  pro- 
cedure, although  a  portion  of  the  results  of  its 
undertakings  finds  expression  in  social  philosophy. 
It  is  beginning  to  formulate  sociological  laws.  It 
is  inaugurating  a  technique  for  preventing  the  mal- 
adjustments that  produce  social  evils;  it  is  estab- 
lishing a  teaching  technique.  Although  the  masses 
of  the  human  race  are  beginning  to  feel  blindly  the 
meaning  of  social  values,  they  have  not  yet  been 
able  to  make  their  highest  social  aspirations  ration- 
ally articulate.  Until  that  time  comes,  democracy 
will  remain  an  experiment,  and  world  progress  a  toy 
of  autocratic  forces. 

A  history  of  social  thought  is  essentially  a  review 
of  an  irregular  but  positive  acceptance  of  social 
values.  Individual  after  individual,  leader  after 
leader,  profession  after  profession,  group  after 
group,  have  felt  and  accepted  the  challenge  of  the 
sociological  viewpoint.  They  have  changed  from 
living  selfishly  to  living  socially.  They  have  even 
given  up  the  ideal  of  service  for  self  advancement, 
setting  up  in  its  place  the  ideal  of  service  for  the 
welfare  of  others.  In  so  doing  and  living  they  have 
found  expansion  of  personality  and  contributed  to 
the  advancement  of  society.  Since  the  days  of 
Comte  in  particular,  the  social  sciences  have  been 


494  HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 

increasing  in  variety  and  scope  until  they  number 
a  score  or  more,  and  sociological  influence  has  been 
widening  until  the  related  sciences  are  inviting  so- 
ciology, which  is  the  scientific  study  of  group  phe- 
nomena, to  define  their  objectives  for  them.  In  fact, 
sociological  concepts  are  permeating  the  farther- 
most reaches  of  personal  living  and  societal  con- 
trol. A  history  of  social  thought  is  a  history  of 
the  socializing  of  human  attitudes  and  interests, 
presaging  a  human  society  in  which  personal 
achievement  and  group  progress  are  equally  and 
supremely  sought. 


FOOTNOTES 


CHAPTER  II 

1.  W.  I.  Thomas,  Source  Book  for 
Social     Origins,      University     of 
Chicago  Press,   1909,  p.   161. 

2.  Daniel     Crawford,     T  h  in  king 
Black,   Doran,   1913. 

3.  E.     M.     Curr,     The     Australian 
Race,   Melbourne,   1883,   1:339. 

4.  A.  M.   Howitt,   The  Organisation 
of  Australian  Tribes,  p.  452. 

CHAPTER  III 

1.  Boulak   Papyrus,   trans,    by   Grif- 
fith,   p.    5340,    La    Moral    Egyp- 
tienne. 

2.  "The     Instruction     of     Ptah-Ho- 
tep,"    trans,    by    Gunn,    Wisdom 
of  the  East   Series. 

3.  Code  of  Hammurapi,   Sect.   196. 

4.  Ibid.,   Sect.   198 

5.  Ibid.,  Sect.  229. 

6.  Shoo  King,  27:3. 

CHAPTER  IV 

1.  C.    F.    Kent,    The    Social    Teach- 
ings  of  the  Prophets  and  Jesus, 
Scribner,  1917,  p.  4. 

2.  Exodus,  3:7,  8. 

3.  Amos,   2:6,    7,    8;    3:10;    4:1,   2; 
5:7,  15;  6:4. 

4.  Isaiah,  1:23. 

5.  Isaiah,  3:14,  15. 

6.  Micah,  3:2,  3. 

7.  Jeremiah,  22:13,  15,  17   (Modern 
Reader's   Bible). 

8.  Louis  Wallis,   Sociological   Study 
of      the      Bible,      University     of 
Chicago  Press,   1912,  Ch.   VII. 

9.  Hosea,   4:11;   9:11,    16. 

10.  Exodus,   20:12. 

11.  Proverbs,  20:20. 

12.  Proverbs,   12:4. 

13.  Proverbs,  29:15. 

14.  Isaiah,  5:11. 

15.  Proverbs,  20:1. 

16.  Proverbs,  31:7. 

17.  Exodus,    21:13;    I    Kings,    1:50; 
2:28. 

18.  Job,   31. 

19.  Amos,   9:7. 

20.  Isaiah,   9:5;    cf  ,    Kent,    The   So- 
cial   Teachings    of    the    Prophets 
and  Jesus,   p.    112. 


CHAPTER  V 

1.  Hesiod,    Work   and   Days,   trans, 
by   A.   W.    Mains,    Oxford,    1908. 

2.  The     Works     of    Hesiod,     Calli- 
machus  and   Theognis,   trans,   by 
Banks,   Bonn's  Classical   Library, 
p.  227. 

3.  B9tsford     and     Sihler,     Hellenic 
Civilisation,  p.  64. 

4.  George       Rawlinson,      translator, 
History   of  Herodotus,   4   vols. 

5.  Plutarch's     Pericles,     revised    by 
Clough,    1:234  ff. 

6.  Botsford  and   Sihler,   op.   cit.,  p. 
340. 

7.  On    Ait,     Water    and    Places    in 
the    Genuine    Works    of    Hippo- 
crates,   trans,    by    Adams,     Vol. 

8.  Plato   I,   338   C.     All   references 
to     Plato's     Dialogues     in     this 
chapter  or  in   later  chapters  are 
to  Jowett's  translation. 

9.  Adela    M.    Adam,    Plato,    Moral 
and  Political  Ideals,  p.   10. 

10.  The    reader    will    find    in    Will 
Durant's      Philosophy      and      the 
Social  Problem,  Ch.  I,  a  unique 
although     ideocentric     interpreta- 
tion of   Socrates. 

11.  Laws,   738. 

12.  The  beginning  student  of  Plato's 
social    thought    should    first    read 
the  Republic,  especially  V  472  A 
to  VII  541  B. 

13.  Republic,  369  B. 

14.  Ibid.,  370  B. 

15.  Ibid.,  373. 

16.  Laws,  803. 

17.  Statesman,   308. 

18.  Ibid.,  307. 

19.  Ibid.,  297. 

20.  Republic,  398  E,  412. 

21.  Laws,  731,  732. 

22.  Republic,  412. 

23.  Statesman,  303. 

24.  Republic,  525;  cf.  Laws,  818. 

25.  Ibid.,  537,  539,  540. 

26.  Ibid.,  413. 

27.  Ibid.,  416. 

28.  Ibid.,  416,  417. 

29.  Ibid.,  457C,  464C. 

30.  Ibid.,  414,  415. 

31.  Ibid.,  415. 

32.  Loc.  cit. 

33.  Ibid.,  460  C,  461  C. 


496 


HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 


34. 

Statesman,  310. 

18. 

Ibid.,  II,  6. 

35. 

Laws,  773. 

19. 

Loc.  cit. 

36. 

Statesman,   310. 

20. 

Ibid.    II,  9. 

37. 

Republic,  422  A;  Laws,  744,  745. 

21. 

Ibid.    11,   12. 

38. 
39. 

Republic,  421. 
Ibid.,  550  D.  E;  Laws,  742,  791. 

22. 
23. 

Ibid.    V,   1. 
Ibid.    VII,   14. 

40. 

Republic,  550. 

24. 

Loc.   cit. 

41. 

Ibid.,  550  C. 

25. 

Ibid.    VII,   4. 

42. 

Ibid.,  556. 

26. 

Ibid.    VII,  11. 

43. 

Loc.  cit. 

27. 

Ibid.    VII,  15. 

44. 

Ibid.,  552  D. 

28. 

Ibid.    VII,  16. 

45. 

Ibid.,  552   E. 

29. 

Ibid.    I,  12. 

46. 

Laws,  744,  745. 

30. 

Ibid.    VII,  16. 

47. 

Ibid.,  729. 

31. 

Ibid.    VIII,  2. 

48. 

Loc.    cit. 

32. 

Ibid.    VIII,  3. 

49. 

Republic,   377,   401. 

33. 

Ibid.    VIII,  4. 

50. 

Laws,  772. 

34. 

Ibid.    VIII,  5. 

51. 

Statesman,  294. 

52. 

Ibid.,   300. 

53. 

In  books,  IX-XII. 

CHAPTER  VII 

54. 

Laws,  934 

55. 

Ibid.,  862  ff 

1. 

Lucretius,  Dererum  natura,  trans. 

56. 

Ibid.,  936. 

by    Muno,    in    Bohn's    Libraries, 

57. 

Ibid.,  955. 

V.  335  ff.,  778  ff. 

58. 
59. 

Republic,  455,  456;  Laws,  805. 
Republic,  451. 

2. 

De    officiis,    trans,    by    Edmonds, 
Bohn's  Libraries,  I,  XVII,  XIV; 

60. 
61. 

Ibid.,  475A;  Laws,  814. 
Laws,  759. 

De   republica,   trans,    by  Younge, 
Bohn's  Libraries,  I,  XXV-XXVI, 

62. 

Ibid.,  929,  930. 

XIV. 

63. 

Republic,    457  A;    Laws,    795     ff, 
813  ff,  830  ff. 

3. 

4. 

Dialogues,   VII,  9. 
Thoughts,   trans,    by   Long,    VII, 

64. 

Ibid.,  410. 

31. 

65. 

Ibid.,  441. 

5. 

Ibid.    VI,  7. 

66. 

Ibid.,  498  B. 

6. 

Ibid.    VIII,   59. 

67. 

Ibid.,  518. 

7. 

Ibid.    IX,  23. 

68. 

Ibid.,  536. 

8. 

Ibid.    VI,  42. 

69. 

Ibid.,  425;  Laws,  643. 

9. 

Ibid.    XII,   36. 

70. 

Republic,   537. 

10. 

Seneca,  Dial,  IX,  4. 

71. 

Laws,   729. 

11. 

Ibid.,   VII,   20. 

72. 

Republic,  435  ff. 

12. 

On  Anger. 

73. 

Laws,  903. 

13. 

Loc.   cit. 

74. 

75. 

Republic,  545-549. 
Ibid.,  550,  551. 

14. 

Epictetus,     Discourses,     Book     I, 
Ch.  XVIII. 

76. 

Loc.  cit. 

15. 

Matthew,  V,  44. 

77. 

Ibid.,  555. 

16. 

Thoughts,   VII,    22. 

78. 

Ibid.,  564. 

17. 

Romans,   XII,    17. 

79. 

Ibid.,  339;  Laws,  714. 

18. 
19. 

Thoughts,   VII,   26;  III,   7. 

Seneca,  On  a  Happy  Life. 

20. 

Loc.   cit. 

CHAPTER  VI 

1. 

Ethics,  trans,  by  Welldon,  II,  2 

CHAPTER  VIII 

2. 

Politics,  trans,   by  Jowett,  I,  2. 

3. 

Loc.  cit. 

1. 

Luke  17:20,  21. 

4. 

Ibid.,  II,   3. 

2. 

Luke  13:34. 

5. 

Ibid.,  II,  5. 

3. 

Matt.  12:48;  Mark  3:34. 

6. 

Loc.  cit. 

4. 

Matt.     13:31,     32;     Mark     4:30; 

7. 

Ibid.,  II,  7;  VII,  10. 

Luke   13:18,   19. 

8. 

Ibid.,  II,  4. 

5. 

Luke  6:36. 

9. 

Ibid.,  I,  4. 

6. 

Matt.  5:23;    Matt.    18:15;    Luke 

10. 

Ibid.,  Ill,   7. 

6:41,   42. 

11. 

Ibid.,  Ill,   15. 

7. 

Matt.  5:44,  46;  Luke  6:20,  35. 

12. 

Ibid.,  V,  8;  VII,  2. 

8. 

Matt.  28:20;  24:14. 

13. 

Ibid.,  II,   8. 

9. 

John  12:43;  Matt.  6:5. 

14. 

Ibid.,  V,   8. 

10. 

Matt.  4:8. 

15. 

Ibid.,  IV,  11. 

11. 

Luke    9:48;    Mark    10:14;    Matt. 

16. 

Ibid.,  V,  7. 

18:1. 

17. 

Ibid.,  IV,  11. 

12. 

Matt.  25:31-46. 

FOOTNOTES 


497 


13. 
14. 
15. 
17. 

18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 

24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 

33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 

38. 

39. 

40. 


Mark   9:41;   Matt.    10:42. 
Luke  6:30;   3:11. 
Matt.  23:23-33. 

John    2:13-17;    Matt.    21:12,    13; 
Mark   11:15-17;   Luke    19:45,   46. 
Mark  11:18;  Luke  19:47. 
Matt.   15:4;   19:19. 
Mark  10:7,    8;    Matt.    19:5. 
Mark  9:42. 
Matt.   19:21. 

John     12:8;     Mark     14:7;     Matt. 
26:11. 

Luke  12:16-21. 

Luke  13:14;   Matt.    12:2,    10-13. 
Mark  2:27;   3:4. 
Matt.    10:34-39. 
Luke   12:49-53. 
John  18:10;  Matt.  26:50-56. 
Matt.   5:39. 
Luke  2:13,   14. 

Acts      15:9;      10:28;      Galatians, 
3:28. 

Romans  8:16;  32. 
I.   Corinthians,  Ch.   13. 
Galatians  5:13;  Romans  12:10. 
Galatians   6:2;   6:10;  Acts  20:35. 
Romans     8:35-39;     12:17;     Ephe- 
sians   1:21;   2:4;   3:17,    18. 
Romans     12:4-8;     cf.     I.     Corin- 
thians 12:12. 
Romans   14:7. 

Ephesians      5:22-23;      Colossians 
3:18,  19;  I.  Corinthians  11:9. 
19;  I   Corinthians    11:9. 
I.   Timothy   6:7-10;    17,    18. 
James  1:26,  27. 
Revelation,   Ch.   21. 


CHAPTER  IX 

B  text,  Passus  VIII.  The 
manuscripts  of  Pier's  Ploughman 
number  over  forty  and  fall  into 
three  sets:  A,  B,  and  C. 


CHAPTER  X 


14. 


The  Utopia  of  Sir  Thomas  More, 
Bell    and    Sons,    London,    edited 
by     George     Simpson    in    Bohn's 
Classical   Libraries,   1910,  p.   75. 

Ibid. 

p.  104. 

Ibid. 

P.  111. 

Ibid. 

p.   153. 

Ibid. 

pp.  84,  93. 

Ibid. 

pp.   135,  84. 

Ibid. 

p.  93. 

Ibid. 

p.  97. 

Ibid. 

p.  92. 

Ibid. 

p.  88. 

Ibid. 

p.  90. 

Ibid. 

p.  96. 

Ibid. 

p.     110,    cf.     Bacon,     The 

New  Atlantis   in  Ideal    Common- 
wealths,   Collier,    1901,    p.    125. 
Ibid.,  p.  131. 


15.  Ibid.,  p.  93. 

16.  Ibid.,  p.  115. 

17.  Ibid.,     p.     117,     cf.     Campanella, 
The    City    of    the    Sun,    in    Ideal 
Commonwealths,  Collier,  1901,  p. 

18.  Ibid.,  p.  174. 

19.  Ibid.,  p.  95. 

20.  Ibid.,  p.   101. 

21.  Ibid.,  p.   175. 

22.  Ibid.,  p.  174. 

23.  Ibid.,  pp.  153    ff. 

24.  Ibid.,  p.   154. 

25.  Ibid.,  p.   103. 

26.  Ibid.,  pp.    140,    141. 

27.  Ibid.,  p.  67. 

28.  Bacon,     The     New    Atlantis     in 
Ideal     Commonwealths,     Collier, 
1901,  pp.   135  ff. 

29.  Bellamy,    Looking  Backward, 
Grosset    and    Dunlap,     1898,     p. 

30.  Ibid.,  p.  88. 

31.  Ibid.,  p.  89. 

32.  Ibid.,  p.  67. 

33.  Ibid.,  p.   192. 

34.  Ibid.,  pp.  220  ff. 

35.  Ibid.,  pp.  287  ff. 

36.  H.       G.       Wells,      Anticipations, 
Mankind    in     the    Making ,   and 
A      Modern      Utopia.        See     A 
Modern    Utopia,    Scribner,    1905, 
pp.  5,  11. 


CHAPTER  XI 

1.  Machiavelli,    The    Prince,    Rout- 
ledge,  London,  n.d.,  p.  53. 

2.  Ibid.,  pp.  104,  105. 

3.  Ibid.,  p.  71. 

4.  Ibid.,  p.   77. 

5.  Hobbes,  Leviathan,  Putnam,  1904, 
Ch.  XIII. 

6.  Locke,    Two    Treatises    on    Gov- 
ernment,  Routledge,   n.d.,   p.    18. 

7.  Ibid.,  p.   193. 

8.  Ibid.,  p.  199. 

9.  Ibid.,  p.  315. 

10.  Rousseau,     Contrat    social,    Gar- 
nier,   Paris,   p.   240. 

11.  Ibid.,  p.  246. 

12.  Ibid.,  p.  249. 

13.  John     Winthrop      in      Selections 
from    Early    American     Writers, 
1607-1800,  edit,  by  W.  B.  Cairns, 
Macmillan,    1910,    p.    52. 

14.  A    Treatise    of     Human    Nature, 
edit,     by     Selby-Bigge,     Oxford, 
1896,   11:777,   114,   140,   150. 

15.  Ibid.,  p.  534. 

16.  Ibid.,    p.  546. 

17.  Adam     Smith,    The     Wealth     of 
Nations,    Putnam,    1904,    11:114. 

18.  Ibid.,  11:83. 

19.  Ibid.,  11:143. 

20.  Ibid.,  11:203. 

21.  Ibid.,  1:80. 


498 


HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 


22.  Ibid.,  1:81. 

23.  Ibid.,  11:203-207. 

24.  Ibid.,    1:11. 

25.  Kant,  Theory  of  Ethics,  trans,  by 
Abbott,  p.   9. 

26.  Hegel,    Philosophy    of    Right, 
trans,  by  Dyde,  Part  III,  p.  ISO. 

27.  W.    G.    Sumner,      What     Social 
Classes  Owe  to  Each  Other,  Har- 
per,   1920,   p.    12. 

28.  Ibid.,  p.   25. 

29.  Publications     of     the     American 
Sociological   Society,  Vol.    XV. 


CHAPTER  XII 

1.  Adam  Smith,  Wealth  of  Nations, 
Putnam,  1901,  1:81. 

2.  Ibid.,  p.  147. 

3.  An    Essay    on    the    Principle    of 
Population,    eighth    edit.,    Reeves 
and  Turner,  1878,  p.  1;  cf.  W.  S. 
Thompson,  Population:    A  Study 
in  Malthusianism,  Columbia  Uni- 
versity,   1915,   Ch.   I. 

4.  Ibid.,  p.  *. 

5.  Ibid.,  p.  8. 

6.  Ibid.,  p.  9. 

7.  Ibid.,  p.   13. 

8.  Ibid.,  p.  371. 

9.  Ibid.,  p.  402. 

10.  Ibid.,  p.  416. 

11.  Ibid.,  p.  437. 

12.  Ibid.,  p.  481. 

13.  T.    N.    Carver,    Essays   in  Social 
Justice,    Harvard    Universit} 
Press,   1915,   Ch.   XIV. 

14.  Cf.    W.    S.    Thompson,     Popula- 
tion: A  Study  in  Malthusianism, 
Columbia      University      Studies. 
1915. 


CHAPTER  XIII 


21.  Ibid. 

22.  Ibid. 

23.  Ibid. 

24.  Ibid. 

25.  Ibid. 


p.  292. 
p.  287. 
p.  286. 
p.  300. 
Vol.  Ill,  p.  320. 


1. 

Auguste  Comte,  Positive  Philoso- 

phy, 

trans,    by    Martineau,    VoJ 

I.   pp 

.   x,  xi. 

2. 

Ibid., 

p.  xi. 

3. 

Ibid., 

p.  xv. 

4. 

Ibid., 

Vol.     Ill,    p.    13. 

5. 

Ibid., 

Vol.  I,    p.    26. 

6. 

Ibid., 

p.  27. 

7. 

Ibid., 

p.  34. 

8. 

Ibid., 

p.  35. 

9. 

Ibid., 

p.  36. 

10. 

Ibid., 

p.  41. 

11. 

Ibid., 

pp.   27   ff. 

12. 

Ibid., 

p.   149. 

13. 
14. 

Ibid., 
Ibid., 

p.  153,    154. 
Vol.    II,    p.    30. 

14. 

Ibid., 

p.  219. 

16. 

Ibid., 

p.   175. 

17. 

Ibid., 

p.   176. 

18. 

Ibid., 

p.  180. 

19. 

Ibid., 

p.   193. 

20. 

Ibid., 

p.  234. 

26.     Comte,   Positive   Polity,    London, 
1871,  1:1. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

1.  Proudhon,    What     Is     Property? 
Twentieth  Century  Press,  1908. 

2.  Rodbertus,     Overproduction    and 
Crises.      Scribner,    1906 

3.  Lassalle,   Science  and  the   Work- 
ingman,    Kerr,    1903. 

4.  Marx   and    Engels,   Manifesto    of 
the      Communist      Party,      Kerr, 
1902. 

5.  Marx,    Capital,    trans,   by  Moore 
and    Aveling,    Kerr,    1909,    1:673 
ff.,   834  ff. 

6.  Kropotkin,  Mutual  Aid;  a  Factor 
of    Evolution,    Doubleday,    Page, 
1902. 

7.  Henry      George,      Progress     and 
Poverty,  Doubleday,   Page,   1916, 
p.   9. 

8.  Ibid. 

9.  Ibid.,  pp.    286,   287. 

10.  Ibid.,  p.  342. 

11.  Ibid.,  p.  339. 


CHAPTER  XV 

1.  Jean   Bodin,   The  Six  Bookes  of 
A    Commonwealth,    trans,    by    R. 
Knoles,  London. 

2.  H.   T.   Buckle,   History  of  Civili- 
sation    in     England,     Appleton, 
1874,    2    vols.,    1:14. 

3.  Ibid.,  p.  29. 

4.  Ibid.,  p.  31. 

5.  Ibid.,  p.  32. 

6.  Ibid.,  p.  33. 

7.  Ibid.,  p.  36. 

8.  Ibid.,  pp.    44    ff. 

9.  Ibid.,  p.  52. 

10.  Ibid.,  p.  85. 

11.  Ibid.,  p.  95. 

12.  Ibid.,  p.  96. 

13.  Ibid.,  p.  99. 

14.  Ellen  Semple,  Influences  of  Geo- 
graphic Environment,  Holt,  1911, 
p.   635. 

15.  See    Ellsworth    Huntington,    Civ- 
ilization  and   Climate,   Yale   Uni- 
versity Press,  1915. 

16.  W.   Z.    Ripley,   Races   in  Europe, 
Appleton,    1899,   p.   571. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

1.     Charles  Darwin,   The  Descent  of 
Man,  Appleton,   1904,  pp.  229  ff. 


FOOTNOTES 


499 


2.  Herbert     Spencer,    First    Princi- 
ples, Appleton,  1900,  Section  III- 
145. 

3.  Spencer,  Principles  of  Sociology, 
Appleton,    1914,    1:596,    597. 

4.  Ibid.,  p.  84. 

5.  Ibid.,  Part  II,   Ch.   II. 

6.  Ibid.,  pp.   457   ft. 

7.  Ibid.,  Part  II,  Ch.  VI  IX. 

8.  Ibid.,  p.  592. 

9.  John     Fiske,    Destiny     of     Man, 
Houghton  Mifflin,   1904,  p     12. 

10.  John    Fiske,    Outlines   of   Cosmic 
Philosophy,     Houghton       Mifflin, 
1874,  Part  II,  pp.  340  ff. 

11.  Ibid.,  pp.  360  ff. 

12.  Ibid.,  pp.  303  ff. 

13.  Paul    von     Lilienfeld,    Gcdanken 
iiber    die    Socialwissenschaft    der 
Ziikunft,  II,  pp,  viii  ff. 

14.  Lilienfeld,  Pathologic  S  o  c  i  a  I  e, 
1904.  4, 

15.  J.   S.  Mackenzie,  Outlines  of  So- 
cial Philosophy,  Macmillan,  1918, 
p.    14. 

16.  Ibid.,  p.  65. 
16.     Ibid.,  p.  243   ff. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

1.  Lester   F.    Ward,    Dynamic   Soci- 
ology,   Appleton,     1911,    Vol.     I, 
pp.   XXV   ff. 

2.  Ibid.,  p.  22. 

3.  Ibid.,  pp.  22,  23. 

4.  Ibid.,  pp.   56,  57. 

5.  Ibid.,  p.  60;   Ward,  Pure  Sociol- 
ogy,   Macmillan,    1914,    p.    4. 

6.  Lester  F.  Ward,  Applied  Sociol- 
ogy,  Ginn,    1906,   pp.   5   ff. 

7.  Dynamic  Sociology,  Vol.  I,  p.  72. 

8.  Ibid.,  p.  143. 

9.  Ibid.,  p.  320. 

10.  Ibid.,  pp.    408,    409. 

11.  Ibid.,  p.  464. 

12.  Ibid.,  p.  452. 

13.  Ibid.,  p.  467. 

14.  Ibid.,  p.  474. 

15.  Ibid.,  p.  486. 

16.  Ibid.,  p.  497. 

17.  Ibid.,  p.  516. 

18.  Ibid.,  pp.    518    ff. 

19.  Ibid.,  p.  520. 

20.  Ibid.,  Vol.  II,  p.  341. 

21.  Ibid.,  Vol.   I,   p.    520. 

22.  Ibid.,  p.  522. 

23.  Ibid.,  p.  541. 

24.  Ibid.,  p.  583. 

25.  Ibid.,  p.  579. 

26.  Ibid.,  p.  594. 

27.  Ibid.,  pp.   606  ff. 

28.  Ibid.,  p.  615. 

29.  Pure    Sociology,    p.    403. 

30.  Dynamic    Sociology,    Vol.    I,    p. 
641. 

31.  Pure  Sociology,   Ch.  XV. 

32.  Ibid.,  p.  420. 


33.  Lester  F.  Ward,  Psychic  Factors 
of    Civilization,    Ginn,    1906,    Ch. 
XXXIV. 

34.  Dynamic   Sociology,    Vol.    I,    pp. 
669,    670. 

35.  Ibid.,  pp.  473,   474. 

36.  Pure  Sociology,  p.  438. 

37.  Ibid.,  pp.  457  ff. 

38.  Ibid.,   p.    469. 

39.  Ibid.,  pp.  231   ff. 

40.  Ibid.,  p.    237. 

41.  Ibid.,  pp.   79  ff. 

42.  Lester  F.  Ward,  "Eugenics,   Eu- 
thenics,    and    Eudemics,"    Amer. 
Jour,  of  Sociology,  18;  737-54. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

H.    F.   Osborn,  Men   of  the   Old 
Stone  Age,  Scribner,  1918,  Ch.  I. 
W.   G.    Sumner,  Folkways,   Ginn, 
1907,   p.   43. 
Ibid,  p.   13. 
Ibid  ,  p.  266. 
Ibid.,  pp.  343,  362. 
Ibid.,  p.  378. 

W.  I.  Thomas,  Sex  and  Society, 
p.  51. 

Ibid.,  p.  182. 
Ibid.,  p.  41. 
Ibid.,  p.  40. 
Ibid.,  p.  41. 
Ibid.,  p.  54. 
Ibid.,  p.  61. 
Ibid.,  p.  65. 
Ibid.,   Ch.   II. 
Ibid.,  p.   76. 
Ibid.,  p.  201. 

Ibid.,  p.  418;  cf.  W.  I.  Thomas, 
Sex  and  Society,  University  of 
Chicago  Press,  1907,  pp.  201-220. 
Ibid.,  p.  629. 

A.  G.  Kellor,  Societal  Evolution, 
Macmillan,  1915. 
Edward   Westermarck,    The   Ori- 
gin    and     Development     of     the 
Moral    Ideas,    Macmillan,     1906, 
1:159. 
Ibid. 

Ibid.,  p.  160. 
Ibid.,  Vol.  II.  p.  740. 
Ibid.,  11:745. 

L.  T.  Hobhouse,  Morals  in  Evo- 
lution, Holt,   1919,  p.   1. 
Ibid.,  p.   2. 
Ibid. 

Ibid.,  p.  43;  cf.  Hobhouse,  Social 
Evolution    and   Political    Theory, 
Lemcke,  1911,  pp.  128  ff. 
Ibid.,  p.  60. 
Ibid.,  p.   64. 

Social  Evolution  and  Political 
Theory,  p.  148. 

Morals  in  Evolution,  pp.  130,  71. 
William  Wundt,  Elements  of 
Folk  Psychology,  trans.  by 
Schaub,  Macmillan,  1916,  p.  1. 


3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 

8. 

9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 


19. 

20. 


21. 


22. 
23. 

24. 
25. 
26. 

27. 
28. 
29. 


30. 
31. 
32. 

33. 
34. 


500 


HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 


35.  Ibid.,  p.   478. 

36.  Ibid.,  p.  514. 

37.  Ibid.,  p.   515. 

38.  Ibid.,  p.   516. 

39.  Franz  Boas,  The  Mind  of  Primi- 
tive   Man,    Macmillan,     1911,    p. 
102. 

40.  Hobhouse,    Social   Evolution   and 
Political  Theory,  p.  39. 

41.  W.  I.  Thomas,   Source  Book  for 
Social     Origins,     University     of 
Chicago  Press,  1909,  p.  18. 

42.  Ibid.,  p.  20. 

43.  Ibid.,  p.   14. 

44.  Thomas,  Sex  and  Society,  p.  51. 

45.  Thomas  and  Znaniecki,  The  Pol- 
ish Peasant  in  Europe  and  Amer- 
ica, University  of  Chicago  Press, 
1918,  1:22. 

CHAPTER  XIX 

1.  Francis   Galton,   Hereditary   Gen- 
ius, Macmillan,   1914. 

2.  Inquiries    into    the    Human    Fac- 
ulty,  Dutton,    1908. 

3.  See   C.    W.    Saleeby,    The   Prog- 
ress of  Eugenics,  Funk  and  Wag- 
nails,  1914,  pp.  1  ff. 

4.  Karl   Pearson,   The   Grammar   of 
Science,  Black,  1911,  p.  1. 

5.  Ibid.,  p.   6. 

6.  See     Saleeby,     The    Progress    of 
Eugenics,  Ch.   II. 

7.  See    C.    B.    Davenport,    Heredity 
in    Relation    to    Eugenics,    Holt, 
1911. 

8.  See    Popenoe    and    Johnson,    Ap- 
plied Eugenics,   Macmillan,   1918. 

9.  Ibid.,  p.  213. 

10      Ibid.,  pp.  218,  231. 

11.  Ibid.,  Ch.  XVI. 

12.  Ibid.,  p.  381. 

13.  Ibid.,  p.  380. 

14.  Saleeby,     The    Progress    of    Eu- 
genics, p.  65. 

15.  Popenoe    and    Johnson,    op.    cit., 
p.  387. 

16.  Hobhouse,    Social   Evolution    and 
Political    Theory,    Lemcke,    1911, 
p.  45. 

17.  Popenoe    and    Johnson,    op.    cit , 
p.  292. 

CHAPTER  XX 

1.  Ludwig  Gumplowicz,  Dcr  Rassen- 
kampf,  Innsbruck,   1883,  p.  64 

2.  Gumplowicz,    Grundriss    der    So- 
ciologie,    tr.    by    Moore,    1885,    p. 
134. 

3.  Gumplowicz,  Sociologie  und  Pol- 
itik,  p.  94. 

4.  Friedrich     Nietzsche,     Genealogy 
of  Morals,    New   York,    1897,   p. 
46. 

5.  Nietzsche,    The    Will    to    Power, 
1889,  pp.  90,  269,  660  ff. 


6.  S.    N.    Patten,   A    Theory   of  So- 
cial Forces,  1896,  Ch.  IV. 

7.  T.    N.    Carver,    Essays   in   Social 
Justice,        Harvard        University 
Press,  1915,  pp.  30,  34. 

8.  Ibid.,  p.  46. 

9.  Ibid.,  pp.  49,  50. 

10.  Ibid.,  p.  56. 

11.  Ibid.,  p.  77. 

12.  Op.  cit. 

13.  T.  N.  Carver,  Principles  of  Polit- 
ical Economy,  Ginn,  1919,  pp.  37 
ff.      Also    see    Essays    in    Social 
Justice,  p.  86. 

14.  Essays  in  Social  Justice,  p.  86. 

15.  Ibid.,  p.    108. 

16.  Principles   of  Political   Economy, 
p.  43. 

17.  J.  Novicow,  War  and  its  Alleged 
Benefits,  trans,  by  Seltzer,   Holt, 
1911. 

18.  E.    A.     Ross,    Principles    of    So- 
ciology, Century,   1920,  p.   167. 

19.  Ibid.,  p.   183. 

20.  Ibid.,  pp.   207,   206. 

CHAPTER  XXI 

1.  Cf.    S.    H.    Swinny,    "Giambatista 
Vico,"   Sociological   Review,  Jan. 
1914,   pp.    50-57. 

2.  Peter  Kropotkin,  Mutual  Aid;  a 
Factor  in   Evolution,    Doubleday, 
Page,  1902,  p.  3. 

3.  Ibid.,     p.     VII;     cf.     Kropotkin, 
Fields,  Factories  and  Workshops, 
Putnam,  1901,  Ch.   1. 

4.  "The   State;  Its   Historic   Role," 
London,    1898   —    reproduced    in 
Man    or    the    State    by    W.     R. 
Browne,  Huebsch,  1919,  p.  21. 

5.  Gustav  Ratzenhofer,  Die  sociolo- 
gische  Erkenntniss,  Leipzig,  1898, 
Sect.  22;  see  A.  W.  Small.    Gen- 
eral    Sociology,     University      of 
Chicago    Press,    1905,    Ch.    XIII. 

6.  Sosiologie,  Leipzig,  1907,  pp.    13- 
17. 

7.  Die  sociologische  Erkenntniss,  p. 
233. 

8.  Albion   W.    Small,    General   Soci- 
ology, ibid.,  p.   196. 

9.  Ibid.,  pp.  433  ff. 

10.  Ibid.,  pp.  201   ff. 

11.  Ibid.,  p.  217. 

12.  Ibid.,   p.    325. 

13.  Ibid.,  pp.  389,   390. 

14.  Between    Eras,   From    Capitalism 
to     Democracy,     Inter-Collegiate 
Press,  1913,  Ch.  XXIII. 

15.  E.    A.    Ross,   Principles   of   Soci- 
ology,  Century,    1920,  p.    121. 

16.  Ibid.,  p.  135. 

17.  The  Function  of  Socialisation  in 
Social   Evolution,    Univ.    of   Chi- 
cago Press,  1916. 

18.  Ross,   op.  cit.,  pp.   257  ff. 

19.  Ibid.,  p.  395. 


FOOTNOTES 


501 


20.  Ibid.,  p.  405. 

21.  L.  T.  Hobhouse,  Social  Evolution 
and    Political     Theory,     Lemcke, 
1911,  p.   127. 

22.  C.     H.     Cooley,     Social    Process, 
Scribners,  1918,  p.  38. 

CHAPTER  XXII 

1.  David  Hume,  A   Treatise  of  Hu- 
man Nature,  edit,  by  Selby-Bigge, 
Oxford,  1896,  p.  363. 

2.  Ibid.,   p.    362. 

3.  Ibid.,  pp.  499,  500. 

4.  Ibid.,  p.  521. 

5.  Ibid.,   pp.   575   ff. 

6.  Ibid.,   p.    535. 

7.  Gabriel  Tarde,  The  Laws  of  Imi- 
tation, tr.  by  Parsons,  Holt,  1903, 
p.  XVII. 

8.  Ibid.,  p.  59. 

9.  Ibid.,  p.  146. 

10.  Ibid.,  p.   74. 

11.  Ibid.,  p.  78. 

12.  Ibid.,  p.  87. 

13.  Ibid.,  p.  114. 

14.  Ibid  ,  p.  39. 

15.  Ibid.,  p.  141  ff. 

16.  Ibid.,    p.    213;    cf.    Tarde,    Social 
Laws,    trans,    by    Warren,    Mac- 
millan,    1907,    p.    65. 

17.  The  Laws  of  Imitation,  p.  22=!. 

18.  Ibid.,  p.   111. 

19.  Ibid.,   p.   14. 

20.  Ibid.,  p.   288. 

21.  Ibid.,  pp.  341  ff. 

22.  Ibid.,  p.  369. 

23.  Ibid.,   p.   30. 

24.  Social  Laws,  p.    132. 

25.  Laws  of  Imitation,  p.  169. 

26.  Social  Laws,  p.  195. 

27.  Ibid.,  p.   204. 

28.  Ibid.,     p.     171;     cf.     Tarde,     La 
logique  sociale,    Paris,    1898,    Ch. 

29.  Laws  of  Imitation,  p.  87. 

30.  Ibid.,   p.    138. 

31.  Ibid,  p.  344. 

32.  Ibid., 

33.  Ibid.,  p.  387. 

34.  E.   A.    Ross,     Social    Psychology, 
Macmillan,    1908,   p.   viii. 

35.  M.    M.    Davis,   Jr.,   Psychological 
Interpretations  of  Society,  Long- 
mans, Green,  1909. 

36.  Tarde,     L.' opinion     et     la     joule, 
Paris,   1901,  pp.   177  ff.     Cf.   Sig- 
hele,      Psychologic      des      scctes, 
Paris,  1898,  pp.  45  ff. 

37.  F.  H.  Giddings,  Principles  of  So- 
ciology, Macmillan,  1896,  p.  17. 

38.  Ibid  ,  pp.  71,   126  ff. 

39.  Ibid.,    pp.    101    ff.    Cf.    Giddings, 
Descriptive     and    Historical     So- 
ciology, Macmillan,  1911,  Ch.  III. 

40.  Principles    of   Sociology,   p.    109; 
Descriptive    and    Historical    Soci- 
ology,  pp.   157   ff. 


41.  Principles    of   Sociology,    p.    138. 

42.  Ibid.,  pp.  141  ff. 

43.  Ibid.,  pp.  147  ff. 

44.  Descriptive    and   Historical   Soci- 
ology, p.  541.     Cf.  Giddings,  In- 
ductive     Sociology,      Macmillan, 
1914,   Part  III. 

45.  American   Journal    of   Sociology, 
Vol.  XXV,  p.  387. 

46.  Ibid.,  p    388. 

47.  J.   M.   Baldwin,   Social  and  Ethi- 
cal    Interpretations,     Macmillan, 
1906,    p.    15. 

48.  Ibid.,  p.  18. 

49.  Ibid.,  pp.  529  ff. 

CHAPTER  XXIII 

1.  C.    H.    Cooley,    Social    Organisa- 
tion,  Scribner,   1909,  p.   5. 

2.  C.     H.     Cooley,    Human    Nature 
and   the   Social   Order,    Scribner, 
1902,  p.   3. 

3.  Ibid.,   p.   5. 

4.  Ibid.,  pp.  152  ff. 

5.  Social  Organisation,  ibid.,  p.    11. 

6.  Ibid.,  p.  12. 

7.  Ibid.,  p.  26. 

8.  Ibid.,  p.  28. 

9.  Ibid.,    p.    37. 

10.  Ibid.,  p.   61. 

11.  Ibid.,  p.  63. 

12.  Ibid.,  p.    80. 

13.  Ibid.,  p.  103. 

14.  Ibid.,  p.   121. 

15.  Cooley,  Social  Process,  Scribner, 
1918,    pp.    68    ff. 

16.  Social    Organisation,    ibid.,    Chs. 
XVIII,  XXV-XXVII. 

17.  Ibid.,  p.   320;  cf.  Social  Process, 
297  ff. 

18.  Introduction       to       Social      Psy- 
chology, Luce,  1914,  pp.  23  ff. 

19.  Ibid.,  pp.  268,  322,  279. 

20.  E.    A.    Ross,    Principles    of   Soci- 
ology,      Century,       1920,       Chs. 
XXXIV  XXXV.  Cf.  Ross,  Social 
Control,    Macmillan,     1910,     Chs. 
VII,  VIII. 

21.  Social    Control,    ibid.,    pp.    49    ff. 

22.  Ibid.,  Chs.  X  ff. 

23.  Ibid.,    pp.    257    ff. 

24.  Ibid.,   pp.    411    ff. 

25.  Ibid  ,  Ch.  XXXI. 

26.  Ross,     Social    Psychology,     Mac- 
millan,   1908,    Ch.    II. 

27.  Ibid.,  p.   70.    Cf-   McDougall,  In- 
troduction  to   Social  Psychology, 
ibid.,  Ch.  IV. 

28.  Ross,     Social     Psychology,     Ch. 
XVIII. 

29.  See  Chapter  XVIII  of  this  book. 

30.  Ross,     Principles     of    Sociology, 
Ch.   XLII. 

31.  Ibid.,  Ch.  XXXVI. 

32.  Ibid.,  Ch.  XXXVIII. 

33.  Ibid.,   pp.    549   ff. 

34.  Ibid.,   p.    564. 


502 


HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 


35.  Ibid.,   p.   590. 

36.  Ibid.,  p.  626. 

37.  Ibid. 

38.  Ibid.,  p.  632. 

39.  Ibid.,  p.  652. 

40.  Ibid.,  p.  653. 

41.  Ibid.,  p.   693. 

42.  Graham    Wallas,    The    Great    So- 
ciety, Macmillan,   1914,  p.    11. 

43.  Ibid.,  p.  276. 

44.  Ibid.,  p.   319. 

45.  Ibid.,  p.  368. 

46.  C.    A.    Ellwood,   Sociology   in   its 
Psychological   Aspects,   Appleton, 
1912,  Ch.  IX. 

47.  Ibid.,  p.  100. 

48.  Ibid.,  p.   117. 

49.  G.   H.    Mead,    "Social   Conscious- 
ness   and    the    Consciousness    of 
Meaning,"     Psychological    Bulle- 
tin,   VII:    405. 

50.  Ellwood,    Sociology    in    its    Psy- 
chological   Aspects,    p.     153.    Cf. 
Introduction    to    Social    Psychol- 
ogy,,  p.    149. 

51.  Ellwood,    Sociology    in    its    Psy- 
chological Aspects,  p.   138. 

52.  Fllwood,  Introduction    to    Social 
Psychology,  p.  149. 

53.  Ibid.,  p.    147. 

54.  Ibid.,  p.  151. 

55.  Ibid.,  p.   170. 

56.  Ellwood,     The     Social    Problem, 
Macmillan,    1919,  p.   2. 

57.  Ibid.,  p.  4. 

58.  E.  C.  Hayes,  Introduction  to  the 
Study     of    Sociology,    Appleton, 
1915,  p.  586. 

59.  Ibid. 

60.  Ibid.,  pp.  586  ff. 

61.  Ibid.,  pp.  664  ff. 

62.  Ibid  ,  p.  669. 

63.  T.    Veblen,    The    Theory    of   the 
Leisure    Class,    Macmillan,    1912, 
p.   31. 

64.  Ibid.,   p.    169. 

65.  Ibid.,    p.    68. 

66.  Ibid.,  p.  38. 

67.  Veblen,    The    Instinct    of    Work- 
manship, Macmillan,  1914,  p.  349. 

68.  The  Theory  of  the  Leisure  Class, 
p.  15. 

69.  Ibid.,  p.  17. 

70.  Publications     of     the     American 
Sociological  Society,  Vol.  XII,  p. 

71.  Ibid.,  p.  27. 

72.  Ibid.,  p.   59. 

73.  Ibid  ,  p.   68. 

74.  Ibid.,  p.   3. 

75.  Ibid.,  p.  6. 

76.  Ibid.,  p.  10. 

CHAPTER  XXIV 

1.  For  example,  see  C.  R.  Hender- 
son, Modern  Methods  of  Charity, 
Macmillan,  1904. 


2.  See   Webb,     The    Prevention    of 
Destitution,      Longmans,      Green, 
1912. 

3.  See     Devine,     Misery     and     iis 
Causes,  Macmillan,  1913;  also  De- 
vine,    The  Principles    of    Relief, 
Macmillan,  1904. 

4.  Also,     see     Amos     G.      Warner, 
American       Charities,       Crowell, 
1919,  3rd.  edit. 

5.  Henry  George,  Progress  and  Pov- 
erty, Doubleday,  Page,  1916. 

6.  Lombroso,  Crime,  Its  Causes  and 
Remedies,  Little,  Brown,  1911. 

7.  Wines     and     Lane,     Punishment 
and   Reformation,   Crowell,    1919, 
Ch.  X. 

8.  T.     M.     Osborne,      Society     and 
Prisons,    Yale    University    Press, 
1916. 

9.  Burleigh    and    Bierstadt,   Punish- 
ment,  Holt,    1916. 

10.  See  G.  B.  Mangold,  Problems  of 
Child   Welfare,   Macmillan,    1914. 

11.  A.     W.     Small,     Between     Eras, 
From    Capitalism    to    Democracy, 
Inter-Collegiate  Press,  1913. 

12.  See    W.     H.    Beveridge,     Unem- 
ployment,      Longmans,       Green, 
1912. 

13.  George   Elliott    Howard,    A    His- 
tory of  Matrimonial  Institutions, 
University     of     Chicago     Press, 
1904. 

14.  Edward  Westermarck,  History  of 
Human      Marriage,       Macmillan, 
1902. 

15.  A.    W.    Calhoun,    A    Social   His- 
tory   of    the    American    Family. 
Clark,  1917-1919. 

16.  Helen     Bosanquet,     The    Family, 
Macmillan,  1915. 

17.  Willystine    Goodsell,    A    History 
of   the   Family    as   a   Social    and 
Educational   Institution,    Macmil- 
lan, 1915. 

18.  Booker  T.  Washington,   Up  from 
Slavery,   Doubleday,    Page,    1901. 

19.  W.    E.    B.     DuBois,     Darkwater, 
Harcourt,  Brace  and  Howe,  1920. 

20.  Peter    Roberts,    The   Problem    of 
Americanization,  Macmillan,  1920. 

21.  J.  K.  Hart,  Community  Organiza- 
tion, Macmillan,   1920. 

22.  M.    C.    Elmer,    Technique   of   So- 
cial  Surveys,   World   Co.,    Law-- 
rence,  Kansas,  1917. 


CHAPTER  XXV 

1.  Democracy   and  Education,   Mac- 
millan, 1916,  p.  6. 

2.  Ibid.,  p.    16. 

3.  Ibid.,  p.  19. 

4.  Ibid.,  pp.   26,  27. 

5.  Ibid.,  p.   41. 

6.  Cf.  ibid.,  p.  416. 


FOOTNOTES 


503 


7.  See  M.  V.  O'Shea,  Social  Devel-        18. 
opment  and  Education,  Houghton 
Mifflin,  1909;  David  Snedden,  So- 
ciological  Determination    of    Ob-        19. 
jectives  in  Education,  Lippincott, 
1921;  W.   R.    Smith,  Educational 
Sociology,  Macmillan,   1917;  Irv-        20. 
ing  King,  Social  Aspects  of  Edu- 
cation,    Macmillan,     1912;     also 
King,    Education   for  Social  Effi-        21. 
ciency,    Appleton,     1913;    F.    R. 
Clow,     Principles     of     Sociology        22. 
with     Educational     Applications, 
Macmillan,    1920;    G.    H.    Betts,        23. 
Social    Principles    of    Education,        24. 
Scribner,     1913;     S.     T.     Dutton,        25. 
Social  Phases  of  Education,  Mac-        26. 
millan,   1907.  27. 

8.  Smith,  Educational  Sociology,  p.        28. 
669.  29. 

9.  Snedden,    American    Journal    of        30. 
Sociology,    25:132    f  f . ;    see    also,        31. 
Snedden,  Sociological  Determina-        32. 
tion   of   Objectives  in  Education, 
Lippincott,    1921,   p.    IS.  33. 

10.  Snedden,  Sociological  Determina-        34. 
tion  of  Objectives  in  Education,        35. 
p.    94.  36. 

11.  Ibid.,  pp.  97,   107.  37. 

12.  Ibid.,  pp.    109,  267.  38. 

13.  Ibid.,  p.  228. 

CHAPTER  XXVI  39. 

1.  Gladden,   Social  Facts  and  Forces,    — **~^ 
Putnam,    1897,   p.    37. 

2.  Ibid.,  p.  152.  41 

3.  Ibid.,  p.  81.  42 

4.  Ibid.  43 

5.  Gladden,     Social    Salvation, 
Houghton  Mifflin,  1902,  p.  14.  44 

6.  Ibid.,  p.  7.  45' 

7.  Ibid.,  p.   136;  cf.  Rauschenbusch,        45] 
A    Theology  for   the   Social   Gos-        47 
pel,  Macmillan,  1918,  pp.  8,  91.  43] 

8.  Strong,  The  New  Era,  Baker  and        49 
Taylor,   1893,  p.   121.  So' 

9.  Ibid.,  p.  124.  51 

10.  Ely,  Social  Aspects  of  Christian-        52' 
ity,  Crowell,  1889,  p.  17. 

11.  Ibid.,  p.   65.  c4' 

12.  Ibid.,  p.   73.  55] 

13.  See    Peabody,    Jesus    Christ    and        55] 
the   Social    Question,    Macmillan, 
1900. 

14.  See  Mathews,  The  Social  Teach-        57 
ings   of  Jesus,    Macmillan,    1897; 

The  Church  and  the  Changing 
Order,  Macmillan,  1907;  The 
Gospel  and  the  Modern  Man, 
Macmillan,  1910. 

16.     See    Rauschenbusch,    Christianity          1- 
and  the  Social  Crisis,  Macmillan, 
1913;     Christianising    the    Social 
Order,   Macmillan,   1912;  A   The- 
ology    for     the     Social     Gospel,          3. 
Macmillan,    1918. 

16.  See   Batten,    The   Social   Task   of 
Christianity,   Re  veil,    1911.  1. 

17.  See   Ward,   The  New  Social  Or- 
der, Macmillan,   1919. 


See  H.  A.  Atkinson,  The  Church 
and  the  People's  Play,  Pilgrim 
Press,  1915. 

See  John  Ryan,  Distributive  Jus- 
tice, Macmillan,  1910;  and  Social 
Reconstruction,  Macmillan,  1920. 
See  Charles  Stelzle,  The  Work- 
ingman  and  Social  Problems,  Re- 
veil,  1903. 

See    Religion    in    Social    Action, 
Dodd,  Mead,   1913. 
Christianity   and   the   Social   Cri- 
sis, supra,  p.  xiii. 
Ibid. 


Ibid 

p.     J.*t*J. 

p.  147. 

Ibid. 

p.  149. 

Ibid. 

pp.  201 

ff. 

Ibid. 

p.  33. 

Ibid. 

p.  91. 

Ibid. 

p.  74. 

Ibid. 

p.  342. 

Ibid. 

p.  386. 

Chrii 

t  ionising 

the   Social 

Order, 

Ibid'. 

p.  2. 

Ibid. 

p.  125. 

Ibid. 

p.  320. 

Ibid. 

pp.  113, 

114. 

Ibid. 

pp.   121 

,   122. 

A   Theology  for  a  Social  Gospel, 

pp.    4,   5,   48. 

Ibid.,  p.  182. 

"Social     Reconstruction,"     Nat'l 

CatholitiWar   Council,   Washing- 

twi»4JJ19^  p.  22. 

Loc.   cit.    ' 

Ibid.,  p.  24. 

Ward,  The  New  Social  Order,  p. 

74. 

Ibid.    p.  112. 


Ibid. 

y.    j.  ji£r. 

p.  114. 

Ibid. 

p.  121. 

Ibid. 

p.  125. 

Loc. 

cit. 

Ibid. 

Ibid. 

p.  143. 

Ibid. 

p.  159. 

Ibid. 

p.  287. 

Ibid. 

p.  363. 

Ibid. 

p.  21. 

Ibid. 

p.  25. 

Coe,  Psychology  of  Religion, 
University  of  Chicago  Press, 
1916,  p.  xiv. 

Coe,  A  Social  Theory  of  Reli- 
gious Education,  Scribner,  1917, 
pp.  59,  58. 


CHAPTER  XXVII 
De     Greef,     Introduction     a     la 
Sociologie,     Paris,     1911,     T.    I., 
pp.   189,  202. 

General  Sociology,  pp.  718  ff. 
Ibid.,  p.  442. 

CHAPTER  XXVIII 
Blackmar    and    Gillin's    Outlines 
of   Sociology   is    one   of   the   best 
textbooks  in  sociology. 


INDEX 


Abstract  thinking,  14. 

Achievement,   299. 

Acquisitiveness,   286. 

Adaptation,  377. 

Addams,  Jane,  424,  429. 

Aeschylus,    76. 

African  social  proverbs,  23ff. 

Aggregation,    383. 

Alcoholism,  333. 

Amaurote,  island  of,  160. 

American  Sociological  Society,  419. 

Americanization,  438. 

Amos,  59,  68,  71,  72. 

Amusements,   439. 

Anarchism,  240. 

Anthropology,  301. 

Anticipation,  principle  of,  404. 

Aquinas,  Thomas,   150. 

Applied  sociology,  423  if. 

Arabian  social  proverbs,  31. 

Aristophanes,  78. 

Aristotle    and    social    thought,    74, 

lOlff,  203,  476. 

Association,  laws  of,  219,  338,  383. 
Associations,    productive,233. 
Assyrian   social  thought,  42ff. 
Astronomy,   218. 
Augustine,    Saint,    146. 
Aurelius,   Marcus,   116. 
Australian  social  proverbs,  27. 


Babeuf,   229. 

Babylonian  social  thought,   29  ff. 

Bacon,  Francis,  167,  174,  175  if. 

Bagehot,   380. 

Bakunin,   239. 

Balance,    principle   of,    405. 

Baldwin,  J.  M.,  386. 

Beccaria,  427. 

Behavior,    pluralistic,    386. 


Bellamy,  Edward,   169. 

Bentham,  194. 

Berkeley,   George,   368. 

Biology,  219. 

Birth  control,  207. 

Birth  rate,  250,  330. 

Blackmar  and  Gillin,  503. 

Blackstone,   91. 

Blanc,  228. 

Boas,  Franz,  321. 

Bodin,  246,  368. 

Bolshevism,  238,  403,  434,  469. 

Bosanquet,  436. 

Brinton,  D.  G..  353. 

British  Labor  Party,  469. 

Brockway,   428. 

Brotherhood  of  man,  122. 

Biicher,  482. 

Buckle,  246  if. 

Buddhism,  42. 

Bulgarian  social  proverbs,   30. 

Burgess,  E.  W,  363. 

Burke,  Edmund,  191. 

Business,   theory  ->f,    I'i9. 


Caesar,  Julius,  115. 
Calculus,  217. 
Calhoun,  A.  W,  436. 
Callicles,    78. 
Cameralism,   188  /f. 
Campanella,  168. 
Canons,  social,  415  :7. 
Capital  punishment,  94. 
Capitalism,    236,    433,    4? 5,    451, 

457,    451. 
Carlyle,   425. 
Carver,  T.  N.,  207,  345. 
Caucasian,  235. 
Catholic  War   Council,   462. 
Censorship,   93. 
Chapin,   F.   S,  419. 
Chemistry,    218. 


INDEX 


505 


Chinese  social   thought,   45    if. 
Chinese  social  proverbs,  49  ff. 
Chivalry,  149. 
Christianity,    social,    121    ff.,    232, 

423,  441. 

Church  fathers,  the,  146 
Cicero,  114,  115. 
Cingalese  social  proverbs,   32. 
Cities  of  refuge,  69. 
Citizenship,   447,   491. 
City  planning,   160. 
Civilization,  248,  287,  310,  385. 
Classes,   287,   311,   370,   381,  405, 

457. 

Class  conflict,  251,  457. 
Classification  of  the  sciences,  216. 
Cleisthenes,  76. 
Climate,   248. 
Code   of  Hammurapi,   40. 
Coe,   G.   A,  472. 
Colbert,  187. 
Commercialization,    401. 
Commercialized  religion,   129. 
Communication,  391,  409. 
Communism,    103,    111. 
Communist  manifesto,  234. 
Comte,  Auguste,  209  ff.,  282,  485. 
Concrete  thinking,  14. 
Conation,    297. 
Conflict  of  races,  305. 
Conflict  theories,  338  ff.,  383. 
Confucius,  45  ff. 
Conjugal  love,  290. 
Consanguineal  love,  291. 
Consciousness,  390. 
Consciousness   of   kind,    365,   381. 
Control,  concept  of,  323. 
Cooley,  C.   H.,   324,   365,   389  ff., 

445,  446. 

Co-operation,   170,  259  ff.,   354. 
Crawford,  Daniel,  25. 
Crime,  414,  425. 
Crises,   323,   342. 
Crusades,  the  148. 
Custom  imitation,  376. 
Customs,  control  of,  22,  94. 

D 

Danish  social  proverbs,   30,   ?1. 
Darwin,  258,   315. 
Davenport,  C.  B.,  326. 


Deception,  286. 

Definition  of  social  thought,  13. 

De  Greef,  484. 

Delinquency,   26,   430. 

Deluge,  account  of,  42. 

Democracy,  69,  70,  99,   198,  375, 

420,  467. 
Democratization  of  social  thought, 

11. 

Desire,  284. 
Determinism,    346. 
Deuteronomic  Code,  64,  65. 
Devine,  E.  T.,  425. 
Dewey,  John,  444,  446. 
Dickens,    424. 
Discussion,    400. 
DuBois,  W.  E.  B.,  438. 
Duprat,  G.  L.,  381. 

E 

Earliest  social  thought,  20  ff. 
Early    Christian     social      thought, 

121    ff. 
Education,  73,  93  ff,  110,  163,  224, 

299,  393,  415,  421. 
Educational  sociology,  447,  449. 
Efficiency,  466. 

Egyptian  social  thought,  36  ff. 
Ellwood,  C.  A.,  407  ff. 
Elmira  reformatory,  428. 
Ely,  R.  T.,  415,  455. 
Engels,   482. 

English  social  proverbs,  33  ff. 
Environment,   336,   444. 
Epaminondas,   78. 
Epicurus,    112 
Epictetus,  119. 
Equality,  465 
Equality  of  races,  303. 
Ethnocentrism,    307. 
Ethnology,    303. 
Esthetic  forces,  293. 
Eugenics,  109,  325,  342. 
Euripides,  77. 
Evolution,  262,  301. 


Family,   the,    131,    141,    163,   223, 

403,  415,  430. 

Fashion    imitation,    160,    376. 
Fear,    310. 
Federal  Council   of  the   Churches, 


506 


HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 


461. 

Feminism,  204,  309,  332,  436. 
Ferguson,    186. 
Fetishism,  213. 
Feudalism,    148. 
Fichte,  193. 

Filipino  social  proverbs,   27,  28. 
Fiske,  John.,  215,  268. 
Folk  psychology,  319. 
Folk  thinking,  21  ff. 
Folkways,  306. 
Food  supply,  201,  if. 
Fourier,  227. 
Francis,  Saint,  149,  424. 
Froebel,   443. 
Functional  analogies,   272. 

G 

Galton,   325. 

Genealogy,  335. 

Genius,    298. 

Geographic  social  thought,  246  ff. 

George,    Henry,    61,    241,    425. 

Giddings,  F.  H.,  381,  411,  446. 

Gladden,  Washington,  451. 

God,  kingdom  of,  122  ff,  132,  454. 

Godwin,   William,    198. 

Golden  Rule,  the,  124. 

Goodsell,  W.,  436. 

Government,    103   ff.,  283. 

Gaunt,  John,  480. 

Great  Society,  the,  406. 

Grecian  social  thought,  74  ff. 

Gregariousness,   219,  269. 

Grotius,   354. 

Group  loyalty  of  Hebrews,  58. 

Groups,   381. 

Guardians,  Plato's,   83,   86  ff. 

Guild  socialism,  403. 

Gumplowicz,  339. 

H 

Habit,   323. 
Hammurapi,  40  ff. 
Harrington,    168. 
Hayes,  E.  C,  414. 
Hebrew  social  thought,  54  ff. 
Hegel,    193. 

Henderson,  C.  R.,  423. 
Heredity,  298,  328,  336. 
Herodetus,    76. 


Hesiod,  75. 

High  school  sociology,  49. 

Hippocrates,    78. 

History  of  social  movement,  13. 

Hobbes,  177,  368. 

Hobhouse,  316  ff,  322,  334,  364. 

Hosea,  65,  71. 

Housing  problems,  437. 

Howard,  George  Elliott,  418,  436. 

Howard,  John,  427. 

Humanitarianism,   225. 

Humboldt,  247. 

Hume,  165,  247,  368. 

Huntington,  E,  255. 

I 

Ibn  Khaldun,  151. 

Ideals,  313,  344,  420. 

Illegitimacy,  424. 

Imitation,   laws  of,  272,  399,  409. 

Immigration,  437. 

Immorality,  66,  314. 

Individualism,    170,    173    ff,    389, 

478. 

Individualization,   405. 
Individual  responsibility,  448. 
Industry,   473. 
Industrial  democracy,  362. 
Industrial  thought,   16,  170. 
Industrial   Workers   of  the  World, 

239.   m 

Innovation,  297. 
Instinct,  396. 
Insurance,  social,  434. 
Institutions,   social,   312,   394,   467. 
Intellectual  forces,  294. 
Interest,  359,  486. 
Intemperance,  68. 
Intermarriage  of   races,   304. 
Internationalism,  71,  275,  283,  460. 
Invention,    373. 
Iron   law  of  wages,   233. 
Isaiah,  60,  68,  72. 


Jahweh,  58,  70  ff. 
James,  the  apostle,  142. 
Japanese  social  proverbs,  27. 
Jeremiah,   63. 

Jesus,  121  ff..  454,  471,  476. 
Job,    71. 


INDEX 


507 


John,  the  apostle,  143. 
Justice,  58,  73,  99  ff. 
Juvenile  court,  431. 
Juvenile    delinquency,    26. 

K 

Kant,    192. 

Kellor,  A.  G.,  315. 

Kelsey,  Carl,  419. 

Kent,  C.  F.,  72. 

Kingdom  of  God,  122  ff,  132. 

Kropotkin,  240,   355. 


Labor    conditions,    163,    233,    248, 

432. 

Labor  strikes,   57. 
Laissez    faire   theories,     195,     196, 

266,   277. 
Lamarck,   257. 

Land  equalization,   102,   147,  242. 
Langland,  William,  152. 
Language,   391,  409 
Lao-tse,  48. 
Lassalle,   233. 
Law,   142,   159,   197,   319. 
Lazarus  and  Steinthal,  371. 
League  of  Nations,  469. 
Le   Bon,   381. 
Legal    science,    119. 
Leisure,  416. 
Le   Play,  481. 
Lewes,  George  Henry,  212. 
Liebknecht,   236. 
Lilienfeld,  von,  270. 
Lindsey,  Ben  B.,  429. 
Locke,  John,  79. 
Lombroso,   427. 

Love,  24,  73,  123  ff.,  290,  366. 
Lucretius,    114. 
Luke,    Saint,    124. 
Luxury,  162. 
Lycurgus,    75. 

M 

Machiavelli,    173    ff. 
Mackenzie,  J.  S.,  273. 
Maine,    Henry,    195. 
Malthus,  200  ff. 


Malthusianism,  32,  199ff.,  230,  243. 

Mann,   Horace,   144. 

Marcus  Aurelius,   166. 

Manu,   laws   of,   42. 

Marriage,   institutions   of,   65,   202, 

289,    330. 

Plato's   conception  of,  90. 

Aristotle's  conception  of,   109. 

Jesus'  conception  of,  131,  132. 
Marx,  234  ff. 
Martineau,   Harriet,   212. 
Materialism,  222. 
Mathematics,  217. 
Maternal   love,   291. 
McDougall,  William,  395. 
Mead,   G.   H,   409. 
Meliorism,   293. 
Mencius,    49. 
Mendelian  laws,  327. 
Mental   defectiveness,    430. 
Mercantilism,   187  ff. 
Metaphysics,  215. 
Methodology,  487. 
Micah,   61,  72. 
Middle  classes,  the,  107,  465. 
Militarism,    215. 
Mill,  James,  194. 
Mill,  John  Stuart,  194,  212. 
Miscegenation,    334. 
Monasteries,   150. 
Money,  love  of,   162. 
Money-making,   287. 
Monotheism,    213. 
Montesquieu,    184,  247. 
More,    Thomas,    155ff.,    173,    367, 

476, 

Morris,  William,    168. 
Moses,    55. 

Moral  restraint,  208,  430. 
Morality,  293,  342. 
Mores,    313. 
Morley,  John,  212. 
Motives,   307. 
Mutation,   328. 


Natural  selection,  259,  410. 
Newton,   Isaac,   368. 
Nietzsche,   193,   341. 
Negro,  335,  438,  472. 


508 


HISTORY  OF  SOCIAL  THOUGHT 


Novicow,   249. 


Old  Testament  social  thought,  55  ff. 

Oligarchy,   98. 

Opposition,  373,  377. 

Orano,   P.,   381. 

Organic  analogies,   365  ff.,  478. 

Organization,   363,   386,  406. 

Osborne,  T.  M,  429. 

Owen,  Robert,   230,   354. 


Pain  economy,  344. 

Paine,  T.,  187. 

Parental   negligence,   431. 

Patten,  S.  N,  343. 

Patriotism,    Hebrew,    71. 

Paul,    Saint,    138    ff. 

Peace,  universal,   72. 

Penn,  William,  428. 

Penology,  166. 

Pearson,  Karl,  326. 

Pericles,    77. 

Personality,  336,  353,  392,  J67. 

Persian  social  thought,   52   if. 

Pestalozzi,    442. 

Petrarch,   173. 

Pharaoh,    57. 

Philosophical  thought,  Itx 

Physical  education,  96.   J 10. 

Physics,  218. 

Physiocrats,   181. 

Pittsburg  Survey,   -'-83. 

Plato,    74ff.,    203,    367,    476. 

Pleasure  economy,  34  \- 

Pluralistic  behavior,  336. 

Polybius,   112. 

Polygamy,  38. 

Polytheism,  213. 

Poor-laws,   204. 

Popenoe,  P.,  326. 

Population  theories,  199  ff.,  250.' 

Portuguese   social   proverbs,    31. 

Positivism,  .314,  477. 

Pound,  Roscoe.  197. 

Poverty,  59  ff.,'91  ff,  107,  108,  133, 

155,  190,  423,  425,  442. 
Practicalism,    12. 
Prevision,    222. 
Priestcraft,    288. 


Primitive  people,  20  ff. 

Prisons,  428. 

Profitism,   402,   434. 

Progress,  281,  299. 

Proletariat,   237. 

Property,  102,  132,  229,  232,  234, 

285. 

Proudhon,  229. 
Proverbs,  Book  of,  169. 
Proverbs,  social,  23  ff. 
Psychology,  319. 
Public  health,  109,  160,  438. 
Public  opinion,  393. 
Punishment,  94,  166,  429. 
Pure  sociology,  28. 


Quetelet,  480. 


Race  equality,  303,  321,  334,  340. 

Racial  conflicts,  ^ 305,  438. 

Racial  intermarriage,  303. 

Rationalism,  213. 

Rauschenbusch,  455  ff. 

Ratzel,  254. 

Ratzenhofer,  350,  357. 

Reform,  social,  402. 

Religion,  97,  353. 

Religious  education,   164,  472. 

Religious  thought,  15. 

Renaissance,  173. 

Republic,  Plato's,  74. 

Reproductive  forces,   289. 

Revolution,  social,   108,   412. 

Ripley,  255. 

Rochdale    pioneers,    the,    355. 

Rodbertus,  232. 

Roman  social  thought,  114  ff. 

Roosevelt,  24. 

Ross,  E.  A,  62,  350,  363,  380,  395, 

403,  415. 
Rousseau.  182,  ff. 


Sabotage,  239. 
Saleeby,  C.  W.,  326,  333. 
Salvation,   social,    73. 
Schaffle,  271  ff. 
Schmidkunz,   H.,   380. 


INDEX 


509 


Scholasticism,    150   ff. 

Sciences,  classification  of,  216. 

Scientific  management,  449. 

Selection,  natural,  259,  328,  411. 

Self,  387,  389. 

Self  interest,  340. 

Semple,  E.  C.,  78,  254. 

Seneca,  116. 

Sentiments,    397. 

Service,   138. 

Sex,  296,  308,  332,  436. 

Sex  immortality,  66. 

Sex  inequality,  292. 

Sighele^  381. 

Simulation,  404. 

Sin,  130,  140. 

Single    tax,    241. 

Slavery,  232,  464. 

Slums,  453. 

Small,  A.  W,  350,  359,  433,  486. 

Smith,  Adam,  89,  199,  308,  370. 

Smith,  W.  R.,  447. 

Snedden,  D.,  448. 

Sociability,    353. 

Social  anthropology,   334. 

Social  case  work,  441. 

Social    centers,    160. 

Social    change,    409. 

Social    Christianity,    121    ff.,    232. 
454,  472. 

Social  control,  104,  398,  414,  419. 

Socian  delinquency,  26. 

Social  democracy,  130,  233. 

Social  dynamics,  200,  280,  296. 

Social  evolution,  22.4,  284. 

Social  improvement,  222. 

Social  injustice,  73,  129. 

Social  institutions,  311. 

Social  insurance,  334. 

Social  laws,   221. 

Social  process,  357,  393,  395,  487. 

Social  progress,  299. 

Social  proverbs,  23   ff. 
African,  24  ff. 
Arabian,  31. 
Australian,   27. 
Bulgarian,   30. 
Chinese,  49. 
Cingalese,  32. 
Danish,  30,  31. 
English,  33  ff. 
Filipino,    27,    28. 


Social   psychology,    324,    380,    397. 
Social  reconstruction,  402,  454. 
Social  reform,  441,  454. 
Social  responsibility,  68. 
Social  revolution,   108. 
Social  salvation,  73. 
Social  service,  138,  463. 
Social  service  director,  473. 
Social  statics,  200.  280. 
Social  technology,'  423,  425,  440. 
Social  telesis,    108,   277,  298,  441. 
Social  thought, 
Japanese,  28. 
Mexican,  32. 
Portuguese,   31. 
Assyrian,  42. 
Babylonian,  29  ff. 
Chinese,   45   ff. 
Christian,  121  ff. 
Confucian,  46  ff. 
Definition  of,  13. 
Demands  upon,  17. 
Democratization  of,  11. 
Earliest,  20  ff. 
Early  Christian,   121  ff. 
Egyptian,   36  ff. 
Eugenic,   325ff. 
Grecian,  74  ff. 
Hebrew,  54  ff. 
Individualistic,   173   ff. 
Nature  of,  14. 
Primitive.    20   IT. 
Persian,  52  ff. 
Roman,  114  ff. 
Scope  of,   18. 
Stoic,  112,   115  ff. 
Vedic,  42. 
Social  values,   223. 
Social  variations,  223. 
Socialization,  361,  363. 
Socialism,  206,  226  ff.,  244,  403. 
Sociocracy,   299. 
Sociology,  209,  361. 
Applied,  423  ff. 
Educational,   447,  449. 
Sociological    investigation,    475    ff. 
Socrates,  75,  79  ff. 
Soil  fertility,  248. 
Solidarity,  468. 
Solon,   75. 
Sophists,  75. 
Sorel,  239. 


510 


HISTORY  01   SOCIAL  THOUGHT 


Sparta,  111. 

Spencer,  Herbert,  195,  214,  258  ff. 

339,   371. 

Spencer  and  Gillen,  27. 
Spinoza,    178,    354. 
Standards,   402. 
State,  doctrine  of,  193,  357. 
Statistics,  482. 
Stoicism,  112,  115  ff. 
Strong,  Josiah,  451,  454. 
Suggestion,   399,  409. 
Sumner,  W.  G.,  196,  306. 
Superman,  342. 
Success,   416. 
Sympathy,   185,   369. 
Syndicalism,    239. 
Syphogrants,    157. 


Tainted   money,   452. 
Tarde,  350,  372  ff.,  400. 
Teaching  sociology,  489   ff. 
Telesis,  social,  108,  277,  298,  441. 
Theocracy,  70. 
Theory,   need  of,    12. 
Thomas,  W.  I.,  301,  322. 
Thrasymachus,  78. 
Timocracy,  98. 
Traditions,    384. 
Trotter,  W.,  397. 
Tuberculosis,  333.  439. 

U 

Unemployment,   435. 
Universal  peace,  72. 
Utilitarianism,    192. 
Utopia,  More's,  156  ff. 


V 

Values,  social,  311,  324. 
Vanity,   310. 
Veblen,  285,  415  ff. 
Vedic  social  thought,  44. 
Venereal  disease,  333. 
Vice,   369. 
Vico,  351. 
Vocational  education,  449. 

W 

Wages  fund  theory,  232. 

Wallas,    Graham,    406. 

War,  108,  164,  165,  283,  331,  347, 

356,  358,  417,  420. 
Ward,  H.  F.,  461,  463  ff,  478. 
Ward,  Lester  F.,  196,  267,  277  ff. 

371,  409,  479. 
Washington,  B.  T,  438. 
Wealth,  91,  133,  142,  161,  250,  416. 
Webbs,  the,  425. 
Webster,  Hutton,  419. 
Weismann,  329. 
Wells,  H.  G,   171. 
Westermarck,   316. 
Western  civilization,  411,  436. 
Wisdom   teachers,   67. 
Woman,  309,  432. 
Work,    285. 
Workmanship,   418. 
World  empire,  320. 
World  peace,  72. 
World  war,  412. 
Worms,  Rene,  273. 
Wundt,   319. 


Zephaniah,  63. 
Zoroaster,  52. 


LOAN  DEPT 


ate  recall. 


06807 


